Archive/File: imt/nca/nca-02/nca-02-16-responsibility-03-05
Last-Modified: 1996/12/19
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. II, Chapter XVI
[Page 505]
Within a month after the German armies invaded the Soviet
Union on 22 June 1941, Ribbentrop was urging Ott, his
ambassador in Tokyo, to do his utmost to cause the Japanese
Government to attack the Soviet in Siberia .(2896-PS; 2897-
PS).
A message, intercepted, which was sent by the Japanese
Ambassador in Berlin on 29 November 1941, a week before the
attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor, reports the
coaxings of Ribbentrop:
"Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring
whether I had received any reports regarding the
Japanese-United States negotiations. I replied that I
had received no official word.
"Ribbentrop: 'It is essential that Japan effect the New
Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity.
There never has been and probably never will be a time
when loser cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so
important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany
goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all
the military might of Britain and the United States
will be concentrated against Japan.
" 'As Fuehrer Hitler said today, -there are fundamental
differences in the very right to exist between Germany
and Japan, and the United States. We have received
advice to the effect that there is practically no hope
of the Japanese-United States negotiations being
concluded successfully because of the fact that the
United States is putting up a stiff front.
" 'If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan
reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United
States, I am confident that that will not only be to
the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would
bring about favorable results for Japan and herself.' "
Then the Japanese Ambassador replied:
" 'I can make no definite statement as I am not aware
of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency
indicating that a state of actual war is to be
established between Germany and the United
"Ribbentrop: 'Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is
impossible to tell what he would do.' " (D-656).
The Japanese Ambassador thereupon concludes:
"Concerning this point, in view of the fact that
Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States
would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops,
and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech, as well as
that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude
toward the United States is being considerably
stiffened. There are indications at present that
Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if
necessary." (D-656).
Part 3 of the Japanese message quotes Ribbentrop as follows:
[Page 506]
"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of
entering into any peace with England. We are determined
to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore,
at the end of this war, England will have no influence
whatsoever in international affairs. The Island Empire
of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions
throughout the world will probably be divided three
ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In
Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those
parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will
be given the greater share of the African Colonies.
Germany desires, above all else, to control European
Russia." (D-656)
In reply the Japanese Ambassador said:
" 'I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war
campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly.
However, suppose that Germany is faced with the
situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual
enemy, but also having all of those areas in which
Britain has influence and those countries which have
been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under
such circumstances, the war area will undergo
considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion
of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?'
"Ribbentrop: 'We would like to end this war during next
year [1942]. However, under certain circumstances, it
is possible that it will have to be continued on to the
following year.
'Should Japan become engaged in war against the United
States, Germany, of course, would join the war
immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of
Germany's entering into a separate peace with the
United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is
determined on that point.' " (I-656)
Ribbentrop was thus associated in the closest possible way,
with the aggression by Japan against the United States.
[Page 507]
Another intercepted diplomatic message from the Japanese
Ambassador in Berlin states (D-657):
"At 1 p.m. today [8 December 1941] I called on Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have
Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on
America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was
then in the midst of a conference at general
headquarters discussing how the formalities of
declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good
impression on the German people, and that he would
transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he
was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time
Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th
Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to
attack American ships whenever and wherever they might
meet
"It goes without saying that this is only for your
secret information.'' (D-657)
Thus, Hitler ordered attacks on American ships before the
German declaration of war.
Then on 11 December 1941 Ribbentrop, in the name of the
German Government, announced a state of war between Germany
and United States.
Ribbentrop also made attempts to get Japan to attack the
Soviet Union. In his conversations with Oshima, the Japanese
Ambassador, in July 1942 and in March and April 1943,
Ribbentrop continued to urge Japanese participation and
aggression against the Soviet Union (2911-PS; 2954-PS). The
report of discussion between Ribbentrop and Ambassador
Oshima reads:
"Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a
telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report, by order of
his Government to the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs the following:
"The suggestion of the German Government to attack
Russia was the object of a common conference between
the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters,
during which the question was discussed in detail and
investigated exactly. The result is the following: The
Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger
which threatens from Russia and completely understands
the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part
will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is
not possible for the Japanese Government, considering
the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is
rather of the conviction that it would be in the common
interest not to start the war against Russia now. On
the other
[Page 508]
hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the
Russian question." (2954-PS)
Whereupon Ribbentrop returned to the attack:
"However, it would be more correct that all powers
allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their
forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia,
together. It is not good when one part must fight
alone." (2954-PS)
Ribbentrop's pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown in
an other report of Japanese-German discussions on 4/18/1943
(2929-PS):
"The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed
again that without any doubt this year presented the
most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt
strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at
her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would
never again be as weak as she is at the moment ***."
(2929-PS)
C. RIBBENTROP'S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.
(The following discussion concerns only the planning of
these crimes. The execution of the crimes was left to the
French and Soviet prosecuting staffs for proof.)
(1) The Killing of Allied Aviators. With the increasing air
raids on German cities in 1944 by the Allied Air Forces, the
German Government proposed to undertake a plan to deter
Anglo-American fliers from further raids on Reich cities. In
a report of a meeting at which a definite policy was to be
established, there is stated the point of view that
Ribbentrop had been urging (735-PS). The meeting took place
at the Fuehrer's headquarters on 6 June 1944, and proceeded
in part as follows:
"Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy
Chief of WFST in Klessheim, on the afternoon of the 6th
of June, that a conference on this question had been
held shortly before between the Reich Marshal
[Goering], the Reich Foreign Minister [Ribbentrop], and
the Reichsfuehrer SS [Himmler]. Contrary to the
original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister,
who wished to include every type of terror attack on
the German civilian population, that is, also bombing
attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above
conference that merely those attacks carried out with
aircraft armament, aimed directly at the civilian
population and their property, should be taken as the
standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this
sense. Lynch law would
[Page 509]
have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has been no
question of court martial sentence or handing over to
the police." (735-PS)
That is, Ribbentrop was pressing that even where there was
an attack on a German city, the airmen who crash-landed
should be handed over to be lynched by the crowd.
The minutes of the conference report further as follows:
"Deputy Chief of the WFST mentioned that apart from
lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for
segregating those enemy aviators who are suspected of
criminal action of this kind until they 'are received
into the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel; if
the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over
to the SD for special treatment." (735-PS)
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