The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

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         Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume One

                                                  [Page 370]
                         Chapter IX

The aggressive war phase of the case against the Nazi
conspirators is, in the view of the American prosecution,
the heart of the case. Everything else in this case, however
dramatic, however sordid, however shocking and revolting to
the common instinct of civilized peoples, is incidental or
subordinate to, the fact of aggressive war.

All the dramatic story of what went on in Germany in the
early phases of the conspiracy -- the ideologies used, the
techniques of terror used, the suppressions of human freedom
employed in the seizure of power, and even the concentration
camps and the crimes against humanity, the persecutions,
tortures and murders committed -- all these things would
have had little international juridical significance except
for the fact that they were the preparation for the
commission of aggressions against peaceful neighboring
peoples. Even the aspects of the case involving "war crimes"
in the strict sense are merely the inevitable, proximate
result of the wars of aggression launched and waged by these
conspirators, and of the kind of warfare they waged. It was
total war, the natural result of the totalitarian party-
dominated state that waged it; it was atrocious war, the
natural result of the doctrines, designs and purposes of the
Nazi conspirators.

The substantive rule of law which is controlling on this
part of the case is stated in Article 6 of the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, which, so far as is
pertinent here, reads as follows:

     "Article 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement
     referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and
     punishment of the major war criminals of the European
     Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish
     persons who, acting in the interests of the European
     Axis countries, either as individuals or as members of
     organizations, committed any of the following crimes.
     "The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming
     within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there
     shall be individual responsibility:
     "(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning,
     preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
     aggression, or a war in violation of international
     treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in
     a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
     any of the foregoing ***"
                                                  [Page 371]
     "Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices
     participating in the formulation or execution of a
     common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the
     foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed
     by any persons in execution of such plan."

Five important principles are contained in these portions of
the Charter:

(1) The Charter imposes "individual responsibility" for acts
constituting "crimes against peace";

(2) The term "Crimes against peace" embraces planning,
preparation, initiation, or waging of illegal war;

(3) The term "Crimes against peace" also embraces
participation in a common plan or conspiracy to commit
illegal war;

(4) An illegal war consists of either a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements,
or assurances; (these two kinds of illegal war might not
necessarily be the same; it will be sufficient for the
prosecution to show either that the war was aggressive
irrespective of breach of international treaties, agreements
or assurances, or that the war was in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances
irrespective of whether or not it was a war of aggression;
but the American prosecution will undertake to establish
that the wars planned, prepared, initiated, and waged by the
Nazi conspirators were illegal for both reasons);

(5) Individual criminal responsibility of a defendant is
imposed by the Charter not merely by reasons of direct,
immediate participation in the crime. It is sufficient to
show that a defendant was a leader, an organizer,
instigator, or accomplice who participated either in the
formulation or in the execution of a common plan or
conspiracy to commit crimes against peace. In this
connection, the Charter declares that the responsibility of
conspirators extends not only to their own acts but also to
all acts performed by any persons in execution of the

It is familiar law in the United States that if two or more
persons set out to rob a bank in accordance with a criminal
scheme to that end, and in the course of carrying out their
scheme one of the conspirators commits the crime of murder,
all the participants in the planning and
execution of the bank robbery are guilty of murder, whether
or not they had any other personal participation in the
killing. This is a simple rule of law declared in the
Charter. All the parties to a common plan or conspiracy re
the agents of each other and each is responsible as
principal far the acts of all the others as his agents.

The documentary evidence assembled on this aggressive war

                                                  [Page 372]
aspect of the case will show the following:- (1) the
conspiratorial nature of the planning and preparation which
underlay the Nazi aggressions already known to history; (2)
the deliberate premeditation which preceded those
acts of aggression; (3) the evil motives which led to the
attacks; (4) the individual participation of named persons
in the Nazi conspiracy for aggression; (5) the deliberate
falsification of the pretexts claimed by the Nazi aggressors
as they arose for their criminal activities.

The critical period between the Nazi seizure of power and
the initiation of the first war of aggression was very
short. This critical period of illegal preparation and
scheming, which ultimately set the whole world aflame,
covered 6 years, from 1933 to 1939. Crowded into these 6
short years is the making of tragedy for mankind.

A full understanding of these 6 years, and the 6 years of
war that followed, requires that this period be divided into
phases that reflect the development and execution of the
Nazi master plan. These phases may be said to be six. The
first was primarily preparatory, although it did involve
overt acts. That phase covers roughly the period from 1933
to 1936. In that period the Nazi conspirators, having
acquired government control of Germany by the middle of
1933, turned their attention toward utilization of that
control for foreign aggression. Their plan at this stage was
to acquire military strength and political bargaining power
to be used against other nations. In this they succeeded.

The second phase of their aggression was shorter. As the
conspiracy gained strength it gained speed. During each
phase the conspirators succeeded in accomplishing more and
more in less and less time until toward the end of the
period, the rate of acceleration of their conspiratorial
movement was enormous. The second phase of their utilization
of control for foreign aggression involved the actual
seizure and absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, in
that order. By March 1939 they had succeeded in this phase.

The third phase may be measured in months rather than years,
from March to September 1939. The previous aggression being
successful and having been consummated without the necessity
of resorting to actual war, the conspirators had obtained
much desired resources and bases and were ready to undertake
further aggressions by means of war, if necessary. By
September 1939 war was upon the world.

The fourth phase of the aggression consisted of expanding
the war into a general European war of aggression. By April
1941 the war which had theretofore involved Poland, the
United King-

                                                  [Page 373]
dom, and France, had been expanded by invasions into
Scandinavia and into the Low Countries and into the Balkans.

In the next phase the Nazi conspirators carried the war
eastward by invasion of the territory of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. The sixth phase consisted of
collaboration with and instigation of their Pacific ally,
Japan, and precipitated the attack on the United States at
Pearl Harbor.

The essential elements of the crime of aggressive war can be
made out by a mere handful of captured German documents.
These documents will leave no reasonable doubt concerning
the aggressive character of the Nazi war or concerning the
conspiratorial premeditation of that war. After the corpus
of the crime has been demonstrated in this way, the
documentary evidence will be discussed in subsequent
sections, in a more or less chronological and detailed
presentation of the relevant activities of the conspirators
from 1933 to 1941.

Each of the ten documents which will be discussed in this
section has been selected to establish the basic facts
concerning a particular phase of the development of the Nazi
conspiracy for aggression. Each document has met three
standards of selection: each is conspiratorial in nature;
each is believed to have been hitherto unknown to history;
and each is self-contained and tells it own story.

A. 1933 to 1936

The period of 1933 to 1936 was characterized by an orderly,
planned sequence of preparation for war. The essential
objective of this period was the formulation and execution
of the plan to re-arm and re-occupy and fortify the
Rhineland, in violation of the treaty of Versailles and
other treaties, in order to acquire military strength and
political bargaining powers to be used against other

A secret speech of Hitler's delivered to all supreme
commanders on 23 November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient
to characterize this phase of the Nazi conspiracy (789-PS).
The report of the speech was found in the OKW files captured
at Flensberg. Hitler spoke as follows:

     "23 November 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the
     Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered.
     The Fuehrer gives the following speech:
     "The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea
     of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me,
     in the face of future events, and to tell you my
     decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only
     possible in con-

                                                  [Page 374]
     nection with the ideological [weltanschaulich]
     education of the German people by the Party.
     "When I started my political task in 1919, my strong
     belief in final success was based on a thorough
     observation of the events of the day and the study of
     the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never
     lost my belief in the midst of setbacks which were not
     spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has
     had the last word and brought me success. On top of
     that, I had a clear recognition of the probable course
     of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal
     decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after
     long internal conflict became a politician and took up
     the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest
     of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that
     I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a
     new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority
     which would take over the leadership. After 16 years I
     arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many
     setbacks. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the
     most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything
     existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize
     everything beginning with the mass of the people and
     extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization
     of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay
     and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While
     reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task:
     to release Germany from its international ties. Two
     particular characteristics are to be pointed out:
     secession from the League of Nations and denunciation
     of the disarmament conference. It was a hard decision.
     The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead
     to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the
     number of believers was very small. I was supported by
     the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I
     carried out my intentions. After that the order for
     rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who
     predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In
     1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service.
     After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a
     process believed to be impossible at that time. The
     number of people who put trust in me was, very small.
     Then beginning of the fortification of the whole
     country especially in the west.
     "One year later, Austria came. This step also was
     considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable
     reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia,
     Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to
     accomplish in one
                                                  [Page 375]
      campaign. First of all, the western fortification had
     to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal
     in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment
     that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German
     territory. That was only partial solution. The decision
     to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the
     erection of the Protectorate, and with that basis for
     the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite
     clear at that time whether I should start first against
     the east and then in the west, or vice-versa". (789-PS)

There are some curious antitheses of thought in that speech,
as in most of Adolf Hitler's speeches. In one sentence he
combines guidance by providence with the making of "brutal
decisions." He constantly speaks of how very few people were
with him, and yet the mass of the German people were with
him. But he does give a brief summary of this early period:
the organization of the mass of the people, the extension of
organization to the armed forces, and the various "brutal
decisions" that were made.

A top secret letter dated 24 June 1935, from General von
Blomberg to the Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and
Air Forces demonstrates the preparations for war in which
the Nazi conspirators were engaged during this period.
Attached to that letter is a copy of a Secret Reich Defense
law of 21 May 1935, and a copy of a decision of the
Reichcabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the Defense
of the Reich (2261-PS). These documents were captured in the
OKW files at Fechenheim. Von Blomberg's letter reads as

     "In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law
     for the defense of the Reich of the 21 May 1935, and of
     a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935
     concerning the Reich's Defense Council. The publication
     of the Reich's defense law is temporarily suspended by
     order of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
     "The Fuehrer and the Reichschancellor has nominated the
     President of the directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr.
     Schacht to be 'Plenipotentiary-General for War
     "I request that the copies of the Reich's defense law
     needed within the units of the armed forces be ordered
     before 1 July -1935 at armed forces office (L) where it
     is to be established with the request that the law
     should only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters
     outside of the Reichministry of war.
     "I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once
     more." (2261-PS)

Underneath von Blomberg's signature is an endorsement,

                                                  [Page 376]
3 September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. To Defense-
Economic Group G-3, copy transmitted (signed) Jodl." (2261-

Attached to this letter is the statute referred to as the
Reich's Defense Law of 21 May 1935, enacted by the
Reichscabinet. The law covers in detail preparations for a
state of defense, mobilization, and appointment of the
Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy (Schacht) with
plenipotentiary authority for the economic preparation of
the war. Part III provides for penalties. The law is signed,
"The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler; the
Reichsminister of War, von Blomberg; the Reichsminister of
the Interior, Frick." At the bottom of it there is this

     "Note on the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May
     "The publication of the law for the defense of the
     Reich of 21 May 1935 will be suspended. The law became
     effective 21 May 1935.
     "The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler." (2261-

Thus, although the publication itself stated the law was
made public, and although the law became effective
immediately, publication was suspended by Adolf Hitler.

There was also further attached to von Blomberg's letter a
copy of the decision of the Reichscabinet of 21 May 1935 on
the Council for the Defense of the Realm. This decree deals
largely with organization for economic preparation for the
war. This law of May 1935 was the
cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators,
and makes clear the relationship of Schacht to this
preparation. (2261-PS)

B. Formulation and Execution of Plans to Invade Austria and

The next phase of aggression was the formulation and
execution of plans to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in
that order.

One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured
documents which have come to hand is one which has come to
be known as the Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reichs
Chancellery on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours (386-
PS). In the course of that meeting Hitler outlined to those
present the possibilities and necessities of expanding their
foreign policy, and requested, "That his statements be
looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and
testament." The recorder of the minutes of this meeting,
Colonel Hossbach, was the Fuehrer's adjutant. Present at
this conspiratorial meeting, among others, were Erich

                                                  [Page 377]
Raeder, Constantin von Neurath, and Hermann Wilhelm Goering.
The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystallization toward
the end of 1937 in the policy of the Nazi regime (386-PS).
Austria and Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by force.
They would provide "lebensraum" (living space) and improve
Germany's military position for further operations. While it
is true that actual events unfolded themselves in a somewhat
different manner than that outlined at this meeting, in
essence the purposes stated at the meeting were carried out.
These notes, which destroy any possible doubt concerning the
Nazi's premeditation of their crimes against peace, read as

     "Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in
     the Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030
     "Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor;
     "The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v.
     "The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr v. Fritsch;
     "The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. H.C. Raeder;
     "The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst Goering;
     "The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr v.
     "Oberst Hossbach [the adjutant who took the minutes].
     "The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter
     of to day's conference was of such high importance,
     that its detailed discussion would certainly in other
     states take place before the Cabinet in full session.
     However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided not to discuss
     this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because 
     of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result
     of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his four and a
     half years in government; he desired to explain to
     those present his fundamental ideas on the
     possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign
     policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he
     requested that his statements be looked upon in the
     case of his death as his last will and testament.
     "The Fuehrer then stated: The aim of German policy is
     the security and the preservation of the nation and its
     propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.
     The German nation comprises eighty-five million people,
     which, because of the number of individuals and the
     compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European
     racial body, the like of which can not be found in any
     other country. On the other hand it justifies the
     demand for larger living space more than
                                                  [Page 378]
     for any other nation. If there have been no political
     consequences to meet the demands of this racial body
     for living space then that is the result of historical
     development spread over several centuries and should
     this political condition continue to exist, it will
     represent the greatest danger to the preservation of
     the German nation at its present high level. An arrest
     of the deterioration of the German element in Austria
     and in Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as the
     preservation of the present state in Germany itself.
     "Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and
     as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will
     appear after a number of years, because political and
     philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as
     long as they are able to produce the basis for the
     realization of the actual claim of existence of a
     nation. The German future is therefore dependent
     exclusively on the solution of the need for living
     space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for
     a limited period, about one to three generations.
     "Before touching upon the question of solving the need
     for living space, it must be decided whether a solution
     of the German position with a good future can be
     attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an
     increased share in universal commerce and industry.
     "Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict
     National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis;
     assuming this can be achieved the results are as
     "A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but
     not total autarchy can be attained:
     "1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw
     materials autarchy is feasible.
     "2. In the case of ores the position is much more
     difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be
     covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can not.
     "3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as
     long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent
     solution is not possible.
     "4. Edible fats -- possible.
     "B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy
     must be answered with a definite NO.
     "The general increase of living standards, compared
     with thirty to forty years ago, brought about a
     simultaneous increase of the demand and an increase of
     personal consumption even among the producers, the
     farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production
     increase in agriculture
                                                  [Page 379]
     have been used for covering the increased demand,
     therefore they represent no absolute increase in
     production. A further increase in production by making
     greater demands on the soil is not possible because it
     already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of
     artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain
     that, even with the greatest possible increase in
     production, participation in the world market could not
     be avoided.
     "The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to
     secure food by import, even in periods when harvests
     are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest
     is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe
     increases correspondingly to the increase in
     population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births
     would bring about an increased consumption in bread,
     because the child is a greater bread eater than the
     "Permanently to counter the difficulties of food
     supplies by lowering the standard of living and by
     rationing is impossible in a continent which had
     developed &n approximately equivalent standard of
     living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has
     brought into effect the complete power of consumption,
     some small corrections in our agricultural home
     production will be possible, but not a wholesale
     alteration of the standard of food consumption.
     Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically
     in the sphere of food supplies as well
     as generally.
     "Participation in world economy. There are limits to
     this which we are unable to transgress. The market
     fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure
     foundation of the German position; international
     commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee for
     practical execution. It must be considered on principle
     that since the World War (1914-18), as
     industrialization has taken place in countries which
     formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic
     empires, in which the tendency to colonies again
     approaches the condition which originally motivated
     colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are
     the basis of their will to expand, and economic need
     will also drive Germany to it. Countries outside the
     great economic empires have special difficulties in
     expanding economically.
     "The upward tendency, which has been caused in world
     economy, due to armament competition, can never form a
     permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this
     latter is also hampered by the economic disruption
     caused by Bol-
                                                  [Page 380]
     shevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in
     those states who base their existence on export. As our
     exports and imports are carried out over those sea
     lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more a
     question of security of transport than one of foreign
     currency, and this explains the great weakness in our
     food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one
     which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater
     living space, an endeavor which at all times has been
     the cause of the formation of states and of movements
     of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds
     no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should
     the security of our food situation be our foremost
     thought, then the space required for this can only be
     sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal
     capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies.
     It is not a case of conquering people, but of
     conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also
     be more to the purpose to seek raw material-producing
     territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and
     not overseas, and this solution would have to be
     brought into effect for one or two generations. What
     would be required at a later date over and above this
     must be left to subsequent generations. The development
     of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow
     process and the German people, with its strong racial
     root Volksstamm] has for this purpose the most
     favorable foundations in the heart of the European
     Continent. The history of all times -- Roman Empire,
     British Empire has proved that every space expansion
     can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking
     risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly
     nor today has space been found without an owner; the
     attacker always comes up against the proprietor."
After this somewhat jumbled discussion of geopolitical
economic theory and of the need for expansion and
"Lebensraum", Adolf Hitler, in these Hossbach notes, posed a
question and proceeded to answer it:

     "The question for Germany is where the greatest
     possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.
     "German politics must reckon with its two hateful
     enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German
     colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable.
     Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement
     of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this
     opposition they would have the support of all parties.
     Both countries would view the
                                                  [Page 381]
     building of German military strong points overseas as a
     threat to their overseas communications, as a security
     measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a
     strengthening of the German position in Europe.
     "England is not in a position to cede any of her
     colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance
     which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss
     of prestige which England has suffered owing to the
     transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of
     East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance
     on England's part would at best consist in the
     readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away
     colonies which at the present moment are not in British
     hands, for example, Angola. French favors would
     probably be of the same nature.
     "A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies
     to us could be considered only at a time when England
     is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is
     strong and well armed. The Fuehrer does not share the
     opinion that the Empire is unshakeable.
     "Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in
     conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The
     British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared
     with one another in regard to durability; after the
     Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political
     enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in
     Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all
     states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to
     subjugate Ancient Rome.
     "Alongside the British Empire today a number of States
     exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother
     Country is able to defend its colonial possession only
     allied with other states and not by its own power. How
     could England alone, for example, defend Canada against
     attack by America, or its Far Eastern interests against
     an attack by Japan "The singling out of the British
     Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an
     admission that the universal empire cannot be
     maintained permanently by power politics. The following
     are significant pointers in this respect
     "(a) Ireland's struggle for independence.
     "(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by
     her half measures, left the door open for Indians at a
     later date to utilize the non-fulfillment of
     constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.
     "(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far
     East by Japan.
                                                  [Page 381]
     "(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which
     by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led
     by a genius-expands its power position and must
     consequently infringe British interests to an
     increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is
     a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is
     endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in
     the Mohammedan World.
     "It must be established in conclusion that the Empire
     cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45
     million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her
     ideals. The proportion of the populations in the
     Empire, compared with that of the Motherland, is nine
     to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we
     expand in space, we must not allow the level of our
     population to become too low.
     "France's position is more favorable than that of
     England. The French Empire is better placed
     geographically, the population of its colonial
     possessions represents a potential military increase.
     But France is faced with difficulties of internal
     politics. At the present time only 10 per cent
     approximately of the nations have parliamentary
     governments, whereas 90 per cent of them have
     totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, we have to take
     the following into our political consideration as power
     "Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller
     "The German question can be solved only by way of
     force, and this is never without risk. The battles of
     Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck's wars
     against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk
     and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria 
     from participating in the war. If we place the decision to
     apply force with risk at the head of the following
     expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions
     'when' and 'how'. In this regard we have to decide upon
     three different cases.
     "Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect
     a change for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the
     Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the
     Officers' Corps, are practically concluded.
     "Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with
     further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date
     will increase. In particular the secrecy of 'special
     weapons' cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of
     reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age
     groups and an addition from older untrained groups
     would be no longer available.
     "In comparison with the rearmament, which will have
                                                  [Page 383]
     carried out at the time by other nations, we shall
     decrease in relative power. Should we not act until
     1943-45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves,
     any year could bring about the food crisis, for the
     countering of which we do not possess the necessary
     foreign currency. This must be considered as a 'point
     of weakness in the regime.' Over and above that, the
     world will anticipate our action and will increase
     counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate
     themselves we should be forced on the offensive.
     "What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45
     no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can
     wait no longer.
     "On the one side the large armed forces, with the
     necessity for securing their upkeep, the aging of the
     Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side
     the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living
     and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice
     but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it
     will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German
     space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for
     action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in
     cases 2 and 3.
     "Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to
     an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it
     absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable
     for employment in war against Germany, then the time
     for action against Czechoslovakia has come.
     "Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against
     Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war
     against another State that it cannot 'proceed' against
     "For the improvement of our military political position
     it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement
     by war to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria,
     simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the
     flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the
     case of a conflict with France it would hardly be
     necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare
     war on the same day as France. However,
     Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in the war will
     increase proportionally to the degree to which we are
     being weakened. Its actual participation could make
     itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the
     North or the West.
     "Once Czechoslovakia is conquered -- and a mutual
     frontier; Germany-Hungary is obtained -- then a neutral
     attitude by Poland in a German-French conflict could
     more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with Poland
     remain valid only
                                                  [Page 384]
     as long as Germany's strength remains unshakeable;
     should Germany have any setbacks then an attack by
     Poland against East Prussia, perhaps also against
     Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.
     "Assuming a development of the situation, which would
     lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943
     to '45, then the behavior of France, England, Poland
     and Russia would probably have to be judged in the
     following manner:
     "The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all
     probability England and perhaps also France, have
     already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that
     they have got used to the idea that this question would
     one day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in
     the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled
     in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive
     factors in the non-participation of England in a war
     against Germany. The British attitude would certainly
     not remain without influence on France's attitude. An
     attack by France, without British support, is hardly
     probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate
     along our Western fortifications. Without England's
     support, it would also not be necessary to take into
     consideration a march by France through Belgium and
     Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned
     with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in
     every case it would have as a consequence, the enmity
     of Great Britain. Naturally we should in every case,
     have to bar our frontier during the operation of our
     attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be
     taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's
     defence measures will increase in strength from year to
     year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of
     the Austrian Army will also be effected in the course
     of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia, in
     the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of
     Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless
     constitute the conquest of food for five to six million
     people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of
     two million from Czechoslovakia, and of one million
     from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of
     the two States to Germany, militarily and politically,
     would constitute a considerable relief, owing to
     shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting
     personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of
     reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about
     twelve Divisions, representing a new Division per one
     million population.
                                                  [Page 385]
     "No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is
     expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be
     judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian
     question, since it would depend largely on whether the
     Duce were alive at the time or not.
     "The measure and speed of our action would decide
     Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination
     to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with
     Russia in the rear.
     "Military participation by Russia must be countered by
     the speed of our operations; it is a question whether
     this needs to be taken into consideration at all, in
     view of Japan's attitude.

     "Should Case 2 occur -- paralyzation of France by a
     Civil War -- then the situation should be utilized at
     any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as
     Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

     "The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming near; it could develop
     from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and
     should it occur, he has firmly decided to make use of
     it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.
     "Following recent experiences in the course of events
     of the war in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an early
     end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the
     time required for past offensives by Franco, a further
     three years duration of war is within the bounds of
     possibility. On the other hand, from the German point
     of view, a one hundred per cent victory by Franco is
     not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation
     of the war and preservation of the tensions in the
     Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of
     the Spanish Peninsula, it would mean the end of Italian
     intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic
     Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing
     the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future
     policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to
     the Balearic Isles However, a solidification of Italian
     positions on the Balearic Isles can not be tolerated
     either by France or by England and could lead to a war
     by France and England against Italy, in which case
     Spain, if entirely in white [Franco's] hands, could
     participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A
     subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very -
     unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to
     Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy's
     military strategy would be to remain on the defensive
     against France
                                                  [Page 386]
     on the Western frontier and carry out operations
     against France from Libya, against the North African
     French colonial possessions.
     "As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian
     coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via
     the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult,
     and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian
     fortifications, French lines of communication by the
     Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the
     transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to
     France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and
     Germany, France will have, at its disposal, solely the
     metropolitan fighting forces.
     "If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the
     Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the
     probability must be assumed that England -- being at
     war with Italy would not decide to commence operations
     against Germany. Without British support, a warlike
     action by France against Germany is not to be
     "The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria
     must be made independent of the course of the Italian-
     French-English war and would not be simultaneous with
     the commencement of military operations by these three
     States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military
     agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and
     by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity, he
     wishes to begin to carry out operations against
     Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have
     to take place with the speed of lightning [blitzartig
     "Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von
     Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation,
     repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not
     appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war
     with Italy would not bind the French Army to such an
     extent that it would not be in a position to commence
     operations on our Western frontier with superior
     forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French
     forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine
     frontier against Italy to be in the region of twenty
     divisions, so that a strong French superiority would
     still remain on our Western frontier. The French would,
     according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into
     the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France
     has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very
     small value of our then existing fortifications --which

                                                  [Page 387]
     was pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von
     Blomberg -- the four motorized divisions which had been
     laid down for the West would be more or less incapable
     of movement. With regard to our offensive in a
     Southeasterly direction, Fieldmarshal von Blomberg drew
     special attention to the strength of the
     Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which
     had assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which
     would present extreme difficulties to our attack.
     "Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the
     purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter
     to investigate the possibilities of carrying out
     operations against Czechoslovakia with special
     consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian
     system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated
     that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have
     to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on
     the 10 November. This intention was countermanded by
     the Fuehrer, who gave as a reason that the possibility
     of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so
     imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarshal
     von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding
     England and France's attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his
     previous statements and said that he was convinced of
     Britain's non-participation and that consequently he
     did not believe in military action by France against
     Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already
     mentioned, lead to a general mobilization in Europe,
     then we should have to commence operations against
     Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who
     are not participating in the war should declare their
     disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time
     being, have to side with this attitude.
     "In view of the information given by the Fuehrer,
     Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think
     of a reduction or abandonment of our military
     undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer agreed to this,
     insofar as he believed this decision should be
     postponed for a suitable date.
     "The second part of the discussion concerned material
     armament questions.
     "(Signed) Hossbach". (386-PS)
The record of what happened thereafter is well-known to
history The Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure
from the Nazis, occurred in arch 1938. Pressure on
Czechoslovakia resulted in the Munich Pact of September
1938. That Pact was

                                                  [Page 388]
violated, and Czechoslovakia invaded by Germany on 15 March

Another captured document, a file kept by Colonel Schmundt,
Hitler's adjutant, reveals the truth concerning the
deliberateness of the aggressions against Czechoslovakia (88-
PS). The file was found in a cellar of the Platterhof at
Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. It consists of a work-file
of originals and duplicates, incidental to the preparations
for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. The German title is
''Grimdlagen zur Stude Gruen", (Basic Principles for "Case
Green"), "Green" being a codeword for the aggression against
Czechoslovakia. Item No. 2 in this file is dated 22 April
1938. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the adjutant,
of a discussion on 22 April 1938 between Hitler and Wilhelm
Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, relates
to "Case Green". This meeting occurred within approximately
one month following the successful annexation of Austria. In
the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became necessary to
revise the "Plan Green", to take into account changed
conditions, as a result of the bloodless success against
Austria. Item 2 reads:

     "Berlin, 22 April 1938. "Bases of the Dissertation on
     "Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General
     Keitel of 21 April:
     "A. Political Aspect.
     "1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky
     without any cause or possibility of justification has
     been turned down. As result would be: hostile world
     opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a
     measure is justified only for the elimination of the
     last opponent on the mainland.
     "2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which
     gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.
     "3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident
     (for example, assassination of German ambassador in
     connection with an anti-German demonstration.)
     "Military Conclusions.
     "1. The preparations are to be made for the political
     possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one
     since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.
     "2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of
     the divisions by rail -- which is unavailable, but
     should be cut down as far as possible -- must not
     impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the
     "3. 'Separate thrusts' are to be carried out
                                                  [Page 389]
     with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification
     lines at numerous points and in a strategically
     favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out
     to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, composition
     of the columns according to their individual tasks).
     Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.
     "The Air Force is to support the individual columns
     (for example dive-bombers; sealing off installations at
     penetration points, hampering the bringing up of
     reserves, destroying signal communications traffic,
     thereby isolating the garrisons.)
     "4. Politically, the first four days of military action
     are the decisive ones. If there are no effective
     military successes, a European crisis will certainly
     arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness
     of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the
     scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize 'Gruen.'
     "Therefore: bridging the time gap between first
     penetration and employment of the forces to be brought
     up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized
     army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)
     "5. If possible, separation of transport movement 'Rot'
     from 'Gruen'. ['Rot' was the code name for their then
     plan against the West.] A simultaneous strategic
     concentration 'Rot' can lead 'Rot' to undesired
     measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to put
     'Case Rot' into operation at any time. "C. Propaganda.
     "1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in
     Czechoslovakia (Gruenland.)
     "2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the
     Czechs (Gruenen).
     [Initialled by Schmundt]" (388-PS)

Particular attention should be drawn to paragraph 3 of this
document, under the heading "Political Aspect", which reads
as follows:

     "Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident
     (example: Assassination of German ambassador as an up-
     shot of an anti-German demonstration)." (388-PS)

The document as a whole establishes that the conspirators
were planning the creation of an incident to justify to the
world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It
establishes that consideration was being given to
assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the
requisite incident.

                                                  [Page 390]
C. Formulation and Execution of the Plan to Invade Poland.
The next phase of the aggression was the formulation and
execution of the plan to attack Poland, resulting in the
initiation of aggressive war in September 1939. Here again
the careful and meticulous record keeping of Hitler's
adjutant, Schmundt, has provided a document in his own
handwriting which throws down the mask (L-79). The document
consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The
place of the conference was the Fuehrer's Study in the New
Reich Chancellery. Goering, Raeder and Keitel were present.
The subject of the meeting was, "Indoctrination on the
political situation and future aims."

The authenticity and accuracy of Schmundt's record of the
meeting of 23 May 1939 has been admitted by Keitel in a
pretrial interrogation. The minutes read as follows:

     "Top Secret "To be transmitted by officer only "Minutes
     of a Conference on 23 May 1939"
     "Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.
     "Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.
     "Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-
     Admiral Raeder, Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen.
     Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder,
     Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. ( G.S. )
     Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.)
     Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Commd. Albrecht,
     Capt. v. Below (Army). "Subject: Indoctrination on the
     political situation and future aims.
     "The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:
     "1. Analysis of the situation.
     "2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces
     arising from the situation.
     "3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
     "4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work
     resulting from these consequences.
     "Secrecy is the first essential for success.
     "The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematized
     form below.
     "Our present situation must be considered from two
     points of view:
     "1. The actual development of events between 1933 and
     "2. The permanent and unchanging situation in which
     Germany lies.
     "In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all
                                                  [Page 391]
     Our military situation improved enormously.
     "Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has
     remained the same.
     "Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers.
     The balance of power had been effected without the
     participation of Germany.
     "This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands
     for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and
     Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are
     regarded as 'Encroachments'. The English are more
     afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the
     simple threat of force.
     "A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological
     problems. So, too, must the economic problems be
     solved. No German can evade the creation of the
     necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of
     the problems demands courage. The principle, by which
     one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to
     circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must
     rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without
     invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign
     "Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the
     state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a
     time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one
     way or the other. The choice is between advancement or
     decline. In 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compelled
     to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the
     question longer than that.
     "We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor,
     which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.
     "The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to
     good use. All measures have been taken in the correct
     sequence and in harmony with our aims.
     "After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:
     "The national-political unity of the Germans has been
     achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further
     successes cannot be attained without the shedding of
     "The demarkation of frontiers is of military
     "The Pole is no 'supplementary enemy'. Poland will
     always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of
     treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the
     secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do
     us harm.
     "Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is
     a question of expanding our living space in the East
     and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of
     the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only
     from thinly populated
                                                  [Page 392]
     areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough-
     going German exploitation will enormously increase the
     "There is no other possibility for Europe.
     "Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This
     does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.
     "If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the
     possession of extensive areas in the East will be
     advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to
     rely even less in time of war than in peace.
     "The population of non-German areas will perform no
     military service, and will be available as a source of
     "The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with
     the West.
     "Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is
     doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier
     against Russia.
     "It is questionable whether military success in the
     West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable
     too is the attitude of Poland.
     "The Polish government will not resist pressure from
     Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the
     West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.
     "There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and
     we are left with the decision:
     "To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
     [This sentence is underscored in the original German
     "We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.
     There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The
     success of the isolation will be decisive,
     "Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give
     the final order to attack. There must be no
     simultaneous conflict with the Western. Powers [France
     and England].
     "If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict
     will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must
     be primarily against England and France.
     "Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland --
     beginning with an attack on Poland -- will only be
     successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If
     this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in
     the West and to settle Poland at the same time.
     "The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful
     "Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for
     various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be
                                                  [Page 393]
     cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own
     interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in
     good time.
     "Economic relations with Russia are possible only if
     political relations have improved. A cautious trend is
     apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that
     Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the
     destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to
     oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.
     "If there were an alliance of France, England and
     Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be
     constrained to attack England and France with a few
     annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility
     of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare
     ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our
     development the foundation of a hegemony which would
     weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the
     conflict with England will be a life-and death
     "What will this struggle be like [This sentence is
     underscored in the German original.]
     "England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with
     a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that
     the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as
     possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall).
     The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the
     duration of our resistance.
     "The Dutch and Belgium air bases will be occupied by
     armed forces. Declarations of neutrality must be
     ignored. If England and France intend the war between
     Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will
     support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and
     make them build fortifications in order finally to
     force them into cooperation.
     "Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield
     to pressure.
     "Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the
     Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning
     speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on
     Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.
     "The war with England and France will be a life-and-
     death struggle.
     "The idea that we can get of cheaply is dangerous;
     there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats,
     and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice,
     but of life or death for 80 million human beings.
                                                  [Page 394]
     "Question: Short or long war
     "Every country's armed forces or government must aim at
     a short war. The government, however, must also be
     prepared for a war of 10-15 years' duration.
     "History has always shown that the people have believed
     that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still
     prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war.
     Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But
     on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as
     possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave
     weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar
     "England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of
     her world power.
     "England is the driving force against Germany. "Her
     strength lies in the following:
     "1. The British themselves are proud, courageous,
     tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organizers.
     They know how to exploit every new development. They
     have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic
     race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German
     average is higher.
     "2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300
     years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, this
     power is not merely something concrete, but must also
     be considered as a psychological force embracing the
     entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with
     consequential financial credit.
     "3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea
     power and a courageous air force.
     "England's weakness:
     "If in the World War I we had had two battleships and
     two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had
     begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been
     defeated and England brought to her knees. It would
     have meant the end of this war. It was formerly not
     sufficient to defeat the fleet. Landings had to be made
     in order to defeat England. England could provide her
     own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.
     "The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she
     is forced to capitulate. The import of food and fuel
     depends on the fleet's protection.
     "If the German Air Force attacks English territory,
     England will not be forced to capitulate in one day.
     But if the fleet is destroyed immediate capitulation
     will be the result.
                                                  [Page 395]
     "There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a
     quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the
     government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.
     "Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by
     "1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military
     circles concerned.
     "2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the
     whole enterprise.
     "3. Human failings.
     "4. Weather conditions.
     "The final date for striking must be fixed well in
     advance. Beyond that time, the tension cannot be
     endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather
     conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy
     and Air Force impossible. 

     "This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.
     "1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a
     significant or the final decisive blow right at the
     start. Consideration of right and wrong or treaties do
     not enter into the matter. This will only be possible
     if we are not involved in a war with England on account
     of Poland.
     "2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparation for
     a long war must be made, while opportunities on the
     Continent for England are eliminated.
     "The Army will have to hold positions essential to the
     Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are
     successfully occupied and held, and if France is also
     defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful
     war against England will have been secured.
     "England can then be blockaded from Western France at
     close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with
     its submarines extend the range of the blockade.

     "England will not be able to fight on the Continent:
     "Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all
     her life-lines:
     "Germany will not bleed to death on land.
     "Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World
     War I and subsequent military operations. World War I
     is responsible for the following strategic
     considerations which are imperative
     "1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the
     War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the
     Channel ports, the end would have been different.
                                                  [Page 396]
     "2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air
     force. It is impossible to attack all objectives
     simultaneously, and the lapse of time of a few minutes
     would evoke defense counter-measures.
     "3 The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.
     "4 Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and
     Navy, has taken the most important positions,
     industrial production will cease in flow in to the
     bottomless pit of the Army's battles, and can be
     diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.
     "The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these
     positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the
     attack. "Study to this end is of the utmost importance.
     "The aim will always be to force England to her knees.
     "A weapon will only be of decisive importance in
     winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess
     "This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It
     would be true of the latter, for instance, as long as
     the English Fleet had no available countermeasures; it
     will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against
     Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the
     Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.
     "Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered
     to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements
     of surprise and by masterly handling. ***"
     "1. Study of the entire problem.
     "2. Study of the events.
     "3. Study of the means needed.
     "4. Study of the necessary training.
     "Men with great powers of imagination and high
     technical training must belong to the staff, as well as
     officers with sober sceptic powers of understanding.
     "Working principles:
     "1. No one is to take part in this who does not have to
     know of it.
     "2. No one can find out more than he must know.
     "3. When must the person in question know it at the
     very latest? No one may know anything before it is necessary 
     that he know it.
     "On Goering's question, the Fuehrer decided that:
     "a. The armed forces determine what shall be built.
                                                  [Page 397]
     "b. In the shipbuilding program, nothing is to be
     "c. The armament programs are to be modeled on the
     years 1943 or 1944.
     [Schmundt certified this text.]" (L-79)
These minutes demonstrate that the Nazi conspirators were
proceeding in accordance with a plan. They demonstrate the
cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. They
demonstrate that the questions concerning Danzig, which the
Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were
not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated
to conceal their motive of aggressive, expansion for food,
and Lebensraum.

Just one week prior to the launching of the attack on
Poland, Hitler made an address to his chief military
commanders, at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. [Three
reports of this meeting are available: (L-3; 798-PS; and
1014-PS). The first of the three documents (L-3) was
obtained through an American newspaperman, and purported to
be original minutes of the Obersalzberg meeting, transmitted
to the newspaperman by some other person. There was no
proof of actual delivery to the intermediary by the person
who took the notes. That document (L-3) therefore, merely
served as an incentive to search for something better The
result was that two other documents (798-PS) and (1014-PS)
were discovered in the OKW files at Flensberg. These two
documents indicate that Hitler on that day made two
speeches, one apparently in the morning and one in the
afternoon. Comparison of those two documents with the first
document (L-3) led to the conclusion that the first document
was a lightly garbled merger of the two speeches, and
therefore was not relied upon.]
On this day of 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed the supreme
commanders of the-three branches of the armed forces, as
well as the commanding generals, (Oberbefehlshabers) as
     "I have called you together to give you a picture of
     the political situation, in order that you may have
     insight into the individual element on which I base my
     decision to act, and in order to strengthen your
     confidence. After this, we will discuss military
     "It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to
     come sooner or later. I had already made this decision
     in Spring. [Apparently this referred to (L-79).] But I
     thought I would first turn against the West in a few
     years, and only afterwards against the East. But the
     sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes
     even before a threatening situation. I wanted to
     establish an acceptable relationship with
                                                  [Page 398]
     Poland, in order to fight first against the West, but
     this plan which was agreeable to me could not be
     executed, since essential points have changed.
     "It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in
     case of a conflict in the West.
     "Poland wants access to the sea.
     "The further development became obvious after the
     occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to
     me that under the circumstances a conflict with Poland
     could arise at an unopportune moment.
     "I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of
     all, two personal constitutions, my own personality,
     and that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me,
     my existence, because of my political activity.
     "Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever
     again have the confidence of the whole German people as
     I do. There will probably never again be a man in the
     future with more authority. My existence is, therefore,
     a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any
     time by a criminal or an idiot.
     "The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence
     is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy's
     loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The
     basic attitude of the Italian Court is against the
     Duce. Above all, the Court sees in the expansion of the
     empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest
     nerves in Italy.
     "The third factor, favorable for us is Franco. We can
     only ask benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this
     depends on Franco's personality. He guarantees a
     certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system
     in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain
     does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our internal
     "On the other side, a negative picture, as far as
     decisive personalities are concerned. There is no
     outstanding personality in England or France.
     "For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing
     to lose: we can only gain. Our economic situation is
     such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold
     out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We
     have no other choice; we must act. Our opponents risk
     much and gain only little. England's stake in a war is
     unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below
     average. No personalities, no masters, no men of
     "Besides the personal factor, the political situation
     is favor
                                                  [Page 399]
     able for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy,
     France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads
     to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.
     "The English empire did not emerge from the last war
     strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing
     was achieved: Conflict between England and Ireland, the
     south African Union became more independent,
     concessions had to be made to India, England is in
     great danger, unhealthy industries. A British statesman
     can look into the future only with concern.
     "France's position has also deteriorated, particularly
     in the Mediterranean.
     "Further favorable factors for us are these:
     "Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the
     Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse
     because of her internal situation.
     "Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack
     and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and
     Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by
     small minds, unsteady weak men.
     "All these fortunate circumstances will no longer
     prevail in two to three years. No one knows how long I
     shall live. Therefore conflict better now.
     "The creation of Greater Germany was a great
     achievement politically but militarily it was
     questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of
     the political leaders. It is necessary to test the
     military, if at all possible, not by general
     settlement, but by solving individual tasks.
     "The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My
     Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of
     the people. My propositions to Poland, the Danzig
     corridor, were disturbed by England's intervention.
     Poland changed her tune towards us. The initiative
     cannot be allowed to pass to others. This moment is
     more favorable than in two to three years. An attempt
     on my life or Mussolini's could only change the
     situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally
     stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A
     suggested compromise would have demanded that we change
     our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They
     talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There
     was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is
     still great that the West will not interfere. We must
     accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician
     must accept a risk as much as
                                                  [Page 400]
     a military leader. We are facing the alternative to
     strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or
     "Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron
     "We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will
     supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It
     is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only
     afraid that at the last minute some Schweinhund will
     make a proposal for mediation."
     "Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the
     assurance that the armed forces will do their duty."

In his second speech on 22 August 1939 the Fuehrer had this
to say:

     "It may also turn out differently regarding England and
     France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure
     on a trade-barrier, not on blockade, and with severance
     of relations. Most iron determination on our side.
     Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a
     point of it that we were determined from the beginning
     to fight the Western powers. Struggle for life or
     death. Germany has won every war as long as she was
     united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors,
     greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of
     the past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long
     period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it
     is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is
     not machines that fight each other, but men. We have
     the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive.
     The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918, the
     Nation fell down because the mental prerequisites were
     not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final
     success only through his mental power.
     "Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is
     elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a
     certain line. Even if war should break out in the West,
     the destruction of Poland shall be the primary
     objective. Quick decision because of the season.
     "I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the
     war, never mind whether it be plausible or not. The
     victor shall not be asked, later on, whether we told
     the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the
     Right is what matters but Victory.
                                                  [Page 401]
     "Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80,000,000 people shall
     get what is their right. Their existence has to be
     secured. The strongest has the Right. Greatest
     "Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the
     German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves
     of the leader give way.
     "First aim: advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our
     technical superiority will break the nerves of the
     Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be
     broken at once. 

     "Constant war of attrition.
     "New German frontier according to healthy principle.
     Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military
     operations shall not be influenced by these
     reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the
     military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit
     until complete elimination.
     "Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the
     requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by
     Saturday morning." (1014-PS)

D. Expansion into General War of Aggression: Scandinavia,
The Low Countries, The Balkans.

The aggressive war having been initiated in September 1939,
and Poland having been defeated shortly after the initial
assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a
general war of aggression extending into Scandinavia, into
the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. (Under the division
of the case agreed by the four Chief Prosecutors, this phase
of aggression was left or development to the British
prosecuting staff, and is discussed in Sections 9, 10 and 11
of this Chapter, infra.)

E. Aggression Against the USSR

The attack upon Russia was preceded with premeditation and
deliberation. Just as, in the case of aggression against
Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had a code name for the secret
operation, "Case Green", so in the case of aggression
against the Soviet Union, they had a code name, "Case
Barbarossa". A secret directive, Number 21, issued from the
Fuehrer's Headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to
"Case Barbarossa," was captured among the OKW files at
Flensberg (446-PS). This directive was issued more than six
months in advance of the attack. (Other evidence shows that
the planning occurred even earlier.) his order, signed by
Hitler and initialled by Jodl and Keitel, -as issued in nine
copies, of which we have the fourth. The directive reads:

                                                  [Page 402]

     "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush
     Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the
     war against England. (Case Barbarossa.)
     "For this purpose the Army will have to employ all
     available units with the reservation that the occupied
     territories will have to be safeguarded against
     surprise attacks.
     "For the Eastern campaign the Air force will have to
     free such strong forces for the support of the Army
     that a quick completion of the ground operations may be
     expected and that damage of the Eastern German
     territories will be avoided as much as possible. This
     concentration of the main effort in the East is limited
     by the following reservation: That the entire battle
     and armament area dominated by us must remain
     sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and
     that the attacks on England and especially the supply
     for them must not be permitted to break down.
     "Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains
     unequivocally against England also during an Eastern
     "If occasion arises I will order the concentration of
     troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks
     before the intended beginning of operations.
     "Preparations requiring more time to start are -- if
     this has not yet been done -- to begin presently and
     are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
     "Great caution has to be exercised that the intention
     of an attack will not be recognized.
     "The preparations of the High Command are to be made on
     the following basis:
     "I. General Purpose:
     "The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to
     be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward
     deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-
     ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be
     "In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from
     where the Russian Air force will no longer be able to
     attack German Reich territory. The first goal of
     operations is the protection from Asiatic Russian from
     the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of
     necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left
     to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.
     In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic
     Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no
     longer be ready to fight.
                                                  [Page 403]
     "Effective intervention. by the Russian Air force is to
     be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of
     the operations." (446-PS)
Another secret document captured from the OKW files
establishes the motive for the attack on the Soviet Union
(2718-PS). It also establishes the full awareness of the
Nazi conspirators of the Crimes against Humanity which would
result from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2
May 1941 concerning the results of a discussion on that day
with the State Secretaries concerning "Case Barbarossa." The
memorandum reads in part:

     "Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files Ia.
     Second copy to General Schubert. 2 May 1941.
     Memorandum. About the result of today's discussion with
     the State Secretaries about Barbarossa.
     "1. The war can only be continued if all armed forces
     are fed by Russia in the third year of war.
     "2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of
     people will be starved to death if we take out of the
     country the things necessary for us." (2718-PS)

F. Collaboration with Japan: Precipitation of The Pearl
Harbor Attack.

With the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the
Soviet Union in June 1941, the Nazi conspirators and, in
particular Ribbentrop, called upon the Eastern co-architect
of the New Order, Japan, to attack in the rear. The Nazi's
incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to
result in an attack on the United States. For a time, they
preferred that the United States not be involved in the
conflict, due to military considerations. However, their
incitement resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and long
prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that
they would declare War on the United States should a United
States-Japanese conflict occur. It was in reliance on these
assurances that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

These matters are disclosed in a document, captured from the
files of the German Foreign Office, which consists of notes
dated 4 April 1941, signed by Schmidt, regarding discussions
between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister
Matsuoka, in the presence of Ribbentrop (1881-PS). Pertinent
parts of this document read as follows:

     "Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the
     Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in
     Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the
     wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was
     in need of German help
                                                  [Page 404]
     particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could
     be given by making available to them the latest
     experiences of the war as well as the latest technical
     improvements and inventions. ***

     "Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the
     United States. In case that the country should decide
     to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had
     to be prepared for a fight with the United States,
     because in that case America would probably side with
     Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that
     the United States could be restrained by diplomatic
     exertions from entering the war at the side of Great
     Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the
     worse situation, that is war against America. They were
     of the opinion that such a war would extend for five
     years or longer and would take the form of guerrilla
     warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the
     South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in
     her guerrilla warfare are of the greatest value to
     Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be
     conducted and how all the technical improvements of
     submarine, in all details such as periscopes and such
     like, could best be exploited by Japan. "To sum up,
     Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it
     that the proper German authorities would place at the
     disposal of the Japanese these developments and
     inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed
     by the Japanese.
     "The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany
     too considered a conflict with the United States
     undesirable, but that it had already made allowance for
     such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion
     that America's contribution depended upon the
     possibilities of transportation, and that this again is
     conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war
     against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening
     not merely against England, but also against America.
     Germany has made her preparations so that no American
     could land in Europe. She would conduct a most
     energetic fight against America with her U-boats and
     her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience,
     which would still have to be acquired by the United
     States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite
     apart from the fact, that the German soldier naturally
     ranks high above the American.
     "In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer
                                                  [Page 405]
     out, that Germany on her part would immediately take
     the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the
     United States. It did not matter with whom the United
     States would first get involved, if with Germany or
     with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one
     country at a time, not to come to an understanding with
     the other country subsequently. Therefore Germany would
     strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of
     a conflict between Japan and America, because the
     strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined
     action, their weakness would be if they would -let
     themselves be beaten individually.
     "Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the
     Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order
     that the proper German authorities would place at the
     disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and
     inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the
     Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict
     with the United States.
     "As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka
     explained further that he has always declared in his
     country, that sooner or later a war with he United
     States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to
     drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict
     would happen rather sooner than later. His
     argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not
     decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk
     upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus
     would she perhaps avoid a war for generations,
     particularly if she gained predominance in the South
     Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate
     to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was
     considered in those circles a dangerous man with
     dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan
     continued to walk along her present path, one day she
     would have to fight anyway and that this would then be
     under less favorable circumstances than at present.
     "The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the
     situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in
     similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland,
     declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces). He too was
     of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable
     conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable
     fight at a time when he himself was still young and
     full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was
     proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not
     hesitate a moment instantly to reply to any widening of
     the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence
                                                  [Page 406]
     vored those who will not let dangers come to them, but
     who will bravely face them.
     "Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather
     their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a
     last manoeuver towards Japan, by declaring that America
     would not fight Japan on account of China or the South
     Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the
     consignment of rubber and tin to America to their place
     of destination. However, America would war against
     Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war
     with the intention to assist in the destruction of
     Great Britain. ***
     The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of
     America did not mean anything but that the United
     States had the hope, hat, as long as the British World
     Empire existed, one day they could advance against
     Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of
     the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally
     isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
     "The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the
     Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to
     maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia,
     but that on the other hand it is proved by this
     attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of
     Japan and Germany.
     "Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance
     to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of
     the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also
     had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he
     (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for
     Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a
     single word of all that he had expounded before the
     Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his
     plans. This would cause him serious damage in political
     and financial circles. Once before, he had committed
     the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for
     Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something about
     his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread
     these things and thus brought about all sorts of
     rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose
     energetically, though as a rule he always tells the
     truth. Under those circumstances he also could not
     indicate, how soon he could report on the questions
     discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He
     would have to study exactly and carefully in the first
     place the development in Japan, so as to make his
     decision at a favorable moment, to make a clean
                                                  [Page 407]
     breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye
     and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be
     made within a few days, because the plans would
     otherwise be spoiled by talk.
     "Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions,
     that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in
     power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities.
     However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had
     great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident
     that he would succeed.
     "On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit
     to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the
     Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed;
     he would, however, state that it was only on a
     hypothetical basis.
     "Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to
     cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason
     to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If
     necessary he would send a courier.
     "The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he
     could rest entirely assured of German reticence.
     "Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German
     reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of
     "The discussion was terminated after the exchange of
     some personal parting words.
     "Berlin, 4 April 1941.
     "(signed) SCHMIDT" (1881-PS)
                                                  [Page 408]

Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Article 6 (a). Vol. I Pg. 5

International Military Tribunal, Indictment
Number 1, Sections IV (F); V. Vol. I Pg. 22,29

[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number
indicates that the document was referred to during the trial
but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason
given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA series number, given in parentheses
following the description of the document, is the official
exhibit number assigned by the court.]

*386-PS; Notes on a conference with
Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937,
signed by Hitler's adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November
1937. (USA 25). Vol. III Pg. 295

*388-PS; File of papers on Case Green
(the plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept by
Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant, April-October 1938. (USA 26)
Vol. III Pg.305

                                                  [Page 409]
442-PS; General Order No. 16 on the
preparation of a landing operation against England, 16 July
1940, initialled by Jodl and Keitel. Vol. III Pg.399

*446-PS; Top Secret Fuehrer Order No.
21 signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Warlimont and
Keitel, 18 December 1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia
(case Barbarossa). (USA 31) Vol. III Pg.407

*789: Speech of the Fuehrer at a
conference, 23 November 1939, to which all Supreme
Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) Vol. III Pg.572

*798-PS; Hitler's speech to
Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA
29) Vol. III Pg.581

*1014-PS; Hitler's speech to
Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. (USA 30) Vol. III

*1881-PS; Notes on conference between
Hitler and Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in Berlin, 4
April 1941. (USA 33) Vol. IV Pg.934

*2261-PS; Directive from Blomberg to
Supreme Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces, 24 June
1935; accompanied by copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May
1935 and copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on
the Council for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) Vol. V Pg.378

                                                  [Page 410]

*2718-PS; Memorandum "About the
result of today's discussion with State Secretaries about
Barbarossa", 2 May 1941. (USA 32) Vol. VII Pg.164

*D-660; Extracts from Hutchinson's
Illustrated edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128) Vol. VII Pg.752

**L-3; Contents of Hitler's talk to
Supreme Commander and Commanding Generals, Obersalzberg, 22
August 1939. (USA 28) (Referred to but not offered in evidence)

*L-79; Minutes of conference, 23 May
1939, "Indoctrination on the political situation and future
aims". (USA 27) Vol. VII Pg.847

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