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Q. You just said that you had discovered that Hitler knew
about the article. When did you discover this?

A. Here, from my co-defendant, Hans Fritzsche.

Q. So, not at the time?

A. No, by no means.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter past

(A recess was taken until 1415 hours.)

DR. SIEMERS: In the meantime I have perused my documents and
I am therefore in a position to carry out the original plan,
that is, of submitting the documents during the examination.

In connection with the document with which we dealt last, C-
126, "Strategic Planning," I should like to submit the
following documents which are contained in the White Books,
documents which have been granted me for my use and which
also concern strategic planning on the part of the Allies:
Exhibit Raeder 33. It is a document dated 9th November,
1939; Exhibit Raeder 34, General Gamelin to General Lelong,
13th November, 1939; and Exhibit Raeder 35, two extracts
from the diary of Jodl, 1809-PS, which concern the measures
taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the Caucasus. It is not
necessary for me to comment on this. I would just like to
call your attention to the questions which I put to the
witness Reichsmarschall Goering on 18th March; he has
already testified regarding the plans of the Allies for the
destruction of the Caucasian oil-fields. And finally in this
connection, Exhibit Raeder 41, to be found in the Document
Book III, Page 205, and the following pages, a report of the
Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin,
dated 16th March, 1940,; it deals with the war plans for the
year 1940, concerning the tightening of the blockade, the
plans regarding the Scandinavian countries and, in addition,
the plans for the destruction of the Russian oil-wells in
the Caucasus.

                                                  [Page 143]


Q. Grand Admiral, before I deal with the separate campaigns
of Greece, Norway, and so forth, I would like to ask you to
answer a question which relates to you personally. What
decorations did you receive from Hitler?

A. I received from Hitler, in addition to the Golden Emblem
which I have already mentioned, in the autumn of 1939, the
Knight's Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year
1941, on the occasion of my sixty-fifth birthday, I received
a donation of 250,000 marks. This donation was given to me
by Hitler through an adjutant and in connection with that he
sent a document.

When I thanked him, he told me that he was giving me this
donation in lieu of a decoration, in the same manner as the
former rulers of Prussia had given their Generals similar
donations, whether as sums of money or as a country estate;
then he emphasized that Field Marshals von Hindenburg and
von Mackensen had received donations from him as well.

Q. Now I shall turn to the passages referring to Greece.
With regard to Greece, the prosecution has quoted Document C-
12, which is Exhibit GB 226. This is to be found in Document
Book No. 10,
Page 1. This document deals with the directive on the part
of Hitler which was transmitted through the OKW, dated 30th
December, 1939, signed by Jodl, and we read under No. 1:

  "Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared
  by the United States to be a barred zone, are to be
  treated as enemy vessels."

This directive on the part of Hitler was made on the basis
of a report put by the SKL. What caused you to make this
report even though Greece was neutral at the time?

A. At that time we had received a large number of reports
from our Intelligence Service, to the effect that Greek
shipping companies, apparently with the knowledge of the
Greek Government, were allowing Greek ships to be chartered
by England under favourable conditions. Therefore these
Greek ships were in the service of England, and according to
that were to be treated in the same way as we were treating
the English merchantmen. These Intelligence reports were
confirmed later on to an even greater degree.

DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit to
the High Tribunal, Exhibit Raeder 53, to be found in my
Document Book III, Page 258. This document deals with the
War Diary kept by the SKL in the month of December, 1939.

On Page 259, under the date of 19th December, the following
entry is made:

  "Greece has put about twenty vessels at the disposal of
  the United States on their sea lanes to Le Havre and

This is confirmed by the reports just mentioned by the

The next entry, on the same page under the date Of 3oth

"Justified by the sale and chartering of numerous Greek
ships to England it has been decreed, with the agreement of
the Fuehrer, that Greek ships in the zone from 20 degrees
West to 2 degrees East and from 44 degrees North to 62
degrees North shall be considered by U-boats as hostile
craft. Attacks to be made invisibly as far as possible."

I also submit the following document, No. 54. This document
is taken from the White Books. It is dated the 23rd of
January, 1940, and it is a report from the German Embassy at
the Hague to the Foreign Office. The heading is: "The
contemplated chartering of fifty to sixty ships to the
British Government." It is not necessary for me to read it.
I should like merely to quote the beginning of the first

"After the British Press brought reports at the end of
November last year" - that is, 1939 - "about the alleged
charterings of Greek vessels to British companies" - and so
forth. Then follows the statement that these fifty to sixty
ships are now chartered by British companies.

                                                  [Page 144]

Even though it is not chronologically correct, I would now
like to first of all conclude the question of Greece. Norway
should be first, but for the sake of coherence I should like
to deal with Greece and the occupation of Greece first.


In Document C-152, Exhibit GB 122, in the Document Book of
the British Delegation, number 10, Page 23, the prosecution
has specifically charged you on (9). It reads:

  "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy requests confirmation
  of the fact that the whole of Greece is to be occupied
  even in the case of a peaceful solution. The Fuehrer:
  'Complete occupation is a stipulation for any

This document concerns your report to Hitler of 18th March,
1941. What were the reasons for your making this proposal?

A. In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the
political intentions of the Fuehrer as far as Greece was
concerned, but I did know of his Directive Number 20, dated
13th December, 1940.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, I would like to mention for
the assistance of the Tribunal that we are dealing with
Document 1541-PS, that is Exhibit GB 117, Document Book of
the British Delegation, 10-A, Page 270. This directive is
dated 13th December, 1940.

A. In this directive the Fuehrer, for the reasons given in
paragraph 1, said that his intention was, as set forth in
paragraph 2: After the setting in of favourable weather,
probably in March, to send this task force to occupy the
North Coast of the Aegean by way of Bulgaria, and, if
necessary, to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation
Marita). He added, that the support of Bulgaria was to be

The next time I heard about these things again was when I
learned, on or about 5th or 6th March, that the British had
landed in the South of Greece on the 3rd. For this reason I
told the Fuehrer that he should occupy the whole of Greece
in order to prevent the British attacking us from the rear,
or establishing air bases and so hampering our conduct of
the war not only in Greece but also in the Eastern

Matters were such that when a political decision had been
made by Hitler of his own accord and without having asked
anyone, I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Naval War Staff,
always had to make my strategic plans to meet this political
decision, and then had to make my proposals on naval and on
other warfare as far as they concerned me.

Since in December he had already considered the possibility
that the whole of Greece would have to be occupied, the time
had now actually come for me to, propose this to him, for
the reason I have already mentioned. When I said "the whole
of Greece," that to me and the Naval Command meant the
entire Greek coast, where the British forces might land.

Q. Your proposal was made about two weeks after British
troops had landed in Greece?

A. Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection I would like to submit
Exhibit Raeder 58, in my Document Book III, Page 271. This
is a document contained in the White Book, according to
which on 4th January - I beg the Tribunal's pardon, Sir
David has corrected me - Document 58 has been rejected and I
withdraw it.

In this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder 59.
It is to be found in Document Book III, Page 273, and is an
extract from the White Book. It is the minutes of the French
War Committee of 26th April, 1940. This document deals with
the decision of the War Committee regarding Norway, the
Caucasus, Roumania, and Greece.

                                                  [Page 145]

I also submit Exhibit Raeder 63, in Document Book III, Page
285, which is an address by the British Secretary of State
for India, Mr. Amery, dated 1st December, 1940. This
document also shows plans regarding Greece, a year and a
quarter before the time just mentioned by the witness.

Now I shall turn to the topic of Norway.


Q. The British Prosecutor, Major Elwyn Jones, considers the
attack against Norway a special case in the series of
aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this
connection he pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not
think of this himself, but rather was persuaded by you.
Since this point is very important, I should like to ask you
to describe this event exactly. Therefore, my first question
is: When was the first conversation about this matter
between you and Hitler?

A. The first conversation between Hitler and myself
concerning the question of Norway was on 10th October, 1939,
and it was at my request. My reason for this request was
that through our Intelligence Service by the intermediary of
Admiral Canaris, we had received reports at various times
during the last week of September that the British intended
to occupy bases in Norway.

I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me
several times, Admiral Canaris, on one occasion, visited me
himself, which was something he only did in very important
cases. And, in the presence of my Chief of Staff, he gave me
comprehensive details of these reports. In them, air bases
were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the South of
Norway. Stavanger and the airport Sova were frequently
mentioned, as was Trondheim, and occasionally Christiansund.

On one of the last days of September I had a telephone
conversation with Admiral Karls, who was the Commander-in-
Chief of Navy Group North, and was therefore in charge of
operations in the Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in the North
Sea. This man had obviously received similar reports. He
informed me that he had composed a private letter addressed
to me, in which he dealt with the danger of Norway being
occupied by British forces and in a general way, with the
disadvantages such a step would have, for us, and whether we
should have to forestall such an attempt. He also dealt with
the advantages or disadvantages of the occupation by our
forces of Norway - that is, of the Norwegian coast and the
Norwegian bases.

Up to that point I had not concerned myself with the
Norwegian question at all except for the fact that I had
received the reports from the Intelligence Service But when
I received this letter at the end of September or the
beginning of October, it must have been about then, I felt
bound to show it to the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to
instruct him, with all dispatch, to deal with the question
of the occupation of Norwegian bases by England, and the
other questions which Admiral Karls had dealt with, and to
have the following points discussed in the SKL: what would
be the advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the
war towards the North, not only of an expansion on our part,
but, above all, an expansion on the part of England; would
we gain by acting first; what disadvantages would result if
we had to defend the Norwegian coast?

The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in
Document C-122, Exhibit GB 82: as to what places were to be
used as bases; what would be our chances of defence; whether
these ports would have to be developed further; and also,
what would be the gain to our U-boats?

These questions, as I have already stated, were put to
Admiral Donitz as well, but his answers arrived only after I
had made the report on 10th October. I would like to say, by
way of introduction, that it was entirely clear to me that
occupation of these bases could constitute a violation of
neutrality. But I also knew of the assurance given by the
German to the Norwegian Government on the 2nd of

                                                  [Page 146]

September, regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding
sentence, in the aide-memoire, which is Document TC-31,
Exhibit GB 79, dated 2nd September, 1939.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point
out, Mr. President, that this document is found in the
Document Book of the British Delegation 10-A, at Page 330.


Q. You have that document before you?

A. Yes, I have, it before me, and I would like to quote the
concluding sentence.

DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, your
Honour, at page 329.

A. (continuing). The last sentence: "Should the attitude of
the Royal Norwegian Government deviate from this so that any
such breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich
Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard
the interests of the Reich in such a way as would be forced
upon the Reich Cabinet by the resulting situation."

Then, within the next few days, I asked the Chief of Staff
of the SKL to submit to me the data which the SKL had
prepared during the preceding days. Then I reported to
Hitler on the 10th of October, because I considered this
problem tremendously important. It was entirely clear to me
that the best possible solution for us would be that Norway
should maintain a reliable neutrality, and I expressed my
opinion, as maybe seen in Document C-21, Exhibit GB 194.
This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.

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