The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

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Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-06-57.16
Last-Modified: 1997/11/08

The third satellite of Germany, Hungary, is not mentioned at
all in Case "Barbarossa."

However, this certainly cannot be taken to mean that the
participation of Hungary in the aggression against the
Soviet Union had not been planned by the Fascist

I ask permission to refer to the testimony of Paulus
(although he has already testified before the Tribunal)
which shows very clearly...

THE PRESIDENT: You aren't going to give us Paulus' affidavit
over again, are you? We have already had Paulus' evidence in

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, I have already mentioned that this
testimony has been presented as Exhibit USSR 182. It is the
record of the interrogation of Paulus by General Rudenko. A
copy of this record may be produced before the Tribunal now
and, furthermore, it is on Page 143 of the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: We have got his actual oral evidence; we
don't want his interrogation.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: But I really need one particular
paragraph of his testimony in order to show the connection
between the subsequent documents relating to Hungary and the
contents of my statement. It is just a few lines only.

THE PRESIDENT: It is surely cumulative, is it not?

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: That which was presented to the
Tribunal I could express in my own words in two sentences.

PRESIDENT: Is it in any way different from what Paulus has
already said?

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Yes. If you will forgive me. I have
just been told that Colonel Pokrovsky has already read that
extract into the record. I shall therefore merely give a
very brief summary of the extract and then pass on to a
further subject and shall not repeat myself.

I have in mind, on the one hand, those paragraphs of Paulus'
affidavit which state that the leading factor of Hungary's
policy was the full recognition of Germany's leading rule
and was determined by two basic factors, one, the desire for
territorial conquests with the help of Germany, and two, the
fear of the growing power of Roumania as Germany's ally,
and, on the other hand, I have in mind that passage where
Paulus states that Hitler was far more prudent in disclosing
his plans to Hungary than to the other satellites, because
he considered the Hungarians as garrulous. It is true that
Paulus immediately adds (on Page 2 of his affidavit) that:

                                                  [Page 290]
     "The main reason was Hitler's unwillingness to give
     Hungary a chance of seizing the oil fields in the
     Russian oil district of Drogobytch."
Following the opening of the offensive against the Soviet
Union, the Supreme Command of the Army (O.K.H.) issued an
order to the 17th Army to seize Drogobytch before the
arrival of the Hungarians.

Further, Paulus describes the circumstances of his
negotiations with the Hungarians regarding armament
supplies. This -- all this -- has already been mentioned by
Colonel Pokrovsky. I wish only to refer to the fact that
this testimony of Paulus' has undoubtedly lifted a corner of
the veil of mystery shrouding the mutual relations between
the German and Hungarian aggressors.

In this connection, I consider it imperative to return to
the depositions by Ruskizai-Ruediger which are already at
the disposal of the Tribunal. This document has been
presented as Exhibit USSR 294.

Touching on the occupation by Hungary of the Transcarpathian
Ukraine in 1939, Ruskizai-Ruediger testified (see Page 3,
Paragraph 3, of the Russian text of the depositions which
can be found on Page 101 of the document book), the
following quotations are underlined:

     "_This took place _ not long before the outbreak of the
     German-Polish war. It then appeared as if economic
     advantages and shaking off the fetters of the Trianon
     Treaty were, for Hungary, the primary objectives of the
     But from the time when the region of the
     Transcarpathian Ukraine acquired a common boundary with
     Soviet Russia _ we began to attach a entirely different
     significance to this region which we had occupied.
     It was clear to us, the high-ranking officers, that the
     political leadership of both Germany and Hungary also
     considered this region strategically important for
     future military operations against Soviet Russia."
On Page 9, paragraph 2 from the bottom, Ruskizai-Ruediger
tells us of a conference which took place at the end of
March, 1941, in the course of which the Hungarian Minister
of War, Barta, outlined the objectives of the war with
Yugoslavia. Among these objectives Barta pointed directly to
the necessity of eliminating Yugoslavia as a possible ally
of the Soviet Union.

However, a more complete picture of German-Hungarian
relations, which were determined by the preparation of an
attack against the Soviet Union, is contained in the
statement by the Hungarian Major-General, Esteban Ujszaszy.

From 1st May, 1939, to 1st July, 1942, Ujszaszy was Chief of
the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the
Hungarian General Staff. In his official capacity during
these years, he had inside information on the secrets which
shrouded this preparation.

Some of the things which he knew, he communicated to us in
the document which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR
155. I ask you to accept this document as evidence.

I will read into the record that part of Ujszaszy's
statement which may clarify the question at issue. Beginning
from Page 2 of the Russian text (this corresponds to Page
149 of the document book) we find Section 2 entitled,
"Preparation of Germany and Hungary for War against Soviet
Russia." Paragraph 1 of this section is devoted to "Halder's
letters." I quote:

     "In November, 1940, the German Military Attach‚ in
     Budapest, Colonel Guenther Krappe of the German General
     Staff, was received in audience by the Chief of the
     Royal Hungarian General Staff, Henry Werth. Krappe
     brought a letter from the Chief of the General Staff of
     the German Army, Colonel-General Halder.
     In that letter Halder informed Werth that in the spring
     of 1941, Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, if
     necessary by force of arms, to take a
                                                  [Page 291]
     definite line in order to exclude, at a later date, the
     menace of a Russian attack from the rear. In this
     preventive war, possibly against Yugoslavia and
     definitely against Soviet Russia, Hungary would have to
     participate if only in her own interests.
     Werth replied that he agreed with Halder's concept but
     drew attention to the lack of equipment in the
     Hungarian Army, which, at that time, was not ready for
     war against Soviet Russia. His reply, in the main, was
     a request for the completion, by Germany, of Hungary's
     I was informed of Halder's letter and Werth's reply
     thereto, by General Werth in person. After that a
     Hungarian armament commission was invited to Berlin. It
     consisted of officer-specialists from the Main
     Ordinance Supply Division of the Royal Hungarian War
     Ministry, and, in December, 1940, the Commission left
     for Berlin. The Hungarian requests were as follows:
     delivery of outstanding balance of order for 10-cm. So-
     called Goering field howitzers and of up-to-date tanks
     for the two mobile divisions."
THE PRESIDENT: General, could you not pass on to December,
1940, where Field Marshal Keitel invites the Hungarian
Minister of Defence to come to Berlin. It is just a few
sentences down.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, I am passing on to this paragraph:

     "In December, 1940, the Chief of Staff of the O.K.W.,
     Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, invited the Hungarian
     Minister War, General Carl Barta, to come to Berlin in
     order to:
          a)   discuss personally the problem of armaments;
          b) elaborate a plan of military and political
          collaboration between Germany and Hungary for
     This invitation was transmitted to Budapest through the
     Royal Hungarian Military Attach‚ in Berlin, Colonel
     Alexander Homlok. At the same time, I received a
     similar invitation from Admiral Canaris, Chief of the
     Ausland Abwehr section of the O.K.W."
I omit a long list given by Ujszaszy of persons who
accompanied Barta on his trip and I read further from Page
151 of the document book:

     "_an agreement was reached on the following:
     _In the spring of 1941 the position of Yugoslavia will
     be clarified, the menace of a Russian Soviet attack in
     the rear eliminated. For this purpose the Hungarian
     Army, reinforced by the delivery of 10-cm. field
     howitzers and with up-to-date tanks for a 'Mobile
     Brigade,' will be ready for action. For the war against
     Russia, Hungary must place at the disposal of Germany,
     15 operational units including three mobile, one
     cavalry and one tank unit; she must also complete, by
     1st June, 1941, the erection of fortifications in
     Transcarpathian Russia, facilitate the advance of the
     German troops in the areas adjacent to the Hungarian-
     Yugoslav and the Hungarian-Soviet frontiers, and the
     passage of supplies for the troops through Hungary. The
     details for the preparation of operations will be
     determined later by representatives of the German
     General Staff about to be sent to Hungary. As a
     political compensation for her participation in the
     war, Hungary will receive territory in Yugoslavia and
     in Russia, the ancient Principality of Galitz, and all
     the land at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains, up to
     the River Dniester."

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