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MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I have drawn the Tribunal's attention to
the circulation of Hitler's order to shoot Commandos. I now
draw the Tribunal's attention to an example of the execution
of that order by the German Navy during the period when
Raeder was its Commander.

My learned friend, Mr. Roberts, has already given the
Tribunal an account of a Commando operation of December,
1942, which had as its objective an attack on shipping in
Bordeaux harbour. The Tribunal will recollect that the
Wehrmacht account he quoted, U.K. 57, Exhibit GB 164, stated
that six of the ten participants in that Commando raid were
arrested and that all were shot on 23rd March, 1943. In
connection with that episode the prosecution has a further
document throwing more light on this Bordeaux incident, and
showing how much more expeditiously the Navy under Raeder
had implemented Hitler's order on this particular occasion.
I draw the Court's attention to Document C-176, at Page 61
of the document book, Exhibit GB 228.

                                                  [Page 276]

That document consists of extracts from the war diary of
Admiral Bachmann, who was the German Flag Officer in charge
of Western France. The first entry, at Page 61, is dated
10th December, 1942, and reads:

  "About 10.15. Telephone call from personal representative
  of the Officer-in-Charge of the Security Service in
  Paris, S.S. Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt, to Flag
  Lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as
  interrogation had not been concluded.
  
  After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff the
  Security Service had been directed to get approval direct
  from Headquarters.
  
  18.20. Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security
  Service authorities at Fuehrer's headquarters to postpone
  the shooting for three days. Interrogations continued for
  the time being."

The next day, 11th December, 1942:

  "Shooting of two prisoners was carried out by a unit
  belonging to the naval officer in charge, Bordeaux, in
  the presence of an officer of the Security Service,
  Bordeaux, on order of the Fuehrer."

Then there is a note in green pencil in the margin opposite
the entry which reads:

  "Security Service should have done this. Phone Flag
  Officer in Charge in future cases."

The Tribunal will therefore see from this Document, C-176,
that the first two gallant men to be shot as a result of the
Bordeaux operation were actually put to death by a naval
firing party on 11th December, 1942. They were Sergeant
Wallace and Marine Ewart, who had the misfortune to be
captured on 8th December in the preliminary stages of the
operation.

Of interest is the comment of the Naval War Staff upon this
shooting, which is found in Document D-658.

THE PRESIDENT: What do the last two lines in Document C-176
about the operation being "particularly favoured" mean?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: "The operation was particularly favoured
by the weather conditions and the dark night" - that
presumably, my Lord, is a reference to the operation of the
Marine Commandos in successfully blowing up a number of
German ships in Bordeaux harbour. Alternatively, I am
advised by the naval officer who is assisting me, that it
probably is a reference to the conditions prevailing at the
time of the shooting of the two men.

THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought so.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I stand corrected by the representative
of the British Navy upon my interpretation of the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: Does not it indicate that naval men had done
it?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: The shooting was in fact, as the entry of
11th December shows, carried out by a naval party-by units
belonging to the naval officer in charge of Bordeaux.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I was seeking to draw the Tribunal's
attention to the comment of the Naval War Staff upon that
shooting, which is in Document D-658, at Page 109, Exhibit
GB 229. It reads:

  "The Naval Commander, West France, reports that during
  the course of the day, explosives with attachable
  magnets, mapping material dealing with the mouth of the
  Gironde, aerial photographs of the port installations at
  Bordeaux, camouflage material and food and water for
  several days were found. Attempts to salvage the canoe
  were unsuccessful. The Naval Commander, West France, has
  ordered that both soldiers be shot immediately for
  attempted sabotage, if their interrogation, which has
  begun, confirms what has so far been discovered; their
  execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain
  more information.

                                                  [Page 277]
  
  According to a Wehrmacht report, both soldiers have
  meanwhile been shot. The measure would be in accordance
  with the Fuehrer's special order, but is nevertheless
  something new in International Law, since the soldiers
  were in uniform."

I submit that that last sentence shows very clearly that the
Naval High Command, under. Raeder, accepted allegiance to
the Nazi conspiracy as of greater importance than any
question of moral principle or of professional honour and
integrity. This operation of the shooting of those two
Commandos was, as I submit, not an act of war, but a murder
of two gallant men, and it is upon this sombre note that it
is my duty to summarise this part of the prosecution's case
against the defendant Raeder.

The prosecution's submission is that he was not just a
military puppet carrying out political orders. The Tribunal
has seen that, before the Nazis came, he had worked actively
to rebuild the German Navy behind the back of the Reichstag.
When the Nazis seized power, he unreservedly joined forces
with them. He was the prime mover in transferring the
loyalty of the German Navy to the Nazi Party. He was as much
a member of the inner councils of the Nazis as possibly any
other defendant. And he was a member of their main political
advisory bodies.

He was well aware of their aggressive designs, and I submit
he assisted in their realisation not only as a military
technician, but also as a mendacious politician, and he
furthered, as I have submitted, their brutal methods of
warfare. Yet of all these conspirators, Raeder was one of
the first to fall from his high position. It is in fact true
that the extension of war beyond the boundaries of Poland
came as a disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi Armada
mastering the Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop's
diplomacy and Hitler's ideas of strategy.

I would draw the Tribunal's attention to Document C-161, at
Page 35 of the document book, which is an extract, GB 230,
from a memorandum of Raeder, dated 10th January, 1943, just
before his retirement, entitled, "The Importance of German
Surface Forces for Conducting the War by the Powers
Signatory to the Three-Power-Pact." The material entry
reads:

  "It was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist
  Reich to give the German Navy by 1944-45 such a strength
  that it would be possible to strike at the British vital
  arteries in the Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting
  power and range.
  
  The war having begun five years earlier, in 1939, the
  construction of these forces was still in its initial
  stages."

The Tribunal will see from that document how completely
Raeder was cheated in his ambitious plans, by miscalculation
as to when his high seas fleet would be required. The
Tribunal has seen that Raeder made a great effort to recover
some of his lost glory, with his attack on an inoffensive
Norway. He made many efforts to liven up the war at sea,
both at the expense of neutrals and also of the customs and
laws of the sea. But his further schemes were disregarded by
his fellow conspirators, and in January, 1943, Raeder
retired, and thereafter he was a leader in name only.

I invite the Court's attention to Document D-655, at Page
108 of the document book, Exhibit GB 231, which is a record
in Raeder's handwriting of his interview with Hitler on 6th
January, 1943, which led to Raeder's retirement. I am
proposing to read only the fifth paragraph, in which Raeder
records:
  
  "If the Fuehrer was anxious to demonstrate that the
  parting was of the friendliest character and wished that
  the name Raeder should continue to be associated with the
  Navy, particularly abroad, it would perhaps be possible
  to make an appointment to General Inspector, giving
  appropriate publicity in the Press, etc. But a new C.-in-
  C. Navy with full responsibility for this office must be
  appointed. The position of Inspector
  
                                                  [Page 278]
  
  General, or whatever it was decided to call it, must be
  purely nominal. Hitler," the record reads, "accepted this
  suggestion with alacrity. The Inspector General could
  perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make tours of
  inspection, etc. The name of Raeder was still to be
  associated with the Navy. After C.-in-C. Navy had
  repeated his request, the Fuehrer definitely agreed to
  30th January as his release date. He would like to think
  over the details."

This was Raeder's twilight, and indeed a very different
occasion from the period of his ascendancy in 1939, when on
12th March Raeder spoke on the occasion of the German
Heroes' Day. I now refer the Court to the final document on
Raeder, an account of that speech in March, 1939, which is
at Page 103 of the document book, in Document D-653, Exhibit
GB 232. The first paragraph reads:

  "Throughout Germany celebrations took place on the
  occasion of Hero Commemoration Day. On 12th March, 1939,
  these celebrations were combined for the first time with
  the celebration of the freedom to rearm. The day's chief
  event was the ceremony held in the Berlin State Opera
  House in Unter den Linden. In the presence of Hitler and
  representatives of the Party and Armed Forces, General
  Admiral Raeder made a speech, extracts from which are
  given below."

I turn to Page 2 of the record, Page 104 of the document
book, to about the fifteenth line.

  "National Socialism," says Raeder, "which originates from
  the spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been
  chosen by the German people as its ideology. The German
  people follow the symbols of its regeneration with the
  same great love and fanatical passion. The German people
  has had practical experience of National Socialism and it
  has not been imposed, as so many critics believe. The
  Fuehrer has shown his people that in the National
  Socialist racial community lies the greatest and
  invincible source of strength, whose dynamic power
  ensures not only peace at home, but also enables us to
  make use of all the Nation's creative powers."

There follow eulogies of Hitler, and, a few sentences below:

  "This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons
  to fight Bolshevism and international Jewry, whose race-
  destroying activities we have sufficiently experienced on
  our own people. Therefore, the alliance with all like-
  minded nations who, like Germany, are not willing to
  allow their strength, dedicated to construction and
  peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by alien
  ideologies as by parasites of a foreign race"

Then a few sentences on:

  "If later on we instruct in the technical handling of
  weapons, this task demands that the young soldier should
  also be taught National Socialist ideology and the
  problems of life. This part of the task, which becomes
  for us both a duty of honour and a demand which cannot be
  refused, can and will be carried out if we stand shoulder
  to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the Party and
  its organisations."

The next sentence:

  "The Armed Forces and the Party thus became more and more
  united in attitude and spirit."

And then just two sentences on the next page:

  "Germany is the protector of all Germans within and
  beyond our frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are
  proof of that."

That refers, of course, to the bombardment of the Spanish
town of Almeria,  carried out by a German naval squadron on
31st May, 1937, during the course of the Spanish Civil War.

There are further references to the Fuehrer and his
leadership, and then a final sentence of the first paragraph
of Page 3:

                                                  [Page 279]
  
  "They all planted into a younger generation the great
  tradition of death for a holy cause, knowing that with
  their blood they will lead the way towards the freedom of
  their dreams."

My submission is that that speech of Raeder's is the final
proof of his deep personal involvement in the Nazi
conspiracy. There is the mixture of heroics and fatalism
that led millions of Germans to slaughter. There are boasts
of violence used on the people of Almeria. There is the lip
service to peace by a man who planned conquest. "Armed Force
and Party have become more and more united in altitude and
spirit" - there is the authentic Nazi voice. There is the
assertion of racialism. Finally, there is the anti-Semitic
gesture, Raeder's contribution to the outlook that produced
Belsen. Imbued with these ideas he became an active
participant on both the political and military level in the
Nazi conspiracy to wage wars of aggression and to wage them
ruthlessly.

MR. ALBRECHT: May it please the Tribunal, the United States
will continue with the presentation, showing the individual
responsibility of the defendant von Schirach. It will be
made by Captain Sprecher.

CAPTAIN SPRECHER: May it please the Tribunal, it is my
responsibility to present the individual responsibility of
the defendant Schirach for Crimes against the Peace, War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as they concern directly
the Common Plan or Conspiracy.

The prosecution contends that the defendant Schirach is
guilty of having exercised a leading part in the Nazi
conspiracy from 1925 until the Nazi downfall.

The conspiratorial acts and the criminality of the defendant
Schirach may be grouped for purposes of convenience into
three principal phases: (1) his early support of the
conspirators over the period 1925-29; (2) his leadership and
direction of German youth over the period 1929-45; (3) his
leadership of the Reichgau Vienna as chief representative of
the Nazi Party and the Nazi State in Vienna for the period
July, 1940 to 1945. The presentation will take up each of
these principal phases after a brief listing of all the
principal positions which Schirach held.

In presenting first a listing of the positions held by
Schirach, it is not intended immediately to describe the
functions of each of these positions. In so far as a
description of the functions of any particular position is
still felt necessary at this stage of the trial, it will be
given later during the discussion of Schirach's
conspiratorial acts as Nazi Youth Leader and as Nazi
official in Vienna.

For the consideration of the Tribunal, we have submitted a
brief on this subject. The document book contains English
translations of 29 documents. Although we feel that we have
reduced the number of documents to the minimum, the document
book is still large. But Schirach's subversion of German
youth is a large subject, even apart from any of his other
acts. Most of these documents are from German publications,
of which the Tribunal can take judicial notice. Therefore,
in most cases, it is intended only to paraphrase these
documents, unless the Tribunal in particular instances will
indicate that they would like fuller treatment.

Before passing to the proof, I want to express my
appreciation, particularly to Major Hartley Murray, Lt. Fred
Nisbergall at my right, and Mr. Norbert Hailpern, for their
assistance in research, analysis, translation, and
organisation of these materials.

Schirach agrees he held the following positions: They are
found in two affidavits, an affidavit of certificate and one
affidavit of report dated December, 1945, which is Document
3302-PS, document book, Page 110.

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