Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-22/tgmwc-22-212.03 Last-Modified: 2001/01/21 Therefore, in this trial before the International Military Tribunal it does not matter whether the SD supported the SS, the Secret State Police, the Party, or individual persons of the State leadership, unless the prosecution has brought the proof of the prerequisites which I have indicated: (a) Existence of a secret plan for the commission of crimes according to Article 6 of the Charter and (b) Knowledge of the members of the SD. Furthermore, the factual submission of the prosecution concerning the co-operation of the SD with the SS, the Secret State Police, or other persons, require correction. I shall not read Pages 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, or 54. I shall continue on Page 55 in the second paragraph. Concerning the aims, purposes and methods of the indicted Amt III, I should like to refer to statements made in Document SD 70, the handbook of the Supreme Headquarters of the United Nations of April, 1945. There it says: "The SD maintained for its purposes a network of reporters throughout all fields of life in Germany - some words are missing - who were recruited from all social strata and professions. The information gained through reporters was used in the situation reports - These reports are exceptionally frank and contain a complete and uncoloured picture of the mood and attitude in Germany - " The correctness of this is proven by the 649 affidavits submitted in my summary and made by former full-time and honorary workers, Vertrauensmanner (persons entrusted with special tasks) for the total area of the Reich and for parts of the Reich. The aims, purposes and activities of Amt VI are shown by the Affidavits SD-61, 62 and 66 from Document SD-1. In regard to Amt VI, I refer particularly to Affidavit SD- 66. I shall now turn to Section (b): Crimes Against Peace (Statement of Evidence V of the English Trial Brief against the Gestapo and SD). As committing a Crime Against Peace the SD is accused of having staged so-called border incidents before the outbreak of the war to give Hitler an excuse for starting the war. The prosecution, however, referred to only one border incident in which the SD is alleged to have participated. That is the alleged attack on the Gleiwitz radio station. In this connection the prosecution made reference to the affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, of 20th November, 1945. This is Document PS-2751. The deponent of Document PS-2751, Alfred Naujocks, was heard before the Commission. On that occasion he declared that the execution of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station was not included in the aims and purposes of Amter III and VI (Record of the Commission, Page 147 of the German text). The witness further testified that no sections of Amter III and VI were used for the execution of that border incident in Gleiwitz and that the men who with him attacked the Gleiwitz station did not belong to the SD, Amt III (Record of the Commission, Page 150). The witness also stated that by the term "SD men" in his affidavit of 20th November, 1945, he did not mean the members of any definite office of the [Page 147] RSHA; but common usage of the term "SD men" referred to RSHA members of all offices which were subordinate to Heydrich. The witness further stated that he was charged with the execution of the border incident at Gleiwitz, not because he belonged to Amt VI and worked there, but that exclusively personal reasons made for that decision (Record of the Commission, Page 150). The witness testified that on the basis of the conversation he had had with Heydrich he had gained the impression that Heydrich would have given him that assignment even if he had not been a member of Amt VI and the SS. The order for the execution of this assignment reached the witness Naujocks not through the official channels of the Chiefs of Amt III or VI. The Chiefs of Amter III and VI had no knowledge of this action. The members of the SD, Amter III and VI, had no knowledge that the attack was carried out by Naujocks, a member of Amt VI. Particularly the members of the SD Leitabschnitt which was in charge of Gleiwitz and the output of the SD had no knowledge of this activity, and they could not have had because Naujocks had been forbidden to get in touch with any members of the SD whatsoever in that territory. The statements of this witness have been reaffirmed by witness Somman and through the Affidavit SD 11 deposed by Dr. Marx. I also submitted 215 affidavits for the office of the RSHA as well as for all territories of the SD Leitabschnitte and the SD Abschnitte, particularly for those situated in the regions of Katowice, Danzig and Saxony. Those affidavits testify that the members of the SD during the critical time had no knowledge of the faked border incidents or the participation of the SD in them. Page 59 will not be read. I shall turn to Page 60, which deals with the Einsatzgruppen. In order to judge whether the SD can be declared criminal on the grounds of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, the following questions must be examined: 1. Did the Einsatzgruppen A, B, C and D, which were assigned in the East to the army groups, belong to the organization of Amter III and VI? 2. Were parts of these office organizations used in these Einsatzgruppen? 3. Did the Amter III, VI or III/VI give orders to the Einsatzgruppen to commit crimes against the laws of war and against humanity? 4. Did the members of the Inland Information Service (Amt III) or of the Foreign Information Service (Amt VI) have any knowledge of activities of the Einsatzgruppen which are crimes in the sense of the Charter? First I must rectify an error. In this Trial and before the Commission the Einsatzgruppen have repeatedly been designated as Einsatzgruppen of the SD, up to a short time ago. As an example, I refer in particular to the records of Keitel, Dr. Best, Hauser and von Manstein. (These are in the Record at Pages 72/46/47, 14442, 14706, 15003-4, 15007, 15010-11, and 15041.) This designation is wrong. The four Einsatzgruppen employed in the East were designated by A, B, C and D. They had under them the Einsatzkommandos, which were designated by the numbers 1 to 12. Thus the word "SD" is mentioned neither in the designation of the Einsatzgruppen nor of the Einsatzkommandos. Furthermore, there was no reason for that, since, according to the evidence submitted by the prosecution, only 3 per cent of their members were part of the SD Amter III or VI. The members of the SD were in the eighth place, as far as membership was concerned. I refer you to the statistics found in Document L-180 submitted by the prosecution. (Repeated in the Record at Page 1676 of the German text.) The designation of the Einsatzgruppen is also shown by the distribution list of prosecution Document D-569. This shows the various relationships. The Einsatzkommandos 1-a, 1-b, 2 and 3 were under Einsatzgruppe A. The Einsatzkommandos 7-a, 7-b, 8, 9, Moscow, were under Einsatzgruppe B; 4-a, 4-b, 5 [Page 148] and 6 were under Einsatzgruppe C; 10-a, 10-b, 11-a, 11-b and 12 were under Einsatzgruppe D. The setting up of the Einsatzgruppen was not ordered by Amt III, VI, or VII, but by Himmler on the basis of an agreement with the OKH. I refer you to the testimony of Dr. Best, Schellenberg and Ohlendorf, to Exhibit USA 1557 and Affidavits SD Nos- 41 and 46. The evidence has shown further that the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were not under the orders of Amts III, VI and VII. (I refer again to Exhibit USA 557, Affidavits SD Nos- 41, 44 and 46, to the record on Pages 1812-14, and 1850-51, to prosecution Document L-180, Pages 2 and 3, to the record at Pages 10906- 08 and Document PS-2620.) If one considers in particular the constitution of the Einsatzgruppen which is set forth on Page 1676 of the record in German, one will have to admit, as has been deposed by the witness Hoeppner and confirmed by the witness Bendt in Affidavit SD 41, that this concerns an affiliation of a special kind of persons who did not belong to the organizations of Amter III, VI or VII. The evidence has further shown that no parts of the organizations of Amter III, VI or VII were employed in the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos, and that the Amter III, VI and VII did not issue any orders for the mass destruction carried out by the Einsatzgruppen. I refer to Affidavit SD 61, the record of the Commission at Pages 2181 and 2217, Affidavit SD 41, and particularly the answers to questions 6 and 9, and to Affidavit SD 44, Nos- 4 and 5. The Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos are special units which deviated in their composition entirely from the structure of the Security Police and SD in the Reich itself. I refer in this connection to the statements of Ohlendorf and Hoeppner and to the Affidavits SD 41 and SD 46. The witness Best testified (on Page 14431 of the record): "They were Security Police Units of a special kind." It is of decisive significance for the question whether the organization can be declared criminal that no parts of the SD, Amter III, VI or VII, were employed in the Einsatzgruppen, but only individual members were assigned to these Einsatzgruppen as a result of legal regulations. In this connection Hoettl's affidavit of 10th April, 1946, seems especially important to me. I emphasize that this is a prosecution document. Hoettl declared in the affidavit mentioned that the membership of the people in the SD was inactive during their affiliation with the Einsatzgruppen. (Pages 14504-5 of the German record.) In so far as members of Amter III, VI and VII were assigned by legal order to the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos in the East, I refer for their tasks and activities to the testimony of Dr. Ehlich, and von Manstein, and to Affidavit SD 69. The selection of the members of the Security Service for the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos was not on the basis of their position and duties in the home offices. For that point I refer to the testimony of Ohlendorf and Affidavits SD 41 and SD 45. Thus I come to the conclusion: (1) Einsatzgruppen A, B, C and D did not belong to the Domestic Intelligence Service, Amt III, to the Foreign Intelligence Service, Amt VI, or to Amt VII. (2) No parts of this organization were used for this purpose, but individual members were assigned to the Einsatzgruppen. (3) The legal position of these persons was the same as, for, example, that of persons who had been called up for military service. Their affiliation with Amter III, VI, or VII was inactive. They were no longer subject to instructions from their home offices. I shall omit the next pages, 64, 65, 66, 67. Pages 68 to 71 refer to the Einsatzkommandos in prisoner-of-war camps (Statement of evidence). THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, the Tribunal understands that the SS, the Gestapo and the SD all disclaim responsibility for the Einsatzgruppen. Could you tell the Tribunal who is responsible for the Einsatzgruppen? [Page 149] DR. GAWLIK: The Einsatzgruppen were subordinated to - the responsibility may be seen from my statement on Page 61. I should like to refer you to the testimony of Dr. Best, Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and document - THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, the Tribunal would like to know who you say was responsible for the Einsatzgruppen. They do not want to be referred to a crowd of documents and a crowd of witnesses. They want to know what your contention is. DR. GAWLIK: The Einsatzgruppen, in my opinion, were organizations of a special kind which were directly under Himmler, and for the rest, the testimony of the witnesses differs as to how far they were subordinate to the commanders-in-chief. Some of the witnesses have stated that they were subordinate to the commanders-in-chief, and some disputed this. As far as this question is concerned, I cannot define my attitude. THE PRESIDENT: Was it possible, according to your contention, for Himmler to control these Einsatzgruppen without any organization, and if it was not, what organization controlled it? DR. GAWLIK: The Einsatzgruppen had their own head, as may be seen from prosecution Document 180-L, the Stahlecker report. Stahlecker was the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe A, and this man probably sent this report, which was found, directly to Himmler, and from that I may assume that the heads of the Einsatzgruppen were directly under Himmler. It was a subordinate organization along with the RSHA for occupied countries. Your Lordship, may I - THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell the Tribunal who were the individual men who composed the Einsatzgruppen? Did they consist of SS or SA or SD or the Wehrmacht? DR. GAWLIK: Your Lordship, the composition may be seen on Page 1676 of the German transcript. I do not remember them exactly, your Lordship, but I do know that they contained Waffen SS, Criminal Police, State Police, SD - THE PRESIDENT: You are too fast. Waffen SS? DR. GAWLIK: Waffen SS, Criminal Police, State Police, SD, and on this page, as far as I can recall, NSKK [N.B. Kraftfahrer (German Text).] is mentioned, and I believe interpreters, but I cannot tell you that for certain. The various groups are stated exactly on this page, your Lordship, which is Page 17 - THE PRESIDENT: The last that I have down is NSKK. What did you say after that? DR. GAWLIK: No, your Lordship, not NSKK. THE PRESIDENT: I have down Waffen SS, Criminal Police - DR. GAWLIK: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: State Police? DR. GAWLIK: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: SD? DR. GAWLIK: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: NSKK? DR. GAWLIK: No, your Lordship, Kraftfahrer (drivers of motor vehicles). THE PRESIDENT: I have struck out NSKK. [Page 150] DR. GAWLIK: Your Lordship, there is a mistake. NSKK is not participating, here. THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything else? Any Gestapo? DR. GAWLIK: Yes, Gestapo, of course. Your Lordship, State Police and Gestapo are identical. Interpreters are enumerated in this document. I believe these were the main groups, but at the moment I cannot tell you for certain, but only as I remember it. THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. DR. GAWLIK: I beg your pardon, did your Lordship wish to know the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen or the members? THE PRESIDENT: I mean the memberships. DR. GAWLIK: Yes, that is quite correct. Your Lordship, I wanted to add that altogether there were a thousand to twelve hundred men in these four Einsatzgruppen. THE PRESIDENT: How many did you say? DR. GAWLIK: One thousand men to approximately twelve hundred men, and from the SD there were three per cent. That may be seen from the document: It is Document 180-L. The set-up is shown there. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for a recess. (A recess was taken.) DR. GAWLIK: Your Lordship, I shall have to correct my statement regarding the Einsatzgruppen on one point. I procured Document 180-L during the recess, and the total strength of Einsatzgruppen A was 990 men. It was composed as follows: Waffen SS, 34 per cent; drivers (Kraftfahrer) 17 per cent; administration, 1.8 per cent; SD, 3.5 per cent; criminal police (Kripo), 4.1 per cent; State police (Stapo), 9 per cent; auxiliary police, 8.8 per cent - those, your Lordship, were apparently the policemen of the occupied territories - regular police, 13.4 per cent; female employees, 1.3 per cent; interpreters, 5.1 per cent; teleprinter operators, 3 per cent; wireless operators, 8 per cent. That is Einsatzgruppe A, as far as I know; no documents are available for Einsatzgruppen B, C, and D, but the witnesses have testified that B, C, and D had about the same ratio. THE PRESIDENT: Then the extent is nearly four times as large as you said? DR. GAWLIK: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Can you give a date for the constitution of Group A? What date was it? DR. GAWLIK: The Einsatzgruppen were formed before the beginning of campaign, before June, 1941. THE PRESIDENT: When you get down to 3 per cent, that must have been at a certain time. It could not have remained 3 per cent all the time, could it, or is that an establishment? DR. GAWLIK: Your Lordship, I do not understand. Which 3 do you mean?
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