Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-06-58.01 Last-Modified:1997/10/11 [Page 297] MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Your Honors, yesterday afternoon I dwelt on the fact that Case "Barbarossa" had foreseen the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, of excluding the possibility of a retreat into the interior of such Red Army units as were still capable of fighting, and of obtaining, by rapid action, a combat line for the German Fascist invaders which would place the regions of Germany beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force. The final aim, according to Case "Barbarossa", was fortification of the Astrakhan-Archangel Line, the destruction from the air of the Ural industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt and, as a decisive finale, the capture of Moscow. The political aims which determined the military plans were formulated by the Hitlerites in the many documents which were read into the record in this courtroom. But these aims were stated particularly clearly at the meeting in Hitler's headquarters on 16th July, 1941. This document was presented by the American Prosecution as 221-L. You will find it on Page 141 of the document book. At this meeting Hitler, Goering, Rosenberg, Keitel and other Fascist conspirators were deciding, as they thought, the subsequent fortunes of the Soviet Union. The Crimea, together with the adjoining regions of the Ukraine, the Baltic regions, the Byelostok Forests and the Kola Peninsula, were declared as "annexed" to Germany. The Volga colonies were also to become a part of the Reich. The Baku area was envisaged as a German military colony. Bessarabia and Odessa were to be handed over to Roumania, while Finland was to acquire Eastern Karelia, Leningrad and the Leningrad region. As you well know, Your Honors, the Hitlerites always strove to prevent their real piratical aims from receiving publicity. At the same meeting at General Headquarters, on 16th July, 1941, Hitler, for instance, said that it was most important not to reveal their aims to the whole world, not to complicate their path by unnecessary declarations, and, when offering reasons for their actions, to ascribe them primarily to tactical intentions. The Defendant Rosenberg stated, 20th June, 1941, at a conference on the Eastern question -- a record of which was presented by the American Prosecution as Document 1058-PS -- that tactics were very important and that political aims would be determined as the occasion arose, when one slogan or another could be given publicity. This particular excerpt from Rosenberg's declaration you will find on Page 17 of the Russian text of the document, which corresponds to Page 201 in the document book. Taking this circumstance into consideration, Your Honors, it appears of value for our investigation to refer to some statements by the Fascist war criminaLs which concern the period when they considered it possible to make public some of their political aims. In 1941-42 the Fascist hordes broke through territories of the Soviet Union on an extensive scale and approached Moscow. Battles were waged on the banks of the Volga. [Page 298] The specter of a "Greater Germany" ruling the world appeared as a beacon before the eyes of the Hitlerite conspirators. It would appear that the opportunity had arrived about which defendant Rosenberg spoke when, from the standpoint of the Fascist criminals, it was possible that "certain political slogans could be made public." I presented to the Tribunal, under Exhibit USSR 58 (Document USSR 58), a document from the archives of the Defendant Rosenberg's office relating to questions of German policy in the occupied regions of the Caucasus. Once again I ask you to refer to this document. I turn to Page 203 in the document book and Page 9 of the Russian text, which is the translation of this document. Rosenberg, on 27th July, 1942, solved the Eastern problem in this fashion, and I quote: "The Eastern problem consists in bringing the Baltic peoples under the influence of German culture and in preparing widely conceived military frontiers for Germany. The Ukrainian problem consists in securing food supplies for Germany and Europe and supplies of raw materials for the Continent. The problem of the Caucasus is primarily a political problem, and its solution means the expansion of Continental Europe, under German leadership, from the Caucasian Isthmus to the Near East." On 27th November, 1941, the defendant Ribbentrop made a report on the international situation. The text of this report was published in No. 329-A of the "Hamburger Fremdenblatt." I present this report as Exhibit USSR 347. Ribbentrop said in this report: "I should like to summarize the consequences of this defeat of Soviet Russia, and of the occupation of the far greater part of European Russia in 1941, as follows: 1. From a military point of view, England's last ally on the Continent has thereby ceased to exist as a significant factor. Germany and Italy, with their allies, thus become unassailable in Europe. And powerful forces will be released. 2. In the economic field the Axis powers, together with their friends, which means the whole of Europe, have achieved independence from countries overseas. Europe has once and for all been freed from the threat of blockade. The grain and raw materials of European Russia can fully cover the needs of Europe. Its war production will serve Germany's war economy and that of her allies, as a result of which Europe's war potential will increase, and increase more powerfully. The organisation of this gigantic area is already in full swing. Thus, the last two decisive prerequisites for the victory of the Axis and its allies over England have been created." I shall take the liberty of presenting another document on this same subject. It is Goebbels' speech in Munich, published on 19th October, 1942, in the main organ of the Nazi Party, the "Voelkischer Beobachter," South German edition. The text of this speech is presented to the Military Tribunal as Exhibit USSR 250. That is on Page 205 in the document book. In his address Goebbels said: "...over and above that, we have captured the most important grain, coal and iron ore producing regions of the Soviet Union. What the enemy has lost we now possess. And since what the enemy lacks has come to us, it is, according to Adam Riese, of double value. While in the past we were a people without space, this is today no longer the case. To-day we have only to give a shape to this space conquered by our soldiers, to organize it and render it useful to us, and this requires a certain period of time. [Page 299] But if the English were to contend that we have lost the war because we have lost time, then this contention will only prove how completely they have misunderstood the entire situation. Time only works against those who have no space and no raw materials. If we make use of our time to organize the space we have conquered, then time will work not against us, but for us."
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