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Page 110


Frames 111659-111660, serial 103

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.

No. 475
     For the Ambassador.
     Please  inform Molotov at once that according to reports
I  have  received  the Turkish Government would  hesitate  to
conclude an assistance pact with France and England,  if  the
Soviet  Union  emphatically opposed it.  In  my  opinion,  as
already stated several times, it would also be in the Russian
interest,  on  account of the question  of  the  Straits,  to
forestall a tie-up of Turkey with England and France.  I  was
therefore particularly anxious for the Russian Government  to
proceed  in that direction, in order to dissuade Turkey  from
the  final  conclusion of assistance pacts with  the  Western
powers  and  to settle this at once in Moscow. No doubt,  the
best solution at the moment would be the return of Turkey  to
a  policy  of  absolute neutrality while confirming  existing
Russian-Turkish agreements.
     Prompt  and final diversion of Turkey from the projected
Anglo-French  treaty, said to have been  recently  initialed,
would  also  clearly be in keeping with the  peace  offensive
agreed  upon  in  Moscow, as thereby  another  country  would
withdraw from the Anglo-French camp.

Frame 111660, serial 103

The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Turkey

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.

No. 352
     Ambassador    Schulenburg   received    the    following
instructions:  Insert text of [preceding  telegram].  End  of
Page 111

     I request that you, for your part, likewise do your best
to  forestall  the  final conclusion of the  assistance  pact
between  Turkey  and the Western powers. In this  matter  you
also  might  point  to  the  strong  Russian  aversion  to  a
unilateral  commitment  of  Turkey  and  explain   that   the
conclusion   of  the  assistance  pact  under   present   war
conditions would necessarily be viewed differently by Germany
than before the outbreak of the war.
Frame 233367, serial 495

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (WeizsĄcker)

BERLIN, October 2, 1939.
St. S. Nr. 769
     The  Finnish Minister today requested me to clarify  the
significance  of  the  arrangement of  spheres  of  influence
between Germany and Russia; he was particularly interested in
knowing  what  effect  the Moscow agreements  might  have  on
     I  reminded the Minister that a short time ago  Finland,
as is well known, had rejected our proposal to conclude a non-
aggression pact. Perhaps this was now regretted in  Helsinki.
For  the rest, now as then it is the wish of Germany to  live
with  Finland  on  the  best  and most  friendly  terms  and,
particularly  in the economic sphere, to effect as  extensive
an  exchange  of  goods as possible. If  Herr  Wuorimaa  felt
uneasy  about  Finland because of the Estonian  incident  and
Herr  Munters' [49] trip to Moscow, announced today, I  would
have  to  tell  him that I was not informed  as  to  Moscow's
policies  vis-Ö-vis  Finland. But I felt  that  worries  over
Finland at this time are not warranted.
     The  Minister  then spoke of the Ciano  visit.  In  this
connection I remarked that after the completion of the Polish
campaign  we had undoubtedly arrived at an important juncture
in  the  war.  The  announced convocation  of  the  Reichstag
pointed to a statement from the Government in which the  idea
would  surely be expressed that we regarded as senseless  any
opening  of  real hostilities in the West. Of course,  should
the  Western powers fail to seize the opportunity for  peace,
one  would  probably  have  to resign  oneself  to  a  bitter
[49] Latvian Foreign minister.

Page 112
Frame 111663-111664, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, October 3, 1939-7:04 p. m.
Received October 3, 1939-11:10 p. m.

No. 463 of October 3

     Molotov  summoned me to his office at 2 p. m. today,  in
order to communicate to me the following:
     The  Soviet Government would tell the Lithuanian Foreign
Minister, who arrives today, that, within the framework of an
amicable settlement of mutual relations (probably similar  to
the  one with Estonia), the Soviet Government was willing  to
cede  the city of Vilna and its environs to Lithuania,  while
at  the  same  time the Soviet Government would  indicate  to
Lithuania  that  it must cede the well-known portion  of  its
territory  to Germany. Molotov inquired what formal procedure
we  had  in  mind  for carrying this out. His  idea  was  the
simultaneous signing of a Soviet-Lithuanian protocol on Vilna
and a German-Lithuanian protocol on the Lithuanian area to be
ceded to us.
     I  replied that this suggestion did not appeal to me. It
seemed  to me more logical that the Soviet Government  should
exchange Vilna for the strip to be ceded to us and then  hand
this  strip over to us. Molotov did not seem quite in  accord
with  my  proposal  but was willing to let  me  ask  for  the
viewpoint  of my Government and give him a reply by  tomorrow
     Molotov's suggestion seems to me harmful, as in the eyes
of  the  world  it  would  make us  appear  as  "robbers"  of
Lithuanian territory, while the Soviet Government figures  as
the  donor.  As  I  see  it, only my suggestion  enters  into
consideration  at all. However, I would ask you  to  consider
whether  it  might  not be advisable for us,  by  a  separate
secret  German-Soviet protocol, to forego the cession of  the
Lithuanian strip of territory until the Soviet Union actually
incorporates  Lithuania, an idea on  which,  I  believe,  the
arrangement concerning Lithuania was originally based.
Page 113
Frame 111666, serial 103
 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

MOSCOW October 3, 1939-8:08 p. m.
Received October 3, 1939-11:10 p. m.

No. 464 of October 3
     Reference your telegram of the 2d No. 475.
     I  informed  Molotov in detail of the contents  of  your
instruction. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government shared
our  trend  of thought and was proceeding in that  direction.
However,  it  appeared that Turkey had already become  rather
closely   involved  with  England  and  France.  The   Soviet
Government  would continue to try to rectify or  "neutralize"
matters in our sense.
     The  Afghan Ambassador, with whom I spoke today, claimed
to  know  that  the  Soviet  Government  demanded  of  Turkey
absolute neutrality and the closing of the Straits.
     Molotov  himself said that the negotiations  were  still
under way.
     When  I  mentioned  the rumors that England  and  France
intended  to assault Greece and overrun Bulgaria in order  to
set  up  a Balkan front, Molotov asserted spontaneously  that
the  Soviet  Government  would  never  tolerate  pressure  on
Frame 11665, serial 103
 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
BERLIN, October 4, 1939.

No. 488

     Reference your telegram No. 463.

     I, too, do not consider the method Molotov suggested for
the cession of the Lithuanian strip of territory as suitable.
On  the  contrary,  please ask Molotov not  to  discuss  this
cession  of  territory with the Lithuanians at  present,  but
rather  to  have the Soviet Government assume the  obligation
toward Germany to leave this strip of territory unoccupied in
the event of a posting of Soviet forces in Lithuania,
Page 114
which  may possibly be contemplated, and furthermore to leave
it  to Germany to determine the date on which the cession  of
the  territory  should be formally effected. An understanding
to  this  effect should be set forth in a secret exchange  of
letters between yourself and Molotov.
Reich Foreign Minister
     As directed by the Reich Foreign Minister, this telegram
is being dispatched at once with his signature. Gaus, October
     I  telephoned  the  contents of the telegram  in  veiled
language  at  11  a.  m.  to  Count  Schulenburg.  He   fully
understood the instruction. G[aus], October 4.
Frames 254871-254872, serial 644

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, October 5, 1939-12:30 a. m.

No. 470 of October 4
     Reference my telegram No. 463 of October 3.
     Immediately  after  Under State  Secretary  Gaus'  first
telephone  call  I  transmitted to Molotov this  morning  the
request  not  to  divulge to the Lithuanian Foreign  Minister
anything regarding the German-Soviet understanding concerning
Lithuania.  Molotov asked me to see him at 5 p. m.  and  told
me,  that,  unfortunately, he had been obliged  yesterday  to
inform the Lithuanian Foreign Minister of this understanding,
since he could not, out of loyalty to us, act otherwise.  The
Lithuanian  delegation had been extremely dismayed  and  sad;
they  had  declared that the loss of this area in  particular
would  be  especially  hard  to bear,  since  many  prominent
leaders  of  the  Lithuanian people came from  that  part  of
Lithuania.  This  morning at 8 a. m. the  Lithuanian  Foreign
Minister  had  flown back to Kowno, intending  to  return  to
Moscow in one or two days.
     I  said that I would immediately notify my Government by
telephone,  whereupon  I  called Herr  Gaus.  An  hour  later
Molotov  informed  me  that Stalin personally  requested  the
German  Government  not to insist for  the  moment  upon  the
cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory.
Page 115
Frames 69687-69689, serial 127

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union, (Schulenburg)

BERLIN, October 5, 1939-3:43 a. m.
Received Moscow, October 5, 1939-11:55 a. m.

No. 497 of October 4
     Referring to today's telephonic communication  from  the
     Legation in Kowno is being instructed as follows:
     1)  Solely for your personal information, I am apprising
you  of  the  following: At the time of the  signing  of  the
German-Russian Non-aggression Pact on August 23,  a  strictly
secret delimitation of the respective spheres of influence in
Eastern  Europe was also undertaken. In accordance therewith,
Lithuania  was  to belong to the German sphere of  influence,
while  in the territory of the former Polish state,  the  so-
called  Four-River  Line,  Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San,  was   to
constitute the border. Even then I demanded that the district
of  Vilna  go  to  Lithuania, to which the Soviet  Government
consented.  At the negotiations concerning the  Boundary  and
Friendship Treaty on September 28, the settlement was amended
to  the extent that Lithuania, including the Vilna area,  was
included  in  the Russian sphere of influence, for  which  in
turn,  in  the Polish area, the province of Lublin and  large
portions  of the province of Warsaw, including the pocket  of
territory  of  Suwalki,  fell within  the  German  sphere  of
influence.  Since, by the inclusion of the Suwalki  tract  in
the  German sphere of influence, a difficulty in drawing  the
border  line  resulted, we agreed that in  case  the  Soviets
should  take special measures in Lithuania, a small strip  of
territory in the southwest of Lithuania, accurately marked on
the map, should fall to Germany.
     2) Today Count von der Schulenburg reports that Molotov,
contrary  to  our  own  intentions, notified  the  Lithuanian
Foreign  Minister last night of the confidential arrangement.
Please  now,  on your part, inform the Lithuanian Government,
orally and in strict confidence, of the matter, as follows:
     As  early  as  at the signing of the German-Soviet  Non-
aggression Pact of August 23, in order to avoid complications
in  Eastern Europe, conversations were held between ourselves
and  the  Soviet  Government concerning the  delimitation  of
German   and   Soviet   spheres  of   influence.   In   these
conversations I had recommended restoring the Vilna dis-
Page 116
trict  to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government  gave  me
its  consent. In the negotiations concerning the Boundary and
Friendship  Treaty of September 28, as is apparent  from  the
German-Soviet  boundary demarcation which was published,  the
pocket  of  territory of Suwalki jutting out between  Germany
and  Lithuania  had  fallen to Germany. As  this  created  an
intricate  and  impractical  boundary,  I  had  reserved  for
Germany  a  border correction in this area, whereby  a  small
strip  of  Lithuanian territory would fall  to  Germany.  The
reward  of  Vilna  to  Lithuania  was  maintained  in   these
negotiations also. You are now authorized to make it known to
the  Lithuanian Government that the Reich Government does not
consider the question of this border revision timely at  this
moment.  We  make the proviso, however, that  the  Lithuanian
Government treat this matter as strictly confidential. End of
instruction for Kowno.
     I   request   you   to  inform  Herr  Molotov   of   our
communication  to the Lithuanian Government. Further,  please
request  of  him,  as  already  indicated  in  the  preceding
telegram,  that  the  border strip  of  Lithuanian  territory
involved  be left free in the event of a possible posting  of
Soviet  troops  in  Lithuania and also that  it  be  left  to
Germany  to  determine the date of the  implementing  of  the
agreement  concerning the cession to Germany of the territory
involved.  Both of these points at issue should be set  forth
in a secret exchange of letters between yourself and Molotov.
Frames 235040-235041, serial 506

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (WeizsĄcker)

BERLIN, October 5, 1939.

St. S. Nr. 786
     The  Lithuanian  Minister called on me this  evening  in
order, as was expected, to inquire about German claims  to  a
strip   of  land  in  southwestern  Lithuania.  Herr  Skirpa,
however,  even  when he entered, had a friendlier  appearance
than was to be expected. For Minister Zechlin [50] had in the
meantime  delivered information in Kowno  as  instructed,  so
that I did not need to go any further into the questions that
Herr  Skirpa put. I restricted myself to a brief  mention  of
today's telegraphic instructions to Herr Zechlin. [51]  Since
Herr Skirpa
[50] German Minister in Lithuania.
[51] see supra.
Page 117
expressed  to me the satisfaction of his Government  that  we
had withdrawn our claim, I stressed that the announcement  of
our  need was "not at the moment pressing." (It is noteworthy
that Herr Skirpa knew and traced exactly on the map of Poland
that happened to be spread out before us the line agreed upon
by us in our secret protocol with the Russians.)
     The  Minister then gave the further information that the
Russians expected to get an assistance pact with Lithuania as
well  as permission to station Russian garrisons, at the same
time  agreeing  in  principle to the joining  [Anschluss]  of
Vilna  and environs to Lithuania. Herr Skirpa asked me  if  I
had any ideas or suggestions to give in this regard. I stated
that I was not informed and added that in connection with our
negotiations in Moscow German interests had not been  claimed
beyond  the  Russo-German line in  the  east  known  to  Herr
     In  conclusion  the  Minister  asked  to  be  given  any
possible suggestions. Herr Urbsys [52] was still remaining in
Kowno  today  and  tomorrow;  he  himself-Skirpa-was  at  the
disposal of the Reich Foreign Minister at any time.

[62] Lithuanian Foreign Minister.

Frames 111680-111681, serial 103

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


BERLIN, October 7, 1939.

No. 518

     I  am  receiving reliable reports from Istanbul  to  the
effect that Russo-Turkish negotiations might yet lead to  the
signing of a mutual assistance pact. Hence I request  you  to
call  on  Herr Molotov immediately and to emphasize  strongly
once  more  how  much  we  would  regret  it  if  the  Soviet
Government  were unable to dissuade Turkey from concluding  a
treaty with England and France or to induce her to adopt  all
unequivocal  neutrality.  In  the  event  that   the   Soviet
Government itself cannot avoid concluding a mutual assistance
pact with Turkey, we would regard it as a foregone conclusion
that  she  would make a reservation in the pact  whereby  the
pact would not obligate the Soviet Government to any kind  of
assistance  aimed  directly  or indirectly  against  Germany.
Indeed, Stalin himself prom-
Page 118
ised this. Without such a reservation, the Soviet Government,
as  has  been  previously stressed, would commit an  outright
breach of the Non-aggression Pact concluded with Germany.  It
would,  moreover,  not suffice to make this reservation  only
tacitly  or  confidentially. On the contrary, we must  insist
that  it  be  formally stipulated in such a manner  that  the
public   will   notice  it.  Otherwise  a  very   undesirable
impression  would be created on the public, and such  an  act
would be apt to shake the confidence of the German public  in
the effectiveness of the new German-Russian agreements.
     Please  take this opportunity to inform yourself on  the
other  details  concerning the status  of  the  Russo-Turkish
negotiations  and  to  find out what is  to  be  agreed  upon
between the two Governments in regard to the question of  the
     Report by wire.
Reich Foreign Minister
     Note: I communicated the contents of this instruction to
Count   Schulenburg   this  afternoon   by   telephone.   The
transmission  was very good. Count Schulenburg  said  he  had
just  come  from Molotov, who had told him that  he  had  not
talked  with the Turkish delegation since Sunday.  Hence  our
warning  certainly  arrived in time.  I  replied  that  Count
Schulenburg  should nevertheless lose no time, as  it  was  a
matter of decisive importance, and the reports received  here
pointed  to  a  rather  advanced stage in  the  negotiations.
Accordingly,  Count Schulenburg is to call on  Molotov  again
tomorrow morning.
Frame 0318, serial F 2

The Chairman  of  the Council of People's Commissars  of  the
     Soviet  Union (Molotov) to the German Ambassador in  the
     Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

Moscow, October 8, 1939.

     MR.  AMBASSADOR: I have the honor hereby to confirm that
in   connection  with  the  secret  supplementary   protocol,
concluded  on  September 29 [28], 1939, between the  U.S.S.R.
and    Germany,    concerning   Lithuania,   the    following
understanding exists between us:
     1)  The  Lithuanian territory mentioned in the  protocol
and  marked on the map attached to the protocol shall not  be
occupied  in case forces of the Red Army should be  stationed
[in Lithuania];
     2) It shall be left to Germany to determine the date for
the  implementing of the agreement concerning the cession  to
Germany of the above-mentioned Lithuanian territory.
Page 119
     Please  accept,  Mr. Ambassador, the  expression  of  my
highest consideration.

Frames 357061-357062, serial 1369

                  Foreign Office Memorandum

[October ?, 1939.]


     1) The credit and trade treaty of August 19 of this year
is not to be tampered with from either side. However, for our
benefit,  we  must  attempt  to  obtain  a  more  expeditious
delivery of raw materials (180 million Reichsmarks).
     2) My principal task in the negotiations will be to find
out  whether Russia, over and above the treaty of August  19,
1939,  could and would compensate for the loss in imports  by
sea  and to what extent this might be done. The military  and
civil  agencies  have  handed me a schedule  of  requirements
totaling  70 million marks of immediate additional  supplies.
(Enclosure  1.  [53]) The requests which I shall  present  in
Moscow  will go far beyond this schedule, as the  German  war
needs  are  several  times as great as the  proposal  of  the
Departments for the negotiations. (See enclosure 2. [53]) But
the  relatively modest schedule of departmental  requirements
shows how low the actual capacity of Russia for supplying raw
materials  is  estimated.  The reasons  are  inadequacies  of
transportation, of organization, of production methods, etc.
     3)  The plan to be proposed to the Russians would be  as
     Apart  from  the treaty of August 19, 1939,  the  Soviet
Union shall supply us X millions worth of raw materials, both
such as are produced in Russia and such as Russia buys for us
from  other neutrals. The German quid pro quo for  these  raw
materials  could not follow at once, but would have  to  take
the form of a supply and investment program, to extend over a
period  of  about five years. Within this time  we  would  be
prepared,  in  order  to  meet our obligations  arising  from
Russian  deliveries  of raw material, to  set  up  plants  in
Russia  in accordance with a large-scale program to be agreed
upon. (See enclosure 3. [53])
[53] Not printed.

Page 120
     4) Within the framework of purely economic negotiations,
the  difficulties  actually  existing  in  Russia  cannot  be
overcome, especially as we demand of the Russians performance
in  advance.  A  positive  achievement  can  really  only  be
expected,  if  an  appropriate directive  is  issued  by  the
highest  Russian authorities, in the spirit of the  political
attitude  toward us. In that respect these negotiations  will
be  a  test of whether and how far Stalin is prepared to draw
practical conclusions from the new political course. The  raw
materials deliveries requested by us can only be carried out,
in  view  of the unsatisfactory domestic supply situation  of
Russia, at the expense of their own Russian consumption.
     5)  Depending on the result of my conversations, it will
be necessary that the raw materials program be taken up again
from  the  strictly political point of view  by  a  qualified
     6)  In the Moscow negotiations it should furthermore  be
ascertained to what extent our imports heretofore  made  from
Iran,  Afghanistan, Manchuria, and Japan, can be  transmitted
via Russia.
Frame 111684, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


MOSCOW, October 9, 1939-12:30 a. m.
Received October 9, 1939-3 a. m.

No. 493 of October 8

     Reference your telegram of the 7th No. 518.
     Molotov  stated  this evening at  9  p.  m.  that  since
October  1  no  meeting had [taken place]  with  the  Turkish
Foreign  Minister  and that the outcome of  the  negotiations
cannot as yet be surmised. Molotov expressed the view that in
all likelihood a mutual assistance pact with Turkey would not
be  concluded. But under any circumstances the  interests  of
Germany  and  the  special nature of German-Soviet  relations
would be upheld. Molotov explained that the Soviet Government
was  pursuing  the  aim  of inducing  Turkey  to  adopt  full
neutrality and to close the Dardanelles, as well as to aid in
maintaining peace in the Balkans.
Page 121
Frame 233368, serial 495

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (WeizsĄcker)

BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
St. S. Nr. 793

     The  Finnish Minister had announced a visit today to the
Reich  Foreign  Minister.  On  the  latter's  instructions  I
received  Herr  Wuorimaa  this afternoon.  He  presented  the
following facts:
     By  virtue  of  the developments in the  Baltic  States,
Russia  had  now penetrated so far into the Baltic  that  the
balance  of  power  there  had been upset,  and  predominance
threatened  to pass to Russia. The lack of interest  in  this
matter  on  the  part of Germany had attracted  attention  in
Finland,  since there was reason there to assume that  Russia
intended to make demands on Finland identical with those made
on the Baltic States.
     The Finnish Government had requested of Wuorimaa that he
find  out  whether  Germany remains indifferent  to  Russia's
forward  thrust in this direction and, should that not  prove
to be the case, to learn what stand Germany intends to take.
     The  Minister added that, on her part, Finland had tried
her best during the last few weeks to regulate her commercial
relations  with Germany and maintain them on a  normal  basis
and  to carry out the policy of neutrality desired by Germany
     I  answered  the Minister in the sense of  the  enclosed
instructions to Helsinki. [55] Wuorimaa asked me to call  him
if we had anything further to add.
     From the words of the Minister it could be inferred that
the  Finnish Government was rather disturbed over the Russian
demands and would not submit to oppression as did Estonia and
     As  regards this attitude on the part of the Minister  I
merely said that I hoped and wished that Finland might settle
matters with Russia in a peaceful manner.

[55] Infra. ([54] not used? LWJ)
Page 122

Frames 233369, serial 495

The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (WeizsĄcker)
         to the German Minister in Finland (BlĀcher)


BERLIN, October 9, 1939.

No. [326]

     In connection with telegraphic instruction No. 322. [56]
     The Finnish Minister, who will call today at the Foreign
Office, is to receive the following information:
     Our relationship to the three Baltic States rests on the
well-known non-aggression pacts; our relationship to  Denmark
likewise.  Norway  and  Sweden have  declined  non-aggression
pacts  with us, since they do not feel endangered by  us  and
since  they  have  hitherto not concluded any  non-aggression
pacts  at  all.  Finland, to be sure, has such  a  pact  with
Russia,  but  declined our offer nevertheless.  We  regretted
this  circumstance, but were and are of the opinion that  our
traditionally good and friendly relations with Finland do not
require any special political agreements.
     With  this  absence  of problems in  the  German-Finnish
relations it is very easy to understand why in his utterances
of  October  6th-concerned  for the  greater  part  with  our
neighbors-the FĀhrer did not mention Finland at all, just  as
he  did  not  mention many other greater and smaller  states.
From this it only follows that between us there are no points
of  difference. In Moscow, where in the negotiations  of  the
Reich   Foreign   Minister,  German-Russian  relations   were
discussed  in broad political outline and where a  treaty  of
friendship came into being, the well-known definitive line of
demarcation  was  fixed. West of this  line  lie  the  German
interests, east of it we have registered no interests. We are
therefore  not informed as to what demands Russia intends  to
make  on  Finland.  We presume, however, that  these  demands
would not be too far-reaching. For this reason alone a German
stand  on  the  question becomes superfluous. But  after  the
developments cited above we would hardly be in a position, in
any case, to intervene in the Russian-Finnish conversations.

[56] Not printed.

Page 123

Frame 235081, serial 506

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (WeizsĄcker)

St. S. Nr. 795
BERLIN, October 9, 1939.
     The  Swedish Minister called on me today to tell me that
a  serious  situation  would arise in the  Baltic  region  if
Russia  were to make demands on Finland which threatened  the
independence and autonomy of Finland. The Minister wished  to
inform  me  of  the  preceding with reference  to  the  close
relations  between  Sweden  and Finland.  It  should  not  be
forgotten that, in contrast to Estonia and Latvia, strong and
vigorous  forces  were  in power in Finland,  who  would  not
submit to Russian oppression.
     I  replied to the Minister that nothing was known to  me
about  the  probable  Russian  demands  on  Finland.  To   my
knowledge  the  word  Finland  had  not  been  mentioned   in
connection  with the visit of the Reich Foreign  Minister  to
Moscow.  The  situation was that we had  not  put  forth  any
claims  to  any  interests east of  the  well-known  line.  I
should,  however, assume that Russia would not set forth  any
wishes  that  were  too far-reaching as against  Finland  and
that, therefore, a peaceable solution could be found.

Frame 214964, serial 407

   The German Minister in Finland (BlĀcher) to the German
                       Foreign Office


HELSINKI, October 10, 1939-9:30 p. m.
Received October 10, 1939-12 midnight.

No. 287 of October 10
     All  indications are that if Russia will not confine its
demands to islands in the Gulf of Finland, Finland will offer
armed  resistance. The consequences for our war economy would
be  grave.  Not  only  food  and  timber  exports,  but  also
indispensable copper and molybdenum exports from  Finland  to
Germany  would cease. For this reason I suggest you intercede
with  Russian Government in the sense that it should  not  go
beyond a demand for the islands.

Page 124


Frame 233342, serial 495

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (WeizsĄcker)

BERLIN, October 12, 1939.
St. S. Nr. 800
     The   Bulgarian  Minister,  supplementing   his   recent
conversation  with  the Reich Foreign Minister,  informed  me
today of the following:
     The   suggestions  recently  made  by  Molotov  to   the
Bulgarian Government concerning a Russian-Bulgarian agreement
were not clear at first. Later it became evident that Molotov
was thinking of a Russian-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact in
the  event  of  attack by a third power. This suggestion  was
rejected in Sofia.
     To my question why Bulgaria did not accept it, Draganoff
offered  as  his  own  conjecture the following:  Up  to  now
Bulgaria had never concluded any treaty of alliance  of  this
kind,  not  even with Germany, to whom she has for  long  had
close ties. Probably his Government did not, for this reason,
wish to swerve from this principle nor, above all, conclude a
mutual assistance pact with Russia first.
     Draganoff  then  went  on  to  say  that  the  Bulgarian
Government made the following counter proposal: Bulgaria  was
ready  to  conclude a treaty of non-aggression or  friendship
with  Russia  if Moscow would present concrete  proposals  of
this kind. A reply to this has not as yet reached Sofia.
     I   thanked  the  Ambassador  for  the  information  and
promised to transmit it to the Reich Foreign Minister.
Frames 69672-69675, serial 127
 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


BERLIN, October 18, 1939-12:40 a. m.
Received Moscow, October 18, 1939-10:05 a. m.

No. 594 of October 17

     For the Ambassador in person.
     At  an  occasion  soon to arise, I intend  to  speak  in
public about the foreign political situation and shall  then,
with  reference to Chamberlain's last speech, deal  with  the
future aims of England and the British propaganda of lies. In
this connection I would also like to refute a lie
Page 125
recently  circulated  in quite specific  form  by  the  enemy
press, alleging that during my stay in Moscow I had asked the
Soviet  Union for military assistance, but had  met  with  an
outright   refusal.  I  propose  to  say  on   this   subject
approximately the following:
     "In  its  grave disappointment at the recent development
in  the  international  situation, which  has  been  strongly
influenced by the establishment of friendly relations between
Germany  and  the Soviet Union, British propaganda  has  left
nothing untried to discredit and disturb this development and
German-Russian  relations.  In  its  well-known  manner,   it
stopped at nothing and has made use of the grossest and  most
absurd  lies.  Thus,  for instance,  it  has  circulated  the
statement  that in the Moscow negotiations I had  asked  Herr
Stalin  for  military assistance against Poland, France,  and
England. To this, Herr Stalin, however, is said to have given
only  the  tart reply: 'Not a single soldier.'  But  what  in
reality was the course of these Moscow negotiations?  Let  me
reveal it to you:
     "I  came  to  Moscow  on August 23 for  the  purpose  of
negotiating and concluding in the name of the FĀhrer, a  non-
aggression  pact  with  the Soviet  Union.  I  commenced  the
negotiations with Stalin and Molotov with the statement  that
I had not come to Moscow, as the British and French delegates
had  come  at  the  time, to ask the Soviet Union  for  armed
assistance  in  case a war should be forced upon  the  German
Government by England. The German Government was not in  need
of assistance for this contingency, but would, in this event,
have  sufficient  military strength to take up  the  struggle
alone against Poland and its Western foes and to carry it  to
a   victorious   conclusion.  To  this,  Stalin,   with   his
characteristic  clarity and precision, replied spontaneously:
'Germany  was  taking a proud attitude by  rejecting  at  the
outset  any  armed  assistance from the Soviets.  The  Soviet
Union, however, was interested in having a strong Germany  as
a  neighbor  and  in  the case of an armed  showdown  between
Germany  and  the  Western democracies the interests  of  the
Soviet  Union and of Germany would certainly run parallel  to
each  other. The Soviet Union would never stand for Germany's
getting  into  a  difficult position.'  I  thereupon  thanked
Stalin for his clear and precise statement and told him  that
I would report to the FĀhrer on this broad-minded attitude of
the  Soviet  Government. Thus the German-Russian negotiations
were  opened  and  this exchange of views  created  from  the
outset a broadminded and friendly climate, in which within 24
hours  the Non-aggression Pact and, in the course of  further
developments,  at  the  end of September,  the  Boundary  and
Friendship   Treaty  were  concluded.  Upon   the   political
foundation, it was likewise decided immediately to inaugurate
a comprehensive economic program, the implementation of which
is now being discussed at Moscow. Germany has need of the raw
materials of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union  has  need
of   manufactured  articles.  There  is  no  reason  why  the
flourishing trade of the past between the two nations  should
not soon revive. On the
Page 126
contrary,  I  am firmly convinced that the former traditional
friendship between Germany and Russia has now been  restored,
and  that  it  will grow stronger and stronger and  that  the
exchange  of  goods, which is complementary by  nature,  will
result in an undreamed-of prosperity for both nations in  the
future. Upon the same political foundation, the German-Soviet
declaration of September 28, 1939, has also been agreed upon,
to  the  effect that both Governments would work  toward  the
restoration of peace upon conclusion of the Polish  campaign.
In   case   these   efforts  should  fail-as  they   have-the
responsibility of England and France for the continuation  of
the  war  would be established and at the same time provision
would  be  made for a consultation between the Government  of
the Reich and the Soviet Government, in this contingency,  on
the  necessary measures to be taken. These consultations  are
now  under way and are proceeding in the same friendly spirit
as  the Moscow negotiations, and on the firm basis of kindred
interests.  In this connection, we expect an early  visit  of
Herr Molotov to Berlin. I believe that this brief account  is
sufficient to sink once and for all the whole raft of lies of
the  British  Ministry  of  Lies  and  the  other  blundering
propaganda centers of our enemies, about the present  German-
Russian  negotiations  and the future  pattern  of  relations
between the two greatest countries of Europe."
     Please inform Herr Stalin as promptly as possible of the
account of the Moscow negotiations as given above and wire me
his approval.
Frame 69660, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, October 19, 1939.

No. 568 of October 19
     Reference your telegram No. 594 of October 17.
     Molotov  today  informed  me that  Stalin  approved  the
account  of the negotiations in Moscow that the Reich Foreign
Minister  contemplates making in his forthcoming  speech.  He
only  asked  that  instead  of the sentences  quoted  as  the
statement of Stalin: "Germany was taking a proud attitude . .
.  "  up  to " . . . getting into a difficult position,"  the
following  version be adopted: "The attitude  of  Germany  in
declining  military aid commands respect. However,  a  strong
Germany  is  the absolute prerequisite for peace  in  Europe,
whence it follows that the Soviet Union is interested in  the
existence  of  a strong Germany. Therefore the  Soviet  Union
cannot give its approval to
Page 127
the  Western  powers creating conditions which  would  weaken
Germany  and place her in a difficult position. Therein  lies
the  community  of interests between Germany and  the  Soviet
Frame 111764, serial 103

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (WeizsĄcker)

St. S. Nr. 864
BERLIN, November 1, 1939.

     Field  Marshal GĒring, Grand Admiral Raeder and  Colonel
General  Keitel, independently of each other,  have  told  me
that  the Russian delegation in Berlin expected too  much  in
the way of inspection and procurement of German materials  of
war.  Colonel  General Keitel told me  it  was  the  FĀhrer's
opinion  that materials regularly issued to troops  could  be
shown  to the Russians; what might be sold, we had to  decide
ourselves.  Things in the testing stage or  otherwise  secret
should not be shown to the Russians.

Frame 111828, serial 103

The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (WeizsĄcker)
                 German Missions Abroad [57]


BERLIN, December 2, 1939.
Pol. VI 2651
     In  your  conversations  regarding  the  Finnish-Russian
conflict please avoid any anti-Russian note.
     According  to  whom  you are addressing,  the  following
arguments  are  to  be  employed: The inescapable  course  of
events  in  the revision of the treaties following  the  last
Great  War.  The natural requirement of Russia for  increased
security  of  Leningrad  and the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  of
Finland. The foreign policy pursued by the Finnish Government
has in the last few years stressed the idea of neutrality. It
has relied on the Scandinavian states and has treated German-
Russian  opposition  as axiomatic. As a  result  Finland  has
avoided  any rapprochement with Germany and has even rejected
the  conclusion  of  a non-aggression pact  with  Germany  as
compromising, even though
[57] As indicated on an accompanying list; list not printed.
Page 128
Finland  has a non-aggression pact with Russia. Also  in  the
League of Nations, Finland, in spite of the debt of gratitude
which she owed to Germany for the latter's help in 1918,  has
never  come out for German interests. Foreign Minister Holsti
is  typical of this point of view and particularly hostile to
Germany.  Extensive  elements  in  Finland  emphasize   their
economic  and  ideological orientation in  the  direction  of
democratic England. Correspondingly the attitude of  most  of
the organs of the press is out-spokenly unfriendly to us. The
platonic  sympathy of England has confirmed  Finland  in  her
previous attitude and has done the country no good.
Frame 111834, serial 103

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (WeizsĄcker)

St. S. Nr. 949
BERLIN, December 5, 1939.

     Colonel  General  Keitel  telephoned  me  today  on  the
following matter: Lately there have been repeated wrangles on
the  boundary between Russia and the Government General, into
which  the  army, too, was drawn. The expulsion of Jews  into
Russian territory, in particular, did not proceed as smoothly
as  had  apparently been expected. In practice, the procedure
was,  for  example, that at a quiet place  in  the  woods,  a
thousand  Jews  were expelled across the Russian  border;  15
kilometers  away, they came back, with the Russian  commander
trying  to force the German one to readmit the group.  As  it
was  a  case involving foreign policy, the O. K. W.  was  not
able  to  issue  directives to the Governor  General  in  the
matter. Naval Captain BĀrkner will get in touch with the desk
officer  at the Foreign Office. Colonel General Keitel  asked
me to arrange for a favorable outcome of this interview.
Frame 111835, serial 103

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (WeizsĄcker)

St. S. Nr. 950
BERLIN, December 5, 1939.
     Colonel General Keitel called me on the telephone  today
to  say  that the Russian schedule of requests for deliveries
of  German products was growing more and more voluminous  and
unreasonable. The negotia-
Page 129
tions  with the Russians would necessarily, therefore, become
more  and  more difficult. The Russians, for example,  wanted
machine tools for the manufacture of munitions, while the  O.
K. W. could not spare such machine tools in the present state
of  the  war  under any circumstances. The same was  true  in
respect to supplies of air and naval war materiel.
     I  confirmed to Colonel General Keitel that the  Foreign
Office,  too, intended to put a curb on Russian  demands.  We
had  not yet quite made up our mind how to do it, whether  in
Moscow  or  here  through the Russian Ambassador.  The  Reich
Foreign Minister, too, had yet to be informed.
     In  conclusion, Colonel General Keitel said that he  was
willing,  either  through  General  Thomas  or  by  his   own
participation, to bring about a meeting, if necessary.
Frames 111836-111837, serial 103

The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (WeizsĄcker)
                           to the
     German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


No. 1003
BERLIN, December 6, 1939.
     Supplement to Instruction Poll VI 2651, Item II.
     Supplementing  telegraphic instruction  of  December  2,
[59] the following additional instruction was issued today to
all the important missions:
     In conversations regarding the Finnish-Russian conflict,
you   are   requested   to   make  use   of   the   following
     Only  a  few weeks ago Finland was about to come  to  an
understanding with Russia, which might have been achieved  by
a  prudent Finnish policy. An appeal to the League of Nations
by  the  Finnish  Government is the  least  suitable  way  of
solving the crisis.
     There  is no doubt that British influence on the Finnish
Government-partly  operating through  Scandinavian  capitals-
induced  the  Finnish Government to reject Russian  proposals
and  thereby brought on the present conflict. England's guilt
in   the   Russo-Finnish   conflict  should   be   especially
[59] Ante, p. 127. ([58] not used? LWJ)
Page 130
     Germany   is   not   involved  in   these   events.   In
conversations,  sympathy is to be expressed for  the  Russian
point  of  view. Please refrain from expressing any  sympathy
for the Finnish position. End of telegraphic instruction.

Frames 395-393, serial F 18

          Memorandum by the Reich Foreign Minister

RAM Nr. 60
BERLIN, December 11, 1939.
     I.  I asked the Russian Ambassador to see me today at  5
     At  the  beginning of our conversation, I  indicated  to
Herr Shkvartsev the inappropriateness of the report given out
by  the  Tass agency yesterday, dealing with alleged armament
supplies by Germany to Finland. I stressed the fact that this
report  had been denied yesterday by German sources. All  the
more  did I regret that this report, apparently launched from
English  sources  via  Sweden and  only  designed  to  create
discord between Germany and the Soviet Union, has been  taken
up in so striking a fashion by the official Russian agency.
     On  the  armaments  business with  Finland  I  made  the
following suggestions to him:
     1)  Germany  had before the commencement of  hostilities
last summer contracted with Finland for the supply of certain
anti-aircraft  guns  in  exchange for nickel  shipments  from
Finland.  After  the  hostilities  began,  further  shipments
     2)  The  Italian  Government  had  inquired  in  October
whether  Germany was willing to permit the transit  of  fifty
aircraft  to  Finland. At that time the  threat  of  military
measures  between  Russia  and  Finland  could  not  yet   be
foreseen. Therefore, the German Government had, to  be  sure,
refused transit by air, but raised no objection to transit by
rail. The Italian Government, however, did not refer to  this
matter  again,  and neither the Italians nor the  Finns  made
requests for a transit permit for the planes.
     3) Some time ago an application was made to ship certain
war  materials for Finland from Belgium through Germany. This
application, too, had been rejected.
     I  was  now asking the Russian Ambassador to inform  his
Government  of  the  foregoing and to  point  out  that  with
publications   such  as  the  Tass  report  mentioned,   only
England's  game was being played. England was behind  Finland
and  according  to  intelligence received, England  was  also
responsible for the failure of the Russo-Finnish negotiations
last November. I should be grateful if the Russian Government
would cause the Tass agency, before releasing such reports in
the  future,  first to get in touch either  with  the  German
Embassy in
Page 131
Moscow   or  with  Berlin,  in  order  that  such  unpleasant
incidents might be avoided.
     The   Russian  Ambassador  showed  appreciation  of   my
viewpoint   and   promised  to  report  to   his   Government
     II.  I  then spoke to the Russian Ambassador  about  the
extensive  demands for military supplies put forward  by  the
Russian trade delegation. I wanted to say beforehand, that  I
had given instructions to comply with the Russian requests in
any conceivable way, within the limits of possibility. But it
should  not  be forgotten that Germany was at  war  and  that
certain things were simply not possible. As I had since  been
told,  a new basis had been found in the meantime, upon which
the  further  negotiations can soon be concluded  in  Moscow,
between   the  newly  arrived  Russian  delegation  and   our
negotiators.  I  asked  the Russian Ambassador,  however,  to
point  out  in  Moscow, that from the German side  everything
humanly possible has been done and that beyond that one could
not go.
     The  Russian Ambassador promised to report to Moscow  in
this  sense and stressed the point that from the Russian side
any   military  information  obtained  here  by  the  Russian
delegation would, of course, be kept secret.
     I  told  the  Russian Ambassador that  we  had  complete
confidence  in  the  Russian  promises,  but  it  should   be
understood  by  the Russians that there was certain  material
that we could not supply during the war.

Frames 213-208, serial F 18

                  Foreign Office Memorandum

W 1027/40 g. Rs.

                 SIGNED ON FEBRUARY 11, 1940
     The  Agreement  is based on the correspondence-mentioned
in  the  preamble-between  the  Reich  Minister  for  Foreign
Affairs   and  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of   People's
Commissars,  Molotov,  dated September  28,  1939.  [60]  The
Agreement represents the first great step toward the economic
program  envisaged  by both sides and is to  be  followed  by
     1.  The  Agreement covers a period of 27 months, i.  e.,
the Soviet deliveries, which are to be made within 18 months,
will be compen-
     [60] Ante, pp. 108-109.
Page 132
sated by German deliveries in turn within 27 months. The most
difficult point of the correspondence of September 28,  1939,
namely,  that the Soviet raw material deliveries  are  to  be
compensated  by German industrial deliveries  over  a  longer
period,  is  thereby settled in accordance with  our  wishes.
This was not possible without a hard fight. Only the personal
message  of the Reich Foreign Minister to Stalin brought  the
final  settlement.  The  stipulation  of  18  and  27  months
represents  a compromise solution, since at stated intervals-
namely, every 6 months-the mutual deliveries of goods must be
balanced  according to the fixed ratio. If this balance  does
not  exist, i. e., particularly if the German deliveries fall
behind  the  ratio  of  the Soviet deliveries  fixed  by  the
Agreement,  the  other  side  is  entitled  to  suspend   its
deliveries   temporarily   until   the   fixed    ratio    is
reestablished. This stipulation is annoying, but could not be
eliminated by us, as Stalin himself had adopted it during the
final talks.
     2.  The  Soviet deliveries. According to the  Agreement,
the Soviet Union shall within the first 12 months deliver raw
materials   in  the  amount  of  approximately  500   million
     In  addition,  the Soviets will deliver  raw  materials,
contemplated in the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939,  for
the  same period, in the amount of approximately 100  million
     The most important raw materials are the following:
     1,000,000  tons of grain for cattle, and of legumes,  in
          the amount of 120 million Reichsmarks
     900,000   tons   of  mineral  oil  in  the   amount   of
          approximately 115 million Reichsmarks
     100,000 tons of cotton in the amount of approximately 90
          million Reichsmarks
     500,000 tons of phosphates
     100,000 tons of chrome ores
     500,000 tons of iron ore
     300,000 tons of scrap iron and pig iron
     2,400 kg. of platinum
     Manganese  ore, metals, lumber, and numerous  other  raw
     To  this  must also be added the Soviet exports  to  the
Protectorate, which are not included in the Agreement, in the
amount  of  about  50 million Reichsmarks  so  that  the  net
deliveries  of goods from the Soviet Union during  the  first
treaty year amount to a total of 650 million Reichsmarks.
     In  addition, there are other important benefits. On the
basis of the correspondence of September 28, 1939, the Soviet
Union  had  granted  us  the right of  transit  to  and  from
Rumania, Iran, and Afghanistan
Page 133
and  the  countries  of the Far East, which  is  particularly
important  in  view  of  the German  soybean  purchases  from
Manchukuo.  The freight rates of the Trans-Siberian  Railroad
were  reduced by 50 percent for soybeans. The transit freight
charges are to be settled by a clearing system and amount  to
approximately 100 million Reichsmarks.
     Adding  certain other items (clearing share in  purchase
of  raw materials by the Soviet Union in third countries), it
may  be  assumed  that  during the  first  12  months  Soviet
deliveries and services will amount to a total of  about  800
million Reichsmarks.
     3. Thus far, only part of the Soviet deliveries has been
fixed  for the second treaty year. During the first 6  months
of  the  second treaty year the Soviet Union will deliver  to
Germany 230 million Reichsmarks worth of raw materials of the
same  kind  as  in the first treaty year. It is  contemplated
that  negotiations will be resumed before the  expiration  of
the first treaty year and the quantities for the exchange  of
goods  for  the  second treaty year fixed and even  increased
beyond the volume of the first treaty year.
     4.  The  German deliveries comprise industrial products,
industrial  processes  and  installations  as  well  as   war
materiel. The Soviet deliveries of the first 12 months are to
be  compensated by us within 15 months. The Soviet deliveries
of the first 6 months of the second treaty year (13th to 18th
month) are to be compensated by us within 12 months (from the
16th to the 27th month).
     5.  Among  the  Soviet deliveries within  the  first  18
months  are 11,000 tons of copper, 3,000 tons of nickel,  950
tons of tin, 500 tons of molybdenum, 500 tons of wolfram,  40
tons  of cobalt. These deliveries of metals are intended  for
the  carrying  out  of the German deliveries  to  the  Soviet
Union.  Since  these metals are not immediately available  in
Germany  and  will not be delivered until the  treaty  is  in
force,  it will be necessary to bridge the initial period  by
using metals from our own stocks for the German deliveries to
the Soviet Union and to replace them from the incoming Soviet
metal  deliveries.  Any different arrangement,  such  as  the
advance delivery of metals which we demanded at first,  could
not be achieved.
     Furthermore,  the Soviet Union declared her  willingness
to  act  as  buyer  of  metals and  raw  materials  in  third
countries.  To  what degree this promise can be  realized  in
view  of  the intensified English counter-measures cannot  be
judged  at  the  present  time.  Since  Stalin  himself   has
repeatedly promised generous help in this respect it  may  be
expected that the Soviet Union will make every effort.
Page 134
     6.  The  negotiations were difficult and lengthy.  There
were   material   and   psychological   reasons   for   this.
Undoubtedly,  the Soviet Union promised far  more  deliveries
than are defensible from a purely economic point of view, and
she must make the deliveries to Germany partly at the expense
of  her  own  supply. On the other hand, it is understandable
that   the  Soviet  Government  is  anxious  to  receive   as
compensation those things which the Soviet Union lacks. Since
the   Soviet  Union  does  not  import  any  consumer   goods
whatsoever,  their wishes concerned exclusively  manufactured
goods  and  war  materiel. Thus, in  numerous  cases,  Soviet
bottlenecks coincide with German bottlenecks, such as machine
tools for the manufacture of artillery ammunition. It was not
easy  to  find  a  compromise between the interests  of  both
sides.  Psychologically  the  ever-present  distrust  of  the
Russians  was  of  importance as well  as  the  fear  of  any
responsibility. And People's Commissar Mikoyan had  to  refer
numerous  questions to Stalin personally, since his authority
was not sufficient.
     Despite   all  these  difficulties,  during   the   long
negotiations  the  desire of the Soviet  Government  to  help
Germany and to consolidate firmly the political understanding
in economic matters, too, became more and more evident.
     The Agreement means a wide open door to the East for us.
The raw material purchases from the Soviet Union and from the
countries   bordering  the  Soviet   Union   can   still   be
considerably  increased.  But it is  essential  to  meet  the
German  commitments to the extent required. In  view  of  the
great  volume  this  will require a  special  effort.  If  we
succeed in extending and expanding exports to the East in the
required volume, the effects of the English blockade will  be
decisively weakened by the incoming raw materials.
     BERLIN, February 26, 1940.

Frames 242-240, serial F 18

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


BERLIN, March 28, 1940.

No. 543
      For the Ambassador personally. Secret.
     During  my  recent  visit to Rome, where-as  you  know-I
worked on the improvement of Italian-Russian relations  among
other things, I already contemplated carrying out the plan of
a visit by Herr Molotov
Page 135
to  Berlin.  Although I did not mention this idea to  anyone,
the   Anglo-French   propaganda,   correctly   guessing    my
intentions, spoke of it with the hope of interfering with the
plan  and  thereby  with  the further  consolidation  of  our
relations  with Russia. I could have denied the  Anglo-French
report  without any trouble, but refrained from doing so  out
of consideration for Molotov. Then, the Russian press for its
part issued a denial.
     Nevertheless, I have not given up the idea of a visit by
Molotov  to Berlin. On the contrary, I should like to  retain
it,  and  if it can be realized I should like to put it  into
effect  in the near future. It goes without saying  that  the
invitation  is not to be confined to Herr Molotov;  it  would
suit  our own needs better, as well as our really ever-closer
relations with Russia, if Herr Stalin himself came to Berlin.
The  FĀhrer  would not only be particularly happy to  welcome
Stalin  in Berlin, but he would also see to it that he  would
get   a   reception  commensurate  with  his   position   and
importance,  and he would extend to him all the  honors  that
the occasion demanded.
     An  invitation both to Herr Molotov and to  Herr  Stalin
has,  as you know, already been issued orally by me in Moscow
and was accepted by both of them in principle. In what manner
the  invitation  should  now be repeated,  and  its  definite
acceptance and realization attained, you yourself  can  judge
best.  During the conversation to be conducted you will  have
to  word  the  invitation  to Herr Molotov  more  definitely,
whereas you will have to state the invitation to Herr  Stalin
in the name of the FĀhrer in less definite terms. We must, of
course, avoid receiving a clear-cut refusal from Stalin.
     Before  you take any action, I request that you  comment
on  the  subject immediately, reporting to me  by  wire  your
opinion  as  to the procedure to be followed by you  and  the
prospects for its success.

Frames 0466-0467, serial F 5

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                    German Foreign Office


Moscow, March 30, 1940-11:40 p. m.
Received March 31, 1940-8:15 a. m.

No. 599 of March 30

     For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
     Reference your telegram of the 28th, No. 543.
Page 136
     I.  I  personally  believe firmly-as I reported  on  the
occasion of my inquiry of October 17, telegram No. 554  [61]-
that  Molotov, conscious of his obligation, will visit Berlin
as  soon  as the time and circumstances appear propitious  to
the  Soviet  Government.  After careful  examination  of  all
factors known to me I cannot, however, conceal the fact  that
I  consider  the  chances slight for  the  acceptance  of  an
invitation  at the present time. My opinion is based  on  the
following considerations:
     1.  All  our  observations, particularly the  speech  of
Molotov  on  March 29, confirm that the Soviet Government  is
determined to cling to neutrality in the present war  and  to
avoid as much as possible anything that might involve it in a
conflict with the Western powers. This must have been one  of
the  main reasons why the Soviet Government broke off the war
against Finland, abandoning the People's Government.
     2.  The  Soviet  Government  having  this  attitude,  it
probably fears that a demonstration of the relations  between
the Soviet Union and Germany such as a visit by Molotov or by
Stalin himself to Berlin might, at present, involve the  risk
of  severance  of  diplomatic relations or  even  of  warlike
developments with the Western powers.
     3.  Indicative  of  the situation  is  the  Tass  denial
mentioned  by you which denies with rather striking plainness
and firmness all rumors about an allegedly impending; trip to
Germany by Molotov.
     4.  It is a known fact that Molotov, who has never  been
abroad  has  strong inhibitions against appearing in  strange
surroundings. This applies as much if not more to Stalin.
     Therefore,   only   very  favorable   circumstances   or
extremely important Soviet advantages could induce Molotov or
Stalin  to make such a trip, in spite of disinclinations  and
"wariness;" furthermore, Molotov, who never flies, will  need
at least a week for the trip, and there is really no suitable
substitute for him here.
     II.  Although the prospects for success therefore appear
to be slight, I will, of course, do everything in my power in
order to try to realize the plan, in case it is to be pursued
any  further.  A  suitable starting  point  for  an  informal
conversation  on  that  subject can  be  found  without  much
trouble.  The course of the conversation will reveal  whether
and  how  far  I  can  go into the subject.  As  regards  the
invitation  to  Stalin, the possibility of  a  meeting  in  a
border  town  would  have  to be  left  open  from  the  very

[61] Not printed.

Page 137

Frame 0465, serial F 5

  The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


RAM Nr. 13 g. Rs.
BERLIN, April 3, 1940.

No. 570

     For the Ambassador personally.
     Reference your telegram No. 599, of March 30.
     The Reich Foreign Minister requests that nothing further
be initiated for the time being.

Frames 203141-203142, serial 354

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

BERLIN, April 7, 1940.
Received MOSCOW, April 9, 1940.
     You  receive  herewith two copies of a  memorandum  [62]
which  will be presented by our envoys in Oslo and Copenhagen
on  April  9,  at  5:20  a. m., German summer  time,  to  the
Governments   concerned.  Until  the  step  which   you   are
instructed to take below has been carried out, the  strictest
secrecy is to be maintained with regard to the memorandum and
this  instruction, and no mention thereof is to be made  even
to any other member of the Embassy.
     On  April  9,  at 7 a. m., German summer time,  you  are
requested  to  ask for an interview with Herr  Molotov,  and,
during  the course of the morning. to hand him a copy of  the
     You  will kindly emphasize orally that we had absolutely
reliable reports regarding an imminent thrust of Anglo-French
military  forces against the Norwegian and Danish coasts  and
therefore  had  to  act without delay.  As  outlined  in  the
memorandum, it is a matter of security measures. Swedish  and
Finnish territory will in no way be affected by our action.
     The  Reich Government is of the opinion that our actions
are  also  in the interest of the Soviet Union, for execution
of the Anglo-French
[62] Not printed here.

Page 138

plan  which  is known to us would have caused Scandinavia  to
become a theater of war, and that, in all probability,  would
have led to a reopening of the Finnish question.
     Please report immediately by wire how your communication
is received.

Frame 203133, serial 354

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, April 9, 1940.

No. 653 of April 9
     Reference  your  instruction of April  7  (delivered  by
Counselor of Legation von Saucken) and our telegram  No.  648
of April 9. [63]
     For the Reich Foreign Minister in person.
     Instruction carried out with Molotov today at  10:30  a.
m.,   European  time.  Molotov  declared  that   the   Soviet
Government  understood the measures which  were  forced  upon
Germany.  The English had certainly gone much too  far;  they
had disregarded completely the rights of neutral nations.  In
conclusion, Molotov said literally: "We wish Germany complete
success in her defensive measures."

[63] Latter not printed.

Frames 210958-210960, serial 384

   Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union

Tgb. Nr. A. 1833/40
Moscow, April 11, 1940.


     For  some time we have observed in the Soviet Government
a  distinct shift which was unfavorable to us. In all  fields
we  suddenly  came up against obstacles which were,  in  many
cases,  completely  unnecessary; even in little  things  like
visas they started to create difficulties; the release of the
Volksdeutsche imprisoned by the Poles, which was promised  by
treaty, could not be achieved; the deportation of the  German
citizens  long  imprisoned in Soviet jails suddenly  stopped;
Page 139
Soviet  Government  suddenly withdrew  its  promises  already
given with regard to the "North Base" ["Basis Nord"] in which
our  Navy  is  interested, etc. These obstacles,  which  were
apparent  everywhere, reached their climax in the  suspension
of  petroleum and grain shipments to us. On the 5th  of  this
month  I had a long talk with Herr Mikoyan, during which  the
attitude of the People's Commissar was very negative.  I  had
to  make  the  most strenuous efforts to get  at  least  some
concessions from him.
     We  asked ourselves in vain what the reason might be for
the  sudden  change  of attitude of the  Soviet  authorities.
After all, nothing at all had "happened"! I suspect that  the
tremendous  clamor of our enemies and their sharp attacks  on
neutrals-particularly on the Soviet Union-and  on  neutrality
in   general   were  not  without  effect  upon  the   Soviet
Government,  so  that it feared being forced by  the  Entente
into  a great war for which it is not prepared, and that  for
this  reason  it  wanted to avoid anything  that  might  have
furnished a pretext to the English and French for reproaching
the  Soviet Union with unneutral behavior or partisanship for
Germany.  It  appeared to me as though the sudden termination
of   the   Finnish   war   had  come   about   from   similar
considerations.  Of  course, these suspicions  could  not  be
proved. However the situation had become so critical  that  I
decided  to  call  on  Herr Molotov in order  to  talk  these
matters  over with him, and after this discussion  to  notify
the  Foreign  Office. On the 8th of this  month  I  therefore
asked  for  permission to see Herr Molotov-i. e., before  the
Scandinavian events. Actually, the visit to Herr Molotov  did
not  take place until the morning of the 9th-i. e., after our
Scandinavian operations. During this talk it became  apparent
that  the Soviet Government had again made a complete  about-
face.  Suddenly  the  suspension of the petroleum  and  grain
shipments was termed "excessive zeal of subordinate agencies"
which  would  be  immediately  remedied.  (Herr  Mikoyan   is
Assistant Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,  i.
e.,  the highest Soviet personality after Herr Molotov!) Herr
Molotov  was  affability itself, willingly received  all  our
complaints and promised relief. Of his own accord he  touched
upon a number of issues of interest to us and announced their
settlement  in a positive sense. I must honestly say  that  I
was completely amazed at the change.
     In  my  opinion there is only one explanation  for  this
about-face:  our Scandinavian operations must  have  relieved
the  Soviet Government enormously-removed a great  burden  of
anxiety,  so to speak. What their apprehension consisted  of,
can again not be determined with cer-
Page 140

tainty.  I  suspect the following: The Soviet  Government  is
always  extraordinarily well informed.  If  the  English  and
French intended to occupy Norway and Sweden it may be assumed
with certainty that the Soviet Government knew of these plans
and  was  apparently terrified by them. The Soviet Government
saw  the  English and French appearing on the shores  of  the
Baltic  Sea,  and they saw the Finnish question reopened,  as
Lord Halifax had announced; finally they dreaded most of  all
the  danger  of  becoming involved in a war  with  two  Great
Powers. Apparently this fear was relieved by us. Only in this
way  can  the completely changed attitude of Herr Molotov  be
understood. Today's long and conspicuous article in  Izvestia
on  our  Scandinavian campaign (already sent to you by  wire)
sounds like one big sigh of relief. But, at any rate-at least
at  the  moment-"everything is in order" again here, and  our
affairs are going as they should.

Frame 112110, serial 103

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, April 13, 1940-10:31 p. m.
Received April 14, 1940-5:20 a. m.

No. 687 of April 13
     Molotov  today  asked me to see him and brought  up  the
     Persistent rumors were being circulated everywhere  that
Germany  would  soon  be  forced to  include  Sweden  in  her
Scandinavian operations, particularly in order to  ship  more
troops  to Norway. Molotov added that in his opinion Germany,
and  definitely  the  Soviet Union,  were  vitally  [lebhaft]
interested in preserving Swedish neutrality. He asked me  how
much truth there was in these rumors.
     First,  I  referred to my statement to him on  April  9,
that  our  operations would not touch Sweden and Finland  and
added  that I was not aware of the slightest indication  that
we  had  any  designs on Swedish territory.  Nevertheless,  I
would pass his inquiry on to Berlin.
     In   conclusion,  Molotov  declared  that   the   Soviet
Government  was  greatly  interested  in  preserving  Swedish
neutrality, that its violation was frowned upon by the Soviet
Government, and that it hoped the inclusion of Sweden in  our
operations  would not take place, if this  could  at  all  be
avoided. Request instructions by wire.

Page 141

Frame 112111, serial 103

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)


BERLIN, April 15, 1940.

No. 636

     Reference your telegram No. 687.
     I  request that you explain to Herr Molotov our attitude
toward Sweden as follows:
     We   share   completely  the  attitude  of  the   Soviet
Government   that   preservation   of   Sweden's   neutrality
corresponds  both to German and to Soviet interests.  As  you
already  told him on transmitting our memorandum on  April  9
and  repeated during the conversation of April 13, it is  not
our  intention to extend our military operations in the north
to  Swedish territory. On the contrary, we are determined  to
respect unconditionally the neutrality of Sweden, as long  as
Sweden  in turn also observes strict neutrality and does  not
support the Western powers.
Reich Foreign Minister
Frames 203979-203980, serial 357

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

BERLIN, May 7, 1940.
Received Moscow, May 10, 1940.
     Enclosed you will find two copies of two memoranda  [64]
which  will  be  presented  by our Legations  in  The  Hague,
Brussels, and Luxemburg to the Governments there on  the  day
and  hour  to  be  indicated to you orally  by  the  courier.
[Interlinear  penciled notation: May 10, 1940,  5:45  a.  m.,
German  summer  time.] Until the dāmarche ordered  below  has
been  accomplished, the memoranda and these instructions  are
to  be  kept  strictly secret and not mentioned even  to  any
member of the Embassy.
     I  request that after receipt of these instructions  you
enter  on  the copies of the attached memoranda-on  the  last
page,  beneath  the text-the date of the day before  that  on
which  you  deliver the copies to the Government  in  Moscow,
preferably with typewriter, or else in ink.
[64] Not printed here.

Page 142
     About  7 o'clock in the morning, German summer time,  on
the  day mentioned to you by the courier, I request that  you
ask  for an appointment with Molotov and then, in the  course
of  the morning at the earliest hour convenient to him,  hand
him  a  copy of the memoranda. I request that you  tell  Herr
Molotov  that  the Reich Government, in view of our  friendly
relations,  is  anxious to notify the  Soviet  Government  of
these  operations in the West, which were forced upon Germany
by  the impending Anglo-French push on the Ruhr region by way
of Belgium and Holland.
     For  the rest, I request that you use the viewpoints and
arguments to be found in the memoranda themselves.
     I request that you report by wire immediately concerning
the reception accorded your mission.

Frame 203978, serial 357

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, May 10, 1940-6 p. m.

No. 874 of May 10

     Reference instructions of May 7.
     For the Reich Foreign Minister:
     I  called  on Molotov; instruction carried out.  Molotov
appreciated  the  news  and added  that  he  understood  that
Germany  had to protect herself against Anglo-French  attack.
He had no doubt of our success.

Frames 210963-210964, serial 384

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office


Moscow, May 29, 1940-7:10 p. m.
Received May 29, 1940-10:10 p. m.
No. 1006 of May 29
     Reference your telegram of the 28th No. 877. [65]
     The  reported agreement of the Soviet Government to  the
sending   of  Cripps  appears  credible,  since  the   Soviet
Government has always
[65] Not printed.
Page 143
taken  the  position that it was of interest to it  to  learn
what  the  British  Government had to  tell  them,  and  that
economic  agreements with England were in  harmony  with  the
neutral position of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet
Union  is interested in obtaining rubber and tin from England
in exchange for lumber.
     There  is no reason for apprehension concerning  Cripps'
mission, since there is no reason to doubt the loyal attitude
of  the  Soviet  Union  toward us  and  since  the  unchanged
direction of Soviet policy toward England precludes damage to
Germany  or  vital German interests. There are no indications
of  any kind here for belief that the latest German successes
caused alarm or fear of Germany in the Soviet Government. All
the  assertions of the foreign and especially enemy press  to
the  contrary are desperate attempts to sow distrust  between
Germany  and the Soviet Union, to start a diplomatic activity
against  Germany  at  any  cost in  view  of  the  precarious
situation  of  the Allies, and to exploit this as  propaganda
for their own people.
     The  selection  of  Cripps  as  British  plenipotentiary
appears  unfortunate in view of the attitude in  Moscow:  the
Soviet Government prefers to negotiate important matters with
a prominent representative of the foreign government.
     As  I  see  it  here a trip by Ritter  [66]  and  (group
garbled) at the present time would have to avoid looking like
a  race with Cripps. The advisability of the trip would  also
have  to  be considered from the point of view of whether  we
would  (group  missing)  anything new  to  offer  the  Soviet
[66] Ambassador Ritter of the German Foreign Office staff.

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