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I. TENTATIVE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS,
APRIL 17-AUGUST 14, 1939
*****
Frames 231609-231610, serial 485
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizs„cker)
St. S. Nr. 339
BERLIN, April 17, 1939.
The Russian Ambassador visited me today-for the first
time since he took up his post here [1]-for a conversation on
practical matters. He dwelt at length on a subject which he
said was of particular interest to him: namely, the
fulfillment of certain contracts for war materiel by the
Skoda Works. Although the items involved are manifestly
rather insignificant, the Ambassador regarded the fulfillment
of the contracts as a test, to determine whether, in
accordance with a recent statement by Director Wiehl [2] to
him, we were really willing to cultivate and expand our
economic relations with Russia. The matter of these supply
contracts is being looked into elsewhere.
Toward the end of the discussion, I casually mentioned
to the Ambassador that even granted goodwill on our part, a
favorable atmosphere for the delivery of war materials to
Soviet Russia was not exactly being created at present by
reports of a Russian-British-French air pact and the like.
Herr Merekalov seized on these words to take up political
matters. He inquired as to the opinion here regarding the
present situation in Central Europe. When I told him that as
far as I knew Germany was the only country not participating
in the present saber-rattling in Europe, he asked me about
our relations with Poland and about the alleged military
clashes on the German-Polish frontier. After I had denied the
latter and made some rather restrained comments on German-
Polish relations, the Russian asked me frankly [unverblmt]
what I thought of German-Russian relations.
I replied to Herr Merekalov that, as everybody knew, we
had always had the desire for mutually satisfactory
commercial relations with Russia. It had appeared to me that
the Russian press lately was not fully participating in the
anti-German tone of the American and some
[1] Ambassador Merekalov had presented his credentials on
June 5, 1938.
[2] Head of the Commercial Policy Division of the German
Foreign Office.
Page 2
of the English papers. As to the German press, Herr Merekalov
could form his own opinion, since he surely followed it very
closely.
The Ambassador thereupon stated approximately as
follows:
Russian policy had always moved in a straight line.
Ideological differences of opinion had hardly influenced the
Russian-Italian relationship, and they did not have to prove
a stumbling block with regard to Germany either. Soviet
Russia had not exploited the present friction between Germany
and the Western democracies against us, nor did she desire to
do so. There exists for Russia no reason why she should not
live with us on a normal footing. And from normal, the
relations might become better and better.
With this remark, to which the Russian had led the
conversation, Herr Merekalov ended the interview. He intends
to go to Moscow in the next few days for a visit.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frame 111301, serial 103
The German Charg‚ in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the
German
Foreign Office
Telegram
No. 61 of May 4
Moscow, May 4, 1939-8:45 p. m.
Received May 4, 1939-10 p. m.
Appointment of Molotov as Foreign Commissar
simultaneously retaining his position as Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars is published as ukase of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of May 3 by Soviet press with
great fanfare. Dismissal of Litvinov appears on last page as
small notice under "Chronicle." Sudden change has caused
greatest surprise here, since Litvinov was in the midst of
negotiations with the English delegation, at the May Day
Parade still appeared on the reviewing stand right next to
Stalin, and there was no recent concrete evidence of
shakiness in his position. Soviet press contains no comments.
Foreign Commissariat is giving press representatives no
explanations.
Since Litvinov had received the English Ambassador as
late as May 2 and had been named in press of yesterday as
guest of honor at the parade, his dismissal appears to be
result of spontaneous decision by Stalin. The decision
apparently is connected with the fact that differences of
opinion arose in the Kremlin on Litvinov's negotiations.
Reason for differences of opinion presumably lies in deep
mistrust that Stalin harbors toward the entire surrounding
capitalist
Page 3
world. At last Party Congress Stalin urged caution lest
Soviet Union be drawn into conflicts. Molotov (no Jew) is
held to be "most intimate friend and closest collaborator" of
Stalin. His appointment is apparently to guarantee that the
foreign policy will be continued strictly in accordance with
Stalin's ideas.
TIPPELSKIRCH
*****
Frame 211496, serial 388
Foreign Office Memorandum
To W IV 1493
This afternoon I asked the Soviet Charg‚, Counselor of
Embassy Astakhov, to come to see me and informed him that we
had agreed, as requested by his Ambassador on April 17, to
carry out the Soviet supply contracts with the Skoda Works.
Appropriate instructions had already been given. I asked him
to inform his Government of this.
Counselor of Embassy Astakhov was visibly gratified at
this declaration and stressed the fact that for the Soviet
Government the material side of the question was not of as
great importance as the question of principle. He inquired
whether we would not soon resume the negotiations which had
been broken off in February. To this I replied that I could
not yet give him any answer to that, as the examination of
the numerous problems which the last Russian answer had
raised was not yet completed.
Then Astakhov touched upon the dismissal of Litvinov and
tried without asking direct questions to learn whether this
event would cause a change in our position toward the Soviet
Union. He stressed very much the great importance of the
personality of Molotov, who was by no means a specialist in
foreign policy, but who would have all the greater importance
for the future Soviet foreign policy.
SCHNURRE
BERLIN, May 5, 1939.
*****
Frame 211486, serial 388
Foreign Office Memorandum
MINUTE
The Counselor of the Russian Embassy, Astakhov, called
on me this afternoon in order to introduce to me the Tass
representative,
Page 4
Filipov, who had just arrived. He began with the statement
that he was happy that Herr Filipov could start his work
under new conditions which were completely different from the
past. The recently practiced reserve of the German press
toward Soviet Russia had already attracted the attention of
the foreign press. I for my part remarked that at the present
time one could not talk about a corresponding Russian reserve
toward Germany and pointed out the latest broadcasts of the
Moscow Radio. To this Herr Astakhov remarked that Moscow
apparently still was rather suspicious because, of course,
they did not yet know how this reserve was to be interpreted,
which was, after all, possibly only a short-lived tactical
maneuver. At any rate, the Soviet Russians would be only too
happy if such fears were unjustified.
Asked about the significance of the change in the
direction of foreign affairs in Moscow, Herr Astakhov
declared that previously it had, after all, not been a
question of a personal policy of Litvinov, but of compliance
with general principles. Therefore, for the time being one
could not speak of a reorientation of policy, particularly
since Soviet Russian policy depended on that of the others
and not least on that of Germany.
BRAUN v. STUMM
BERLIN, May 9, 1939.
*****
Frames 211504-211505, serial 388
Foreign Office Memorandum
To W IV 1870/39
MEMORANDUM
The Soviet Charg‚, Counselor of Embassy Astakhov, called
on me today in order to talk to me about the legal status of
the Soviet Trade Mission in Prague, established there on the
basis of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Trade Agreement of 1935. The
Soviet Union wants to leave the Trade Mission in Prague as a
section of the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin, and requests
that it be given temporarily the same legal status that it
had under the Soviet-Czechoslovak Trade Agreement. Herr
Astakhov invoked the German declaration, according to which
the present Czechoslovak trade agreements would continue to
be applied to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia until
something new had replaced them.
I received this request and promised an early answer. I
told him
Page 5
as my personal opinion that there would hardly be any
objections to the Soviet request.
During the subsequent conversation Astakhov again
referred in great detail to the development of German-Soviet
relations, as he had already done two weeks ago. He remarked
that the German press for some weeks looked entirely
different. The attacks hitherto directed against the Soviet
Union were missing, reports were objective; in an industrial
newspaper of the Rhineland he had even seen some photographs
of Soviet installations. Of course, the Soviets could not
judge whether this was only a temporary break that was used
for tactical reasons. However, it was hoped that a permanent
state of affairs would result from it. Astakhov stated in
detail that there were no conflicts in foreign policy between
Germany and Soviet Russia, and that therefore there was no
reason for any enmity between the two countries. It was true
that in the Soviet Union there was a distinct feeling of
being menaced by Germany. It would undoubtedly be possible to
eliminate this feeling of being menaced and the distrust in
Moscow. During this conversation, he also again mentioned the
Treaty of Rapallo. In reply to my incidental question, he
commented on the Anglo-Soviet negotiations to the effect that
under the present circumstances the result desired by England
would hardly be achieved.
To substantiate his opinion concerning the possibility
of a change in German-Soviet relations, Astakhov repeatedly
referred to Italy and stressed that the Duce, even after the
creation of the Axis, had implied that there were no
obstacles to a normal development of the political and
economic relations between the Soviet Union and Italy.
In my replies I was reserved and induced Astakhov, by
means of incidental remarks only, to further elaborate his
viewpoint.
SCHNURRE
BERLIN, May 17, 1939.
*****
Frames 111353-111355, serial 103
Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Schulenburg)
Tgb. Nr. A/1023
Moscow, May 20, 1939.
This afternoon at 4:00, I was received by the Chairman
of the Council of People's Commissars and Commissar for
Foreign Affairs Molotov. The interview took place in the
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. It lasted over an hour and
was carried on in most friendly
Page 6
fashion. Herr Molotov, who speaks only Russian, had requested
that no translator be brought along since he himself would
provide an excellent interpreter. The latter, a rather young
man, translated very correctly but slowly from the French.
That explains in part the long duration of the conference.
I opened the conversation by saying to Herr Molotov that
the last proposals of Herr Mikoyan in our economic
negotiations had presented several difficulties which could
not be immediately removed. We now believed that a way had
been found to come to an understanding and we intended in the
very near future to send Geheimrat Dr. Schnurre to Moscow to
discuss with Herr Mikoyan whether an agreement could be
reached on the basis of our proposals. I asked whether Herr
Mikoyan was prepared to confer with Herr Schnurre.
Herr Molotov replied that the course of our last
economic negotiations had given the Soviet Government the
impression that we had not been in earnest in the matter and
we had only played at negotiating for political reasons. At
first it had been reported that a German delegation was
coming for economic negotiations to Moscow (I suggested that
this report did not emanate from us but from the Polish and
French press), and later it was to the effect that Herr
Schnurre was coming alone. Herr Schnurre did not come, but
Herr Hilger [3] and I had conducted the negotiations and then
these negotiations also had faded out. The Soviet Government
could only agree to a resumption of the negotiations if the
necessary "political bases" for them had been constructed
[wenn hierfr die notwendige "politische Grundlage"
geschaflen sein werde.].
I told Herr Molotov that we had never regarded the
economic discussions as a game, but we had always conducted
them entirely in earnest. We always had had and still have
the sincerest intention to come to an agreement, and Berlin
was of the opinion, if I understood it correctly, that a
successful conclusion of the economic discussions would also
help the political atmosphere. It had been technical reasons
only that had been responsible for Herr Schnurre's absence
and for the delay of the negotiations. The present economic
conditions in Germany made it very difficult to fulfill the
wishes of Herr Mikoyan. I asked Herr Molotov what he meant by
the construction of political bases. I had had the impression
that the German-Soviet atmosphere had improved during the
last year or so, and I was astonished that economic
negotiations should now be impossible while previously
negotiations of the same sort had repeatedly taken place
under more
[3] Of the staff of the German Embassy in Moscow.
Page 7
unfavorable conditions and had been brought to a conclusion.
Herr Molotov then declared that the way in which better
political bases could be built was something that both
Governments would have to think about. All of my determined
efforts to bring Herr Molotov to make his wishes more
definite and more concrete were in vain. Herr Molotov had
apparently determined to say just so much and not a word
more. He is known for this somewhat stubborn manner. I
thereupon concluded the conversation and stated that I would
inform my Government. Herr Molotov then bade me farewell in a
very friendly fashion.
Immediately at the conclusion of my visit to Herr
Molotov, I visited Herr Potemkin. I related to him the course
of my conversation with the Chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars, and I added that I had unfortunately not
been able to find out from the conversation what Herr Molotov
actually wanted. He certainly must have had something in
mind. I asked Herr Potemkin to find out whether he could not
possibly let me know what direction Herr Molotov's line of
thought was taking. I gave the impression that I did not know
at all what I should suggest to my Government. Nothing could
be changed in the main lines of German policy. Thus in my
opinion, we would persevere in our East Asia policy. I could
however, add that this policy was in no way directed against
the Soviet Union.
COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 111328, serial 103
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
BERLIN, May 21, 1939.
No. 94
Reference your telegram 73. [4] For Ambassador
personally
On basis of results so far of your discussions with
Molotov, we must now sit tight [ganz stillzuhalten] and wait
to see if the Russians will speak more openly.
I request that you act accordingly until otherwise
instructed, but to wire from time to time any useful reports
and news reaching you as well as your appraisal of the
situation.
WEIZSŽCKER
[4] Not printed; it summarized interview between Schulenburg
and Molotov described in preceding document.
Page 8
*****
Frames 111346-111347, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
Tgb. Nr. A/1023
Moscow, May 22, 1939.
DEAR HERR VON WEIZSŽCKER: I have the honor to transmit
to you as an enclosure a copy of the memorandum [5] which
gives the content and course of my interview with Herr
Molotov on May 20. I have also included the memorandum with
my report.
The Reich Minister directed me to maintain extreme
caution in my conference with Molotov. As a result I
contented myself with saying as little as possible and took
this attitude all the more because the attitude of Herr
Molotov seemed to me quite suspicious [recht verd„chtig]. It
cannot be understood otherwise than that the resumption of
our economic negotiations does not satisfy him as a political
gesture, and that he apparently wants to obtain from us more
extensive proposals of a political nature. We must be
extremely cautious in this field as long as it is not certain
that possible proposals from our side will not be used by the
Kremlin only to exert pressure on England and France. On the
other hand, if we want to accomplish something here, it is
unavoidable that we sooner or later take some action.
It is extraordinarily difficult here to learn anything
at all about the course of the English-French-Soviet
negotiations. My British colleague, who apparently is the
only one who is active in that connection here (he was being
announced to Herr Potemkin when I was visiting the latter),
preserves an iron silence. Even neutral diplomats have not
been able to learn anything.
My French colleague has been away for some time. The
Counselor of Embassy and Charg‚ in the last few days asked us
for a transit visa, so that it seems that he also is going to
leave Moscow soon. If the reports are correct that France
will now take over the negotiations in the matter of the
French-British-Soviet "alliance," these negotiations may well
take place not here but in Paris.
My Italian colleague is of the opinion that the Soviet
Union will surrender her freedom of negotiation only if
England and France give her a full treaty of alliance.
It is often stated here (I do not know whether it is
correct) that one of the principal reasons for the hesitation
of England in accepting the Soviet proposals for a military
alliance is the question of Japan. London is afraid of
driving the Japanese into our arms if she guar-
[5] Ante, p.5.
Page 9
antees the defense of all Soviet frontiers. If Japan should
come into our arms voluntarily, this consideration for
England should be eliminated.
With best greetings and Heil Hitler, I am, Herr von
Weizs„cker, yours very respectfully,
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 178398-178397, serial 276
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to the
German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
BERLIN, May 27, 1939.
DEAR COUNT SCHULENBURG: We answered your letter of the
22d in our telegram of yesterday, [6] which will probably
surprise you less than Herr Hilger, who was at hand at the
birth of a very different sort of instruction. I feel that I
still owe you a word of explanation. We are of the opinion
here that the English-Russian combination certainly will not
be easy to prevent. However, there may even today be a rather
wide field of negotiation into which we may be able to inject
ourselves with an impeding and disturbing effect by use of a
more unmistakable sort of language. The possibility of
success is considered here to be quite limited, so that one
must weigh whether a very open statement in Moscow, instead
of being beneficial, might not rather be harmful and perhaps
produce a peal of Tartar laughter. In weighing these points
of view, it had also to be considered that one link in the
whole chain, namely, a gradual conciliation between Moscow
and Tokyo, is regarded by the Japanese as distinctly
problematical. Rome also was very hesitant, so that
eventually the disadvantages of the proposed far-reaching
step were regarded as the determining factor. In short, we
will remain within the instructions which we have sent to
you, and we now want to see how deeply Moscow on the one hand
and Paris-London on the other are willing to pledge
themselves to each other.
Your reports and judgments of the situation are
naturally most welcome here at all times.
Our inquiries about the return here of the Soviet
Russian Ambassador, Merekalov, are only of significance in
relation to the future moves at the Kremlin.
Heartiest greetings and best wishes.
Heil Hitler!
Always yours faithfully,
WEIZSŽCKER
[5] Telegram not printed.
Page 10
P. S. Berlin, May 30, 1939.
To my lines above I must add that now, with the consent
of the Fhrer, a distinctly limited exchange of views with
the Russians will take place by means of a conference which I
am to hold today with the Russian Charg‚. You will, of
course, be officially informed of developments. I need,
therefore, not go more deeply into the matter here.
W.
*****
Frames 111372-111374, serial 103
Foreign Office Memorandum [7]
MAY 29, 1939.
1. We are faced with the fact that our Ambassador in
Moscow had a talk with Herr Molotov about the resumption of
German-Soviet commercial negotiations and that on this
occasion Herr Molotov made them subject to the clarification
of political relations between Germany and Soviet Russia. Of
course we ask ourselves whether Herr Molotov wanted to
express thereby a desire that a talk get under way concerning
the political relations between us, or whether he wanted this
considered simply as a form of rejection.
2. You yourself as well as their Ambassador occasionally
have indicated possibilities of some day discussing the
political relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, and
we ask ourselves whether this is in harmony with Molotov's
views or whether we are dealing here with different points of
view of their Embassy here and their Foreign Commissariat.
3. If they should have the desire to have a political
conversation with us, I personally can imagine this as
entirely possible. I would consider as a condition that the
aggressive promotion of the idea of world revolution no
longer be an element in the present Soviet foreign policy.
[Marginal notation: "mutually not to interfere in domestic
politics in any way, for ..."] If this condition is met-as
certain signs might indicate-I could imagine that such a
conversation could lead to useful results in the direction of
a progressive normalization of German-Soviet Russian
relations. [Marginal notation: "Ukraine."]
4. It is admittedly very doubtful whether the state of
affairs in Europe just at the moment promises success from
such talks, since the Soviet Government is engaged in
negotiations with England, which indicate that Moscow is more
or less determined to enter actively
[7] This and the following document are apparently a series
of proposals submitted by Ribbentrop to Hitler.
Page 11
into the English policy of encirclement. However, it is, of
course, up to your Government [marginal note: "ice-cold"] to
judge whether at this stage in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations,
it still sees room for such a conversation with Germany.
[Penciled notation: "spare myself the reproach of not having
spoken up."] [8]
*****
Frames 111368-111371, serial 103
Foreign Office Memorandum
SECRET
I suggest that the request of the Soviet Embassy in
Berlin for permission for the further maintenance of the
Soviet Russian commercial agency in Prague as a branch of the
Russian commercial agency in Berlin be used as the occasion
for the following statement, to be made by Herr von
Weizs„cker to the Russian representative in Berlin.
1. The question of the continued maintenance of the
Russian commercial agency in Prague is one of principle. For
that reason the Minister believed that in this matter he
could not make a decision on his own responsibility and
presented the matter to the Fhrer.
2. The German Reich Government would like to know
whether the Soviet Government wishes to consider the
maintenance of its commercial agency in Prague on a permanent
basis or whether it has only a limited period in mind. What,
in the latter case, would be the time limit ?
3. It is not easy for the German Reich Government, under
the present circumstances, to consent at all to the
maintenance of this Russian commercial agency, even as a
branch of the Berlin office. To its last suggestion
particularly, of taking up direct commercial negotiations
with Moscow, it received an answer in Moscow from which it
believes it must infer that the Soviet Government is at
present very little interested in resuming and strengthening
German-Russian commercial relations. There is, in addition,
the development of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union,
which also calls for caution on the part of the German Reich
Government with respect to the examination and granting of
special Soviet Russian wishes, such as in this case of the
Prague commercial agency. For the Reich Government has no
doubt the that Russia seems to be inclined actively to
support the British policy of encirclement directed against
Germany. The Reich Government, therefore for its part too, in
its own understandable interest, considers a clarification of
this development as the necessary condition for the granting
of special concessions. But above all, as stressed in
[8] The penciled notations appear to be notes by State
Secretary von Weizs„cker for his conversation with the
Russian Charg‚ on May 30, post, p. 12.
Page 12
point 2, it would be important to know for how long, under
those circumstances, the Soviet Government requests
permission for the continuance of its commercial agency in
Prague.
*****
Frames 111362-111367, serial 103
Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office (Weizs„cker)
STRICTLY SECRET
St. S. Nr. 455
BERLIN, May 30, 1939.
The Soviet Russian Charg‚ called on me this morning at
my request. I designated as our subject of conversation the
Soviet Russian request to continue accrediting their trade
mission in Prague as a branch office of the trade mission in
Berlin. In my subsequent remarks, which the Charg‚
interrupted by occasional objections, I adhered strictly to
the instructions given to me.
First, I told the Charg‚ that the request of the Russian
Government involved a matter of principle, and that for this
reason the Foreign Minister had dealt with it. Herr von
Ribbentrop had presented the matter to the Fhrer. At this
point the attention of the Charg‚ was aroused, and he made
sure by asking me again whether the Fhrer had really dealt
with the matter.
I then continued that we would like to know whether the
trade mission in Prague was to be retained permanently or
only temporarily, and for what length of time. To this the
Charg‚ immediately replied that he personally could only
state that there was still much work to be done in order to
complete current business in the Protectorate, but that his
Government had probably been thinking of a permanent status.
In accordance with instructions I then went on to state
that it would not be easy for us to give our consent to the
retention of the trade mission in Prague, because we, i. e.,
Ambassador Count Schulenburg, had recently received from Herr
Molotov a not very encouraging reply in the matter of our
economic relations. The Charg‚ indicated that he was informed
of the contents of the talk, and pending more detailed
instructions interpreted it to the effect that in Moscow they
wanted to avoid a repetition of what happened last January,
i. e., they did not want to make preparations again for the
trip of a German trade negotiator to Moscow only to receive a
cancellation at the last moment, amidst the ridicule of the
foreign press. Actually, Herr Molotov had stated that
politics and economy could not be entirely
Page 13
separated in our relations; a certain connection between the
two did actually exist. Apparently Potemkin in his
communication to the Charg‚ here expressed the matter this
way: that the contemplated trade negotiations could not be
treated lightly.
After we had exchanged a few more words to clarify the
incident of last January, I told the Charg‚ that I agreed
with him that economics and politics could not be entirely
separated from each other. It was for this very reason that I
was having the conversation with him, because the British
efforts to draw Russia into her sphere-efforts of which we
were informed-indicated a political orientation in Moscow of
which we would have to take account, even in considering less
important problems, such as the Soviet Russian trade mission
in Prague. I returned therefore to the question raised at the
beginning of our conversation-namely, what length of time the
Soviet Government would propose for the business of its trade
mission in Prague.
The Charg‚ concluded from this part of the conversation
that he would have to inquire again in Moscow as to what
intentions they actually had for the trade mission in Prague
and, furthermore, what Foreign Commissioner Molotov actually
meant to tell Count Schulenburg. The Charg‚ was willing to
say on his own account that Herr Molotov had, to be sure,
talked with the customary Russian distrust, but not with the
intention of barring further German-Russian discussions.
After the discussion had reached this point I reminded
the Charg‚ of certain conversations which he himself had
conducted in the Office and above all of the statements of
his Ambassador, now absent from Berlin, who told me in the
middle of April of the possibility of a normalization and
even further improvement of German-Russian political
relations. From this point the conversation proceeded
spontaneously and I changed over to a purely conversational
tone and put aside paper and pencil.
I here reminded the Charg‚ of the remarks of his
Ambassador about the more reserved language of the press on
both sides in the last few months. I mentioned that to my
knowledge the topic of Soviet Russia had receded into the
background in official German speeches of recent months-which
the Charg‚ confirmed but held that it could be interpreted in
different ways. Finally I told the Charg‚ that the
development of our relations with Poland, which was known to
him, had actually made our hitherto restricted policy in the
East freer.
After some concurring remarks by the Charg‚, I told him
that personally thought the German position toward Soviet
Russia was as
Page 14
follows: Germany was not narrow-minded, but she was not
officious either. Among our German political merchandise,
however, one item did not exist, namely a special liking for
Communism. We had dealt with Communists in short order and we
would continue to do so; moreover, we did not expect any
special liking for National Socialism in Moscow either. At
this point the Charg‚ interrupted with explanations as to how
Russian relations with Italy and particularly Turkey, as well
as other countries could be normal or even very good,
although in those countries Communism was not favored at all.
He strongly emphasized the possibility of a very clear
distinction between maxims of domestic policy on the one hand
and orientation of foreign policy on the other hand.
I then continued with my figure of speech and stated
that among our political merchandise there was also a pretty
good selection for Russia, ranging from normalization of our
relations such as the Russian Ambassador had suggested to me,
to unrelenting hostility. Normalization was indeed obstructed
by a lot of rubble and I was convinced that many people would
even like to pile it higher. The Charg‚ probably knew that
Herr Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, was also not entirely
without his share in this. One could conduct interesting
talks with Herr Beck, but he appeared to me to have become a
little old, because he sometimes suffered from a regrettable
weakness of memory. Thus, for instance, Beck's interpretation
of the German policy toward the Ukraine was refuted by the
German conduct in the case of the Carpathian Ukraine.
However, I did not want to go into these things in detail; I
thought that Germany had proved that she could cope with
Communism at home; nor did she have any fear in foreign
policy. I did not know whether there still was any room at
all for a possible gradual normalization of relations between
Soviet Russia and Germany, now that Moscow had perhaps
already listened to the enticements of London. At any rate,
however, since the Charg‚ and his Ambassador had talked so
frankly in the Foreign Ministry, I would like to spare myself
the reproach that we on our part had held back and had
concealed our position. We did not ask anything from Moscow,
we did not desire anything from Moscow, but neither did we
want to be told by Moscow at a later date that we had erected
between us an impenetrable wall of silence.
The Charg‚, who had followed the talk attentively and
had contributed to it a number of remarks not mentioned here,
stated in conclusion that the ideological barrier between
Moscow and Berlin was in reality erected by us. Before our
treaty with Poland we
Page 15
had rejected a Russian offer of alliance and until recently
there had been little comprehension here of the Russian
thesis that foreign and domestic policy did not have to
interfere with each other. He believed that his Government
had not wavered in this viewpoint and was still faithful to
it today. In conclusion the Charg‚ stated that he would
report home about our talk, the second part of which he
designated, for his part, as private, and he would request
instructions from his Government as to what its real aims
were concerning the trade mission in Prague, as well as
whether he, the Charg‚, had correctly interpreted the Molotov
talk as in no way negative [keineswegs zurckweisendes].
I did not, of course, ask the Charg‚ about the state of
the Anglo-Russian negotiations; nor did he mention anything
about them. However, it cannot be contested that in his
remarks today about our political relations he used basically
the same language as hitherto and as his Ambassador did in
the middle of last April. The Molotov-Schulenburg episode
appears to me, therefore, to have been the product of
sensitivity and distrust rather than a premeditated
rejection.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frames 111375-111378, serial 103
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
MOST URGENT
BERLIN, May 30, 1939.
No. 101. For the Ambassador.
For information.
Contrary to the policy previously planned, we have now
decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet
Union. Accordingly, in the absence of the Ambassador I asked
the Charg‚, Astakhov, to see me today. The Soviet request for
further continuance of their trade mission at Prague as a
branch of the trade mission at Berlin provided the starting
point of our conversation. Since the Russian request presents
a question of policy the Reich Foreign Minister had also been
considering it and he had taken the matter up with the
Fhrer. To my inquiry as to whether the maintenance of the
trade mission at Prague involved a permanent situation or a
continuance over a limited period, the Charg‚ remarked that
in his personal view it seemed most likely that the Soviet
Government was thinking of a permanent arrangement. I replied
that it would not be an easy matter for us
Page 16
to grant permission for continuance of the trade mission in
Prague, since Ambassador Count Schulenburg had just received
from Molotov a not very encouraging pronouncement on the
subject of the general state of our relations. The Charg‚, in
the absence of more definite instructions, interpreted the
conversation between Count Schulenburg and Molotov, of which
he had knowledge, as meaning that at Moscow they wished to
avoid a repetition of the course of events of last January.
In Molotov's view political and economic matters could not be
completely separated in our relationship. Between the two as
a matter of fact, there was a definite connection.
After I had cleared up to some extent the events of
January, I said to the Charg‚ that in our opinion also
political and economic matters in Russo-German relations
could not be entirely separated and I was conferring with him
particularly because British efforts to draw Russia into
their orbit pointed to a political orientation on the part of
Moscow of which we would have to take notice even in
relatively minor matters such as that of the trade mission in
Prague. I would therefore have to renew my query regarding
the length of time the Soviet Union desired the trade mission
at Prague. The Charg‚ at this stage of the conversation
stated that he must ask Moscow what the intentions there were
regarding the trade mission at Prague and what Foreign
Commissar Molotov had intended to say to Count Schulenburg.
In his view Molotov had, it was true, spoken with the
suspicion customary with the Russians, but not with the
intention of putting a check on further Russo-German
discussion.
In this connection I recalled to the Charg‚ certain
conversations which he himself had carried on at the Foreign
Office and especially statements made to me by the Soviet
Ambassador about the middle of April about the possibility of
normalization and even further improvement of Russo-German
political relations, and at this point I also referred to the
more moderate tone of the public statements on both sides for
several months past and above all to the fact that the
development of our relations with Poland had made our policy
in the East. which had previously been hampered, more free.
Following indications of agreement on the part of the Charg‚,
I said that in my personal opinion Germany was not narrow-
minded as respects Soviet Russia, but also not importunate.
Communism would continue to be rejected by us, while we, on
the other hand, expected no affection for National Socialism
from Moscow. The Charg‚ emphasized strongly in that
connection the possibility of a very clear separation between
principles governing internal policy on the one hand and the
attitude
Page 17
adopted in foreign policy on the other. I continued that
Russia, in addition to that normalization of our relationship
at which the Russian Ambassador had hinted, could choose any
course up to unyielding antagonism, even though many people,
as, for instance, the Polish Foreign Minister, were
interested in hindering such normalization. Beck's
interpretation of Germany's Ukrainian policy could, however,
be best refuted by Germany's conduct in respect to the
Carpatho-Ukraine. Whether there was still room for a gradual
normalization after Moscow had, perhaps already, given ear to
the enticements of London, I did not know. However, after the
Charg‚ and the Ambassador had made unequivocal statements at
the Foreign Office, we wanted to escape the charge that we
had kept silent about our own position. We were asking and we
wanted nothing from Moscow; however, we did not want Moscow
to be able to say to us later that we had erected an
impassable wall of silence between us.
The Charg‚ replied that he believed that his Government
was still of the opinion that foreign policy and internal
policy need not disturb each other. He would report the
conversation and request instructions from his Government
both as to its intentions about the trade mission in Prague
and as to whether he had correctly interpreted the statements
of Molotov as being in no sense a rejection.
I got the impression from the conversation that the
statements of Molotov should not be considered an intentional
refusal.
Instructions for further treatment of the subject are
being held in reserve.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frames 111379-1113S0, serial 103
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, May 30, 1939.
No. 102
With reference to telegram of today No. 101.
In the light of talk of today with Soviet Charg‚ here,
about which other telegraphic instructions are under way,
there are no objections here if Hilger gets in touch with
Mikoyan of his own accord and without referring to an order.
The fact that Hilger has worked for two and one-half weeks in
Berlin with competent authorities on creation of a basis for
commercial negotiations with Soviet Union ought
Page 18
to be sufficient occasion to initiate such a talk on his
part. However, Hilger would have to confine himself in
possible conversation to talking generally of his work here,
without repeating the offer to resume negotiations. On the
other hand, in view of Soviet sensitivity because of the
recall of Schnurre some time ago, he may try to remove doubts
of the seriousness of our intentions at that time and at
present of expanding economic relations with the Soviet
Union. If in this connection the Soviet negotiators touch
upon political questions, Hilger is only to point out that
political questions were the subject of direct conversation
between the State Secretary and the Soviet Charg‚ and that
the political authorities were probably about to clarify the
situation further.
If during this talk the Soviets show willingness to
resume economic negotiations Hilger could promise to get in
touch with Berlin at once.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frames 111398-111401, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
[9]
MOSCOW, JUNE 5, 1939.
MY DEAR HERR VON WEIZSŽCKER: May I thank you very much
for your kind and very interesting letter of the 27th of last
month.
It is obvious that Japan would not like to see even the
smallest agreement between us and the Soviet Union. The less
our pressure becomes upon the western boundary of Russia, the
stronger the might of the Soviet Union will make itself felt
in Eastern Asia. The Italians really ought to welcome a
German-Russian arrangement; they themselves have always
avoided clashing with Moscow, and the Reich could take a
stronger stand toward France if Poland were kept in check by
the Soviet Union, thus relieving our eastern boundary. If the
Italians nevertheless are "pretty reserved," the reason may
be that they are not pleased to see the importance of the
Reich within the Axis increase through an improvement in
German-Soviet relations and the resulting automatic increase
in our power.
It appears to me that they have gained the impression in
Berlin that Herr Molotov had rejected a German-Soviet
arrangement during the discussion with me. I have read
through my telegram once
[9] Marginal notation: "F" [sent to the Fhrer].
Page 19
again and compared it with my letter to you and my
memorandum. I cannot discover what has given rise to this
opinion in Berlin. [10] In reality, the fact is that Herr
Molotov almost invited political discussions. Our proposal of
conducting only economic negotiations appeared insufficient
to him. Of course, there was and is the danger that the
Soviet Government will utilize German proposals for pressure
on the English and French. Herr Molotov in his speech at once
utilized tactically our offer to begin economic negotiations.
Caution on our part was and is therefore necessary, but it
appears clear to me that no door has been shut and that the
way is open for further negotiations.
We have heard and read with the very greatest interest
of your conversation with Herr Astakhov. Incidentally,
several days after having mailed my last letter to you I had
occasion to talk again with Herr Potemkin about Soviet-German
relations. I told him that I had racked my brains as to what
positive steps could be taken to realize the suggestions of
Herr Molotov. There were no points of friction, no
controversial issues, between Germany and the Soviet Union.
We had no border incidents to eliminate and no dispute to
settle. We were asking nothing, from the Soviet Union and the
Soviet Union nothing from us, apparently. I asked Herr
Potemkin, with whom-in private-I can talk much more freely,
whether he could now tell me anything about the ideas of Herr
Molotov. Herr Potemkin answered this in the negative;
unfortunately, he could not add anything to the statements of
Herr Molotov, who had spoken for the Soviet Government. [11]
I am curious whether your conversation with Astakhov
will help the matter. Herr von Tippelskirch in my opinion was
justified in calling attention to the fact that, through our
non-aggression treaties with the Baltic countries, Russia has
received from us, free of charge, increased security and
thereby a German political down payment.
I would like to call attention to the fact that Herr
Molotov mentioned in his speech three conditions, which must
be met under any circumstances in order to achieve the
English-French-Soviet alliance. In none of the three points
is it stated that the demands of the Soviet Union refer
exclusively to Europe. The Far East is not named, to be sure,
but it is not excluded, either. As far as I know, however,
Great Britain wants to assume new obligations only in Europe.
From this a
[10] This sentence underlined and with marginal comment in
Ribbentrop's handwriting: "?? Erl [edigt]"-[Taken care of].
[11] This sentence underlined and in margin " !! ".
Page 20
new controversy may result, if the guarantee of the Baltic
countries is achieved. The Soviet Russians are full of
distrust toward us, but they do not much trust the democratic
powers, either. Distrust is aroused very easily here and,
once aroused, can be removed only with great difficulty.
It is significant that Molotov, in speaking of relations
with England, did not mention the invitations which the
British Government has extended to Mikoyan and recently to
Voroshilov, too, following the visit of Mr. Hudson in Moscow.
I learn from a generally reliable source that Herr
Potemkin was sent to Ankara in such a hurry in order to
prevent Turkey from signing with the English. Herr Potemkin
prevented the signature of the treaty, but not the
"declaration." The Soviet Government is reported not to be
opposed in principle to an English-Turkish agreement, but is
said to consider it important that Turkey should not dash
ahead, but should act at the same time and in the same manner
as the Soviet Union.
The most recent border incidents on the Mongolian-
Manchurian frontier seem to have been quite serious.
According to Japanese reports, the "Mongols" on May 28
employed one hundred airplanes, forty-two of which the
Japanese claim to have shot down. They claim that seventeen
airplanes had been shot down previously. I believe that the
Soviets are responsible for these serious incidents. They
represent aid to China; they are to prevent the Japanese from
withdrawing their very strong troop contingents from
Manchuria to China.
With most cordial regards and Heil Hitler, I remain, my
dear Herr von Weizs„cker,
Yours most respectfully,
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 178376-178378, serial 276
Foreign Office Memorandum
BERLIN, June 15, 1939.
The Bulgarian minister called on me today and told me
confidentially the following: The Soviet Russian Charg‚, with
whom he had no intimate relations, called on him yesterday
without any apparent reason and stayed with him two hours.
The long conversation, of which it could not be ascertained
whether it had reflected the personal opinions of Herr
Astakhov or the opinions of the Soviet Government, could be
summarized approximately as follows:
The Soviet Union faced the present world situation with
hesitation.
Page 21
She was vacillating between three possibilities, namely the
conclusion of the pact with England and France, a further
dilatory treatment of the pact negotiations, and a
rapprochement with Germany. This last possibility, with which
ideological considerations would not have to become involved,
was closest to the desires of the Soviet Union. In addition,
there were other points, for instance that the Soviet Union
did not recognize the Rumanian possession of Bessarabia. The
fear of a German attack, however, either via the Baltic
countries or via Rumania was an obstacle. In this connection
the Charg‚ had also referred to Mein Kampf. If Germany would
declare that she would not attack the Soviet Union or that
she would conclude a non-aggression pact with her, the Soviet
Union would probably refrain from concluding a treaty with
England. However, the Soviet Union did not know what Germany
really wanted, aside from certain very vague allusions.
Several circumstances also spoke for the second possibility,
namely to continue to conduct the pact negotiations with
England in a dilatory manner. In this case the Soviet Union
would continue to have a free hand in any conflict which
might break out.
Herr Draganoff then stated that he had declared to the
Soviet Russian Charg‚ that Germany, in his opinion, could
have no aggressive aims against the Soviet Union, and he
pointed out that the situation had also changed with respect
to other countries, since Mein Kampf had been written. He
reproached Russia with the fact that she had helped Rumania
to the Dobruja, for which the Charg‚ tried to lay the blame
exclusively on the Tsarist Government.
At the end Herr Draganoff repeated again that he had no
indications why Herr Astakhov had given him this information.
He was pondering the possibility that this was probably done
with the intention of having Herr Draganoff report it to us.
WOERMANN
*****
Frames 111436-111440, serial 103
The German Charg‚ in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the
German Foreign Office
D/261
SECRET
Moscow, June 18, 1939.
W. 950/39g
Reference report of June 17, 1939, by a different channel.
Subject: conversation with Commissar for Foreign Trade
Mikoyan on June 17, 1939.
Enclosed I am sending a memorandum of Counselor of
Legation Hilger on his conversation with Commissar for
Foreign Trade Miko-
Page 22
yan on June 17, 1939. The fact that Mikoyan received Herr
Hilger immediately after his arrival, after an appointment
had been made on the day before, shows that Mikoyan is
anxious not to lose contact. That Mikoyan would immediately
accept the German proposal could hardly be expected
considering the mentality of the Soviet Government, which at
present is riding a high horse, and its known methods of
negotiation. The continually repeated statement of Mikoyan
that he suspects a political game behind our offer of
negotiation may not be due only to tactical motives but may
partly reflect his true opinion. Mikoyan seems to believe
that we had deliberately chosen the present time for economic
negotiations. This becomes clear from his remark that we
expected an advantage from a resumption of the economic
negotiations just now.
It is a remarkable nuance that Mikoyan in his answer
uses the same formula as the communiqu‚ published on June 16
on the first conversation of Molotov with the British and
French Ambassadors and Strang. In this as well as in the
other case the result is called "not entirely favorable."
v. TIPPELSKIRCH
(Enclosure)
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
Subject: conversation with Mikoyan on June 17, 1939.
After the Embassy had made an appointment the People's
Commissar Mikoyan received me today immediately after my
return from Berlin.
I explained to Mikoyan the purpose of my trip and
pointed out the unfavorable impression which his last
communication of June 8 had left with us. At the same time I
asked him to consider the fact of my trip to Berlin and the
answer of the German Government which I had brought along as
an additional proof of the seriousness of our intentions with
respect to the expansion and strengthening of German-Soviet
economic relations. Thereupon I read to Herr Mikoyan the text
of the German answer that had been given to me in Berlin (cf.
enclosure). The People's Commissar listened with rapt
attention, while Babarin, newly appointed Deputy Commercial
Representative in Berlin, who was present at the
conversation, busily wrote down every word. The People's
Commissar appeared to be visibly impressed with the German
answer. Nevertheless, he declared after a short pause that
the German answer had disappointed him, since it did not meet
his conditions.
Page 23
On the basis of the instructions received in Berlin on
this subject, I then commented on the contents of the German
answer in great detail. I stressed particularly the great
German concession which was expressed in sending Counselor of
Legation Schnurre and in accepting the last Soviet proposal
as a basis for negotiations. I reminded the People's
Commissar that during the negotiations in February he did not
describe the last Soviet proposal as his last word, but as
the basis of further negotiations. I further reminded him of
his statement in the conversation of June 8, in which he had
declared that the Soviet Government would see in the despatch
of Herr Schnurre proof of the fact that the German Government
was also serious in the matter of "policy" [der "Politik"].
Mikoyan replied that my two last statements corresponded
entirely with the facts and that I had repeated his
statements correctly. Nevertheless, he still did not believe
he had assurance that it was for us not a question of
continuing a political game in which the Germans had an
interest just at the present moment and from which they
expected advantages to them.
To this I replied sharply that I had often enough
rejected his statements regarding a political game allegedly
played by us and that they would not become more convincing
by continuous repetition. I could not understand at all what
risk for the Soviet Union the People's Commissar saw in the
whole matter, since the Soviet Government was not delegating
a special emissary to Berlin, but the German Government was
sending Herr Schnurre to Moscow, and, in fact, in agreement
with the request expressed by the Soviet Government in
January of this year.
Herr Mikoyan replied that this statement by me was also
correct, since the Soviet Government at that time had
expressed the specific desire to conduct the negotiations in
Moscow.
Thereupon I stated to the People's Commissar that I was
completely in the dark about what he really wanted from us,
after all, and what answer he had expected from the German
Government.
Mikoyan replied that he had expected concrete statements
as to which points of his last proposal we would and which we
would not accept.
I told the People's Commissar that this was clearly
apparent in the German answer and my oral comments of today.
Therefore I would like to repeat for the third time that,
after the existing obstacles had been removed on our part, we
definitely expected agreement from the Soviet Government to
our wishes and an increase in the Soviet offer
Page 24
of raw materials. All other less important points would have
to be left to the negotiations suggested by us. This offer
from us represented the maximum concession. If on this basis
we did not soon arrive at concrete negotiations, the
responsibility would fall alone upon the Soviet Government.
Thereupon, the People's Commissar declared that he
unfortunately could not change his opinion that the German
answer was "not entirely favorable." Nevertheless, he would
present it to his Government and inform me of the result.
HILGER
MOSCOW, June 17, 1939.
[Subenclosure]
SECRET
The German Government is willing to send Counselor of
Legation Schnurre to Moscow with authority to negotiate
expansion and strengthening of economic relations between the
Reich and Soviet Russia and, if a common basis is found, to
come to an agreement. From the fact of sending a German
plenipotentiary as negotiator we request the Soviet
Government to conclude that the German Government expects and
desires a positive conclusion on a widened basis. We would
have to refuse acceptance in advance of the Soviet
counterproposal of February 1939, however, since this
counterproposal itself is to be the basis of the
negotiations. The Soviet Government, however, should note
that in the meanwhile we have endeavored to remove obstacles
which in February still appeared to us as insurmountable.
However, we expect that the Soviet Government, too, will
reexamine Soviet raw material deliveries in the light of
German desires in order to establish a balance of give-and-
take under the future treaty.
*****
Frame 23208, serial 34
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
No. 113 of June 27
Moscow, June 27, 1939-5:42 p. m.
Received June 27, 1939-8:30 p. m.
Reference your telegram of the 26th No. 132 [12]
As I see it, Mikoyan's tactics can be interpreted as
follows: Mikoyan does not want to see the talks with us
broken off, but wishes to keep
[12] Not printed.
Page 25
the negotiations firmly in hand, in order to control their
progress at any time. Obviously it would not fit very well
into the framework of the Soviet Union's general policy, if a
stir should be created by a resumption of the trade
negotiations, and above all by repeated journeys of a special
plenipotentiary to Moscow. The Soviet Government apparently
believes that by resuming the trade negotiations at this
particular moment we intend to influence the attitude of
England and Poland, and thereby expect to gain certain
political advantages. They fear that after gaining these
advantages we would again let the negotiations lapse.
In order to dispel this distrust, there are in my
opinion the following possibilities:
That I be directed to propose to Mikoyan the dispatch of
a qualified special delegate with all necessary powers to
Berlin, in order to continue and possibly conclude the
negotiations there. In view of Mikoyan's tactics, this course
seems to me to have a far better prospect of success. If
Mikoyan should decline this proposal, the possibility would
remain of entrusting me with the further conduct of the trade
negotiations in Moscow.
I propose to supplement these considerations after I
have had an opportunity to speak with Molotov.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 111454, serial 103
Foreign Office Memorandum
TO THE OFFICE OF THE MINISTER
In connection with the telegram of Count Schulenburg
concerning the Hilger-Mikoyan conversation, [13] the Fhrer
has decided the following:
The Russians are to be informed that we have
concluded from their attitude that they make the
continuation of further talks dependent upon the
acceptance of the bases of our economic discussions, as
they were fixed for January. Since this basis was not
acceptable to us, we would not be interested in a
resumption of the economic discussions with Russia at
the present time.
The Fhrer agreed that this answer be delayed for a few
days.
I notified the Reich Foreign Minister of this by
telephone, and I am
[13] Supra.
Page 26
sending this note only as a guide for a conference of the
competent official with the Minister.
HEWEL
BERCHTESGADEN, June 29, 1939.
Respectfully submitted herewith to
State Secretary von Weizs„cker.
June 29, 1939.
*****
Frames 111452-111453, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
SECRET
Moscow, June 29, 1939-2:40 a. m.
Received June 29, 1939-7:20 p. m.
No. 115 of June 28
This afternoon I had a conversation with Molotov, who
received me immediately after I had been announced. The
conversation lasted over an hour and proceeded in a friendly
manner.
I described to Molotov the impressions which I had
gained from talk with influential personalities in Berlin,
particularly with the Reich Foreign Minister. I pointed out
that we would welcome a normalization of the relations
between Germany and Soviet Russia, as the State Secretary had
stated to the Soviet Charg‚ in Berlin. For this we had
furnished a number of proofs, such as reserve in the German
press, conclusion of the non-aggression treaties with the
Baltic countries and desire for resumption of economic
negotiations. From all this it was evident that Germany did
not have any bad intentions toward the Soviet Union,
particularly since the Berlin Treaty [14] was still in force.
We, on the German side, would continue to take advantage of
any opportunity to prove our goodwill. However, we had had no
answer from the Soviet Union to the question of what Molotov
meant in his last conversation with me by "creation of a new
basis of our relationship" ["Schaffung einer Neuregelung der
Basis"]. We also objected to the attitude of the Soviet
press.
Molotov replied that he received my statements with
satisfaction. The foreign policy of the Soviet Government
was, in accordance with the pronouncements of its leaders,
aimed at the cultivation of good relations with all
countries, and this of course applied-provided there was
reciprocity-to Germany too. He was gratified that in the
[14] Treaty of friendship and neutrality between Germany and
the Soviet Union, signed at Berlin April 24, 1926.
Page 27
opinion of the German Government the Berlin Treaty was still
in force, particularly since the Soviet Government had had
doubt about that. As to the question of the treaty
negotiations for non-aggression pacts with the Baltic
countries, Molotov remarked that Germany had concluded them
in her own interest, and not out of love for the Soviet
Union. He had to doubt the permanence of such treaties after
the experience which Poland had had; to which I replied that
Poland had herself caused the termination of the treaty by
joining a combination hostile to us, which was irreconcilable
with friendly relations to us.
Concerning the question of resuming economic
negotiations Molotov referred to the last conversation
between Mikoyan and Hilger. Molotov showed himself informed,
approved the attitude of Mikoyan, and suggested that we give
Mikoyan the desired information. After settlement of this
question the trip to Moscow contemplated by Schnurre would
perhaps prove useful.
My impression is that the Soviet Government is greatly
interested in knowing our political views and in maintaining
contact with us. Although a strong distrust was evident in
everything that Molotov said, nevertheless he described
normalization of relations with Germany as desirable and
possible. Progress is to be seen also in the fact that
Molotov, in connection with the resumption of economic
negotiations, this time did not speak of prior creation of a
political basis, but confined himself to Mikoyan's demand.
I request telegraphic instructions whether and in what
form compliance should be given to Mikoyan's requests,
presented also by Molotov.
(Cf. telegraphic reports No. 111 and 113 of the 20th and
the 27th of this month.) [15]
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frame 111464, serial 103
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
No. 134
BERLIN, June 30, 1939.
Reference your telegram 115. [16]
Reich Foreign Minister took note of your telegraphic
report on conversation with Molotov. He is of the opinion
that in the politi-
[15] Neither printed.
[16] Supra.
Page 28
cal field enough had been said until further instruction and
that for the moment the talks should not be taken up again by
us.
Concerning the possible economic negotiations with the
Russian Government, the deliberations here have not yet been
concluded. In this matter, too, request that for time being
nothing further be initiated, but that instructions be
awaited.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frames 111460-111469, serial 103
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
VERY URGENT
No. 121 of July 3
Moscow, July 3, 1939-8:40 p. m.
Received July 4, 1339-1:20 a. m.
Reference telegram of July 2 No. 139. [17]
In accordance with instructions, I add to my telegram
No. 115 of June 28 the following:
Molotov received me in the Kremlin, after I had
announced my arrival three hours before. Correct translation
was secured through Hilger. Molotov's translator failed to
appear.
I opened the discussion with the statement that on the
basis of the talks in Berlin, particularly with the Reich
Foreign Minister, I had the impression that we would welcome
a normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. The State
Secretary had very clearly acquainted Herr Astakhov with our
position. Indicative of this position was the following:
correct tone of the German press toward the Soviet Union,
conclusion of non-aggression treaties with the Baltic
countries and our desire for resumption of economic
negotiations.
Molotov listened attentively and stated that he received
this communication with satisfaction. I continued that since
the conversation of the State Secretary with Astakhov we had
waited for a Soviet statement as to what Molotov had meant in
his conversation with me on May 20 by the words "creation of
a political basis for the resumption of economic
negotiations"; I would also have to point out to him that the
attitude of the Soviet press in all questions concerning
Germany still gave cause for serious criticism. Herr Astakhov
had been told that Herr Molotov wanted to answer me
personally. Among other
[17] Not printed.
Page 29
things I had come in order to inquire whether he held
anything to tell me.
In his answer Molotov did not go into the question as to
the meaning of the concept "political basis," but he declared
that the Soviet Government in accordance with the
enunciations of its leaders desired good relations with all
countries and therefore-provided there was reciprocity-would
also welcome a normalization of relations with Germany. It
was not the fault of the Soviet Government if these relations
had become bad. He could not accept the criticism of the
Soviet press, since he was not aware of any hostile attitude
of the press toward Germany.
I replied that much could be said about these questions;
that I had not, however, come to talk of the past, but of the
future.
Thereupon, Molotov asked how we visualized further
developments and what changes had occurred lately in the
relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. As to the non-
aggression treaties, Germany had concluded them in the first
place in her own interest, and they concerned only Germany
and the countries participating, but not the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, he would have to doubt the permanence of such
treaties after the experiences which Poland had had.
I replied that our non-aggression treaties provided the
Baltic countries with additional security, in which the
Soviet Union was very much interested. Poland had herself
provoked the termination of the treaty with us by behaving
irresponsibly and joining a combination hostile to us, which
was irreconcilable with friendly relations with us. To this
Molotov stated that in his opinion the treaty concluded by
Poland with England was a purely defensive instrument.
I disagreed and pointed out that the word "defensive" in
this connection was of only academic significance. Then I
returned to Molotov's question as to how we visualized
further developments and said that, in my opinion, the main
task in the future would be that both countries avoid
everything that would lead to a further deterioration of
relations and do everything that might result in their
improvement. Germany had no ill intentions against the Soviet
Union, and one of the proofs for that was the Berlin Treaty,
which we had extended some time ago.
Thereupon Molotov asked, "Are you convinced that the
Berlin Treaty is really still in force and has not been
abrogated by later treaties concluded by Germany?" I replied
the following: "I know
Page 30
of no such treaties and have no reason to doubt the validity
of the Berlin Treaty."
At the end I asked Molotov what he had to say to the
question of the resumption of economic negotiations.
Molotov replied that he knew the contents of the last
conversation between Mikoyan and Hilger. He approved
Mikoyan's (group missing) and suggested that we give Mikoyan
the desired information.
I sought to convince Molotov that it would not be in the
interest of speeding up the economic negotiations if details
were discussed between Mikoyan and Hilger or me, since we
continuously had to request instructions from Berlin.
Schnurre, on the other hand, had all the necessary authority,
knowledge, and experience and would be able to conclude the
negotiations quickly to mutual satisfaction
Thereupon Molotov indicated that cancellation of
Schnurre's trip in February had annoyed the Soviet Union.
They would leave it to Mikoyan, who had mastery of the
subject matter, to ask for what he considered right. When we
had given the information desired by Mikoyan, a trip by
Schnurre to Moscow might perhaps prove useful.
The conversation closed in friendly spirit and with my
repeated request that Molotov influence the attitude of the
Soviet press.
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 178431-178434, serial 276
The Counselor of Embassy of the German Embassy in the Soviet
Union (Tippelskirch) to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
BERLIN, JULY 12, 1939.
MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Herr Lamla, [18] whom I asked to
I remember me to you, has probably already told you a few
things. However, I still would like to report on my
impressions here. The Reich Foreign Minister was busy with
the Bulgarian state visit and was not able to see me.
Otherwise, however, with the exception of Gaus and Selchow,
who were on vacation I have talked to all personalities
concerned. The State Secretary was interested to hear an
opinion as to what result the English-French-Soviet pact
negotiations would have. He said that he could not imagine
that the Soviet Union after having entered the negotiations
would let them pass without result and sink back into
isolation. He was also interested in your conversations with
Molotov and remarked that in his opinion our side had done
enough
[18] Of the staff of the German Embassy in Moscow.
Page 31
politically for the moment. Then we discussed the
instructions concerning the answer to Mikoyan, and I
expressed myself as in favor of giving this information. (The
instructions were submitted to the Fhrer by the Reich
Foreign Minister and were dispatched after details had been
added by the State Secretary.) The State Secretary believed
that we might try to make some progress in the field of
economics, but slowly and step by step. The State Secretary
apparently did not want to go further into the subject of the
"Berlin Treaty ;" he asked about the result of the discussion
with Molotov on this point. I referred to your second
telegram and said that you had only touched upon the topic.
My vacation appeared to him a little bit long!! I shall
therefore be back at the beginning of August.
Herr Schnurre was not in a very good mood. He stressed
repeatedly that without any positive reaction by Molotov it
would be difficult to make any progress. He showed me an
order of the Fhrer he had received by telephone on June 30
according to which further activities in Moscow were to be
stopped in view of the conduct of the Russians. Thereupon,
Schnurre drafted a memorandum and the order. I told him that
the Embassy and particularly you, yourself, had done
everything possible, but we could not drag Molotov and
Mikoyan through the Brandenburger Tor.
Unfortunately, I stayed with Woermann only a short time,
because the State Secretary called for me. He considered it
as important that the Soviets, through Astakhov, had taken
the initiative for the rapprochement. I did not deny that,
but I called attention to the Fournier despatch published by
the Temps about the negative statement of the Soviet Embassy
here, which had escaped him. Incidentally, he made an
interesting remark about the Berlin Treaty which makes it
appear advisable not to touch upon the topic again without
instructions. More details orally! I have talked with Schliep
about the Komsomol people and caused him to have further
steps taken now for the removal [die Abbef”rderung].
Of course, we conferred with everyone else concerned,
including Meyer-Heydenhagen. I have also roused Herr
Schwendemann against the Komsomol people. Then I discussed
with Braun Stumm (since Dr. Schmidt was not available)
everything concerning the press in the sense of your letter
to Seibert which, incidentally, Schmidt still had, and it
fell on fertile ground.
In the Personnel Division I talked with Herren Kriebel,
Schroeder, Dienstmann, Dittmann. In accordance with your
instructions I expressed myself as against either one of us
being reassigned.
Page 32
According to my impressions the problem of the Soviet
Union is still of the greatest interest here. The opinions,
however, fluctuate and are undecided. The formation of a
definite political opinion has not yet materialized.
Tonight I am going to Badgastein, Hotel Kaiserhof.
With most cordial regards I remain, my dear Ambassador,
yours most respectfully, Heil Hitler.
W. von TIPPELSKIRCH
*****
Frame 111485, serial 103
The German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign Office
Telegram
URGENT
Moscow, July 22, 1939-1:07 p. m.
Received July 22, 1939-1:35 p. m.
No. 136 of July 22
Entire Soviet press today publishes following report
under headline "In the Foreign Trade Commissariat":
"Soviet-German negotiations on commerce and credit have
recently been resumed. Negotiations are being conducted by
Babarin, the Deputy Commercial Representative in Berlin, for
the Foreign Trade Commissariat, and by Schnurre for the
Germans."
SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 69530-69536, serial 127
Foreign Office Memorandum
SECRET
1216g
BERLIN, July 27, 1939.
MEMORANDUM
In accordance with my instructions I invited the Soviet
Charg‚, Astakhov, and Babarin, the chief of the Soviet trade
mission here, to Ewest for dinner last night. The Russians
stayed until about half past twelve. The Russians started the
talk about the political and economic problems which interest
us in a very lively and interested manner so that an informal
and thorough discussion of the individual topics mentioned by
the Reich Foreign Minister was possible. The following parts
of the conversation should be stressed:
1. Referring to remarks by Astakhov about close
collaboration and community of interests in foreign policy
which formerly existed between Germany and Russia, I
explained that such collaboration
Page 33
appeared attainable to me now, if the Soviet Government
considered it desirable. I could visualize three stages:
Stage One: The re-establishment of collaboration in
economic affairs through the credit and commercial treaty
which is to be concluded.
Stage TWO: The normalization and improvement of
political relations. This included, among other things,
respect for the interests of the other party in the press and
in public opinion and respect for the scientific and cultural
activities of the other country. The official participation
by Astakhov in German Art Day at Munich, or the invitation of
German delegates to the Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow, as
suggested by him to the State Secretary, could, for instance,
be included under this heading.
Stage Three would be the re-establishment of good
political relations, either a return to what had been in
existence before (Berlin Treaty [19]) or a new arrangement
which took account of the vital political interests of both
parties. This stage three appeared to me within reach,
because controversial problems of foreign policy, which would
exclude such a relationship between the two countries, did
not, in my opinion, exist in the whole area from the Baltic
Sea to the Black Sea and the Far East. In addition, despite
all the differences in Weltanschauung, there was one thing in
common in the ideology of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet
Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies. Neither we
nor Italy had anything in common with the capitalism of the
West. Therefore it would appear to us quite paradoxical if
the Soviet Union, as a Socialist state, were to side with the
Western democracies.
2. With the strong agreement of Babarin, Astakhov
designated the way of rapprochement with Germany as the one
that corresponded with the vital interests of the two
countries. However, he emphasized that the tempo must
probably be very slow and gradual. The Soviet Union had been
forced to feel itself most seriously menaced by the National
Socialist foreign policy. We had appropriately called our
present political situation encirclement. That was exactly
how, after the events of September of last year, the
political situation had appeared to the Soviet Union.
Astakhov mentioned the Anti-Comintern Pact and our relations
to Japan, and Munich and the free hand in Eastern Europe that
we gained there, the political consequences of which were
bound to be directed against the Soviet Union. Our assumption
that the Baltic countries and Finland, as well as Rumania,
were in our sphere of interest completed for the Soviet
Government the feeling of being menaced. Moscow could not
quite believe in a
[19] Treaty of friendship and neutrality between Germany and
the Soviet Union, signed at Berlin April 24, 1926.
Page 34
shift of German policy with respect to the Soviet Union. A
change could only be expected gradually.
3. In my reply I pointed out that German policy in the
East had taken an entirely different course in the meantime.
On our part there could be no question of menacing the Soviet
Union; our aims were in an entirely different direction.
Molotov, himself, in his last speech had called the Anti-
Comintern Pact camouflage for an alliance aimed against the
Western democracies. He was acquainted with the Danzig
question, and the related Polish question. I saw in these
anything but a clash of interests between Germany and the
Soviet Union. That we would respect the integrity of the
Baltic countries and of Finland had become sufficiently clear
through our non-aggression pacts and our non-aggression
offers. Our relationship to Japan was that of a well-founded
friendship, which was not, however, aimed against Russia.
German policy was aimed against England. That was the
decisive factor. As I had stated previously, I could imagine
a far-reaching compromise of mutual interests with due
consideration for the problems which were vital to Russia.
However, this possibility was barred the moment the Soviet
Union, by signing a treaty, sided With England against
Germany. The Soviet Union would then have made its choice,
and then would only be able to share the German opposition
with England. Only for this reason would I have any objection
to his view that the tempo of a possible understanding
between Germany and the Soviet Union had to be slow. The time
was opportune now, but would not be after the conclusion of a
pact WITH London. This would have to be considered in Moscow.
What could England offer Russia? At best, participation in a
European war and the hostility of Germany, but not a single
desirable end for Russia. What could we offer, on the other
hand? Neutrality and staying out of a possible European
conflict and, if Moscow wished, a German-Russian
understanding on mutual interests which, just as in former
times, would work out to the advantage of both countries.
4. During the subsequent discussion Astakhov came back
again to the question of the Baltic countries and asked
whether, besides economic penetration, we had more far-
reaching political aims there. He also took up the Rumanian
question seriously. As to Poland, he stated that Danzig would
return to the Reich in one way or another and that the
Corridor question would have to be solved somehow in favor of
the Reich. He asked whether the territories which once
belonged to Austria were not also tending toward Germany,
particularly the Galician and Ukrainian territories. After
describing our
Page 36
commercial relations to the Baltic countries, I confined
myself to the statement that no German-Russian clash of
interests would result from all these questions. Moreover,
the settlement of the Ukrainian question had shown that we
did not aim at anything there that would endanger Soviet
interests.
5. There was a rather extensive discussion about the
question of why National Socialism had sought the enmity of
the Soviet Union in the field of foreign policy. In Moscow,
they had never been able to understand this. They had always
had full understanding for the domestic opposition to
Communism. I took advantage of this opportunity to explain in
detail our opinion concerning the change in Russian
Bolshevism during recent years. The antagonism of National
Socialism resulted naturally from the fight against the
Communist Party of Germany which depended upon Moscow and was
only a tool of the Comintern. The fight against the German
Communist Party had long been over. Communism had been
eradicated in Germany. The importance of the Comintern had
been overshadowed by the Politbureau, where all entirely
different policy was being followed now than at the time when
the Comintern dominated. The amalgamation of Bolshevism with
the national history of Russia, which expressed itself in the
glorification of great Russian men and deeds (celebration of
the battle of Poltava, Peter the Great, the battle on Lake
Peipus, Alexander Nevski), had really changed the
international face of Bolshevism, as we see it, particularly
since Stalin had postponed world revolution indefinitely. In
this state of affairs we saw possibilities today which we had
not seen earlier, provided that no attempt was made to spread
Communist propaganda in any form in Germany.
6. At the end Astakhov stressed how valuable this
conversation had been to him. He would report it to Moscow,
and he hoped that it would have visible results in subsequent
developments there. The question of the commerce and credit
treaty was discussed in detail.
7. After the statements of the Russians I had the
impression that Moscow had not yet decided what they want to
do. The Russians were silent about the status and chances of
the English pact negotiations. Considering all this, it looks
as if Moscow, for the time being, is following a policy of
delay and postponement toward us as well as England in order
to defer decisions the importance of which they understand
completely. Therefore the receptive attitude of the Russians
after the various talks, particularly the attitude of
Molotov; therefore the delay in the protracted economic
negotiations, in which the Russians absolutely reserve the
tempo to themselves; therefore
Page 36
most likely also the retention of Ambassador Merekalov in
Moscow. As a further handicap, there is the excessive
distrust, not only toward us but toward England as well. From
our point of view it may be considered a noteworthy success
that Moscow, after months of negotiation with England, still
remains uncertain as to what she ought to do eventually.
SCHNURRE
*****
Frames 69528-69529, serial 127
The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
SECRET
BERLIN, July 29, 1939.
W 1216g
On the evening of the 26th of this month Schnurre had a
detailed discussion with Astakhov and Babarin, the content of
which is reported in the enclosed memorandum. [20] Astakhov's
answer indicates that a detailed report from him is already
available in Moscow. At the end Astakhov asked whether we
would maintain similar opinions if a prominent Soviet
representative were to discuss these questions with a
prominent German representative. Schnurre answered this
question essentially in the affirmative.
It would be important for us to know whether the
statements made to Astakhov and Babarin have found any
response in Moscow. If you see the opportunity of arranging a
new talk with Molotov, I request that you sound him out in
this sense and that, should the occasion arise, you use the
line of thought of the memorandum. If it should develop that
Molotov abandons the reserve thus far maintained by him, you
can advance another step in your presentation and state
somewhat more precisely what was expressed generally in the
memorandum. This concerns particularly the Polish question.
In any development of the Polish question, either in a
peaceful manner as we desire it or in any other way that is
forced upon us, we would be prepared to safeguard all Soviet
interests and to reach an understanding with the Moscow
Government. If the talk proceeds positively in the Baltic
question too, the idea could be advanced that we will adjust
our stand with regard to the Baltic in such a manner as to
respect the vital Soviet interests in the Baltic.
Draft signed by von WEIZSŽCKER
[20] Supra.
Page 37
*****
Frame 260369, serial 695
The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, August 3, 1939-1:47 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 3, 1939-6:00 p. m.
SECRET
No. 164 of August 3
For the Ambassador for his information.
Reference telegraphic instruction of today. [21] In
accordance with the political situation and in the interest
of speed, we are anxious, without prejudice to your
conversation with Molotov scheduled for today, to continue in
Berlin the clarification of terms for the adjustment of
German-Soviet interests. To this end Schnurre will receive
Astakhov today and will tell him that we would be ready for
more concrete discussions if that is also the desire of the
Soviet Government. We would propose in this case that
Astakhov obtain instructions from Moscow. We would then be
prepared to speak quite concretely concerning problems of
possible interest to the Soviet Union.
WEIZSŽCKER
*****
Frames 69519-69521, serial 127
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
VERY URGENT
BERLIN, August 3, 1939-3:47 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 4, 1939-4:30 a. m.
No. 166 of August 3
For the Ambassador personally!
Last evening I received the Russian Charg‚, who had
previously called at the office on other matters. I intended
to continue with him the conversations with which you are
familiar, that had previously been conducted with Astakhov by
members of the Foreign Office with my permission. I alluded
to the trade agreement discussions, which are at present
progressing satisfactorily, and designated such a trade
agreement as a good step on the way toward a normalization of
German-Russian relationships, if this was desired. It was
well known that the tone of our press with regard to Russia
had for over half a year been a very different one. I
considered that, insofar as the desire
[21] No. 166, infra.
Page 38
existed on the Russian side, a remolding of our relations was
possible, on two conditions:
a) noninterference in the internal affairs of the other
country (Herr Astakhov believes he can promise this
forthwith);
b) abandonment of a policy directed against our vital
interests. To this, Astakhov was unable to give any clear-cut
answer, but he thought his Government had the desire to
pursue a policy of mutual understanding with Germany.
I continued that our policy was a direct and long-range
one; we were in no hurry. We were favorably disposed toward
Moscow; it was therefore a question of what direction the
rulers there wanted to take. If Moscow took a [negative] [22]
attitude, we would know where we stood and how to act. If the
reverse were the case there was no problem from the Baltic to
the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us.
I said that there was room for the two of us on the Baltic
and that Russian interests by no means needed to clash with
ours there. As far as Poland was concerned, we were watching
further developments attentively and dispassionately. In case
of provocation on the part of Poland, we would settle matters
with Poland in the space of a week. For this contingency, I
dropped a gentle hint at coming to an agreement with Russia
on the fate of Poland. I described German-Japanese relations
as good and friendly; this relationship was a lasting one. As
to Russian-Japanese relations, however, I had my own ideas
(by which I meant a long-range modus vivendi between the two
countries).
I conducted whole conversation in an even tone and in
conclusion again made it clear to the Charg‚ that in
international politics we pursued no such tactics as the
democratic powers. We were accustomed to building on solid
ground, did not need to pay heed to vacillating public
opinion, and did not desire any sensations. If conversations
such as ours were not handled with the discretion they
deserved, they would have to be discontinued. We were making
no fuss about it; the choice lay, as mentioned, with Moscow.
If they were interested there in our ideas, why then Herr
Molotov could shortly pick up the thread again with Count
Schulenburg (this superseded by telegram No. 161 [23]).
Conclusion of the conversation.
[22] This word, missing in the telegram as received in the
Moscow Embassy, has been supplied from the German Foreign
Office file copy.
[23] Ante, p. 37.
Page 39
Note for Count Schulenburg:
I conducted the conversation without showing any haste.
The Charg‚, who seemed interested, tried several times to pin
the conversation down to more concrete terms, whereupon I
gave him to understand that I would be prepared to make it
more concrete as soon as the Soviet Government officially
communicated its fundamental desire for a new relationship.
Should Astakhov be instructed in this sense, we for our part
would be interested in an early definite settlement. This
exclusively for your personal information.
RIBBENTROP
*****
Frames 695322-69527, serial 127
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the German Foreign, Office
Telegram
Moscow, August 4, 1939-12:20 a. m.
No. 158 of August 3
Re instruction W 1216g of July 29, and telegraphic directive
of July 31. [24]
In a conference of 1 1/4 hours today, Molotov abandoned
his usual reserve and appeared unusually open. I referred to
my last conversation with M. and said that in the meantime
economic negotiations had been resumed in Berlin and were
apparently proceeding in a promising manner. we were
consequently expecting an early conclusion. An exchange of
ideas had further taken place between Schnurre and Soviet
representatives in Berlin, as to the contents of which M. was
surely informed. M. confirmed the fact that "by and large" he
was posted in the matter. Referring to Astakhov's question as
to whether Schnurre's statements would, if the occasion
arose, be backed up by a qualified German personage, I
declared that I was authorized to confirm explicitly the
train of thought developed by Schnurre. I then explained how,
on the basis of the three steps mentioned by Schnurre, we
contemplated the normalization and improvement of our
relations with the Soviet Union. In continuation I stated
that from the Baltic to the Black Sea, in our opinion, no
opposition of interests existed between Germany and the
Soviet Union, that the Anti-Comintern Pact was not directed
against the Soviet Union, that by concluding non-aggression
pacts with the Baltic countries we
[24] Latter not printed.
Page 40
had proven our decision to respect their integrity, and that
our well-known demands on Poland meant no impairment of
Soviet interests. We therefore believed that adjustment of
interests was entirely possible and were asking the opinion
of the Soviet Government in this matter.
M. answered point by point at some length. He stated
that the Soviet Government had always desired the conclusion
of an economic agreement and if a like desire existed on the
German side, he considered the prospects for realization of
an economic agreement as entirely favorable. So far as the
attitude of the Soviet press was concerned, he considered our
reproaches-with some exceptions-unjustified. But he took the
stand that the press of both countries must desist from
anything that might tend to exacerbate their relations. He
considered the gradual resumption of cultural relations
necessary and expedient and believed that a gratifying start
had already been made toward improvement.
Going on to the question of political relations, M.
declared that the Soviet Government also desired
normalization and improvement of mutual relations. It was not
its fault that relations had so deteriorated. The reason for
this he saw, firstly, in the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern
Pact and in everything that had been said and done in this
connection. To my objection that the Anti-Comintern Pact was
not directed against the Soviet Union and had been designated
by M. himself on May 31st as an alliance against the Western
democracies M. said that the Anti-Comintern Pact had
nevertheless encouraged the aggressive attitude of Japan
toward the Soviet Union. In the second place, Germany had
supported Japan, and thirdly, the German Government had
repeatedly shown that it would not participate in any
international conferences in which the Soviet Union
participated. M. cited the meeting in Munich as an example.
I answered M. in detail, stressing that it was not a
matter of discussing the past but of finding new ways.
M. replied that the Soviet Government was prepared to
participate in the quest for such ways; yet he must insist on
asking how my statements of today are to be reconciled with
the three points mentioned by him. Proofs of a changed
attitude of the German Government were for the present still
lacking.
I thereupon again stressed the absence of opposition of
interests in foreign policy and mentioned German readiness so
to orient our behavior with regard to the Baltic States, if
occasion arose, as to safeguard vital Soviet Baltic
interests.
Page 41
At the mention of the Baltic States, M. was interested
in learning what States we meant by the term and whether
Lithuania was one of them.
On the Polish question I stated that we persevered in
our well-known demands on Poland but strove for a peaceful
solution. If on the other hand a different solution were
forced on us, we were prepared to protect all Soviet
interests and come to an understanding with the Soviet
Government on this matter.
M. showed evident interest but said that a peaceful
solution depended first of all on us.
I vigorously contradicted this and pointed out that the
British guarantee had unfortunately brought it about that the
decision lay with the Polish authorities.
I then repudiated Molotov's assertion that Germany alone
was to blame for deterioration in German-Soviet relations. I
reminded him of the fateful consequences of the conclusion of
the treaty of 1935 with France and added that the possible
new participation by the Soviet Union in a combination
hostile to Germany might play a similar role. M. replied that
the present course taken by the Soviet Union aimed at purely
defensive ends and at the strengthening of a defensive front
against aggression. In contrast to this, Germany had
supported and promoted the aggressive attitude of Japan by
the Anti-Comintern Pact and in the military alliance with
Italy was pursuing offensive as well as defensive aims.
In conclusion M. assured me that he would apprise his
Government of my statements and repeated that the Soviet
Government also desired normalization and improvement of
relations.
From M.'s whole attitude it was evident that the Soviet
Government was in fact more prepared for improvement in
German-Soviet relations, but that the old mistrust of Germany
persists. My over-all impression is that the Soviet
Government is at present determined to sign with England and
France if they fulfill all Soviet wishes. Negotiations, to be
sure, might still last a long time, especially since mistrust
of England is also great. I believe that my statements made
an impression on M.; it will nevertheless take considerable
effort on our part to cause the Soviet Government to swing
about.
SCHULENBURG
Page 42
*****
Frames 178513-178517, serial 276
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
Counselor of Legation Schliep of the German Foreign Office
Moscow, August 7, 1939.
DEAR COUNSELOR 0F LEGATION SCHLIEP: Sincerest thanks for
your letter of the 2d of this month [25] and its interesting
enclosure.
As a matter of fact, I have in the meantime received the
telegraphic instruction to take part in Party Day. On
September 1, I am to travel in the new grey uniform from
Berlin to Nuernberg with the other gentlemen of the Foreign
Office. That means that I must be in Berlin on August 27 at
the latest. A final fitting and the purchase of a number of
accessories are unavoidable.
You know from our telegram that the political
negotiations of the British and the French have been
interrupted for the time being. Mr. Strang left by air this
morning for London, where a great quantity of work kind
allegedly accumulated for him. At the end of the week, the
British and French officers will come. The British military
men here regard the prospects of the pending military
negotiations also with considerable skepticism. Among the
members of the British Military Mission is the former Air
Attach‚ in Moscow, Collier. Collier is a very sober and quiet
man and knows Soviet conditions well. At the time of the
intervention, he was in Archangel. The fact that he is being
sent is welcomed by the British here, since he will not be
taken in by the Russians and knows their methods of
negotiation.
Concerning the political negotiations up to now, we hear
that throughout Herr Molotov sat like a bump on a log. * He
hardly ever opened his mouth, and if he did it was to utter
only the brief remark: "Your statements do not appear to me
entirely satisfactory. I shall notify my Government." The
British and the French Ambassadors are both said to be
completely exhausted and glad that they now have a breathing
spell ahead of them. The Frenchman said to one of my
informants, "Thank God that that fellow ** will not
participate in the military negotiations!"
Regarding my conversations with Molotov, you are, of
course, informed. I believe that we put a few good fleas in
the ears of the Soviets, anyhow. At every word and at every
step, one can see the great distrust toward us. That this is
so, we have known for a long
[25] Not printed.
* He has been very different toward Hilger and me of late,
very communicative and amiable. [Marginal note in the
original]
** Molotov. [Footnote in the original]
Page 43
time. The unfortunate part of it is, that the mistrust of
such people is very easily kindled and can only be allayed
slowly and with difficulty.
I recently wrote you of rumors concerning the fist-fight
between the Turkish Ambassador Apaydin (who left here very
suddenly) and his military attach‚. At that time I didn't
believe these rumors, but they seem to be correct. I hear now
on good authority that the fracas even took place before
witnesses. At first the military attach‚ was also recalled,
but then this disciplinary measure was withdrawn, apparently
so that the rumors concerning the fight which were
circulating here would not receive new support.
My old acquaintance, Minister Idman, who at present is
in charge of the Finnish Legation, told me that when he
called on Molotov the latter expressed himself as very
dissatisfied over the hostile attitude of the Finnish press
toward Russia. Idman said he replied that the Finnish press
is free to write what it wishes and if it prints anti-Russian
articles the Soviet Union had certainly given occasion for
them.
The Danish Minister here recently made his first call on
Molotov. The Minister President brought up the question of
the German-Danish Non-aggression Treaty. He had taken note
of, but had made no comment on, the Minister's statement that
Denmark was much reassured by the conclusion of the pact.
In conversation with Molotov, the Ministers of Latvia
and Estonia here also characterized the German Non-aggression
Treaties as guarantees of peace, and remarked that the
conclusion of the treaties had been entirely natural, since
Latvia and Estonia had similar non-aggression treaties with
the Soviet Union. Molotov, however, had taken the position
that these treaties indicated an inclination toward Germany,
and he could not be moved from this position.
The Estonian Charg‚ here, in talking about the attitude
of the Soviets toward Baltic questions, spoke of the
possibility that Germany might guarantee the independence of
Latvia and Estonia, as it had done with Belgium. I am of the
opinion that the Soviets no longer want such a guarantee to
be given by us.
General K”string, who has gone to Berlin for a few days,
will look you up and give you the news from here. I hope he
has already done it. We are very curious to know what news he
will bring us from Berlin. Just as eagerly we await the
arrival of Herr von Tippelskirch on next Friday.
Page 44
I hope the three Germans will arrive soon who are to
visit the agricultural exhibition here at the invitation of
the Soviet Government. The exhibition is really very much
worth seeing (amazingly grandiose). Should not the Soviet
Government be invited to the Eastern Fair at K”nigsberg?
Obviously it is too late for the Soviet Union to participate
and to send exhibits to the fair; however, in return for the
invitation to the agricultural exhibition, a couple of Soviet
representatives could at least be invited to visit the fair.
Here the rather terrific heat continues. I like it
better than the usual rain and mud.
With warmest regards to your wife and with greetings to
you, and with Heil Hitler! I remain, dear Herr Schliep,
Sincerely yours,
COUNT von der SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 23237-23241, serial 34
Foreign Office Memorandum
To W 1301/39g
MEMORANDUM
Soviet Charg‚ Astakhov called on me today at 11 a. m.
for a conversation lasting an hour. First the journey of the
German participants in the agricultural exhibition at Moscow
was discussed (cf. separate memorandum [26]). I then asked
Astakhov whether he had any news from Moscow regarding the
questions which had been discussed between us. Astakhov
replied in the affirmative and stated as follows:
The question informally discussed between us, as to
whether a political thought should be inserted in the
preamble to the credit agreement, had also been examined in
Moscow. It was held more appropriate not to connect the trade
and credit agreement with language of a political nature.
This would be anticipating the future. I replied to Herr
Astakhov that this was our view, too. Astakhov then mentioned
that he had once again received an express instruction from
Moscow to emphasize that the Soviet Government desired an
improvement in relations with Germany. The declaration he had
made to me the last time was thereby strengthened. I took
advantage of this in the ensuing conversation to tell
Astakhov the following:
We had noted with satisfaction that the Soviet
Government was anxious to continue the conversation regarding
the improvement of Soviet-German relations. We had wished
that Molotov would let
[26] Not printed.
Page 45
us know his basic attitude in regard to the status of Soviet
interests in order to facilitate further conversations and
had believed that it was premature for us to discuss concrete
problems so long as we did not know exactly the interests of
the Soviets. But, in any event, one question was quite ripe,
namely Poland. The Polish delusion of grandeur, shielded by
England, drove Poland constantly to new provocations. We were
still hoping that Poland would somehow come to reason, so
that a peaceful solution could be found. Failing this, it was
possible that, against our will and against our desires, a
solution by force of arms would have to take place. If, as we
had now done on various occasions, we had declared ourselves
willing to enter upon a large-scale adjustment of mutual
interests with Moscow, it was important for us to know the
position of the Soviet Government on the question of Poland.
In Moscow, after political negotiations had brought no
result, military negotiations were now being conducted with
England and France. We scarcely believe that. contrary to the
direction in which her interests clearly lay, the Soviet
Union will align herself with England and make herself, as
had England, a guarantor of megalomaniac Polish aspirations.
It would, of course, mean a poor start for the German-Soviet
conversations, if, however, as a result of the military
negotiations in Moscow, a sort of military alliance were
contemplated against us, with the Soviet Union participating.
These were therefore questions that were of interest to us at
this stage of our conversations, and upon them depended,
after all, the prospects of achieving a German-Soviet
understanding: in the first place, then, the attitude of the
Soviet Union on the Polish question, and, in the second
place, the objectives that Moscow was pursuing in the
military discussions with England and France. I could again
assure Herr Astakhov, as I had already done on various
occasions, that, even in the event of a solution by force of
arms, German interests in Poland were quite limited. They did
not at all need to collide with Soviet interests of any kind,
but we had to know those interests. If the motive behind the
negotiations conducted by Moscow with England was the feeling
of being threatened by Germany in the event of a German-
Polish conflict, we for our part were prepared to give the
Soviet Union every assurance desired, which would surely
carry more weight than support by England, which could never
become effective in Eastern Europe.
Astakhov was keenly interested, but naturally had no
instructions of any kind from Moscow to discuss the subject
of Poland or the subject of the negotiations in Moscow. In
the course of the conversation,
Page 46
however, he went quite extensively into both subjects on his
own accord. The negotiations with England had begun at a time
when there had still been no sign of a disposition on the
part of Germany to come to an understanding. The negotiations
had been entered upon without much enthusiasm, but they had
to conduct them because they had to protect themselves
against the German threat and had to accept assistance where-
ever it was offered. To be sure, the situation had changed
since the conversations with Germany had started. But one
could not now simply break off something which had been begun
after mature consideration. The outcome of the negotiations
was uncertain in his opinion, and it was quite possible that
his Government likewise considered the question as completely
open. Our conversation of today, just as those which
previously took place, would surely tend in that direction.
On the question of Poland, he said that he doubted whether he
would receive a concrete reply from Moscow on this enormous
problem. At this stage of the conversations it was somewhat
like putting the cart before the horse to want to bring the
question of Poland up now for final discussion. Astakhov
sought to learn whether any German decisions in the Polish
question could be expected in the next few days and what
Germany's aims in respect to Poland were. I avoided a reply
to this question and at any rate did not show such urgency in
the matter. Astakhov will report and then revert to these
questions. Astakhov was unable to answer an informal question
regarding the possible return of his Ambassador. On the
contrary, he asked me whether we had not heard anything from
Moscow regarding Herr Merekalov. He emphasized, however, that
it made no difference in our talks who was acting as the
official representative of the Soviet Government in Berlin.
SCHNURRE
BERLIN, August 10, 1939.
*****
Frames 228752-228755, serial 472
The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)
Moscow, August 14, 1939.
MY VERY ESTEEMED HERR VON WEIZSŽCKER!
May I thank you most heartily for your gracious letter
of the 7th instant. [27]
I am still of the opinion that any hasty measure in the
matter of
[27] Not printed.
Page 47
our relations with the Soviet Union should be avoided; it
will almost always be harmful. So I consider it entirely
right that our treatment of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin be
relaxed only slowly.
The following were the main points in my last
conversation with Herr Molotov: the statements about the
Baltic States satisfied him to a certain extent, but he
wanted to know whether we also included Lithuania among the
Baltic States. My statements on the Polish question evidently
impressed him, too; he followed my words with the greatest
attentiveness. His comment on this point is perhaps worth
noting: "Compliance with the desire of the Germans that, in
the Polish matter, no 'solution' be forced on the Reich,
depends, above all, on Germany itself." Herr Molotov
apparently meant thereby that-whatever might happen-the fault
would be ours. Finally-and this seems to me the most
important point-Herr Molotov demanded that we cease to
support Japanese "aggression." In this connection, it is
perhaps not uninteresting to note that a member of the
American Embassy here, which for the most part is very well
informed, stated to one of our aides that we could at any
moment upset the British-French negotiations, if we abandoned
our support of Japan, sent our military mission back to China
and delivered arms to the Chinese. I am afraid that these
American ideas are very optimistic, however, and not readily
workable, but the Reich Foreign Minister, after all, had some
ideas of his own on this point. Something of this sort would,
perhaps, have to take place if we are to make any progress.
The British and French military missions have been in
Moscow for three days now. The Soviets made no great fanfare
over their arrival. Only a very few conferences of the
military men have taken place so far, and of their subject
matter and outcome nothing is yet known. I assume that the
negotiations will last a long time.
With reference to the foregoing, I should like to
mention the following: I received instructions to participate
in the Nuernberg Party Day, and am supposed to leave Berlin
for Nuernberg on September 1 with the other gentlemen of the
foreign service. I must also have the new grey uniform made
for me for this purpose. Although all preparations have been
made, I shall nevertheless have to make a three-day stop in
Berlin in order to make the final arrangements and purchases.
This means that I shall have to leave here on August 26th, at
the latest. The instructions I have received from the Foreign
Office are circular instructions, such as apparently every
one of us has received. Would it not, as things stand, be
better and more necessary
Page 48
for me not to go to Nuernberg this time, but to remain here!
I am unable, of course, to judge of these matters with
certainty, but I wanted, at least, to address an inquiry to
you in the matter. As matters now stand, I consider it very
proper that our political conversations with the Soviet Union
be carried on in Berlin. In view of conditions here, however,
it seems certain to me that from time to time in order to
expedite matters I shall have to speak with Herr Molotov, the
highest personage that can be reached. Surely I am the person
who can best and most easily carry on conversations with Herr
Molotov. This remarkable man and difficult character has now
grown accustomed to me and has, in conversations with me, in
great measure abandoned his otherwise always evident reserve.
Any new man would have to start from scratch. But, as I
stated, I am unable to judge whether this viewpoint should
prevail or whether participation in the Nuernberg Party Day
should have priority. I would therefore be very grateful to
you if you would have a short telegram sent me on this
subject.
With very best regards and a Heil Hitler! I am, my dear
Herr von Weizs„cker,
Your ever very devoted
F. W. SCHULENBURG
*****
Frames 69514-69515, serial 127
The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Telegram
No. 171 of August 14
BERLIN, August 14, 1939-1:52 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 11, 1939-5 p. m.
For the Ambassador for his information.
Astakhov called on me on Saturday in order to
communicate to me the following:
He had received instructions from Molotov to state here
that the Soviets were interested in a discussion of the
individual groups of questions that had heretofore been taken
up. A. designated as such questions, among others, besides
the pending economic negotiations, questions of the press,
cultural collaboration, the Polish question, the matter of
the old German-Soviet political agreements. Such a
discussion, however, could be undertaken only by degrees or,
as we had expressed it, by stages. The Soviet Government
proposed Moscow as the place for these discussions, since it
was much easier for the Soviet Government to continue the
conversations there. In this conversation,
Page 49
A. left the matter open as to whom we would propose to
conduct the conference, the Ambassador or another personage,
to be sent out.
To my question as to what priority the Soviets assigned
the question of Poland, A. replied that he had received no
special instructions regarding sequence, but that the chief
stress of his instructions lay in the phrase " by degrees."
These communications of A.'s were probably the amplified
instructions to the Charg‚ of which you notified us.
Subject to further instructions.
SCHNURRE
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