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[108]
PART FOUR
The German-Polish Crisis
(March 27-May 9, 1939)
No. 83
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
March 27, 1939.
I HAVE learned from an authoritative German source that
the retrocession of Danzig to the Reich by friendly
arrangement is at the present moment the subject of
negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw, but the negotiations
do not seem likely to come to a successful conclusion. The
further information was given that, although Germany does
not at present contemplate an attack, she could not wait
until the expiration of the Treaty of 1934 for the
settlement of this question.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 84
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
March 27, 1939.
I HAVE just received confirmation from the Polish
Commissioner's Office of the existence of proposals relating
to Danzig's return to the Reich, presented by the German
Government to the Polish Government.
The Polish Government has categorically rejected these
proposals and simultaneously taken strong measures for the
security of Pomerelia.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 85
M. DE MONTBAS, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 28, 1939.
I HAVE received from various authoritative sources
confirmation of
[109]
the information conveyed yesterday, March 27, by M. de
la Tournelle concerning the present state of the Danzig
question.
Conversations between Berlin and Warsaw have, in fact,
been going on in the greatest secrecy for some days, with a
view to the retrocession of the Free City to the Reich in
return for an undertaking by the latter to forego an
immediate military occupation, the problem of the Corridor
being for the moment excluded from the discussions. A
pessimistic view as to the result of these negotiations is
held by Polish circles in Berlin, which, after giving the
impression that a solution on these lines would not raise
any difficulties, seem now to be taking up a more rigid
attitude, to anticipate the worst and to be making
preparations accordingly.
On the German side, where great dissatisfaction is
shown with regard to the alleged treatment of the German
minority in Silesia, it is most emphatically declared that
Danzig is not to be the object of an attack. They affirm
that they are well aware of what would be the consequences
of this in the present excited state of international
opinion and that they intend to pursue the settlement of the
question solely through peaceful channels in the spirit of
the 1934 Agreement. One thing is clear: the German Press
preserves a complete silence with regard to this, and so far
there has been no indication in any newspaper of an early
revival of "dynamism" in any particular direction.
MONTBAS.
No. 86
M. DE VAUX SAINT-CYR, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
March 30, 1939.
POLISH circles in Berlin do not conceal the fact that
they consider the situation arising from the Danzig question
as very serious and that the tension between the Reich and
Poland may, any day, become extremely grave. Most of the
Embassy officials and members of the Polish Colony have
already sent their wives and children away. The Polish
students in the German capital have returned to their own
country, and, according to information given us by certain
of our agents, the Consuls are said to have received orders
to burn the secret papers in their archives.
Possibly these precautionary measures are partly
intended to impress the Nazi leaders. M. Lipski and his
staff are indeed persuaded that up
[110]
to the present the Fhrer has attempted to use force only
when he was convinced that he would meet with no resistance
worthy of the name. Therefore they seize every opportunity
of declaring that Poland will strenuously oppose by force of
arms any violent action taken by the Reich against the
constitution of the Free City.
With regard to the German-Polish contacts on this
matter, I have been able to obtain the following information
about the question as it stands at present.
There have been, apparently, no negotiations properly
so called between Berlin and Warsaw. There has been a
question and a reply. Herr von Ribbentrop is said to have
asked the Polish Government if they were ready to enter into
negotiation on the following points:
The modification of the Danzig statute and the return
of the City to the Reich;
The concession to Germany of an extra-territorial
railway and a motor road across the Corridor;
A rectification of the frontier in the Oderberg region,
this important railway centre to belong to the Reich;
An elucidation of Poland's attitude towards the Axis.
To this question, Warsaw is said to have replied with
an emphatic "No." In taking note of this refusal, Herr von
Ribbentrop apparently confined himself to warning the
responsible Polish leaders that they had better think things
over. Polish Embassy circles in Berlin are of opinion that
the Reich Foreign Minister has not yet acquainted the
Chancellor with the failure of his d‚marche, probably
because he still hopes for a change of attitude in Warsaw.
The German Press as a whole has for some time observed
a complete silence on the questions which divide the Reich
and Poland. This reserve is in itself disquieting. It will,
doubtless, be maintained during the interval for
reconsideration which Herr von Ribbentrop has tacitly
allowed his interlocutors. The National Zeitung, however, in
its edition of the day before yesterday (March 28), issued a
warning the implication of which it is impossible to
misunderstand. This warning was taken up the next day by the
Diplomatische Correspondenz.
However that may be, it seems clear that the National-
Socialist leaders had not expected resistance of this kind
from Poland. Certain well authenticated reports lead one to
believe that the occupation of Danzig by the German forces
had been originally intended to take place next Saturday,
April 1. This was, in fact, the date fixed for the actual
linking-up of the S A. in the Free City with the Wehrmacht.
[111]
Today, confronted with Warsaw's firm attitude, Berlin seems
to hesitate. Perhaps the German arrangements are only
postponed.
A member of my staff has learnt from a usually reliable
source that, as a result of the unexpected difficulties that
have arisen, the Reich has had to face the possibility of a
military operation, which would necessitate at least a
fortnight's preparation. His informant is of opinion that,
in these circumstances, nothing will happen before the day
of the monster parade in which four divisions are to take
part and which has been arranged in Berlin for April 20 to
celebrate the Fhrer's fiftieth birthday.
Nevertheless, one cannot altogether exclude the
possibility of a premature Putsch taking place in Danzig
even before Colonel Beck's departure for London.
VAUX SAINT-CYR.
No. 87
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
March 30, 1939.
I HAVE been able to obtain fresh information as to the
way in which the Danzig question seems to have been
introduced last week by Germany, in the course of a
conversation between Herr von Ribbentrop and the Polish
Ambassador.
I learn, from an absolutely reliable source, that,
during this conversation, the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs also spoke to M. Lipski about Poland's relations
with the U.S.R.R. He gave emphatic expression to the wish
that "even if Poland thought she could not become a party to
the Anti-Comintern Pact, she should at least endeavour to
bring her general policy as close as possible to the line
followed by Germany."
LON N™EL.
No. 88
M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw.
Paris,
March 31, 1939.
THE British Ambassador informed me on March 30 that a
question would be put to the British Government next day in
the House of Commons, suggesting that a German attack on
Poland was imminent
[112]
and asking what measures the Government would take in such
an eventuality.
With the intention of giving the German Government a
necessary warning in the least provocative form, the British
Government proposed, with the approval of the French
Government, to answer that, although it considered such a
rumour to be without foundation, it has given the Polish
Government an assurance that if, previous to the conclusion
of consultations going on with the other Governments, any
action were undertaken which clearly threatened the
independence of the Polish Government, and which the latter
should find itself obliged to resist with armed force, the
British and French Governments would immediately lend it all
the assistance in their power.
I replied to the communication from Sir Eric Phipps
that the French Government would give its whole-hearted
approval to the declaration which the British Government
proposed to make.
GEORGES BONNET.
No. 89
Declaration of Mr. Chamberlain in the House of
Commons
March 31, 1939
As I said this morning, His Majesty's Government have
no official confirmation of the rumours of any projected
attack on Poland, and they must not, therefore, be taken as
accepting them as true.
I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again the
general policy of His Majesty's Government. They have
constantly advocated the adjustment, by way of free
negotiation between the parties concerned, of any
differences that may arise between them. They consider that
this is the natural and proper course where differences
exist. In their opinion there should be no question
incapable of solution by peaceful means, and they would see
no justification for the substitution of force or threats of
force for the method of negotiation.
As the House is aware, certain consultations are now
proceeding with other Governments. In order to make
perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in
the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now
have to inform the House that during that period, in the
event of any action which clearly threatened Polish
independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly
considered it vital to resist with their national forces,
His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once
to lend the Polish Government
[113]
all support in their power. They have given the Polish
Government an assurance to this effect.
I may add that the French Government have authorized me
to make it plain that they stand in the same position in
this matter as do His Majesty's Government.
No. 90
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 1, 1939.
THE behavior of the Polish Nation during the last few
days has created a very deep impression on all foreigners
resident here.
The patriotic feeling of the Poles in the face of the
German threat, which the country has suddenly realized, is
intensified in all parties and all classes; workers and
peasants show that they are aware of the danger and ready
for the greatest sacrifices. The women, as always in Poland
when things are serious, play a vital part in this movement
of public opinion. An extraordinary enthusiasm, shared by
Jews and Catholics alike, rich as well as poor, is
manifested for the air defence loan, although the
subscription has not yet been opened. Military measures and
requisitions are accepted in the best spirit.
The executive committees of all parties (except the
Communist Party, which has no legal status) have accepted
the invitation to be represented on the Loan Committee, a
thing which would have seemed impossible a few weeks ago.
This gesture is enough to show how deeply a consciousness of
danger has rapidly reached every section of the nation.
The calmness shown by the population also creates a
very good impression. However, in the Warsaw cinemas, the
appearance of German uniforms in the news films is beginning
to call forth marked hostile reactions.
LON N™EL.
No. 91
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
April 5, 1939.
ON two occasions, during the second fortnight in the
month of March, the constitution of the Free City appeared
to be in danger, in
[114]
the first instance owing to the action of the Reich, and
then to the activity of the Danzig National-Socialists, and
it seemed that the carrying out of this threat might have
the most serious reactions on German-Polish relations.
The development of the crisis, as seen from Danzig, was
as follows:
The High Commissioner of the League of Nations, on his
way from Geneva, broke his journey in Berlin on the 12th and
13th of March. He was not received by Herr von Ribbentrop,
as he had hoped to be, but personal friends in the
Wilhelmstrasse advised him "to remain only a very short
time in the Free City to avoid exposing himself to most
serious inconvenience." So M. Burckhardt, returning on March
14, left again on the 17th for Switzerland to give a verbal
report at once to the Committee of Three.
I myself learned that arms had been transported daily
since the end of February from Elbing to the barracks of the
Schutzpolizei, that on the 13th and 14th of March about 500
officers and non-commissioned officers from East Prussia had
reconnoitered first the road from Elbing to Danzig, then
possible battlefields, and finally that in the schools
elocution lessons were given to the very young on the words,
"We thank our Fhrer." The population was instructed on
March 16 not to discontinue the street decoration ordered
for March 15 to celebrate the setting up the Protectorate in
Bohemia and Moravia.
The local Polish authorities seemed to me to be
surprised and bewildered by the imminence and the gravity of
the danger threatening their interests. I also had the
impression that they had been waiting in vain for some days
for instructions from their Government, although there could
no longer be any doubt as to the action that Germany was
preparing here. However, from March 17 onwards, it was
observed that Polish troops were being rushed to the
frontiers of the Territory; war material, coming from Tczew
and bound for Gdynia, passed through Danzig station every
night, and about March 25 batteries of field-artillery took
up their position at Orlowo, between Zoppot and Gdynia.
Whether the Reich had delayed action too long, or
whether it had desired to act only with the assent of
Warsaw, it was henceforth impossible for the Wehrmacht to
enter Danzig without fighting.
It was then that the local militiamen, exasperated by
this futile waiting, decided to organize a Putsch. It was to
be carried out on March 29 at midday. A rehearsal was held
the night before at the same hour, groups of S.A. and S.S.
making a show of occupying the
[115]
public buildings. They hoped to present the Reich and Poland
with a fait accompli and to proclaim, without any incident,
the reunion with Germany. But convinced, with reason no
doubt, that the Polish troops would immediately enter the
City, the President of the Senate, accompanied by the
President of the Bank of Danzig and the head of the
Department for Foreign Affairs, flew to Berlin on March 28
and persuaded the Party Headquarters that strict orders
should be issued at once to the Danzig units forbidding any
kind of agitation. Herr Greiser's intervention was
facilitated by the absence of the Gauleiter, who was in
hospital for an operation. If Herr Forster had been present,
events would doubtless have taken a different course.
The present line of argument of the local National-
Socialist authorities is as follows: Germany and Poland
maintain their friendly relations, which the former has
never dreamed of disturbing. In the spirit of the Treaty of
1934 and in order to strengthen still further these
relations, Germany has merely formulated several demands
which the Warsaw Government refused to consider, a refusal
strictly within their rights. If some anxiety seems to have
been felt in Poland, who has, without any reason, believed
her interests to be threatened, this is due to the action of
agitators belonging to the military and Francophile party
and not to the responsible and serious-minded politicians,
who remained perfectly calm. In Germany the Fhrer was
obliged to take steps which, at times, seemed brutal in
order to put the army in its proper place in the nation, and
to prevent any usurpation of power; it is to be hoped that
the Warsaw Government will derive inspiration from this
method, the application of which in Poland, to say the
least, is equally necessary.
It seems that, for political as well as for economic
reasons, it will be impossible to maintain the status quo
here. It is felt that most of the high officials and the
majority of the population do not desire the return to the
Reich, the former because they wish to remain the most
important persons in this State, Lilliputian though it be,
and the latter because they have no illusions about the
hardships and restrictions that will be laid upon it as soon
as the frontiers, which still offer some protection, are
removed. But it will be difficult in the future to control
the exasperation of the more ardent Nazis, who are hoping
for a new and speedy victory for Germanism, a victory which,
this time, is to be their own direct achievement. Many of
them have recently stayed up night after night, expecting
from hour to hour the arrival of the German troops.
[116]
Then again, the uncertainty of the situation is having
disastrous effects on the traffic of the port. The Polish
authorities had ordered the removal of rolling stock and
small craft, the merchants have sent their stocks of goods
to Poland, the Polish credits have been withdrawn, grain and
flour are no longer sent from Poland except on presentation
of a letter of credit in that country.
At the same time, the population, fearing that they
would be compelled to accept marks at an arbitrary rate when
the local coinage was withdrawn from circulation, exchanged
this in considerable quantities for zlotys or contraband
marks at 1 mark to 70 Danzig pfennigs, although the official
rate stands at 1 mark to 2 gulden 20. In order to protect
its currency and to obtain exchange, the Bank of Danzig
compelled every person residing in the Free City, whether
nationals or not, to declare the money and the foreign
securities in their possession and to deposit them in
approved establishments under the Bank's own account, where
they must remain untouched. In this field also an early
clearing up of the situation seems indispensable. The recent
crisis in German-Polish relations has only increased the
state of confusion that has now prevailed in the Free City
for several months.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 92
M. DE VAUX SAINT-CYR, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 5, 1939.
I HAVE obtained from various reliable sources the
following particulars concerning the present attitude of the
leaders of the Reich concerning the Polish question:
In official circles the prospect of an Anglo-French
intervention in favour of Poland gives rise to the most
serious fears. It exasperates the Fhrer who has been, of
late, in a constant state of anger. The opinion is said to
prevail still in Government circles that Danzig is outside
the scope of the guarantee given by England to Poland, and
also the view is obstinately held that Poland would not take
up arms to defend the constitution of the Free City.
But it is firmly maintained that the Fhrer is
determined, whatever the circumstances, to secure the return
of Danzig to the Reich, and it is thought possible,
considering his state of irritation, that any day he may
decide to settle the question without further delay.
VAUX SAINT-CYR.
[117]
No. 93
M. DE VAUX SAINT-CYR, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 6, 1939.
IN the course of the negotiations which took place
yesterday in Berlin between the Government of the Reich and
the Slovak delegation headed by Mgr. Tiso, Herr von
Ribbentrop, referring to the relations between Poland and
Germany, made the following declaration to the head of the
Bratislava Government, reported almost word for word as
follows:
"The Fhrer does not want war. He will resort to it
only with reluctance. But the decision in favour of war or
peace does not rest with him. It rests with Poland. On
certain questions of vital interest to the Reich, Poland
must give way and accede to demands which we cannot
renounce. If Poland refuses, it is upon her that the
responsibility for a conflict will fall and not upon
Germany."
These words, which I must insist were quoted to me in a
strictly confidential manner, seem to me to sum up fairly
well the present state of the German-Polish tension.
Although, bearing in mind the Chancellor's unfathomable
pride, his state of irritation and his boundless faith in
his star, one cannot rule out a priori the possibility of an
angry gesture and an imminent and brutal seizure of Danzig,
I consider that, in the present state of things, this is not
the most likely contingency. I am more inclined to believe
that before resorting to extreme measures, the Government of
the Reich will attempt once more the method of negotiating
with Poland as understood by Hitlerian Germany, that is to
say, by pressure and blackmail, accompanied by the threat of
force.
As I have already stated, Berlin has not yet lost all
hope that Poland will give way on the question of the return
of the City of Danzig to the Reich and the construction of
an extra-territorial motor road across the Corridor. This
hope is all the stronger since, in spite of the very clear
way in which the English guarantee was drawn up. they
persist in thinking in Berlin that the British promise of
assistance does not include the Danzig problem.
On the other hand, as far as I can see, it seems that
on the Polish side it is thought that after the return of
Colonel Beck there will be a resumption of the diplomatic
conversations begun last week with Germany, which have so
far failed. It goes without saying that Ger-
[118]
many will use the time during which these conversations may
continue for military preparations directed against Poland.
There is no doubt in my mind about one thing: the
Chancellor is resolutely determined to settle the Danzig
question "one way or another." On this subject Herr von
Ribbentrop's remarks reported above are typical and are
confirmed by other reliable sources.
But, however exasperated the Fhrer may be by the Anglo-
Polish negotiations and the threat of encirclement, however
great his haste to proclaim the return of Danzig to the
Reich and to restore direct communications between East
Prussia and Pomerania, he cannot but know that if this
result is not obtained in an amicable way, it would not be
merely a matter of a military parade for the German army
marching across Polish territory. This time he would have to
face a conflict necessitating very extensive preparations.
According to convergent and reliable reports, it would
seem that in the Chancellor's opinion the amicable solution
suggested last week to Poland was to constitute only a
stage. If this is passed in consequence of a refusal on the
part of Poland, the Reich will try to obtain a solution of
the whole problem of German-Polish relations, a problem
which has been artificially relegated to the background
since 1934. Poland will have to face the question: "To be or
not to be?"
From another source it is pointed out that in the
meantime the leaders of the Reich have not lost all hope of
weakening the resolution of England and France by trying to
divide opinion in both countries on the question of eventual
military aid for Poland. We must expect the Reich to display
activity in this direction, and in particular to try to
obtain the publication in certain newspapers of articles
intended to spread confusion. As far as France is concerned,
the journey of Herr Abetz to Paris is doubtless not foreign
to this purpose. The fact that until now the German Press
has affected to discriminate between England and France,
directing all its fury against the former and merely
attacking the latter in a perfunctory manner, is in itself
significant. German propaganda will doubtless try to
convince certain sections of French opinion that by fighting
England's battles on the Continent, their country is playing
a dupe's part. Nazi agents will not fail to maintain that
the Third Reich has the best intentions towards us. Already,
when Austria was invaded, Field-Marshal Goering repeatedly
gave his word of honour to M. Mastny that Germany was
animated by the very best intentions towards Czechoslovakia.
We know today what such assurances are worth.
[119]
We must therefore, during the coming weeks, expect a
violent offensive against the moral structure of France and
of England.
The German-Polish dispute has, in fact, degenerated
into a tension between the Reich and the Western
Democracies.
VAUX SAINT-CYR.
No. 94
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 7, 1939.
I POINT out as very typical the abrupt change in the
tone of the German agencies and Press with regard to Poland.
After Mr. Chamberlain's first declaration, and at the
beginning of Colonel Beck's stay in London, the inspired
German newspapers displayed a cautious and moderate attitude
towards Poland, as if they feared to alarm her and drive her
over to the Western Powers.
Since yesterday evening, and particularly in the
Deutscher Dienst and the Volkischer Beobachter, these
tactics have given place to intimidation and threats. Poland
finds herself accused of becoming the satellite of England
in a policy of aggression against Germany; she has been
warned that she runs the risk of becoming like other "small
nations," the first victim of British intrigues.
It may be that Germany is trying by these methods of
intimidation, to persuade Poland to consent without further
delay to substantial concessions with regard to Danzig and
the "territorial link" between East Prussia and the rest of
the Reich, but it may equally well be wondered whether
Chancellor Hitler, feeling that time is now working against
him, will not refrain from precipitating events by a
decision to address an unacceptable final summons to Poland.
LON N™EL.
No. 95
M. DE VAUX SAINT-CYR, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 8, 1939.
COLONEL BECK passed through Berlin today, on his return
journey from London to Warsaw. One of the secretaries in the
Protocol Service met him at the station but he did not, as
far as we know, have any conversation with any Minister of
the Reich.
[120]
I hear from a well-informed quarter that M. Lipski had
previously paid a visit to Herr von Weizs„cker. In the
course of this interview, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs is said to have asked the Polish Ambassador for
further information as to the attitude of the Warsaw
Government, and particularly with regard to Polish military
measures. M. Lipski, without any loss of composure, is said
to have replied that the measures in question were justified
by the recent troop movements and the annexations which the
Reich, without notifying the Polish Government, had just
carried out, and that the units mobilized in Poland did not
in any case exceed two army corps.
VAUX SAINT-CYR.
No. 96
M. DE VAUX SAINT-CYR, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 10, 1939.
FROM a well-informed quarter it is pointed out that
German official circles continue to hope that Poland will be
persuaded to accept the German claims in respect of the
passage across the Corridor and Danzig. Herr von Ribbentrop
is said to have had a personal letter delivered to Colonel
Beck, when the latter passed through Berlin, requesting the
Polish Government to withdraw its troops from the German
frontier.
A report from another quarter informs me that leading
Nazi circles are said to be speculating still on the
wavering attitude attributed to France.
My personal impression is that up to the present the
Germans have made no final decision, and that they are still
counting on the success of an intimidating maneuver. I
persist in thinking that the best chance of avoiding a
conflict depends on the spirit of resolution which the
Western Powers will display.
VAUX SAINT-CYR.
No. 97
M. DE VAUX SAINT-CYR, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 11, 1939.
REGARDING the state of German-Polish relations after
Colonel Beck's
[121]
journey to London and his return to Warsaw, certain facts
seem worthy of attention.
Up to the present, there has been no evidence of large-
scale military measures which would justify the conclusion
that an operation against Poland is imminent. The
verifications undertaken during the Easter holiday showed
that up to yesterday, April 10, there was as yet no
concentration of troops in Silesia, nor opposite Posen, nor
in Pomerania.
No newspaper campaign has yet been launched against
Poland by the Reich. Even at the time of Colonel Beck's
visit to London, the German Press maintained a certain sense
of proportion in its language with regard to Poland. After
trying, especially on the eve of Colonel Beck's journey, to
intimidate the Warsaw Government, it resumed, during and
after the Anglo-Polish conversation, a moderate tone towards
Warsaw. It was principally against England that it vented
its resentment and annoyance.
In so far as the Danzig question in particular is
concerned, the German Press has till now refrained from
directly attacking it. The problem has not been put before
the public. The Fhrer's prestige, so far as his own people
are concerned, is therefore not yet involved. His liberty of
action remains complete.
On the German side, hope of coming to an amicable
settlement with Poland has not yet been given up, a
resumption of contacts and exchanges of views appears to be
under consideration. Likewise, on the Polish side, a new
approach by the Reich is expected, and there is no aversion
whatever to a renewal of contacts. Even the hope of
effecting an arrangement is still entertained. Up to the
present, it is true, it is hard to see what fundamental
conditions would make this arrangement feasible. Germany's
two main demands are: The return of Danzig and the
establishment of an extra-territorial passage across the
Corridor. Poland has categorically refused to admit these
demands. She has made it clear that she would not hesitate,
if the occasion arose, to resort to force to oppose the
German requirements on these points. She hopes to be able to
settle the dispute by granting most generous privileges to
the Germans in Danzig and considerable traffic facilities
across the Corridor. According to certain reports, the
Warsaw Government would even agree to the breaking of all
juridical ties between the Free State and the League of
Nations, to Danzig's becoming in some sort independent, and
to Germany's obtaining important economic privileges.
Be that as it may, one thing appears incontestable.
Before having re-
[122]
course to measures which might provoke an armed conflict
with Poland, the Third Reich will neglect no means of
settling its disputes with Poland by the method which the
Chancellor has until now found so successful, that is to say
"without firing a shot."
The German hesitations must without any doubt be
attributed in the first place to the firm attitude adopted
by Poland. For the first time the Third Reich has come up
against a categorical No; for the first time a country has
clearly expressed its determination to oppose force by
force, and to reply to any unilateral movement with rifles
and guns. This is the kind of language that is understood in
Germany. But they have not been used to hearing it there for
a long time. It has also been very difficult for them to
believe their ears, and they still do not despair of wearing
down Polish resistance in the long run. Meanwhile, no
decision regarding Danzig seems to have been reached as yet,
although its restoration to the Reich had been anticipated
for April 1.
The vacillation of German policy in the Danzig affair
brings out a point which seems to me of capital importance
for the appreciation of the general political situation,
viz.: the German aversion to rush into a conflict in which
the Reich would be engaged on two fronts and in which it
would have to reckon, in the East as in the West, with
powerful adversaries.
VAUX SAINT-CYR.
No. 98
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 12, 1939.
I QUESTIONED Colonel Beck about the widespread rumours
regarding a recent conversation between M. Lipski and Herr
von Ribbentrop.
The Minister assured me that his Ambassador had not
seen Herr von Ribbentrop for several days, that no approach
had been made during the last few days by the German
Government to the Polish Government, and that a high
official of the Wilhelmstrasse, in the course of a non-
political conversation, had confined himself to asking M.
Lipski the reason for the military measures taken by Poland.
The Ambassador had replied that his Government, as a result
of recent initiatives on the part of Germany, had been moved
to do, though to a lesser extent, what had been done by a
certain number of other countries. Colonel Beck told me also
that he had summoned M. Lipski to Warsaw, and
[123]
that he would let Herr von Moltke know the following morning
what had been determined upon in London. He had, up to the
present, confined himself to informing the German Government
that the Anglo-Polish Agreement was a reassurance operation
necessitated by the existing circumstances, and that it was
not in any way aimed at the encirclement of Germany.
LON N™EL.
No. 99
Extract from a declaration communicated to the Press
by M. Edouard Daladier, President of the Council of
Ministers, Minister for War and National Defence, on April
13, 1939
THE French Government, moreover, derives great
satisfaction from the conclusion of the reciprocal
undertakings between Great Britain and Poland, who have
decided to give each other mutual support in defence of
their independence in the event of either being threatened
directly or indirectly.
The Franco-Polish alliance is, moreover, confirmed in
the same spirit by the French Government and the Polish
Government. France and Poland guarantee each other immediate
and direct aid against any threat direct or indirect, which
might aim a blow at their vital interests.
Today this declaration is being communicated by our
Ambassadors to all Governments interested, and in particular
to Turkey.
No. 100
M. DE VAUX SAINT-CYR, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 13, 1939.
IN official circles in Berlin today, there were two
points of view regarding German-Polish relations.
At the Ministry of Propaganda, correspondents of the
German and foreign Press were still informed that
negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw were being continued
and that an amicable settlement was not an impossibility.
On the other hand, a high official of the
Wilhelmstrasse stated, in confidence, to one of our fellow
countrymen that there would be no further conversations with
the Warsaw Government on the matter of Danzig and the
Corridor. The same person added that Herr von Rib-
[124]
bentrop was extremely annoyed with Colonel Beck; he
considered that Poland had taken up a definitely hostile
attitude and that he was contemplating breaking off
diplomatic negotiations with Warsaw and London in the near
future.
VAUX SAINT-CYR.
No. 101
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 15, 1939.
ALTHOUGH Colonel Beck let Herr von Moltke know that he
wished to see him as soon as he returned, the latter, who
was expected back in Warsaw two days ago, after having
received instructions from his Government, has not yet
rejoined his post.
The Foreign Minister concludes from this that the
German Government is hesitating over the policy it should
pursue with regard to Poland, and that the conclusion of the
Anglo-Polish agreement has disconcerted it.
LON N™EL.
No. 102
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 17, 1939.
THE German tactics with regard to the Poles seem quite
clear; the propaganda of the Reich is busy disquieting them,
fraying their nerves and wearying them by the multiplicity
and persistence of false reports, criticisms and more or
less veiled threats, by which it either counts on bringing
about a change of opinion among the Polish people, or seeks
to weaken the moral resistance of an eventual adversary.
The newspaper correspondents of the Reich in Poland
have orders to report anything which can be presented to
German public opinion as an incident, as a maltreatment of
the minority, and also to be as unpleasant as possible to
Poland in their reports.
Then again, German agents are spreading among the
minorities, especially at Katowice, the rumour that it will
not be long before the German troops appear. It is even
reported that April 24 is to be the date of "deliverance."
Up to the present, the Polish authorities and
population have reacted
[125]
with restraint to these manoeuvres, and they continue, in
spite of the increase of anti-German feeling, to show signs
of praiseworthy calm.
LON N™EL.
No. 103
M. DE VAUX SAINT-CYR, French Charg‚ d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 24, 1939.
ALTHOUGH M. Lipski returned to Berlin more than a week
ago, Herr von Moltke is still awaiting orders to return to
his post.
This delay is probably due to the feeling of intense
irritation which the Fhrer, so I am told, continues to
feel towards Colonel Beck and Polish Government. No doubt
the Nazi leaders are also trying in this way to intimidate
Warsaw and weaken its resistance.
VAUX SAINT-CYR.
No. 104
M. DE LA TOURNELLE, French Consul in Danzig,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Danzig,
April 25, 1939.
THE failure of the attempt last month by the Reich to
blackmail Poland has in the diplomatic and military spheres
still further increased the confusion in the Free City; one
might almost speak of a crisis in the regime itself, since
the National-Socialist Party, with its Gauleiter, the
Government represented by the Senate, and lastly the
Gestapo, are severally at loggerheads with one another.
Himmler was obliged to come here in secret, at the
beginning of the month; he endeavoured to settle the
dispute, very bitter since Herr Greiser's journey to Berlin,
in order to frustrate the Putsch prepared by Herr Forster's
associates. He is said to have been very dissatisfied with
the lack of discipline prevailing in the Danzig district
and, on his return to Berlin, to have advised the recall of
the Gauleiter. It remains to be seen whether the Fhrer, who
is a personal friend of the latter, will consent to this.
The leaders of the storm troops do not admit defeat;
they repeatedly prophesy the return of the Free City to
Germany at an early date, which they are compelled
continually to postpone; and they condemn in the strongest
terms the present state of deferred hopes.
The responsible officials maintain quite a different
attitude. The
[126]
Head of the Department for Foreign Affairs of the Senate
readily declares, in conversation with foreigners, that the
Danzig question can only be settled by German-Polish
negotiations; that such negotiations, in view of their
complexity, will necessarily be long and difficult; but that
time does not matter, since the Free City, having already
waited twenty years for its future to be decided, can be
patient a little longer. Finally, according to Herr
B”ttcher, the Danzig people are said to be taking offense at
being looked upon almost as a box of chocolates that one
might give away as a birthday present.
This attitude of caution may have been due to a warning
that the High Commissioner of Poland is said to have given
to the Senate at the beginning of the month; at the
slightest attempt to modify the constitution by violence,
whether coming from inside or outside the Territory, Polish
troops would immediately enter Danzig and endeavour to
maintain themselves there, whatever damage the City might
suffer.
That is apparently the sort of language best understood
here.
I have learned from an authoritative German source that
the Reich in order to disarm Polish prejudices, would, in
the negotiations it hopes to open with the Warsaw
Government, drop its claim to the territorial annexation of
Danzig; it would recognize and confirm the sovereignty of
the Free City; freed from the control of the League of
Nations, but it would demand its transfer from Polish
customs territory to that of Germany.
This would mean that in return for a formal concession,
the neighbouring Republic would have to give up the
advantages it now holds. But, according to the local Polish
authorities, it is not likely that Warsaw will allow itself
to be thus duped, so that this maneuver has little chance of
success.
LA TOURNELLE.
No. 105
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 28, 1939.
THE speech just made by the Fhrer to the Reichstag, in
answer to President Roosevelt's message, lasted for two
hours and a half. There were two parts to it. In the first,
which was in the nature of a speech for the defence, the
Chancellor recalled the main principles of his
[127]
policy and endeavoured to show that the occupation of
Bohemia and Moravia was not incompatible with these
principles, Germany having merely acted in obedience to
vital political and economic necessities.
The second part was the actual reply to President
Roosevelt, whose message the Chancellor dissected into
twenty or so questions to which he replied in turn.
Concerning relations with Poland, Herr Hitler declared
that the Danzig problem remaining an open question that must
be settled, he had made the following proposals to the
Polish Government:
"1. Danzig to return within the framework of the Reich,
Germany to obtain an extra-territorial railway and road
across the Corridor.
"2. In return, all Polish rights in Danzig to be
recognized. Poland to retain for ever the right to a free
port in Danzig.
"3. Poland and Germany to guarantee the frontiers of
Slovakia.
"4. Germany to recognize the German-Polish frontier as
final."
"This proposal," he added, "was rejected in the same
way as happened in the case of Czechoslovakia. Poland
thought it to her interest to yield to the pressure of the
Democratic Powers, which promised her their support; and to
decline this unparalleled proposal which will never be made
again.
"I hope to be able to settle this question by
compromise, as no one can imagine that Danzig could ever
become a Polish city.
"Since the international Press has imputed aggressive
intentions to the Reich, Poland has felt obliged to mobilize
and to accept a pact of assistance. Now, the treaty between
Germany and Poland never envisaged the conclusion of such a
pact. It applied solely to the alliance with France. The
German-Polish non-Aggression Pact has therefore no further
meaning. It has been violated, and it no longer exists.
"However, that does not involve any change in my
attitude to the problems themselves. If the Polish
Government should once more wish to enter into negotiations
on this subject I am quite willing to do so, provided that
this time the question is clearly settled."
COULONDRE.
No. 106
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 29, 1939.
POLISH public opinion has received Herr Hitler's speech
with the
[128]
greatest calm. His decision to end the 1934 Agreement, which
the German Press had, for that matter, foreshadowed, has
occasioned no surprise here.
Since the events of last March and their repercussions
on the relations between Poland and Germany, it was felt in
Warsaw that the policy inaugurated in 1934 had, for the time
being at least, and owing to Germany's action, ceased to be
a reality.
The memorandum to which the Chancellor alluded was
handed over this morning at the Bruhl Palace by the German
Charg‚ d'Affaires. The Foreign Office staff immediately
began to study the document, and it is said that the Polish
Government intends to reply to it in the same form.
LON N™EL
No. 107
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 29, 1939.
THE Polish people, contrary to German allegations, has
so far given evidence of great calm, and the authorities use
their influence to promote great moderation. This fact is
noted by all foreign observers. Furthermore, the Government
and the Army Chiefs are too anxious to gain time for
strengthening their preparations for defence, to tolerate
any acts of imprudence.
The most serious of the incidents noted recently by the
Press of the Reich are due, moreover, to German provocation.
The only grave case to which attention has been drawn lately
concerns a German who, after being turned out of a Polish
patriotic meeting, at which he had made a protest, fired on
the crowd which demonstrated outside his house, wounding six
Poles, one of whom has since died.
LON N™EL
No. 108
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 29, 1939.
AFTER a careful reading of Herr Hitler's speech, the
following impressions can be clearly drawn: Delivered in a
tone relatively calm,
[129]
moderate in substance and in form, it is a speech for the
defence rather than an indictment. It is directed more
towards the past than to the future. It would, however, be
dangerous to allow oneself to be impressed to any extent by
this appearance.
It is possible that, as he himself rises with the Reich
which he has built, Herr Hitler may view things with a more
lofty serenity; there is no reason to hope that he will give
up his designs, his ambitions and his covetous appetites;
indeed, it is quite the reverse.
If the Fhrer has decided to allow his troops a pause
it is because he thinks it necessary to prepare the next
operation by means of negotiations; the fact that he is
shifting his maneuver from the military to the diplomatic
plane, permits the Western Powers to appreciate the efficacy
of their action. But Herr Hitler's activity will not be less
dangerous because he plays the hermit for a while, and the
Allies could not with safety relax either their vigilance or
their military and diplomatic efforts.
Having noted that, in the face of the resolute attitude
of the three allied Powers, the Reich has drawn in its
claws, we must see the Fhrer's speech in the light of so
many others conceived in the same spirit, and I think it
desirable that from today the French Press should put an end
to its comments.
By this time we know too well what the German Fhrer's
word is worth, to allow ourselves once again to be taken in
by it. Herr Hitler has, moreover, just broken it once more
by denouncing, five years before its expiration, the German-
Polish Agreement which was to last, without any possibility
of denunciation, until 1944.
What must be remembered in his speech is that he sets
his face against any pacific organization of the European
community, and that each new conquest, which will strengthen
the Reich's position as the heir to the Holy Roman Empire or
to the Hapsburgs, is regarded by him as legitimate.
Armed force is the only thing that counts with him. We
must therefore proceed with our re-armament and the
strengthening of our alliances. I may be allowed to recall
the words that Herr Hitler addressed to me at our first
meeting:
"Do not think that Alsace-Lorraine means nothing to me;
it is because the retaking of Strasbourg would necessitate
the shedding of too much German blood that I have decided to
end the Franco-German quarrel."
[130]
More than ever I am convinced that the Fhrer's whole
temperament is revealed in these words.
COULONDRE.
No. 109
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Warsaw,
April 29, 1939.
THE Warsaw Press publishes this morning the German
memorandum to Poland.
This document merely amplifies in diplomatic style the
declarations made yesterday by the Fhrer on German-Polish
relations.
It does not shut the door on negotiations, it even
formally "invites" the Polish Government to a discussion, so
that the inspired newspapers are able to announce today that
the "Reich's memorandum, with its proposals for a new
agreement, will be examined by the Polish Government."
Herr Hitler's tentative proposal contains, however, an
implicit but very distinct threat should Poland persist in
associating herself with the defence front now in formation.
The Polish Government is preparing to reply to this in the
same form. The discussion, thus made public, offers only
slender chances of an agreement. Definite positions have
been taken up by both sides and, between the plans of Herr
Hitler and the determination of a proud nation, the margin
for possible concessions appears very narrow.
LON N™EL.
No. 110
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 29, 1939.
A FUNDAMENTAL ambiguity has always subsisted in the
German-Polish Agreement of 1934. For the Poles, this
Agreement was intended to assure the stability of their
frontiers for ten years and make Danzig secure against
annexation by the Reich.
For Herr Hitler, this Agreement was not intended in any
way to prevent the annexation of Danzig or a revision of
frontiers; his habitual methods of pressure and intimidation
allowing him to realize both without war at the first
opportunity. On the other hand, the agreement
[131]
implied, in his eyes, an obligation on Poland's part not to
strengthen her ties with France and not to make new ties
with the friends or allies of France.
After the events of March, Poland notified Germany that
she would not agree either to the annexation of Danzig or to
the construction of a motor road across the Corridor; and
Poland accepted the offer of alliance from England. The
Chancellor is disappointed and angry; he has the impression
that he has been deceived, almost betrayed, and he must be
strongly tempted to give free rein in future to the feelings
of hatred that the German has never ceased to feel for the
Pole.
The Poles, on the other hand, have lost any illusions
they may have had about Herr Hitler, and know that sooner or
later they will have to defend their independence against
the great adversary, which Germany has once more become for
them.
LON N™EL.
No. 111
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 29, 1939.
IT is stated at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that
the German Government, contrary to the Chancellor's
declarations, did not propose to Poland either a
prolongation of the Non-Aggression Pact or a guarantee by
Germany, Poland and Hungary of Slovak independence.
Neither M. Beck nor his collaborators have ever made in
my hearing, or in conversations reported to me, the
slightest allusion to any proposals of this nature.
The German Press alone had indicated that the German
Government, in return for concessions it expected from
Poland, would be ready to prolong the Pact of 1934.
There has never been any question, to my knowledge, of
a proposal relating to Slovakia.
LON N™EL.
No. 112
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 29, 1939.
IN putting the Danzig question in the forefront, Herr
Hitler clearly
[132]
reveals his tactics; he reckons that in France and Britain
this question will appear of too slight importance to
justify Polish resistance.
One could not help wondering why Polish public opinion
took such an uncompromising attitude concerning the Danzig
Statute and refused to consider any substantial concession
on this point.
The fact is that, since the events of last March, the
Poles feel that the vital question is one between themselves
and the Reich.
The point is whether, by consenting to concessions,
which, moreover, would lead to others, Poland is to agree to
stand aside in an eventual conflict between Germany and the
Western Powers and thus resign itself to becoming an
auxiliary and vassal of the Reich; or whether, on the
contrary, it will use the political independence which it
will have striven to safeguard, in order to join, should
occasion arise, the common defence front against German
imperialism.
It may be deplored that the problem seems to centre, at
the moment, round Danzig. It is important that opinion in
France should realize that it goes far beyond this Danzig
question, and that it is neither the cause nor the essential
factor.
The Polish leaders hope, like ourselves, that the issue
will not be precipitated; but, in any case, if we want to
find Poland at our side when the hour of danger comes, it is
important that nothing should be done which might make her
doubtful of our support.
LON N™EL.
No. 113
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin,
April 30, 1939.
OFFICIAL circles in the Reich have clearly been
disappointed by the attitude of the French Press following
the Chancellor's speech; they had counted on its making a
profound impression and creating controversies which would
divide French public opinion. This hope has been clearly
disappointed. The propaganda of the Reich has not, however,
on that account, given up exploiting the Fhrer's
declarations on the hope of breaking up the defensive front
that is forming round Paris and London.
This morning the efforts of this propaganda seem to be
directed chiefly against Britain. The diplomatic
correspondent of the B”rsenzeitung, the semi-official
mouthpiece of the Wilhelmstrasse, today
[133]
outlines in a significant article a maneuver certainly
marked out for future development. He endeavours to persuade
the British public that the German demands with regard to
Danzig and the Corridor are trifling and that the stake
certainly does not justify Great Britain in giving a
guarantee to Poland and imposing the burden of conscription
on her people.
I am still convinced that it is important that the
French Press should not carry on any long discussions on the
subject of the Fhrer's speech. Should the German maneuver
indicated above become clearly defined and developed, I feel
I ought to draw attention to the following points
concerning, in particular, the question of Danzig and the
Corridor:
1. The position adopted by the Fhrer with regard to
Danzig is in direct opposition to that which he took up in
his speech on February 20, 1938.
The Fhrer then declared in so many words that Danzig
had entirely lost its menacing significance; that the Polish
State respected the national character of the Free City,
just as Germany, on its side, respected the rights of
Poland; that the relations between the two countries had
been finally cleared up and transformed into a loyal and
friendly collaboration.
At that date, then, the Fhrer had declared that the
Danzig question had been settled in a final manner to the
satisfaction of both the Reich and Poland.
2. In order to denounce the German-Polish agreement of
1934, the Fhrer later on invoked the promises of mutual
assistance recently agreed upon between London and Warsaw.
He appears thus to imply that Germany, by virtue of the
Agreement of 1934, held a mortgage on Polish foreign policy,
while itself retaining complete liberty of action allowing
the conclusion of political agreements with other countries.
In these circumstances, the new settlement proposed by
Germany, which would link the questions of Danzig and of the
passage across the Corridor with counterbalancing questions
of a political nature, would only serve to aggravate this
mortgage and practically subordinate Poland to the Axis and
the Anti-Comintern Bloc. Warsaw refused this in order to
retain its independence.
3. If Poland, after thus weakening its political and
strategic position by yielding to the German demands, had
subsequently tried to find in London a counterweight to Nazi
pressure, can it be doubted that the Reich would then have
declared not only that the Agreement
[134]
of 1934 was null and void, but also the new arrangement from
which the Reich would, however, have received all the
benefit?
4. The same process, in two stages, which has ended in
the disappearance of Czechoslovakia would have then been
applied against Poland.
5. Polish acceptance of Germany's demands would have
rendered the application of any braking machinery in the
East impossible.
The Germans are not wrong then, when they claim that
Danzig is in itself only a secondary question. It is not
only the fate of the Free City, it is the enslavement or
liberty of Europe which is at stake in the issue now joined.
COULONDRE.
No. 114
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw,
April 30, 1939.
ONE of my colleagues has learned from one of the most
intimate collaborators of M. Beck that in September, January
and March last, the German Government proposed to Warsaw
collaboration against the U.S.S.R.
To a question by my colleague, M. Beck's collaborator,
without wishing to define these proposals, replied that they
went far beyond an adhesion of Poland to the Anti-Comintern
Pact.
LON N™EL.
No. 115
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, May
2, 1939.
MY Polish colleague, whom I saw before his departure
for Warsaw, told me that he had formed a similar impression
to my own of Herr Hitler's speech in the Reichstag. He
attributes its moderate tone to the firmness of the Anglo-
French attitude, to the adoption of conscription in Great
Britain and to Poland's determination to meet force with
force. He is convinced that by persevering on these lines,
the Allied Powers will keep Germany in check.
The sting of the Fhrer's speech seemed to him to be
plainly directed against Poland. The German-Polish dispute
was presented
[135]
very cleverly and with the manifest intention of exciting
German public opinion against Warsaw. Also, my colleague was
of the opinion that in order to defeat the German maneuver,
his Government's answer should be carefully prepared and
very cautious. He had indeed been summoned by M. Beck in
order to discuss this matter with him.
M. Lipski also confirmed reports that during the last
few days there had been movements of German troops in
Slovakia, beyond the Vaag and all along the Polish frontier.
He wonders whether this is not a means of pressure being
used by Berlin to show Warsaw that the offer made by the
Reich of a tripartite German-Polish-Hungarian guarantee of
the integrity of Slovakia, might easily become null and void
in the near future.
COULONDRE.
No. 116
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, May
2, 1939.
BY the will of Chancellor Hitler, the German-Polish
pact, concluded for ten years in Berlin on January 26, 1934,
by M. Lipski and Herr von Neurath, has lapsed after being in
force only five years.
The circumstances in which this pact was signed will be
remembered, and its premature denunciation will not prevent
it from standing out in the diplomatic history of our time.
The Poland of Pilsudski refused to forget that the
Locarno system had established a discrimination, at its
expense, between Germany's Western and Eastern frontiers; it
had never resigned itself to a discrimination so injurious
to its security. To the ill-will towards France and England
which this created among the Poles, who reproached those
countries with having abandoned them in advance to the
covetousness of a Germany which neglected nothing in order
to build up her strength again in secret, had been recently
added the dissatisfaction and anxiety occasioned in Warsaw
by the proposed Four Power Pact. This attempt to establish
in Europe a "Directorate of the Great Powers," intolerable
in itself in the eyes of the Polish nation, which was now
becoming conscious of its new strength and drew the line at
nothing in its ambition, had appeared all the more
threatening to Marshal Pilsudski since the first draft drawn
up by Signor Mussolini clearly opened the way to a revision
of the Eastern frontiers of Ger-
[136]
many. It had been interpreted in Warsaw as a device for
directing German covetousness towards Poland in order to
turn them away from the West, and still more, from the South
and from Austria. At the same time, incidents were taking
place on the Polish-German frontiers, and the Third Reich,
born yesterday and uncertain of its future, suspected Poland
of planning a preventive war.
Marshal Pilsudski thought that he would do wisely by
utilizing the fears of a regime not yet sure of itself; he
instructed M. Wysocki, then Ambassador in Berlin, to make
overtures to Herr Hitler with a view to the establishment of
relations of "good neighbourliness" between Poland and
Germany. The Fhrer unhesitatingly agreed. An official
communiqu‚, which followed this conversation, and was dated
May 3, 1933, marked the first stage of the new policy. In
the course of the following months, negotiations were
continued without any great haste between M. Wysocki's
successor, M. Lipski, and the German Government. Finally,
Marshal Pilsudski decided to hasten their conclusion: on
January 26, 1934, Poland and the Reich declared themselves
agreed to open "a new era in Polish-German relations" and to
adjust "by the method of direct agreement" the difficulties
which might bring them into conflict, in order to establish
"good neighbourly relations," and, in accordance with the
principles of the Pact of Paris of April 27, 1928, to avoid
in all cases any "recourse to force."
Thus Poland had given satisfaction to her concern for
prestige by showing Europe that she was capable of
conducting an "independent" policy, and diplomatically she
was self-sufficient, while declaring her determination to
maintain the alliance with France, the preservation of which
had been permitted by the Berlin pact, owing to a formula
drawn up in general terms.
From a more practical point of view Pilsudski had seen
in this agreement a method for "gaining time." He was
convinced that sooner or later, a war would become
inevitable between Poland and Germany, but he realized the
considerable effort which had to be exacted from his country
and the time which it would require in order really to
become a great power; for the present he no doubt feared the
U.S.S.R. more than Germany; in any case he thought it
advisable to safeguard himself for some time against any
surprise from the West.
For his part the new master of Germany had eagerly
responded to the advances which had been made to him by
Marshal Pilsudski; for him, the hour had not yet struck for
adventures or conquests; he was aware of his weakness and of
that of his country; judging his neigh-
[137]
bours by himself he already suspected them of encircling the
Third Reich and of preparing a preventive war in order to
destroy his newborn work without giving him time to put into
operation the programme set out in Mein Kampf. Pilsudski, by
offering him an agreement, provided him so to speak with the
"credentials" which he needed in relation to Europe in order
to have time to make his position secure.
Immediately on publication of the Polish-German pact,
it had for that matter been evident to thoughtful minds that
Germany both needed it more and derived more benefit from it
than Poland.
The system was in any case based from the outset on
ambiguity on both sides. When signing it, the Reich had not
for a moment considered that it implied the slightest
renunciation by the Reich of its hopes of laying hands on
Danzig, of wiping the Corridor off the map and of recovering
its old frontiers. Herr Hitler had only considered it as a
convenient method of appeasing the hostility of the Poles at
a difficult time. Like all his compatriots he retained all
his prejudices and his hostility towards them, together with
his secret hopes for a day of reckoning.
Pilsudski on his part appears to have been under no
illusion whatever as to the nature or the value of the
engagement which Germany had agreed to conclude with his
country. This is clearly proved by observations made by him
during the last months of his life to some of his familiars
and to the Chiefs of the Army. If he made any mistake in
this respect it was, it seems, only as regards the time
which the new Germany would require in order to rebuild its
military forces and once more become a formidable danger to
the whole of Europe.
Events, however, took a much more speedy course. Though
the Anschluss entailed great difficulties for the Reich
these did not divert Herr Hitler for a single day from his
extensive plans. The rate of progress of his undertakings
and his successes became more and more rapid. The collapse
of Czechoslovakia enabled the armies of the Reich to place
themselves at the foot of the Carpathians, along the Polish
frontier, and all that Poland was able to record as a
compensation for this formidable increase of strength of the
Reich was the annexation of the territory of Teschen. The
annexation of Memel accentuated the encirclement of Poland.
It was then that Herr Hitler thought that the time had come
to turn towards the latter, and no doubt he thought it
perfectly natural to instruct Herr von Ribbentrop to notify
M. Lipski on March 21 that the Reich intended to annex
Danzig and to obtain the right to build an extra-territorial
motor-road across the Corridor.
[138]
On that day all eyes in Warsaw were opened and the
divergence of interpretation which underlay the pact of 1934
became clear to all. So Germany had not changed! The Third
Reich was as hostile to Poland as the Germany of Bismarck
and the Hohenzollerns! The respite on which they had counted
in order to complete the organization of the country and
equip it had come to an end. They had to be ready to fight
perhaps the very next day, or to go under. For the Poles
would not allow themselves to be caught in the mesh of
conversations, they would not enter upon the path which
leads to vassalage! The Poles had very quickly regained
their presence of mind on the sudden appearance of danger.
If they had to fight with those who after all had never
ceased to be their hereditary enemies, they would fight, and
would win, just as at Grunwald in the past.
From that moment the pact of 1934 had lost all its
value. Though it remained intact legally, it no longer
corresponded to political realities.
Furthermore for Germany it was no longer justified and
could not survive some of the causes which had induced
Germany to accept it. Since the Chancellor had achieved his
first objects, had annexed Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and
Memel, it appeared to him quite natural to settle the
question of Danzig. He is known to be indignant with Poland
and Colonel Beck. He is no doubt sincere in his strange
psychology, and no doubt he fails to understand the
resistance and the obstinacy of these Poles, who do not
immediately recognize the goodwill which he has shown in not
claiming from them all the lands situated in the "Lebensraum
of the German people": the Corridor, Torun, Poznan, Upper
Silesia, Bohumin . . . and by contenting himself for the
moment with an extra-territorial motor-road.
LON N™EL.
No. 117
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, May
3, 1939.
AT the moment when, in consequence of the denunciation
by Germany of the pact of January 26, 1934, the Polish
Government is preparing to send a notification that it no
longer considers itself bound by the Polish-German
declaration on minorities of November 5, 1937, it is not
inappropriate to recall the history of the sixteen months of
existence of this declaration.
[139]
Directly after its publication, the Polish Government
Press claimed to view it as the most important fact which
had occurred in the relations of the two countries since
1934. Such comments were justified by the wish to show the
German Government the importance which Poland attached to
the declaration. The pact had indeed been intended to put an
end to an exchange of recriminations, sometimes very bitter,
which had been dragging on for nearly six months.
Furthermore, in the course of the negotiations, Germany had
constantly acted the part of the requesting party. It had
insistently pressed for the signature of a definite
convention and the institution of a mixed commission, before
which the complaints of the minorities could have been
brought. The Polish Government had only agreed to a simple
declaration, leaving each party alone responsible for the
fulfillment of its engagements "within the framework of its
sovereignty." Therefore it had no reason for appearing to
minimize the scope of the agreement towards the other party.
In spite of the Press comments, the political scope of
the declaration was not exaggerated in Warsaw. I have
already pointed this out, adding that neither the intricate
intermingling of the nationalities, nor the differences
between the political systems, could lead one to expect a
lasting peace in the frontier relations of the two
countries. I concluded, nevertheless, that no doubt a sort
of armistice would result, and that the local authorities
would for some time avoid giving ground for complaint to the
minorities.
This is how things actually happened. During the winter
of 1937-1938, calm appeared to prevail; no incidents were
reported. From the end of April the Embassy correspondence
has to recommence the record of reports of bad Polish-German
frontier relations. The German minority Press complains of
the "Polish chicanery." It deplores the discharge of
numerous German workmen in Upper Silesia (one thousand one
hundred in a few months) and their replacement by Poles. It
is irritated when it observes, as it believes, that the
application of the agrarian reform in the Western Provinces
is being systematically directed against the German
landowners. It is indignant at the closure of several
schools.
For their part, the Poles complain no less of the bad
treatment undergone by their compatriots in the Reich, as
well as of the activity of the German minority in Poland,
which, at the instigation of Berlin, endeavours to
amalgamate its forces. The Government Press main
[140]
tains a reserved attitude, but the independent Press, above
all the provincial newspapers, issues lavishly news and
articles concerning this subject. By the month of June, it
was realized here that the fiction created by the
declaration of November 5 had been dissipated.
At the moment when things began to be embittered, a
lull occurred, as had already happened several times in the
history of Polish-German relations. Obviously the two
Governments, considering that matters were beginning to go
too far, intervened to moderate the zeal of the local
authorities and that of the minorities themselves. All that
there is to record from July onwards is a question raised by
the Abb‚ Downar in the Diet on Nazi intrigues in Poland. The
German minority Press calmed down. Other events were going
to absorb public attention. The Czechoslovak crisis was
about to open.
During the whole time of the preparation and then the
carrying out of the dismembering of Czechoslovakia,
everything remained quiet. The German minority displayed the
most exemplary loyalty. One would have said that the
minority question no longer existed.
As soon as the Czechoslovak affair had been settled,
the difficulties reappeared. The Chief of the
"Jungdeutschepartei" claimed for the German minority in
Poland the benefit of the "Volksgruppenrecht."
On January 26 last, Herr von Ribbentrop came to Warsaw
to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the pact of 1934.
During his brief stay, he obtained from the Polish
Government the appointment of a mixed commission responsible
for ensuring the proper operation of the declaration of
November 5, 1937.
Meanwhile, the minority agitation took its course. The
Germans continued their campaign in favour of the
"Volksgruppenrecht," while Polish opinion became more and
more impatient at the growing boldness of the Germans. The
anti-German manifestations in Warsaw at the end of February
brought these feelings to the full light of day. When in the
middle of March the international crisis occurred which was
to relegate the minority question into the background, it
found in Poland an aggressive German minority and a Polish
opinion determined to defend the principle that the Poles
are masters in their own house.
From the foregoing, the conclusion emerges that
difficulties on matters affecting them as neighbours have
been more or less the rule in German-Polish relations. The
periods of calm form the exception. Furthermore it is to be
observed that this calm only occurs after periods
[141]
of tension, when the anxious Governments intervene in order
to restore peace.
LON N™EL.
No. 118
M. CORBIN, French Ambassador in London,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, May
3, 1939.
THE conversation of the British Ambassador with the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs has not, according to
what Sir Alexander Cadogan has told me, been satisfactory
from any point of view. Herr von Ribbentrop spoke in a
peevish tone when referring to England and expressed himself
violently in regard to Poland. In the view of the Foreign
Office he is one of the principal instigators of the policy
followed towards this country by Herr Hitler.
CORBIN.
No. 119
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, May
4, 1939.
THIS afternoon I saw my British colleague, who had been
received the day before yesterday by the Reich Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
Sir Nevile Henderson showed himself rather disappointed
by that conversation. Herr von Ribbentrop, who appeared to
be tired, addressed to him, as usual, a long paraphrase of
Herr Hitler's speech, and declared that Great Britain and
France were pursuing a policy of encirclement of Germany in
order to attack her one day, but that they should know that
they would break their teeth and that the Reich would hold
out for "six months and even for twenty years if necessary "
Sir Nevile corrected his assertions, but he felt that Herr
von Ribbentrop was not even listening to him.
Nevertheless he gathered from this conversation the
impression that a rather far-reaching change had taken place
in the mind of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. "A year
ago," he said to me, "von Ribbentrop was convinced that
neither England nor France would come to the help of Central
or Eastern Europe. He admits the contrary today.
Nevertheless, he does not believe it as regards Danzig."
On the latter point this impression is corroborated by
the con-
[142]
fidential information recently given by Herr Dietrich,
Minister for the Press, to another of my colleagues,
according to which, in the course of a Council held by the
Fhrer following his speech of April 28, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, supported by Herr Himmler, declared his
conviction that neither Great Britain nor France would stir
for Danzig.
It results, however, from information obtained by Sir
Nevile Henderson, and confirmed to me from other quarters
that Herr Hitler has decided to proceed slowly in the Polish
affair. He is said to think that time would work for him,
that Danzig was a good subject for discussion, on which he
would succeed in dividing opinion in France and in England,
and that Poland would herself one day come and ask for
mercy.
COULONDRE.
No. 120
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, May
5, 1939.
THE declaration of M. Beck, which I have just heard,
was made in a firm tone. The Minister recounted in moderate
terms the manner in which Herr Hitler had made the entente
between Great Britain and Poland a pretext for denouncing
unilaterally the agreement which he had himself concluded
with Poland in 1934. The Diet greeted the Minister very
warmly, and the end of his statement he was cheered for a
long time by all the deputies, standing.
The passage concerning the Anglo-Polish agreement and
also that dealing with the Franco-Polish agreement, were
warmly applauded, but the Diet above all emphasized, by
acclamation, the more categorical and the more ironical
passages concerning the attitude of Germany, as well as
those which announced the firmness of Polish policy.
The Assembly particularly appreciated those
declarations which stressed the point that Poland had no
reason to lament the disappearance of the pact of 1934; that
the German Government appeared to interpret this fact as
intended to hinder the collaboration of Poland with the
Western Powers and so isolate it from them, that Poland
would not allow itself to be thrust back from the Baltic;
that it was not Poland's habit (apropos of Slovakia) to make
the interests of others a subject of bargaining; that the
Reich represents the proposal
[143]
to recognise the Polish frontier as final as a concession on
its part; finally that the Polish Government is always
prepared to discuss with Germany, provided that the Reich
gives evidence of peaceful intentions.
The last words of the statement, dismissing the idea of
peace at any price, and exalting the idea of honour, brought
forth the utmost enthusiasm.
LON N™EL.
No. 121
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, May
6, 1939.
THE Polish memorandum, drawn up in firm, but courteous
and conciliatory terms, emphasizes the fact that Poland,
despite the denunciation by Germany of the pact of 1934,
remains ready to negotiate in order to arrive at a fresh
settlement of Polish-German relations "on the basis of good
neighbourliness"; and is thus at the same time ready to
settle the question of transit through the Corridor and the
problem of Danzig. The Polish Government recalls the fact
that the Reich has not replied to the Polish
counterproposals of March 26. It seems thus to let it be
understood that it is waiting for the German Government to
take the initiative in resuming the pourparlers.
Herr von Moltke has just returned to Warsaw, and this
evening there was speculation at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs whether he would endeavour to resume contact with M.
Beck or not.
LON N™EL.
No. 122
M. LON N™EL, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Warsaw, May
6, 1939.
THE following passages from the Polish memorandum
should be particularly noted.
"The Polish Government had foreseen for several years,
that the difficulties encountered by the League of Nations
in carrying out its functions at Danzig would create a
confused situation which it was in Poland's and Germany's
interest to clear up. For several years the Polish
Government had given the German Government to understand
that frank conversations should be held on this subject. The
German
[144]
Government, however, avoided these, and confined themselves
to sating that German-Polish relations should not be exposed
to difficulties by questions relating to Danzig. Moreover,
the German Government more than once gave assurances to the
Polish Government regarding the Free City of Danzig. It is
sufficient here to quote the declaration made by the
Chancellor of the Reich on February 20, 1938:
"'The Polish State respects the national conditions in
this State of the Free City, and Germany respects Polish
rights. It has thus been possible to clear the way for an
understanding which, while arising the efforts of out of the
question of Danzig, has today in spite of certain disturbers
of the peace succeeded in effectively purifying relations
between Germany and Poland and has transformed them into
sincere and friendly collaboration.'"
The denunciation of the agreement of 1934 was made
after Germany had refused to accept the explanations of
Poland concerning the divergence between the Polish-British
guarantee and the agreement of 1934.
LON N™EL.
No. 123
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, May
7, 1939.
I TAKE the liberty of drawing the especial attention of
Your Excellency to the information contained in the enclosed
report, our informant being in a particularly good position
to know the intentions of the Fhrer and of his principal
lieutenants.
His new declarations may be summed up as follows:
(1) M. Beck's speech will in no way alter the
situation. The Fhrer is determined to secure the return of
Danzig to Germany, as well as the reunion of East Prussia to
the Reich.
(2) The Fhrer is patient and cautious, and will not
tackle the question in a direct way, for he knows that in
future France and Britain would not give way, and that the
coalition which he would have to confront would be too
strong. He will go on manoeuvring until his time comes.
(3) The Fhrer will come to an understanding to this
effect with Russia. The day will come when he attains his
aims by these means, without the Allies "having any reason,
or even any intention, to
[145]
intervene." It may be that we shall witness a fourth
partition of Poland. In any case, "we shall soon see that
something is brewing in the East."
(4) The equivocal attitude of Japan has contributed to
Herr Hitler's orientation towards the U.S.S.R.
(5) When the Polish question has once been settled, and
Germany's military supremacy definitely assured, Germany
will be in a position to come to a conference.
For the above reasons I believe that, taken as a whole,
and under the reservations made at the conclusion of this
letter, the enclosed indications may be considered to
reflect fairly exactly Herr Hitler's designs and to reveal
the maneuvers which we must be prepared to counter. As is
his habit, my informant became very animated in the course
of the conversation, and it is very likely that he finally
said much more than he was authorized to tell us. Especially
as regards Russia, one cannot help being struck by the
coincidence between the intentions attributed to the Fhrer
and the resignation of M. Litvinov.
In my opinion, two facts of primary importance can be
inferred from this conversation.
The first is that Herr Hitler does not want to go to
war with Poland under the prevailing conditions: this
confirms the information which I have already sent to Your
Excellency; it stresses the full significance of the
recovery effected in Europe by France and Great Britain.
The second is an entirely new one: the new orientation
of Germany towards Russia.
If the intention of the Fhrer really is to attempt a
rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., it remains to be seen how
he intends to exploit this new policy. In my opinion, he may
hope to draw advantage from it in three different ways:
(1) By arriving at a more or less tacit agreement with
the U.S.S.R. which would assure him of the benevolent
neutrality of that country in the event of a conflict,
perhaps even of her complicity in a partition of Poland.
(2) By bringing, through the mere threat of a better
understanding with the U.S.S.R., pressure simultaneously to
bear on Japan and on Poland, in order to induce the former
to sign a military alliance, and the latter to agree to the
concessions he is asking for.
(3) By bringing the Western Powers, under the threat of
collusion between Germany and Russia, to accept certain
Soviet demands to
[1461
which Poland and Rumania would be opposed, and thus to sow
discord among the Allies.
On the other hand, it is not yet certain that Herr
Hitler has already decided upon his line of conduct, and
already made his choice between a real understanding with
the U.S.S.R., or a simple diplomatic maneuver intended to
reverse the situation in his favour. One would be rather
inclined to adopt the latter conjecture. For Herr Hitler
finds it difficult to reconcile his own views and those of
his Party, and actual collusion with the Soviets, and to
ignore completely the fact that not only the home but even
the foreign policy of National-Socialism has been founded on
an anti-Bolshevist ideology.
I need not stress the fact that the person concerned,
who is in no respect an informer, intends, in his relations
with us, to serve the cause of Germany. There is every
reason to believe that apart from genuine indications, given
deliberately or in the heat of the discussion, certain
developments were deliberately designed to exercise pressure
upon or to impress us. I should be inclined to place in this
category the part of the conversation when he insisted on
the state of exhaustion to which a prolonged semi-
mobilization would reduce both ourselves and Poland. This
may be the expression of a desire to see our military
measures relaxed and to create a propitious moment for a new
coup. The opinion held by the person concerned on the forces
which from now onwards oppose the Reich and make the game a
much too dangerous one for it, cannot fail to stimulate us
to persevere in our military and diplomatic efforts and to
remain permanently on the alert.
COULONDRE.
Resume of a conversation that took place on May 6
between a member of the Embassy (C) and one of the Fhrer's
associates (X)
THE POLISH QUESTION: THE RUSSIAN FACTOR
"M. Beck's speech," X declared, "may appear very
ingenious and well-founded, from the legal point of view.
"As to ourselves, we cannot, nevertheless, admit his
contentions. In 1934, Poland signed a treaty of non-
aggression with us. Now the reciprocal guarantee that Poland
has just concluded with Great Britain places the former
under the obligation of attacking us in the event of the
latter being in conflict with us. Does that not already
contain a flagrant contradiction?
[147]
"Moreover, M. Beck in his speech has shown his bad
faith. He was perfectly aware of Germany's attitude, which
was dearly set forth to him by the Fhrer himself. What is
more, M. Beck had declared that the requests of the German
Government did not appear to him likely to raise any
difficulties, and that he had undertaken to secure their
acceptance by the Polish Government.
"Furthermore," continued X, "the Fhrer, as a man of
action, scorns legal discussions; he remains on the plane of
realities and necessities. He is firmly resolved, at all
events, to settle the question of Danzig and of the reunion
of East Prussia to the Reich, the solutions foreshadowed in
the suggestions made by us at the beginning of the year
representing a minimum."
"But then," C objected, "judging by the tone of your
Press, this means war within a short time?"
"Not at all," replied X. "In this contest, as arranged
by Great Britain, we are not the strongest. We realise
perfectly that at present Great Britain and France are
determined not to give way, especially France, for we are
aware of M. Daladier's energy.
"Do you think that Hitler would be prepared to fight
without holding all the trump cards? That would be contrary
to his habit, which has brought him all his former successes
without striking a single blow.
"Were you not struck, in his last speech, by the fact
that he made no reference whatever to Russia? Have you not
noticed the understanding manner in which this morning's
newspapers-which, incidentally, had received precise
instructions on the subject-speak of M. Molotov and of
Russia? You must certainly have heard of certain
negotiations that are going on, and of the journey of the
Ambassador and the Military Attach‚ of the U.S.S.R. to
Moscow; they had been received on the eve of their
departure, the former by Herr von Ribbentrop, the latter by
the Oberkommando of the Wehrmacht, and had been fully
informed of the point of view of the Government of the
Reich. I can really tell you no more, but you will learn
some day that something is being prepared in the East. (Dass
etwas im Osten im Gange ist.)"
"How can you reconcile this new policy with the
declaration made by the Fhrer in one of his speeches that
there is only one country with which he could never reach an
agreement-Soviet Russia?"
X, stressing his answer with an evasive gesture,
replied that it was not a question of haggling over words.
[148]
"When it is a case of carrying out a plan, there are no
legal or ideological considerations that hold good. You are
in a good position to know that a most Catholic King did not
hesitate, in times gone by, to enter into an alliance with
the Turks. Besides, are the two regimes actually different?
Are they not very nearly identical in the realm of
economics, although we, on our side, have in a certain
measure maintained private enterprise? Briefly," concluded
X, "the situation may be summed up as follows: the Poles
fancy that they can be insolent to us, as they feel strong
in the support of France and Britain, and believe that they
can count upon the material assistance of Russia. They are
mistaken in their calculations: just as Hitler did not
consider himself in a position to settle the question of
Austria and of Czechoslovakia without Italy's consent, he
now would not dream of settling the German-Polish difference
without Russia."
Then X, who was getting more and more excited,
declared: "There have already been three partitions of
Poland; well, believe me, you will witness a fourth!
"In any case, we will arrange this matter in such a way
that you will have neither reason nor even intention (weder
Grund noch sogar Absicht) to intervene. It will not be in a
month, nor even in two months' time. Time is needed for
adequate preparation. Hitler is not, as some of your
journalists maintain, the man to take a sudden decision when
he has a fit of temper.
"In home affairs, he knew how to wait until 1933 for
the favourable opportunity to seize power. In foreign
policy, all his successes are the result of careful
reflection, of combinations studied down to their smallest
details, and of the exploitation of all the mistakes and
weaknesses of his opponents. In the matter of Poland, he
will know how to bide his time.
"I may add finally that, however unpopular a war on
account of the question might have been, a war against
Poland would find favour with the masses, by reason of the
inherent hatred of the German, and of the Prussian in
particular, for the Pole."
According to X, Hitler is very dissatisfied with the
attitude recently adopted by Japan, whose aims he cannot
clearly discern. The uncertainty of her policy has
indisposed Hitler towards her and has partly accounted for
his resolutions concerning the U.S.S.R.
[149]
FRANCE
X insisted on the definite and final (endgltig)
renunciation of the Fhrer's claims on Alsace-Lorraine, and
on the fact that no difference of opinion separates the
Reich from France. He is surprised at all the military
preparations that have recently been made in France, and
especially at the reinforcement of the Maginot Line, about
which, said he, the German Secret Service is fully informed.
"If this were not the case, I beg you to believe that
Admiral Canaris and his staff might as well pack their bags
(sonst k”nnte der Admiral Canaris mit seinem ganzen Laden
aufpacken). All these measures are the result of an active
war-psychosis which is fraying the people's nerves: they
cannot fail in the long run to exhaust France, without any
benefit to her. The semi-mobilization of France, as well as
that of Poland, have not been, on our side, countered by any
similar measure."
POTENTIAL MILITARY STRENGTH OF GERMANY
"All Germany's military efforts," continued X "are
exclusively directed towards an industrial mobilization and
an intensification of armaments. The Fhrer has even
declared that he would not hesitate to order the cessation
of the great public works in course of completion (Berlin,
Nuremberg ...) in order to devote the country's entire
manpower and all its materials to national defence.
"Nevertheless, in the Fhrer's intentions," said X in
conclusion, "once the Polish matter has been settled, the
calling of a general conference will be a possibility. To
that conference Germany would come backed by the full weight
of all her military strength."
No. 124
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, May
7, 1939.
THE German-Polish conflict appears to have come to a
standstill for the moment.
On May 5, Colonel Beck replied in the Diet to the
speech that Herr Hitler had made before the Reichstag on
April 28. On the same day, the Polish Charg‚ d'Affaires in
Berlin handed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs his
Government's memorandum in reply to the German memorandum.
Each of the conflicting parties maintains its attitude. The
National-Socialist leaders announce through their Press that
[150]
they expect a gesture from Warsaw. [1] On their side, the
Poles put forward the history of the German-Polish
negotiations and the unilateral repudiation by the Reich of
the treaty of 1934 in order to maintain, and rightly so,
that it is not for them to take the first step, or to take
the initiative in proposing that conversations should take
place. In placing the text of the Polish memorandum in Baron
von Weizs„cker's hands, Prince Lubomirski did not attempt to
bring about a renewed exchange of views. The interview, so
he told me, lasted only as long as was necessary for the
actual handing over of the document.
It should be noted, on the other hand, that since
Saturday afternoon, that is to say, since May 6, the German
Press has restrained its tone towards Poland. The newspapers
are noticeably more moderate in their attacks against M.
Beck and his Government. This lull coincides with the
Italian-German conversations in Milan. Is this mere chance?
Or might it be, as it is rumored in Berlin, that Italy only
signed the military alliance with the Reich on condition
that the latter would, for the present, not undertake
anything against Poland?
Anyhow, the articles about Poland, which in the German
newspapers tend to take the same place as articles about
Czechoslovakia last summer, have not been multiplied by new
incidents. Obviously, formal instructions towards moderation
have been given on both sides. As to Poland, Prince
Lubomirski has assured me that nothing has been neglected in
order to allay the excitement of the people there. As a
proof of this, he instanced the fact that his Government,
while it was lodging a protest in Berlin through diplomatic
channels, had not wished to give any publicity to the
numerous violations of the frontier committed by German
planes: according to what he told me, in the last fortnight
64 German machines were reported to have flown over Polish
territory in an illegal manner. The Germans, on the other
hand, during the last three months had only been able to
make nine similar charges against Polish aviation.
I did not fail to remind the Polish Charg‚ d'Affaires
of the importance attached in Paris and London to the fact
that Warsaw should maintain this attitude of wise moderation
and should avoid furnishing the slightest excuse for the
anti-Polish campaign to Dr. Goebbels.
On military questions, as I have mentioned elsewhere, I
have
[1] See B”rsenzeitang, May 6: "M. Beck mentioned, at the end
of his
speech, the possibility of fresh negotiations. He cannot
expect us,
after all that has happened, to go to him. If fresh
negotiations should
really take place, Germany expects Poland to make a gesture
which is in
conformity with the Fhrer's straightforward
attitude."
[151]
received no information of special interest. True, movements
of troops are being observed in different parts of German
territory, but nowhere have there been any disquieting
concentrations in the vicinity of the Polish frontier.
It appears, then, that this must be taken as a short
lull, the duration of which, admittedly, remains uncertain.
Convinced as it is today of the determination of Poland and
of her Western allies to offer armed resistance to any new
attack on the part of Germany, the Reich appears to abandon
for a time purely strategical considerations and to take up
anew the diplomatic game. One may assume that the exact
study of the moral and material forces confronting one
another counted for something in this prudent decision.
As to the diplomatic contest which is now being
initiated, the conditions are comparatively easy for
Germany. Her purpose is to subdue Polish resistance, either
by direct or indirect pressure, and thus to destroy beyond
repair the bulwark which the Western Powers are endeavouring
to erect in the East against National-Socialist expansion.
The first stage, that of direct pressure, ended in a
reverse. Shall we now witness the development of the second
stage, that of intimidation by indirect means? In order to
reply to that question, it is not unprofitable to call to
mind briefly the history of the German proposals to Poland.
In his speech of April 28, Herr Hitler summed up as
follows the essential points of those proposals:
(1) Danzig returns as a Free State into the framework
of the German Reich.
(2) Germany receives a road through the Corridor and a
railway line at her disposal possessing the same extra-
territorial status as the Corridor itself has for Poland.
In return, Germany is prepared:
(1) To recognize all Polish economic rights in Danzig.
(2) To ensure for Poland a free harbour in Danzig of
any size desired with completely free access to the sea.
(3) To accept at the same time the present boundaries
between Germany and Poland and to regard them as final.
(4) To conclude a twenty-five-year non-aggression
treaty with Poland.
(5) To guarantee the independence of the Slovak State
by Germany, Poland and Hungary jointly-which means in
practice the renunciation of any unilateral German hegemony
in this territory.
[152]
According to Herr Hitler, the Polish Government
declined this offer and declared itself merely disposed:
(1) To negotiate concerning the question of a
substitute for the High Commissioner of the League of
Nations.
(2) To consider facilities for the transit traffic
through the Corridor.
Now M. Beck, before the Polish Diet on May 5, gave the
correct version:
(1) On the first and second points, i.e., the question
of the future of Danzig and communications across Polish
Pomerania, he said it was still a matter of unilateral
concessions which the Government of the Reich appear to be
demanding from Poland.
The proof of this, according to him, was that the
Polish counterproposals of March 26, aiming at a "joint
guarantee of the existence and the rights of the Free City,"
remained unanswered, and that the Government of Warsaw had
learnt only through the speech of April 28 that these
counter-proposals had been taken as a refusal in Berlin.
(2) As regards the triple condominium in Slovakia, the
Minister stated that he had heard this proposal for the
first time in the Chancellor's speech of April 28. In
certain previous conversations allusions were merely made to
the effect that in the event of a general agreement the
question of Slovakia could be discussed.
According to M. Beck, the Polish Government did not
attempt to pursue such conversations any further.
(3) Similarly, the proposal for a prolongation of the
pact of non-aggression for twenty-five years was also not
advanced in any concrete form in any of the recent
conversations. Here also unofficial hints were made,
emanating, it is true, from prominent representatives of the
Reich Government.
Through the pen of an officially inspired editor, Dr.
Kriegk, in the Nachtausgabe (May 6), political circles in
Berlin have in their turn refuted M. Beck's assertions. The
German version gives the following account:
(1) M. Beck had an opportunity in October 1938, and in
January and March 1939, to learn all the details of the
German proposals, either through his personal interviews
with Chancellor Hitler and with Herr von Ribbentrop, or
through the conversations of his Ambassador in Berlin with
leading members of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(2) Concerning especially the conclusion of a pact of
non-aggression for twenty-five years, the Fhrer had
expressly spoken of it to M. Beck
[153]
in the course of their interview at the Obersalzberg on
January 5, 1939
(3) As to the Polish counter-proposals of March 26, it
had been definitely indicated to the Polish Ambassador, when
he presented them in Berlin, that the German Government saw
them in the light of a refusal of the German proposals.
Either M. Lipski did not inform his chief, or the latter is
not speaking the truth.
Yet in this controversy, keenly contested as it is,
there is one point which on the German side was modestly
left in the dark. It is the one to which the Polish Foreign
Minister referred when he specified that, in the German-
Polish conversations, the representatives of the Reich
Government had also given "other hints extending much
further than the subject under discussion," and that their
Government reserved the right to return to this matter if
necessary.
Germany's silence is understandable, if it is realized
that this is actually where the crux of the whole problem
lies.
I have gathered, from a very reliable source,
information which allows me to assert that, by way of
compensation and in order to draw Poland into their game,
the National-Socialist leaders have hinted in their
conversations with the Poles at the possibility of sharing
in a partition of the Russian Ukraine.
In the same connection the Polish Military Attach‚,
when he received one of my collaborators yesterday, gave
some significant indications on the great plans which even
recently the leaders of the Third Reich had been hammering
out, and in the realization of which they had hoped, until
March 26, to enlist Polish complicity.
It is said that when Chancellor Hitler received M. Beck
in Berchtesgaden, he had spread out before him a map of
Europe corrected in his own hand. On this map Danzig and the
Corridor were again attached to the Reich; as to Poland, she
was to annex Lithuania and receive the port of Memel. (The
interview of Berchtesgaden took place on January 5.) M. Beck
is reported to have been astounded at this sight.
When restored to its proper place in Adolf Hitler's
general plans, the problem of Danzig thus represents merely
a detail, but a detail which today assumes the importance of
a strategical point. It is actually on this point that
German policy has been testing, and will continue to test,
the resistance of its adversaries. With good reason, the
question of Danzig has been compared to the question of the
Sudetenland. Doubtless, a certain degree of compromise is
possible between Germany and Poland on the subject of the
Free City, but the fact remains that if Danzig should one
day become a German base, Poland will as
[154]
surely be under the sway of the Reich as Czechoslovakia has
been since the occupation of the Sudetenland.
One must never lose sight of the fact that the true aim
of German ambitions is, and remains, the colonization of the
centre and of the East of Europe; in a word, the domination
of the Continent. If Poland had accepted Hitler's proposals
she would have really placed herself in the position of a
vassal of the Reich, she would have given her allegiance to
the policy of the Axis, whose vanguard she would have been
in aggression against Russia.
I believe that I can say, without fear of error, that
what interested Herr Hitler above all in the offers he made
to Poland was less the return of Danzig than the point which
he never mentioned, viz., the alliance against Moscow and
the bonds of complicity and absolute dependence which it
entailed for Warsaw in respect of Berlin. The great merit of
the Polish Government is to have realized that, through this
insidious policy, the very independence of its country has
been at stake from the very beginning.
Now that the method of direct pressure has failed, will
the National-Socialist leaders have recourse to indirect
pressure? After attempting to play Poland against Russia,
will they reverse their method in order to try to intimidate
the Poles and play Moscow against Warsaw? Certain
declarations, and the interpretation given by political
circles in Berlin to the fact that M. Litvinov has fallen
into disfavor might lead to this conclusion. But it is
possible that they may be taking their wishes for facts in
the matter.
We must not fail to "see the wood for the trees." The
question is not whether we should fight, or not, for the
sake of Danzig. It is up to Poland, when the time comes, to
decide this question. The only concern of France and Great
Britain is to be determined to prevent another coup by
Hitler, and to check Nazi expansion while there is still
time.
COULONDRE.
No. 125
M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, May
9, 1939.
A FEW days after M. Beck's speech, the atmosphere
prevailing in the capital of the Reich is on the whole
calmer. The general impression is that a comparative lull
will continue in Europe, during which the
[155]
struggle of the Axis Powers against the policy of restraint
adopted by London and Paris will continue in the realm of
propaganda and diplomacy.
In this struggle, the events of the last days
constitute some new episodes.
1. The speech delivered at the Sejm on May 5 by M.
Beck, and the Polish memorandum presented on the 6th to the
Government in Berlin, have not noticeably altered the
tension of German-Polish relations, such as it has existed
since March 26, the day on which Warsaw rejected the German
demands and presented counter-proposals. Replying to the
speech of the Fhrer, April 28, the declarations of M. Beck
have however made public the disagreement between Berlin and
Warsaw and have transferred the German-Polish dispute from
the decent obscurity of the chancelleries to the forum of
international politics.
M. Beck's expose has been interpreted here as
representing a further rejection of the Fhrer's offers. It
is very firm in substance, but moderate in manner; it
offered no real opening for violent controversy. Actually,
the German comments betrayed some embarrassment. After
absorbing 7 million Czechs, the Reich is in a rather
difficult position to appeal to the principle of
nationalities. As to the doctrine of Lebensraum, in this
particular case this could obviously only be applied in
favour of Poland.
Consequently, the German reaction has been expressed in
the shape of personal grievances against M. Beck, whilst
certain of the arguments invoked have very significantly
revealed the real objects pursued by the policy of the Reich
in presenting at Warsaw proposals of a "generosity
unparalleled in history."
Fundamentally, what Poland is being reproached with is
for preferring the guarantee and friendship of Great Britain
to the place she was being offered in the German-Italian
camp.
If she had accepted the German proposals, Poland,
weakened politically and in the military sphere, moreover
reduced to a tributary State of the Reich economically,
would have been definitely riveted to the Axis. The
establishment in the East of a rampart against the German
drive would have become impossible.
As far as the actual substance of the dispute is
concerned, the two parties remain in their respective
positions. Each maintains that it is up to the other to make
a gesture. Actually, on the German side, they anticipate
that Poland will soon grow tired of her "heroic" attitude,
will exhaust herself financially and morally, and that she
will be given
[156]
to understand from London and Paris that nobody is anxious
to fight for the sake of Danzig. "Danzig is not worth a
European war"-this seems to be the catch phrase of German
propaganda. Here great hopes are based on this phrase and on
the echo which it might awaken abroad. That is the reason
why it is maintained that there will be no war on account of
Danzig, though it is at the same time claimed that the
question will have to be settled sooner or later, in a
manner in conformity with the wishes of the Reich.
In the meantime, the German Press continues its
campaign against Poland, without, however, forsaking a
certain restraint, as though its leaders were anxious to
prevent the atmosphere from getting overheated too quickly.
Clearly, in Berlin, they are anxious not to be obliged to
act before the propitious moment has arrived.
2. The slow and uneven course of the Anglo-Russian
negotiations continues to maintain, in official circles in
Berlin, certain hopes that had been encouraged by the sudden
resignation of M. Litvinov (May 4)
It appears that, for some time past, Berlin believed in
a possible change in Soviet policy. Very rapidly, however,
the Press at least has returned to a more cautious attitude.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that, amongst the
National-Socialist leaders, "determined to break through the
encirclement at any price," M. Litvinov's retirement has
awakened in certain minds the idea of an intrigue designed
to upset the negotiations which are already most difficult
between Moscow and the Western Powers and to wreck them in
one way or another. Did this idea grow and take definite
shape before M. Litvinov's retirement, or was it inspired by
this event? This is difficult to ascertain.
In any case, for the last twenty-four hours, the rumour
has spread through the whole of Berlin that Germany has made
or is going to make proposals concerning a partition of
Poland.
This rumour is so persistent that the Soviet Charg‚
d'Affaires himself was much struck by it, and when I met him
this evening, asked me in an excited manner: "Have you
learnt that the Soviet Government has decided to change its
policy?" As I remarked that it was rather for me to put the
question to him, he stated that he had received no
indication whatever from Moscow which would justify him in
thinking that the rumours circulated were founded on any
facts. He added that in the last conversation which his
Ambassador had had with
[157]
Herr von Weizs„cker on April 17, they had dealt with no
political questions.
This evening, moreover, the German Press is showing a
certain agitation because of the resumption of the Anglo-
Russian negotiations. It appears to be somewhat perturbed by
the news according to which M. Potemkin, on his return from
Bucharest, was to stop in Warsaw in order to pay a visit to
M. Beck. As though to reassure itself, it declares that the
Soviets are not inclined to serve as England's henchmen in
Eastern Europe.
This attitude stresses the primary importance which is
attached in the leading circles of the Reich to the final
attitude which will be adopted by the Soviets towards the
British proposals, and on which will depend, to a great
extent, according to their views, the strength and the
efficiency of the anti-aggression front set up in the East.
COULONDRE.
[158]
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