Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-19/tgmwc-19-appendix.03 Last-Modified: 2000/10/23 101. Speer's conference minutes of Central Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning labour supply (R-124, USA 179, p. 32, Part 2, pp. 303, 300, 312). 102. Memorandum of 15th November, 1941, from Canaris to Keitel concerning an OKW Order regulating the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war (EC-338, USSR 356, Part 7, p. 11). 103. Part 9, p. 166. 104. Examples of violations of International Law and proposed counter propaganda, issued by OKW, 1st October, 1938 (RF-7, F-382, Part 4, p. 387). 105. OKW circular entitled Direction of War as Problem of Organization, 19th April, 1938 (L-211, GB 161, Part 4, p. 110). 106. Part 9, p. 53. 107. Report by Raeder to Hitler, 15th October, 1939 (C-157; GB 224, Part 4, p. 273). 108. Extract from Befehlshaber der U-boote; Secret Standing Order No. 154, signed by Donitz.(D-642, GB 196, Part 4, p. 238). Operation Order "Atlantic" No. 56 for U-boats in Atlantic, 7th October, 1943 (D-663, GB 200, Part 4, p. 240). 109. Part 9, p. 198. 110. Part 9, pp. 81 et seq. 111. Part 9, pp. 185 et seq. 112. Extracts from testimony of Goering: "It was understood by all of us that as soon as we had once come into power we must keep that power under all circumstances ... we did not want to leave this any longer to chance, elections and parliamentary majorities ... " (Part 9, p. 72). "The State Parliaments ... I considered entirely superfluous ... I saw no reason why so many different authorities should exist which, with their unnecessary frictions and discussions, merely hindered constructive work ... A further point in the consolidation of power was to eliminate to a certain extent the Reichstag as a parliament ... In some cases we suggested to the former parties they dissolve themselves, because they no longer had any purpose, and those which would not dissolve themselves were dissolved by us" (Part 9, p. 74). " ... For the further consolidation of power, those laws were created which ... did away with the so-called freedoms .. ." (Part 9, p. 74). See also Part 9, pp. 185 et seq. Frick accurately predicted the Nazi method of dealing with political opponents when he declared to an opposing member of the Reichstag in 1932: "Do not worry, when we are in power, we shall put all of you guys into concentration camps" (Affidavit of Gebhart H. Seger, L-83, USA 234). 113. Part 9, p. 196. 114. Part 9, p. 188. 115. Part 9, p. 88. 116. Stenographic report of the meeting on the Jewish Question under the Chairmanship of Field-Marshal Goering, 12th November, 1938 (1816-PS, USA 261, Part 2, p. 382). 117. Memorandum 19th November, 1938 concerning meeting of Reich Defence Council (EC-405, USA 781, Part 9, p. 241). For similar reasons Goring preferred the destruction of Jews rather than of their property (1816-PS). 118. Vide Dr. Siemers on prosecution's conception of conspiracy, 17th July, 1946, Part 19. 119. Other factors were not overlooked. One of the reasons for von Neurath's selection as Foreign Minister at the beginning of the Nazi regime was his excellent connections abroad (Part 9, p. 171). 120. Hitler's speech to Commanders-in-Chief, 22nd August, 1939 (1014-PS, USA 30, Part 1, pp. 173-174). [Page 480] 121. Affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks 20th November, 1943 (2751-PS, USA 482, Part 3, p 191). Likewise Jodl noted in his diary a few weeks before the planned invasion of Norway that the Fuehrer was still looking for an excuse for the operation (1809-PS, GB 88, Part 4, p. 113). 122. Case Green with wider implications, report of Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe General Staff, 25th August, 1938 (376-PS, SA 84, Part 2, p. 112). 123. Minutes of conference, 23rd May, 1939. "Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims (L-79, USA 27, Part 1, pp. 166, 186; Part 2, p. 107). 124. Goering had accepted responsibility for the Nuremberg Laws, which he signed (Part 9, p. 90), for the Austrian Anschluss (Part 9, P: 104), and for the use of prisoners of war in armament industries (Part 9, p. 272). Von Schirach had admitted responsibility for the training of the Hitler Youth: "It is my guilt that I educated the youth of a Germany for a man who murdered millions. That I believed in this man is my own, my own personal guilt. I was responsible for the youth of the country, I was placed in authority over the young people, and the guilt is mine alone" (Part 14, Pp. 369-370). Frank has admitted, "I am possessed by a deep sense of guilt" (Part 12, p. 105). 125. Goering blamed persecution of the Churches on Himmler and Bormann (Part 9, p. 86). Schirach blamed extermination of the Jews on Hitler and Himmler: "The murder was ordered by Adolf Hitler ... he and Himmler jointly committed that crime which, for all time, will be a stain on the pages of our history. It is a crime which fills every German with shame "(Part 14, p. 369). 126. Final argument of Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Goering. Afternoon session, 4th July, 1946, Part 18; pp. 104 et seq. 127. "The Nazi Plan," excerpt of script of a motion picture composed of captured German film (3054-PS, USA 167, Part 2, pp. 286-287). 128. Goering testified: "No, I did not want a war... " (Part 9, p. 207). Ribbentrop testified: "We both - the Fuehrer and then myself at his order - so I believe I am the chief witness - always tried to solve these problems through diplomatic and peaceful channels "(Part 10, p. 206). 129. Goering testified: "to get rid of Versailles, the State had to be strong, for a weak State never makes itself heard; that we knew from experience " (Part 9, p. 199). 130.Goering has testified that he urged the Fuehrer, in spite of the menace threatening from Russia, to rather let this menace continue to exist and, if it was at all possible, to try to direct the interests of Russia against England (Part 9, p. 136). 131. Part 9, p. 185. 132. Part 9, pp. 106, 178. 133. Part 9, P. 157. 134. Other defendants admitted that the wars were aggressive. Schacht testified: " Q. Well we found something we agree on, Doctor. You knew of the invasion of Poland? A. Yes. Q. You regarded it as an unqualified act of aggression on Hitler's part? A. Absolutely. Q. And of Holland? A. Absolutely. Q. And of Denmark? A. Absolutely. Q. And of Norway? A. Absolutely. Q. And of Yugoslavia? A. Absolutely. Q. And of Russia? A. Absolutely, sir; and you have left out Norway and Belgium" (Part 13, pp. 61-62). 135. Goering testified: "I urged him not to start a war against Russia at that moment or an even short time thereafter" (Part 9, p. 135). Keitel testified that he wrote a memorandum to Hitler opposing the attack on Russia. He said: "But I did in that memorandum most certainly refer to the fact that the Non-aggression Pact existed" (Part 11, p. 13). 136. Morning session, 4th July, 1946, Part 18, p. 86. 137. OWK Directive for Unified Preparation for War, 1937- 1938, with covering letter from von Blomberg, 24th June, 1937 (C-175, USA 69, Part 1, p. 244). Yet it was in this period that Goering was trying out the strength of his Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War (Part 9, p. 93). Goering has admitted the non-defensive nature of the Luftwaffe (Part 9, p. 43). 138. Final argument of Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Goering, to the effect that a conspiracy with a dictator at its head is a contradiction in itself. A dictator does not enter into a conspiracy with his followers he does not make any agreement with them, he dictates (Part 18, afternoon session of 4th July, 1946, p. 111). 139. Part 17, P. 77. 140. Part 17, p. 91. 141. Part 9, P. 174. 142. Extracts from Organization Book of the NSDAP, 1943 edition (1893-PS, USA 323, Part 3, p. 15). 143. Criminal Code, 1871, Sec. 128 (never repealed). [Page 481] 144. Goering testified that Schacht was a very strong personality, and whilst not wanting to over-emphasize my importance and disregarding whether we were friends or not on the basis of the two positions, were bound to get into each other's way, and cane or the other had to give in (Part 9, pp. 204-205). 145. "Q. Mr. Dahlerus will you tell me whether I understood your last answer to Dr. Stahmer correctly? Did you say that 'I then realized that it was on the 26th of September, that his, Goering's aim, had been to split Poland and Great Britain and to occupy Poland with the consent of Great Britain'? Is that right? A. Yes, it is correct, but I should like to say it was the German Government, including Goering" (Part 9, p. 222). The Fuehrer informed Goering some time before the attack on Poland was launched that the task was to "eliminate British intervention" (TC-90, GB 64). 146. Hitler's speech to the Commanders-in-Chief, 22nd August, 1939 (1014-PS, USA 30, Part 1, p. 173). 147. Frank Diary. 1st January, 1944, to 28th February, 1944. Entries of 14th January, 15th January, 8th February, 1944 (2233-PS, USA 295, Part 2, p. 417). 148. Note, 11th April, 1943, and report of speech of Koch in Kiev on 5th March, 1943, concerning treatment of civilian population in Ukraine (1130-PS, USA 169, Part 2, p. 290). 149. Frank testified: "Q. Did you ever participate in the annihilation of Jews? A. I say yes, and the reason why I say yes is because having lived through the five months of this trial, and particularly after having heard the testimony of the witness Hoess, my conscience does not allow me to throw the responsibility solely on these small people. I myself have never installed an extermination camp for Jews or supported the existence of such camps ; but if Adolf Hitler personally has laid that dreadful responsibility on his people, then it is mine too, for we have fought against Jewry for years; and we have indulged in the most horrible utterances, and my own diary bears witness against me. Therefore it is no more than my duty to answer your question in this connection with 'Yes'. A thousand years will pass and this guilt of Germany will still not be erased" (Part 12, p. 109). 150. Funk explained that "the position of Minister in the usual meaning of the term did not exist" (Part 13, p. 112). 151. Ribbentrop, Part 10, pp. 222, 204 ; Keitel, Part 11, pp. 43, 44 ; Funk, Part 13, p. 162; Goering. Part 9, p. 287. 152. Part 13, pp. 61-62. 153. Part 13, pp. 12, 14-16, 67-68. 154. "The fact was that Hitler tried to use this defeat for the self-destruction of the German people, as Speer has now horribly confirmed, and as I was able to observe during the last phase of the conflict in Berlin when, through deceit by raising false hopes, boys of 15, 14, 13, and even 12 years of age were equipped with small arms to fight against tanks, and called into battle, boys who otherwise might have been the hope of the period of reconstruction. Hitler found escape in death, leaving behind him the order to keep on fighting. He also left behind him the official report that he had died in battle. I learned that he had committed suicide, and my last public statement, on 2nd May, 1945, was to let everybody know of this suicide, for I wanted to nip a Hitler legend in the bud" (Part 17, p. z69). Dahlerus has recorded his impression of Hitler, before the war, as a completely abnormal person (Part 9, p. 225). 155. Part 17, p. 39. 156. Part 117, pp. 57-58. 157. Milch testified: "My offer that I would try to speak to Hitler against war once more was rejected by the Reichsmarschal as absolutely hopeless " (Part 8, p. 255). 158. Part 17, P. 58. 159. Part 10, p. 234. 160. Minutes of second session of Working Committee of the Reich Defence Council held on 22nd May, 1933 (EC-177, USA 390, Part 3, pp. 79, 95). 161. Raeder testified: Yes, as regarding circumventing the Versailles Treaty as far as that was necessary to improve our defenceless position, for reasons which I explained recently here. To do this was a matter of honour for every man" (Part 14, p. 183). 162. Goering testified: "In the conversation which I had with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, who was in London at that time, I stressed that the ultimatum had not been put by us, but by Seyss-Inquart. That was absolutely true de jure; de facto, of course, I put it, but this telephone conversation was being listened to by the English, and I had to conduct a diplomatic conversation, and I have never heard yet that diplomats in such cases say how it was de facto, rather they always stress how it was de jure, and why should I make an exception there?" (Part 9, p. 104). But the transcript of the telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart which led to the capitulation of Austria shows Goering. saying: "Now, remember the following: You go [Page 482] immediately together with Lt.-General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed on and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist." Transcript of telephone calls from Air Ministry, 11th-14th March, 1938 (2949-PS, USA 76, Part 1, pp. 254- 256). 163. German assurance to Czechoslovakia of 12th March, 1938 (TC-27, GB 21, Part 2, p. 123). 164. Speer's conference minutes of Central Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning labour supply (R-124, USA 179, Part 2, p. 300, 303, 312; Part 4, p. 402). 165. Part 9, p. 97. 166. Part 9, p. 238. 167. Part 9, p. 108. 168. Part 12, p. 317. 169. Part 12, p. 312. 170. Dr. Thoma, Part 18, morning session, 10th July, 1946. 171. Part 10, p. 222. 172. Examples of the application of this philosophy may be found in Goering's explanation of his art looting: he had intended to put his pictures in a gallery which he intended to construct for the German people - some day (Part 9, p. 124); his statement that he had always held that captured enemy airmen were to be treated as "comrades" (Part 9, p. 147); and his attempt to minimize his words advocating harsh treatment of the Jews, was the result of conversational excitement (Part 9, p. 259).
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