The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

Shofar FTP Archive File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-01/tgmwc-01-05.06

Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-01/tgmwc-01-05.06
Last-Modified: 1999/08/28


   Further favourable factors for us are these:


   Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the

   Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because

   of her internal situation.


   Roumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack

   and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and

   Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by

   small minds, unsteady weak men.

                                                  [Page 173]


   All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail

   in two or three years.


   No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict

   is better now.


   The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement

   politically, but militarily it was questionable, since

   it was achieved through a bluff of the political

   leaders.  It is necessary to test the military, if at

   all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving

   individual tasks.


   Relations with Poland have become unbearable. My Polish

   policy hitherto has been contrary to the ideas of the

   people. My propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor,

   were disturbed by England's intervention. Poland changer

   her tune towards us. The initiative cannot be allowed to

   pass to the others. The time is more favourable today

   than it will be in two to three years. An attempt on my

   life or Mussolini's would change the situation to our

   disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite

   another with rifle cocked. A suggested compromise would

   have demanded that we change our convictions and make

   agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the

   language of Versailles. There was danger of losing

   prestige. Now the probability is still great that the

   West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with

   reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as

   much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative

   to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or


We skip a paragraph, two paragraphs.

"Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution."

A long discussion follows which I think it is unnecessary to

read, and then towards the end, four paragraphs from the

bottom, I resume: "We need not be afraid of a blockade. The

East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc.

It is a big aim which demands great efforts. I am only

afraid that at the last minute some 'Schweinehund' will make

a proposal for mediation."  And then the last paragraph of

one sentence: "Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer

and the assurance that the Armed Forces will do their duty."

I believe I have already offered exhibit USA 30, which is a

shorter note entitled, "Second Speech of the Fuehrer on 22nd

August, 1939." Reading, then, from that exhibit headed

"Second Speech of the Fuehrer on 22nd August, 1939:

    "It may also turn out differently regarding England and

    France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure

    on a trade barrier, not on blockade, and with severance

    of relations. Most iron determination on our side.

    Retreat before nothing. Everybody will have to make a

    point of it that we were determined from the beginning

    to fight the Western Powers. A struggle for life or

    death. Germany has won every war as long as she was

    united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors,

    greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of

    the past by getting used to the heaviest strain. A long

    period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it

    is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is

    not machines that fight each other, but men. We have

    the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive.

    The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918 the nation

    fell down because the mental pre-requisites were not

    sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success

    only through his mental power.


    Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is the

    elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a

    certain line. Even if war should break out in the West,

    the destruction of Poland shall be the primary

    objective. Quick decision because of the season.


    I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the

    war, never mind whether it be plausible or not. The

    victor shall not be asked, later on, whether we told

    the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the

    Right is what matters, but Victory.


    Have no pity. Brutal attitude. Eighty million people

    shall get what is their right. Their existence has to

    be secured. The strongest has the right. Greatest



                                                  [Page 174]


    Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the

    German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves

    of the leaders give way.


    First aim: advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our

    technical superiority will break the nerves of the

    Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be

    broken at once. Constant war of attrition.


    New German frontier according to healthy principle.

    Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military

    operations shall not be influenced by these

    reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the

    military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit

    until complete elimination.


    Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the

    requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by

    Saturday morning."

That ends the quotation. The Tribunal will recall that in

fact the start was actually postponed until 1st September.

DR. STAHMER (Counsel for defendant Goering): I should like

to make a statement or explanation of the last two documents

read. Both these, as well as the third that was not read,

but which was taken into consideration, are not recognised

by the defence. In order to avoid the appearance that this

objection has been raised without due reason, I should like

to justify it as follows:

Both the documents that were read contain a number of

factual mistakes. They are not signed. Moreover, only one

meeting took place, and that is where the documents lack

precision. No one it, that meeting was commissioned with

taking down stenographically the events in the meeting, and

since all signatures are lacking, it cannot be determined

who wrote them or who is responsible for their reliability.

The third document that was not read is, according to the

photostatic copy in the defence's document room, simply

written by typewriter. There is no indication of place nor

of time.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got nothing to do with the

third document, because it has not been read.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document has nevertheless

been published in the Press and was apparently given to the

Press by the prosecution. Both the defence and the

defendants have consequently a lively interest in giving a

short explanation of the facts concerning this document.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is trying this case in

accordance with the evidence and not in accordance with what

is in the Press, and the third document is not in evidence

before us.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognise that

counsel wonder how these two documents which I have just

read are in our hands. They come to us from an authentic

source. They are German documents. They were found in the

O.K.W. files. If they are not correct records of what

occurred, it surprises us that with the thoroughness with

which the Germans kept accurate records, they would have had

these records in their O.K.W. files if they did not

represent the truth.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal will of course

hear what evidence the defendants choose to give with

reference to the documents.

MR. ALDERMAN: It has occurred to me in that connection that

if any of these defendants have in their possession what is

a more correct transcription of the Fuehrer's words on this

occasion, the Court should consider that. On the other

question referred to by counsel, I feel somewhat guilty. It

is quite true that by a mechanical slip, the Press got the

first document, which we never at all intended them to have.

I feel somewhat responsible. It happened to be included in

the document books that were handed up to the Court on

Friday, because we had only intended. to refer to it and

give it an identification mark and not to offer it. I had

thought that no documents would be released to the Press

until they were actually offered in evidence. With as large

an organisation as we have, it is very difficult to police

all those matters.

                                                  [Page 175]

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal would like to know

how many of these documents are given to the Press.

MR. ALDERMAN: I can't answer that.

COLONEL STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, it is my

understanding that as and when documents are introduced in

evidence, then they are made available to the Press.

THE PRESIDENT: In what numbers?

COLONEL STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about

200 or 250 mimeographed copies.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the defendants'

Counsel should have copies of these documents before any of

them are handed to the Press. I mean to say that, in

preference to gentlemen of the Press, the defendants'

Counsel should have the documents.

COLONEL STOREY: Your Honour, if it pleases the Court, I

understand that these gentleman had the ten documents on

Saturday morning or Sunday morning. They had them for 24

hours, copies of the originals of these documents that have

been read today, down in the Information Centre.

THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional

arrangement which was made, and which was made upon your

representations, that ten copies of the trial briefs and

five of the volumes of documents should be given to the

defendants' counsel.

COLONEL STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were

deposited in the room.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you,

Colonel Storey, is that if 2SO copies of the documents can

be given to the Press, then the defendants' counsel should

not be limited to five copies.

COLONEL STOREY: If your Honour pleases, the 250 copies are

the mimeographed copies in English when they are introduced

in evidence. I hold in my hands or in my brief case here a

receipt that the document books and the briefs were

delivered 24 hours in advance.

THE PRESIDENT: You don't seem to understand what I am

putting to you, which is this: that if you can afford to

give 250 copies of the documents in English to the Press,

you can afford to give more than five copies to the

defendants' counsel - one each.

COLONEL STOREY: I see your point, your Honour, and we-

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we needn't discuss it further. In

future that will be done.

DR. DIX: May I make the point that of the evidence

documents, every defence counsel should receive one copy and

not simply one for several members of the defence.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: The aggressive war having been initiated in

September 1939, and Poland having been totally defeated

shortly after the initial assaults, the Nazi aggressors

converted the war into a general war of aggression extending

into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into the

Balkans. Under the division of the case between the four

Chief Prosecutors, this aspect of the matter is left to

presentation by the British Chief Prosecutor.

Another change that we have made in our plan, which I

perhaps should mention, is that following the opening

statement by the British Chief Prosecutor on Count 2, we

expect to resume the detailed handling of the later phases

of the aggressive war phase of the case. The British instead

of the Americans will deal with the details of aggression

against Poland. Then with this expansion of the war in

Europe and then as a joint part of the American case under

Count 1 and the British case under Count 2, I shall take up

the aggression against Russia and the Japanese aggression in

detail. So that the remaining two subjects with which I

shall ultimately deal in more detail, by presentation of

specifically significant documents, are the case of the

attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the

22nd of June, 1941, and the case on collaboration between

Italy and Japan

                                                  [Page 176]

and Germany and the resulting attack on the United States on

the 7th of December, 1941.

As to the case on aggression against the Soviet Union, I

shall, at this point, present two documents. The first of

these two documents establishes the pre-meditation and

deliberation which preceded the attack. Just as, in the case

of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had a code

name for the secret operation "Case Green," so in the case

of aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name

"Case Barbarossa."

THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?

MR. ALDERMAN    B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a -after Barbarossa of

Kaiser Friederich. From the files of the O.K.W. at Flensburg

we have a secret directive, Number 21, issued from the

Fuehrer's headquarters on 18th December, 1940, relating to "

Case Barbarossa." This directive is more than six months in

advance of the attack. Other evidence will show that the

planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by

Hitler and is initialled by the defendant Jodl and the

defendant Keitel. This secret order was issued in nine

copies. The captured document is the fourth of these nine

copies. It is document 446 PS, in our numbered series.

I offer it in evidence as exhibit USA 31.

If the Tribunal please, I think it will be sufficient for me

to read the first page of that directive; the first page of

the English translation. The paging may differ on the German


It is headed "The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the

German Armed Forces" with a number of initials, the meaning

of which I don't know, except O.K.W. It seems to be

indicated to go to O.K. Chiefs, whom I suppose to be General

Kommando Chiefs.

  "The Fuehrer's Headquarters, 18th December, 1940.

  Secret. Only through Officer. Nine Copies. 4th copy.

  Directive Number 21, case Barbarossa.


  The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet

  Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war

  against England. (Case Barbarossa).


  For this purpose the Army will have to employ all

  available units with the reservation that the occupied

  territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise



  For the Eastern campaign the Air Force will have to free

  such Strong forces for the support of the Army that a

  quick completion of the ground operations may he expected

  and that damage of the Eastern German territories will be

  avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the

  main effort in the East is limited by the following

  reservation: That the entire battle and armament area

  dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected

  against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England

  and especially the supply for them must not be permitted

  to break down.


Home ·  Site Map ·  What's New? ·  Search Nizkor

© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012

This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and to combat hatred. Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.

As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.