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Page 50

      II. AGREEMENT ACHIEVED, AUGUST 14-AUGUST 23, 1939

                            *****
                              
Frames 69510-639513, serial 127

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

                          Telegram

MOST URGENT
BERLIN, August 14, 1939-10:53 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 15, 1939-4:40 a. m.
No. 175 of August 14

For the Ambassador personally.

     I request that you call upon Herr Molotov personally and
communicate to him the following:
     1)   The  ideological  contradictions  between  National
Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union were in past years the
sole  reason  why Germany and the U.S.S.R. stood  opposed  to
each   other   in  two  separate  and  hostile   camps.   The
developments of the recent period seem to show that differing
world  outlooks  do  not  prohibit a reasonable  relationship
between the two states, and the restoration of cooperation of
a  new and friendly type. The period of opposition in foreign
policy can be brought to an end once and for all and the  way
lies open for a new sort of future for both countries.
     2)  There  exist  no real conflicts of interest  between
Germany and the U.S.S.R. The living spaces of Germany and the
U.S.S.R.  touch each other, but in their natural requirements
they do not conflict. Thus there is lacking all cause for  an
aggressive  attitude on the part of one country  against  the
other.  Germany  has  no  aggressive intentions  against  the
U.S.S.R. The Reich Government is of the opinion that there is
no  question  between  the Baltic and the  Black  Seas  which
cannot  be  settled  to  the complete  satisfaction  of  both
countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea,
the Baltic area, Poland, Southeastern questions, etc. In such
matters  political cooperation between the two countries  can
have only a beneficial effect. The same applies to German and
Soviet economy, which can be expanded in any direction.
     3) There is no doubt that German-Soviet policy today has
come to an historic turning point. The decisions with respect
to  policy  to be made in the immediate future in Berlin  and
Moscow will be of deci-
     
Page 51

sive  importance for the aspect of relationships between  the
German   people   and  the  peoples  of  the   U.S.S.R.   for
generations. On those decisions will depend whether  the  two
peoples will some day again and without any compelling reason
take  up  arms against each other or whether they pass  again
into  a  friendly relationship. It has gone  well  with  both
countries  previously when they were friends and  badly  when
they were enemies.
     4) It is true that Germany and the U.S.S.R., as a result
of  years  of  hostility in their respective world  outlooks,
today  look at each other in a distrustful fashion.  A  great
deal of rubbish which has accumulated will have to be cleared
away.  It must be said, however, that even during this period
the  natural  sympathy of the Germans for the Russians  never
disappeared. The policy of both states can be built  anew  on
that basis.
     5)  The Reich Government and the Soviet Government must,
judging  from  all experience, count it as certain  that  the
capitalistic Western democracies are the unforgiving  enemies
of  both National Socialist Germany and of the U.S.S.R.  They
are  today  trying  again, by the conclusion  of  a  military
alliance, to drive the U.S.S.R. into the war against Germany.
In  1914 this policy had disastrous results for Russia. It is
the  compelling interest of both countries to avoid  for  all
future  time the destruction of Germany and of the  U.S.S.R.,
which would profit only the Western democracies.
     6)  The  crisis which has been produced in German-Polish
relations by English policy, as well as English agitation for
war  and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up  with
that  policy,  make a speedy clarification of  German-Russian
relations  desirable.  Otherwise these matters,  without  any
German initiative, might take a turn which would deprive both
Governments  of  the  possibility of restoring  German-Soviet
friendship   and   possibly  of  clearing  up   jointly   the
territorial  questions of Eastern Europe. The  leadership  in
both  countries should, therefore not allow the situation  to
drift, but should take action at the proper time. It would be
fatal  if,  through  mutual lack of knowledge  of  views  and
intentions our peoples should be finally driven asunder.
     As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also has
the  desire  for a clarification of German-Russian relations.
Since,   however,  according  to  previous  experience   this
clarification can be achieved only slowly through  the  usual
diplomatic channels, Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is
prepared  to  make a short visit to Moscow in order,  in  the
name of the Fhrer, to set forth the Fhrer's views to

Page 52

Herr  Stalin. Only through such a direct discussion,  in  the
view  of Herr von Ribbentrop, can a change be brought  about,
and   it  should  not  be  impossible  thereby  to  lay   the
foundations  for  a  definite improvement  in  German-Russian
relations.
     
     ANNEX: I request that you do not give Herr Molotov these
instructions  in writing, but that you read them  to  him.  I
consider it important that they reach Herr Stalin in as exact
a  form  as possible and I authorize you at the same time  to
request from Herr Molotov on my behalf an audience with  Herr
Stalin  so  that  you  may  be able to  make  this  important
communication  directly  to  him  also.  In  addition  to   a
conference  with Molotov, an extended conference with  Stalin
would be a condition for my making the trip.

RIBBENTROP

                            *****

Frames 254836-254837, serial 644

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 16, 1939-2:30 a. m.
SECRET

No. 175 of August 15

Reference your telegram No. 175 of August 14.

     Molotov  received with greatest interest the information
I  had  been authorized to convey, designated it as extremely
important,  and  declared that he  would  report  it  to  his
Government  at once and give me an answer shortly.  He  could
already  state  that  the Soviet Government  warmly  welcomed
German  intentions  of improving relations  with  the  Soviet
Union  and in view of my communication of today now  believed
in the sincerity of these intentions.
     In the matter of the Reich Foreign Minister coming here,
he wanted to state tentatively, as his own opinion, that such
a  trip  required  adequate preparation  in  order  that  the
exchange of opinions might lead to results.
     In this connection, he was interested in the question of
how  the  German  Government was  disposed  to  the  idea  of
concluding  a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union,  and
further,  whether  the  German  Government  was  prepared  to
influence  Japan  for the purpose of improvement  in  Soviet-
Japanese  relations  and settlement of border  conflicts  and
whether  a possible joint guarantee of the Baltic States  was
contemplated by Germany.

Page 53

     With   regard  to  sought-for  expansion  of  commercial
intercourse,  M. admitted that negotiations were  progressing
successfully   in   Berlin   and  approaching   a   favorable
conclusion.
     M.  repeated that if my communication of today  included
the  idea of a non-aggression pact or something similar, this
question must be discussed in concrete terms, in order  that,
in  the event the Reich Foreign Minister comes here, it  will
not  be  a matter of an exchange of opinion but that concrete
decisions will be made.
     M.  recognized that speed was necessary in order not  to
be  confronted with accomplished facts, but stressed the fact
that  adequate preparation of the problems mentioned  by  him
was indispensable.
     A   detailed  memorandum  [28]  on  the  course  of  the
conversation  will  follow Thursday by  special  courier  via
plane.

SCHULENBURG

                            *****

Frames 69503-69509, serial 127

   Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union
                        (Schulenburg)

SECRET

     I  began  the interview with Molotov on August la  about
8:00 p m. by stating that according to information which  had
reached us the Soviet Government was interested in continuing
the  political conversations, but that it preferred that they
be carried on in Moscow.
     Molotov replied that this was correct.
     Then  I  read  to  Herr  Molotov  the  contents  of  the
instruction which had been sent to me and the German text was
immediately translated into Russian, paragraph by  paragraph.
I also informed Molotov about the content of the annex to the
instruction  which  I  had  received.  Molotov   took   under
consideration  my communication that on the  instructions  of
the  Reich Foreign Minister I was to ask for an audience with
Herr Stalin, as well as my statement that in addition to  the
conference  with Molotov, an extended conference with  Stalin
was  a  condition for the proposed visit of the Reich Foreign
Minister.  With  regard to the desire of  the  Reich  Foreign
Minister  that  the content of the instruction  should  reach
Herr  Stalin in as exact a form as possible, Molotov  made  a
gesture of assent.
     Molotov listened to the reading of the instruction  with
close  [gespannter] attention, and he directed his  secretary
to make as extensive and exact notes as possible.

[28] See the following document.

Page 54

     Molotov then declared that in view of the importance  of
my  communication he could not give me an answer at once  but
he  must  first render a report to his Government.  He  could
state  at  once,  however, that the Soviet Government  warmly
[lebhaft] welcomed the intention expressed on the German side
to  bring  about an improvement in relations with the  Soviet
Union. Prior to the further communication which he would make
to   me   shortly,  after  securing  instructions  from   his
Government,  he  wanted,  at  the  moment,  to  express   the
following  views of his own with regard to the  proposals  of
the German Government.
     A  trip  by  the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow  would
require  extensive  preparation if the intended  exchange  of
views was to produce any result. In this connection, he asked
me  for  information  as  to whether  the  following  was  in
accordance with the facts.
     The  Soviet Government at the end of June of  this  year
had  received  a telegraphic report from its Charg‚  in  Rome
about a conference between the latter and the Italian Foreign
Minister,  Ciano. In this conversation Ciano  had  said  that
there  was  a German plan under way which had as its  goal  a
decisive  improvement  in German-Soviet  relations.  In  that
connection Ciano had referred to the following items  in  the
plan:

     1)   Germany  would  not  be  disinclined  to   exercise
influence on Japan for the purpose of an improvement  of  her
relations  with the Soviet Union and the elimination  of  the
boundary disputes.
     2)  Further, the possibility was envisaged of concluding
a  non-aggression  pact with the Soviet Union  and  making  a
joint guarantee of the Baltic States.
     3)  Germany was prepared to make an economic treaty with
the Soviet Union on a broad basis.

     The  contents of the foregoing points had aroused  great
interest  on  the  part  of  the Soviet  Government  and  he,
Molotov,  would very much like to know how much of  the  plan
which  Ciano had outlined in the form just mentioned  to  the
Soviet Charg‚ was true.
     I replied that the statements of Ciano apparently rested
on  a  report of the Italian Ambassador here, Rosso, of which
we  had  already  heard. The content of  this  report  rested
principally on Rosso's deductions.
     To a question interjected by Molotov as to whether Rosso
was  inventing his information, I replied that that was  only
partly correct. We wanted, as Molotov knew, an improvement in
German-Soviet relations and naturally had considered how such
an  improvement could be brought about. The result  of  these
deliberations was contained in my communications  which  were
known to Molotov and in the state-

Page 55

ments  of the Reich Foreign Minister and of Herr Schnurre  to
Herr Astakhov.
     Molotov  replied that the question as to  whether  Rosso
had  informed  his Government correctly did not interest  him
further.  The  Soviet Government at the  present  moment  was
interested above all in knowing whether plans such  as  those
which were contained in Rosso's report, or something similar,
actually  did  exist  and whether the German  Government  was
still  following such a line of thought. He,  Molotov,  after
hearing  of  the report from Rome had seen nothing improbable
about it. The Soviet Government all through recent years  had
been  under the impression that the German Government had  no
desire  to bring about an improvement in relations  with  the
Soviet  Union.  Now  the  situation  had  changed.  From  the
conferences which had taken place in the last few weeks,  the
Soviet  Government had gotten the impression that the  German
Government was really in earnest in its intentions  to  bring
about  a  change  in  relations with  the  Soviet  Union.  He
regarded  the statement which had been made today as decisive
and  as one in which this wish was especially completely  and
clearly expressed. As regards the Soviet Government,  it  had
always  had a favorable attitude with regard to the  question
of  good  relations with Germany and was happy that this  was
now the case on the German side also. Whether the details  as
contained  in Rosso's report were actually what  the  Germans
had  in  mind  was  not of such overwhelming importance.  He,
Molotov,  had the impression that there must be a great  deal
of truth in them, since these ideas paralleled those advanced
from  the German side for some months. In this connection  he
stated  with  satisfaction that the economic  discussions  in
Berlin were continuing and apparently promised good results.
     I  remarked that the course of the economic negotiations
was  satisfactory to us as well, and I asked how he envisaged
the   further   method   of  procedure   in   the   political
conversations.
     Molotov repeated that he was interested above everything
else  in  an answer to the question of whether on the  German
side  there  was the desire to make more concrete the  points
which  had been outlined in Rosso's report. So, for  example,
the  Soviet Government would like to know whether Germany saw
any real possibility of influencing Japan in the direction of
a  better relationship with the Soviet Union. "Also, how  did
things  stand  with  the idea of the  conclusion  of  a  non-
aggression  pact?  Was the German Government  sympathetically
inclined to the idea or would the matter have to be gone into
more deeply?" were Molotov's exact words.

Page 56

     I  replied  that, as regards the relationship to  Japan,
the  Reich Foreign Minister had already said to Herr Astakhov
that  he  had his own views on this matter. Thus it might  be
assumed  that  the  Reich Foreign Minister  was  prepared  to
interest  himself  in this matter also, since  his  influence
upon the Japanese Government was certainly not slight.
     Molotov said that all this interested him very much and,
at  this point, he interjected that Ciano had told the Soviet
Charg‚ that he would strongly support the ideas in the  Rosso
report.  He  continued  that it was very  important  for  the
Soviet Government in connection with the intended trip of the
Reich  Foreign Minister to Moscow to obtain an answer to  the
question  of  whether the German Government was  prepared  to
conclude a non-aggression pact or something similar with  the
Soviet  Union. On an earlier occasion there had been  mention
of  the possibility of "a resurrection and revival of earlier
treaties."
     I   confirmed  to  Herr  Molotov  that  we  really  were
considering a new order of things [eine Neuordnung der Dinge]
either in connection with what had gone before or perhaps  on
an  entirely new foundation. I then asked him whether I might
conclude  that the questions which had been put by him  would
constitute  the substance of the conferences with  the  Reich
Foreign  Minister in Moscow and that he had only communicated
them to me so that I might prepare the Reich Foreign Minister
for these questions.
     Molotov  replied  that he would still  have  to  make  a
further reply to me with regard to the question of the  visit
here  by  the  Reich  Foreign Minister.  It  seemed  to  him,
however, that for such a journey a previous clarification and
preparation of definite questions would be necessary, so that
it  would not be just conversations which were carried on  in
Moscow, but that decisions could be made as well. He heartily
subscribed  to  my statement that a prompt clarification  was
desirable.  He also had the opinion that haste was desirable,
so  that  the  march  of events would not  confront  us  with
accomplished facts. He must, therefore, repeat  that  if  the
German  Government was favorably inclined to the idea of  the
conclusion  of a non-aggression pact, and if my statement  of
today   included  this  or  a  similar  idea,  more  concrete
discussion of these questions should take place at  once.  He
requested me to inform my Government in this sense.

COUNT von der SCHULENBURG

Moscow, August 16, 1939.

Page 57

                            *****

Frames 178545-178547, serial 276

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizs„cker)

Moscow, August 16, 1939.

MY ESTEEMED STATE SECRETARY: With regard to my conversation
of yesterday with Herr Molotov, I should like in all haste to
stress especially the following:
     Herr Molotov was quite unusually compliant and candid. I
received the impression that the proposal of the visit of the
Reich Minister was very flattering personally to Herr Molotov
and  that  he  considers  it  an actual  proof  of  our  good
intentions. (I recall that-according to newspaper dispatches-
Moscow  requested  that  England and France  send  a  Cabinet
Minister  here,  and that, instead, only  Herr  Strang  came,
because  London and Paris had been angry that Herr Voroshilov
had  not  been  permitted to accept  the  invitation  to  the
British  maneuvers, which is, in fact, quite another  matter,
since  high  Soviet Russians have heretofore  never  traveled
abroad.)
     In  Herr  Molotov's statements yesterday, the surprising
moderation  in his demands on us also seems to be  worthy  of
note.  He  did not once use the words "Anti-Comintern  Pact,"
and  no  longer  demanded  of us,  as  he  did  in  the  last
conversation,   "suppression"   of   support   of    Japanese
aggression.  He  limited himself to the wish  that  we  might
bring about a Soviet-Japanese settlement.
     More significant is his quite clearly expressed wish  to
conclude a non-aggression pact with us.
     Despite  all efforts, we did not succeed in ascertaining
entirely  clearly what Herr Molotov desired in the matter  of
the  Baltic States. It appears that he mentioned the question
of  a  joint guarantee of the Baltic States as only one point
in Herr Rosso's report, but did not expressly make the demand
that  we give such a guarantee. Such a joint guarantee  seems
to  me at variance with the behavior of the Soviet Government
in the British-French negotiations.
     It  actually looks at the moment as if we would  achieve
the desired results in the negotiations here.
     With  cordial greetings and a Heil Hitler!  I  am,  Herr
State Secretary,

Your ever devoted
COUNT von der SCHULENBURG

Page 58

                            *****

Frames 69501-69502, serial 127

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

                          Telegram

URGENT
BERLIN, August 16, 1939-4:15 p. m.
Received MOSCOW, August 17, 1939-1 a. m.

No. 179 of August 16

For the Ambassador personally.

     I request that you again call upon Herr Molotov with the
statement that you have to communicate to him, in addition to
yesterday's   message  for  Herr  Stalin,   a   supplementary
instruction just received from Berlin, which relates  to  the
questions raised by Herr Molotov. Please then state  to  Herr
Molotov the following:

     1)  the  points  brought  up  by  Herr  Molotov  are  in
accordance  with  German desires. That is, Germany  is  read,
[bereit]  to conclude a non-aggression pact with  the  Soviet
Union  and,  if the Soviet Government so desires,  one  which
would  be  irrevocable [unkndbar] for a term of  twenty-five
years.  Further,  Germany is ready to  guarantee  the  Baltic
States  jointly  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Finally,  it   is
thoroughly in accord with the German position, and Germany is
ready,   to   exercise  influence  for  an  improvement   and
consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations.
     2)  The  Fhrer is of the opinion that, in view  of  the
present  situation, and of the possibility of the  occurrence
any day of serious incidents (please at this point explain to
Herr  Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish
provocation indefinitely), a basic and rapid clarification of
German-Russian  relations and the mutual  adjustment  of  the
pressing questions are desirable. For these reasons the Reich
Foreign  Minister  declares that he is prepared  to  come  by
plane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to  deal
on  the  basis of full powers from the Fhrer with the entire
complex  of  German-Russian questions and.  if  the  occasion
arises [gegebenenfalls], to sign the appropriate treaties.

     ANNEX:  I  request that you read these  instructions  to
Herr  Molotov  and  ask  for  the  reaction  of  the  Russian
Government  and Herr Stalin. Entirely confidentially,  it  is
added  for  your  guidance that it would be of  very  special
interest to us if my Moscow trip could take place at the  end
of this week or the beginning of next week.

RIBBENTROP

Page 59

                            *****

Frames 69496-69500, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 18, 1939-5:30 a. m.
SECRET

No. 189 of August 17

Reference your telegram 179 of August 16.

     After   I   had   read  to  Molotov  the   supplementary
instructions,  Molotov  declared, without  going  into  their
content more closely, that he could give me today the  answer
of  the  Soviet Government to my communication of August  15.
Stalin  was following the conversations with great  interest,
he  was being informed about all their details, and he was in
complete agreement with Molotov.
     Here  Molotov read the answer of the Soviet  Government,
which in the text given to me is as follows:

     "The  Soviet  Government  has taken  cognizance  of  the
statement  of  the  German Government  transmitted  by  Count
Schulenburg  on August 15 concerning its desire  for  a  real
improvement  in the political relations between  Germany  and
the U.S.S.R.
     "In  view  of  the  official  statements  of  individual
representatives  of  the  German Government  which  have  not
infrequently  had  an unfriendly and even  hostile  character
with  reference to the U.S.S.R. the Soviet Government up till
very   recently  has  had  the  impression  that  the  German
Government  was  working for an excuse for a clash  with  the
U.S.S.R.,  was  preparing itself for such a  clash,  and  was
basing the necessity of its constantly increasing armament on
the  inevitability of such a clash. Not to mention  the  fact
that  the German Government by means of the so-called  'Anti-
Comintern Pact' was attempting to build up a unified front of
a  group  of  states against the U.S.S.R., and was attempting
with especial persistence to draw Japan in.
     "It is understandable that such a policy on the part  of
the  German Government compelled the U.S.S.R. to take serious
steps  in  the  preparation  of a  defense  against  possible
aggression  on the part of Germany against the  U.S.S.R.  and
also  to participate in the organization of a defensive front
of a group of states against such an aggression.
     "If,  however,  the German Government now  undertakes  a
change  from  the old policy in the direction  of  a  sincere
improvement  in  political relations with the  U.S.S.R.,  the
Soviet  Government  can look upon such  a  change  only  with
pleasure and is on its own part prepared to alter its  policy
in  the direction of an appreciable [ernsthaften] improvement
in relations with Germany.

Page 60

     "If  there  be  added to this the fact that  the  Soviet
Government  has  never had any sort of aggressive  intentions
toward  Germany  and  will not have such,  and  that  now  as
previously   the  Soviet  Government  considers  a   peaceful
solution  of the questions at issue in the field of relations
between  Germany and the U.S.S.R. as entirely  possible,  and
that  the  principle  of  a  peaceful  existence  of  various
political  systems side by side represents a long established
principle of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., one comes to
the conclusion that for the establishment of new and improved
political relations between the two countries, there are  now
at  hand  not only a real basis, but the actual prerequisites
for   undertaking  serious  and  practical  steps   in   that
direction.
     "The  Government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion  that
the  first  step  toward  such an  improvement  in  relations
between the U.S.S.R. and Germany could be the conclusion of a
trade and credit agreement.
     "The  Government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion  that
the second step, to be taken shortly thereafter, could be the
conclusion  of a non-aggression pact or the reaffirmation  of
the neutrality pact of 1926, with the simultaneous conclusion
of a special protocol which would define the interests of the
signatory parties in this or that question of foreign  policy
and which would form an integral part of the pact."

     Next   Molotov   supplied  the  following  supplementary
information:

     1) Economic agreements must be concluded first. What has
been begun must be carried through to the end.
     2)  Then  there  may  follow  after  a  short  interval,
according  to  German  choice,  the  conclusion  of  a   non-
aggression pact or the reaffirmation of the neutrality treaty
of 1926. In either case there must follow the conclusion of a
protocol  in which, among other things, the German statements
of August 15 would be included.
     3) With regard to the proposed trip of the Reich Foreign
Minister  to  Moscow, he declared that the Soviet  Government
was  very  gratified by this proposal, since the dispatch  of
such  a  distinguished public figure and statesman emphasized
the  earnestness of the intentions of the German  Government.
This  stood  in noteworthy contrast to England, who,  in  the
person  of  Strang, had sent only an official of  the  second
class  to  Moscow.  A journey by the Reich Foreign  Minister,
however, required thorough preparation. The Soviet Government
did  not like the publicity that such a journey would  cause.
They preferred that practical work be accomplished without so
much  ceremony.  To my remark that it was  precisely  by  the
journey of the Reich Foreign Minister that the practical goal
could  be speedily reached, Molotov countered that the Soviet
Government nevertheless preferred the other way in which  the
first step had already been taken.

     To  my  question as to how the Soviet Government reacted
to  my  communication of today, Molotov declared that today's
favorable  German  reply had not been  known  to  the  Soviet
Government when its answer

Page 61

was prepared and it would still have to be examined, but that
today's  Soviet answer already contained all the  essentials.
He  suggested that on the German side we take up at once  the
preparation of a draft for the non-aggression pact or for the
reaffirmation of the neutrality treaty, as the case might be,
as  well as for the protocol; the same would be done  on  the
Soviet side.
     I  stated  that  I  would report these proposals  to  my
Government.  With  regard  to  the  protocol,  it  would   be
desirable to have more exact information about the wishes  of
the Soviet Government.
     The conversation was concluded with Molotov's expressing
the  desire  to  be  supplied as soon as  possible  with  our
drafts.

SCHULENBURG

                            *****
                              
Frames 69492-69495, serial 127

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
BERLIN, August 18, 1939-10:48 p. m.
Received Moscow, August l9, 1939-5:45 a. m.

No. 185 of August 18

For the Ambassador personally.

Reference your telegram No. 182. [29]

     Please  arrange  immediately another  conversation  with
Herr  Molotov  and do everything possible to  see  that  this
conversation   takes  place  without  any  delay.   At   this
conference, I would ask you to speak with Herr Molotov in the
following sense:
     The  Reich  Government, to its great  satisfaction,  has
learned from his last statement the favorable attitude of the
Soviet  Government  with regard to the remolding  of  German-
Russian relations. We, too, under normal circumstances, would
naturally be ready to pursue a re-alignment of German-Russian
relations further through diplomatic channels and to carry it
out  in  the customary way. But the present unusual situation
made it necessary, in the opinion of the Fhrer, to employ  a
different  method which would lead to quick results.  German-
Polish relations were becoming more acute from day to day. We
had  to take into account that incidents might occur any  day
that  would make the outbreak of hostilities unavoidable.  To
judge  from the whole attitude of the Polish Government,  the
developments in this

[29] supra.

Page 62

respect  by no means rested with us. The Fhrer considers  it
necessary that we be not taken by surprise by the outbreak of
a   German-Polish  conflict  while  we  are  striving  for  a
clarification  of  German-Russian  relations.  He   therefore
considers a previous clarification necessary, if only  to  be
able  to  consider  Russian  interests  in  case  of  such  a
conflict, which would, of course, be difficult without such a
clarification.
     The  statement made by Herr Molotov refers to your first
communication  of  August 15th. My supplementary  instruction
had  gone  beyond  this and stated clearly that  we  were  in
complete agreement with the idea of a non-aggression pact,  a
guarantee of the Baltic States, and German pressure on Japan.
All  factual  elements for immediate commencement  of  direct
verbal  negotiations  and for a final accord  were  therefore
present.
     Furthermore,  you  may  mention  that  the  first  stage
mentioned   by  Herr  Molotov,  namely,  the  conclusion   of
negotiations for a new German-Russian economic agreement, has
today been completed, so that we should now attack the second
stage. [30]
     We were, therefore, now asking for an immediate reaction
to   the  proposal  made  in  the  supplementary  instruction
regarding  my immediate departure for Moscow. Please  add  in
this  connection that I would come with full powers from  the
Fhrer,  authorizing me to settle fully and conclusively  the
total complex of problems.
     As   far  as  the  non-aggression  pact  especially   is
concerned,  it  seems to us so simple as to require  no  long
preparation. We have in mind here the following three points,
[31]  which  I would ask you to read to Herr M., but  not  to
hand to him.

     ARTICLE 1. The German Reich and the U.S.S.R. will in  no
event resort to war or to any other use of force with respect
to each other.
     ARTICLE  2.  this  agreement  shall  enter  into   force
immediately   upon   signature  and  shall   be   valid   and
undenounceable thereafter for a term of twenty-five years.

     Please state in this connection that I am in a position,
with  regard to this proposal, to arrange details  in  verbal
discussions at Moscow

[30]  For  a summary of the German-Soviet Trade Agreement  of
August 19, 1939, see the memorandum by Schnurre of August 29,
1930, post, p 83.
[31]  In  a telegram of August 19, 1939, 1:44 p. m.  (Moscow,
No.  180,  not  printed here) Ambassador  Schulenburg  called
attention  to  the fact that the following draft  of  a  non-
aggression treaty contained only two articles.

Page 63

and, if occasion arises, to comply with Russian wishes. I  am
also in a position to sign a special protocol regulating  the
interests  of both parties in questions of foreign policy  of
one  kind or another; for instance, the settlement of spheres
of  interest  in the Baltic area, the problem of  the  Baltic
States,  etc. Such a settlement, too, which seems  to  us  of
considerable  importance, is only possible,  however,  at  an
oral discussion.
     Please emphasize in this connection, that German foreign
policy has today reached a historic turning point. This  time
please  conduct  conversation, except for above  articles  of
agreement,   not   in  the  form  of  a  reading   of   these
instructions, but by pressing emphatically, in the  sense  of
the  foregoing statements, for a rapid realization of my trip
and  by  opposing  appropriately  any  possible  new  Russian
objections.  In  this connection you must keep  in  mind  the
decisive  fact  that an early outbreak of open  German-Polish
conflict  is probable and that we therefore have the greatest
interest in having my visit to Moscow take place immediately.

RIBBENTROP

                            *****
                              
Frames 69490-69491, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in The Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 19, 1939-5:50 p. m.

No. 187 of August 19

Reference your telegram No. 185 of August 18.

     The  Soviet  Government  agrees  to  the  Reich  Foreign
Minister's  coming to Moscow one week after  proclamation  of
the signing of the economic agreement. Molotov stated that if
the  conclusion  of  the  economic  agreement  is  proclaimed
tomorrow,  the Reich Foreign Minister might arrive in  Moscow
on August 26 or 27.
     Molotov  delivered  to me a draft  of  a  non-aggression
pact.
     A  detailed account of the two conversations I had  with
Molotov  today,  as  well as the text of  the  Soviet  draft,
follows by wire at once.

SCHULENBERG

Page 64

                            *****
                              
Frames 69481-69483, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 19, 1939.
SECRET

No. 189 of August 19

Supplementing my telegram No. 187 of August 19.

     In  my  first  conversation of today with  Molotov-which
began  at 2 o'clock and lasted an hour-after having made  the
communications I had been charged with, I repeatedly tried to
convince  M.  of the fact that a visit of the  Reich  Foreign
Minister  to Moscow was the only way of achieving  the  speed
that  was  urgently  called  for  because  of  the  political
situation.  M.  acknowledged the positive importance  of  the
proposed  trip, stressed the fact that the Soviet  Government
understood and esteemed the underlying purpose, but persisted
in  his opinion that for the present it was not possible even
approximately  to  fix  the time  of  the  journey  since  it
required thorough preparation. This applied both to the  non-
aggression  pact and to the contents of the  protocol  to  be
concluded  simultaneously.  The  German  draft  of  the  non-
aggression  pact  was  by  no means  exhaustive.  The  Soviet
Government desired that one of the many non-aggression  pacts
that the Soviet Government had concluded with other countries
(for example with Poland, Latvia, Estonia, etc.) should serve
as  a model for the non-aggression pact with Germany. He left
it to the German Government to choose from among them the one
that  seemed  suitable. Further, the content of the  protocol
was  a  very  serious  question  and  the  Soviet  Government
expected  the  German Government to state  more  specifically
what  points were to be covered in the protocol. The attitude
of  the  Soviet Government toward treaties which it concludes
was a very serious one; it respected the obligations which it
undertook and expected the same of its treaty partners.
     To  the  reasons  I  repeatedly  and  very  emphatically
advanced for the need for haste, M. rejoined that so far  not
even  the  first step-the closing of the economic agreements-
had  been taken. First of all, the economic agreement had  to
be signed and proclaimed and put into effect. Then would come
the turn of the non-aggression pact and protocol.
     M.  remained  apparently unaffected by my  protests,  so
that the first conversation closed with a declaration on  the
part of M. that he had

Page 65

imparted  to  me the views of the Soviet Government  and  had
nothing to add to them.
     Hardly half an hour after the close of the conversation,
M.  sent  me  word,  asking me to call on him  again  at  the
Kremlin at 4:30 p. m.
     He   apologized  for  putting  me  to  the  trouble  and
explained  that he had reported to the Soviet Government  and
was authorized to hand me a draft of the non-aggression pact.
As  far  as  the Reich Foreign Minister's trip was concerned,
the  Soviet Government agreed to Herr von Ribbentrop's coming
to  Moscow about a week after proclamation of the signing  of
the  economic  agreement.  Thus, if this  proclamation  takes
place tomorrow, Herr won Ribbentrop might arrive in Moscow on
August  26  or  27. M. did not give reasons  for  his  sudden
change of mind. I assume that Stalin intervened. My effort to
get  M.  to  accept  an earlier date for  the  Reich  Foreign
Minister's trip was, unfortunately, unsuccessful.
     The text of the non-aggression pact draft will follow by
wire.

SCHULENBURG

                            *****
                              
Frames 69479-69480, serial 127

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 19, 1939-11:30 p. m.
SECRET

No. 190 of August 19

Supplementing my telegram No. 189 of August 19.

     The Soviet non-aggression pact draft reads as follows:

     "The   Government  of  the  U.S.S.R.  and   the   German
Government,  desirous of strengthening  the  cause  of  peace
among   the  nations  and  proceeding  from  the  fundamental
provisions of the Neutrality Agreement that was concluded  in
April 1926 between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, have reached the
following accord:
     ARTICLE   1.  Both  High  Contracting  Parties  obligate
themselves  to desist reciprocally from any act  of  violence
and  any  aggressive action whatsoever toward each other,  or
from  an  attack on each other either individually or jointly
with other powers.
     ARTICLE  2.  Should one of the High Contracting  Parties
become the object of an act of violence or attack by a  third
power,  the other High Contracting Party shall in  no  manner
whatever give its support to such acts of that power.
     ARTICLE  3.  Should disputes or conflicts arise  between
the  High Contracting Parties with regard to questions of one
kind of another, both

Page 66

parties  obligate  themselves to settle  these  disputes  and
conflicts  exclusively  by  peaceful  means  through   mutual
consultation or if necessary through the creation of suitable
arbitration commissions.
     ARTICLE 4. The present Treaty shall be concluded  for  a
period of five years with the proviso that insofar as one  of
the  High  Contracting Parties does not denounce it one  year
before  the expiration of the term the validity of the Treaty
shall automatically be extended for another five years.
     ARTICLE  5. The present Treaty shall be ratified  in  as
short  a  time as possible, whereupon the Treaty shall  enter
into force.
     Postscript, The present Pact shall be valid  only  if  a
special protocol is signed simultaneously covering the points
in  which the High Contracting Parties are interested in  the
field  of  foreign policy. The protocol shall be an  integral
part of the Pact."

SCHULENBURG

                            *****
                              
Frames 254844-254846, serial 644

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
BERLIN, August 2O, 1939-4:35 p. m.
Received Moscow, August 91, 1939-12:45 a. m.

No. 189 of August 20

For the Ambassador personally.

     The Fhrer authorizes you to present yourself to Molotov
at  once and hand him the following telegram from the  Fhrer
to Herr Stalin:

     "Herr Stalin, Moscow. 1) I sincerely welcome the signing
of  the  new German-Soviet Commercial Agreement as the  first
step in the reordering of German-Soviet relations.
     2)  The  conclusion of a non-aggression  pact  with  the
Soviet  Union  means to me the establishment of a  long-range
German  policy.  Germany thereby resumes a  political  course
that  was beneficial to both states during by-gone centuries.
The  Government  of the Reich is therefore resolved  in  such
case  to  act  entirely consistent with such  a  far-reaching
change.
     3)  I  accept the draft of the non-aggression pact  that
your  Foreign Minister, Herr Molotov, delivered but  consider
it urgently necessary to clarify the questions connected with
it as soon as possible.
     4)  The supplementary protocol desired by the Government
of  the  Soviet  Union can, I am convinced, be  substantially
clarified  in  the  shortest possible time if  a  responsible
German  statesman  can come to Moscow himself  to  negotiate.
Otherwise the Government of the

Page 67

Reich is not clear as to how the supplementary protocol could
be cleared up and settled in a short time.
     5)  the  tension between Germany and Poland  has  become
intolerable.  Polish demeanor toward a great  power  is  such
that  a  crisis may arise any day. Germany is determined,  at
any  rate,  in the face of this presumption, from now  on  to
look  after the interests of the Reich with all the means  at
its disposal.
     6)  In  my  opinion, it is desirable,  in  view  of  the
intentions of the two states to enter into a new relation  to
each  other, not to lose any time. I therefore again  propose
that  you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August  22,
but  at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign
Minister  has  full  powers to draw  up  and  sign  the  non-
aggression pact as well as the protocol. A longer stay by the
Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow than one to two days at most
is  impossible  in  view  of the international  situation.  I
should be glad to receive your early answer. Adolf Hitler."

     Please deliver to Herr Molotov the above telegram of the
Fhrer to
Stalin in writing, on a sheet of paper without letterhead.

RIBBENTROP

                            *****

Frame 260314, serial 695

 The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the
                 Soviet Union (Schulenburg)

                          Telegram

No. 191 of August 21
BERLIN, August 21, 1939-10:15 a. m.
Received Moscow, August 21, 1939-2:30 p. m.

For the Ambassador.

     Please   do   your   best  to  see  that   the   journey
materializes. Date as in telegram.

RIBBENTROP

                            *****

Frames 260312-260313, serial 695

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 21, 1939-5:30 p. m.
SECRET

Telegram No. 197 of August 21

Reference your telegrams No. 189 of August 20 and No. 191 of
August 21.

Page 68

     Strongly stressing the extraordinary importance of,  and
exceptional need for haste, I delivered to Herr Molotov at  3
p.  m. the Fhrer's message to Stalin, with a translation. M.
read the document through and was evidently deeply impressed.
He  stated  that he would forward the message and  advise  me
immediately as soon as a decision was reached.
     I  tried  with all the means at my disposal to  make  it
clear  to  M. that an immediate journey of the Reich  Foreign
Minister  was absolutely- necessary in the interest  of  both
countries.  I  closed  with  the  request  that,  under   any
circumstances, I be given an answer today.
     I  have just learned that M. wishes to see me again at 5
p. m.
     
SCHNURRE

                            *****
                              
Frame 260307, serial 695

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
MOSCOW, August 21, 1939.
SECRET

No. 199 of August 21

Supplementing my telegram No. 197 of August 21.

     Molotov  delivered  to me at 5 p.  m.  Stalin's  answer,
couched  in  very conciliatory form in reply to the  Fhrer's
message. Stalin advises that the Soviet Government agrees  to
the arrival of the Reich Foreign Minister on August 23.
     Molotov  declared that it was the desire of  the  Soviet
Government  that  tomorrow morning  at  the  latest  a  short
factual communiqu‚ on the contemplated conclusion of  a  non-
aggression  pact and "pending" arrival of the  Reich  Foreign
Minister  be  published in Moscow. Molotov  requested  German
assent  to  this by midnight. I advise consenting  since  the
Soviet   Government   places   itself   on   record   through
publication.
     Text of Stalin's letter follows at once by wire.

SCHNURRE

Page 69

                            *****

Frame 260306, serial 695

 The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to
                  the German Foreign Office

                          Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 21, 1939-7:30 p. m.
SECRET

No. 200 of August 21

Supplementing my telegram No. 199 of August 21.

     Text of Stalin's reply:

     "August 21, 1939. To the Chancellor of the German  Reich
A. Hitler. I thank you for the letter. I hope that the German-
Soviet  non-aggression pact will mark a decided turn for  the
better in the political relations between our countries.
     The people of our countries need peaceful relations with
each  other.  The  assent  of the German  Government  to  the
conclusion  of a non-aggression pact provides the  foundation
for   eliminating   the  political  tension   and   for   the
establishment   of  peace  and  collaboration   between   our
countries.
     The  Soviet  Government has authorized me to inform  you
that it agrees to Herr von Ribbentrop's arriving in Moscow on
August 23. J. Stalin."

SCHULENBURG

                            *****

Frames 0032-0033, serial F 11

                         Full Powers
 To the Reich Foreign Minister, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop

     I  hereby grant full power to negotiate, in the name  of
the  German  Reich,  with authorized representatives  of  the
Government  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,
regarding  a  non-aggression treaty, as well as  all  related
questions,  and  if occasion arises, to sign  both  the  non-
aggression  treaty  and other agreements resulting  from  the
negotiations,  with the proviso that this  treaty  and  these
agreements shall enter into force as soon as they are signed.

ADOLF HITLER
RIBBENTROP

OBERSALZBERG, August 22, 1939.

Page 70

                            *****
                              
Frames 130968-130970, serial 155

   Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign
                     Office (Weizs„cker)

St. S. Nr. 614
BERLIN, August 22, 1939.

     After  the Reich Foreign Minister late yesterday evening
had  briefly  informed the Japanese Ambassador  by  telephone
from  the  Berghof about the latest turn between  Berlin  and
Moscow,  I  received  Herr  Oshima  about  midnight   for   a
conference   which  lasted  about  one  hour.  The   Japanese
Ambassador as usual showed himself well disposed. At the same
time,   I  discerned  in  him  a  certain  uneasiness,  which
increased in the course of the conversation.
     I first described to Oshima the natural course of events
which  had  led  us to today's conclusion of a non-aggression
pact. When Oshima expressed his own concern, we finally  came
to   an  agreement  as  to  how  Oshima  might  convince  his
Government of the necessity and the advantage of the  current
proceedings.
     The  ideas of Oshima were, as was to be expected,  along
two lines:

     1)  If  Russia were relieved of anxiety in  Europe,  she
would strengthen her East Asiatic front and put new life into
the Chinese war.
     2)  The jurists in Tokyo (and there were a great many of
them) would debate the consistency of our present proceedings
with certain earlier German-Japanese conversations.

     Oshima  added  that  there  was  no  use  in  trying  to
interfere with accomplished facts. He did, however, look  for
a  certain shock in Japan, and he would like to abate this by
making a telegraphic report tonight.
     My discussion was along lines somewhat as follows:

     1) We were doing nothing which would put in question our
friendly  relationship with Japan. On the contrary, we  would
continue to maintain that, and we esteemed the personalities,
like  Oshima, who had acted and would act most vigorously  to
that end.
     2) The present proceedings were not a cause for surprise
inasmuch  as  the  Reich Foreign Minister  had  informed  the
Ambassador  some  months previously that a  normalization  of
German-Russian relations was worth attempting.
     3)  Such  an arrangement would also put us in a position
to  take  steps to bring about a period of quiet in Japanese-
Russian  relations  and  to  insure  its  continuance  for  a
considerable period of time. That Japan was at the moment not
seeking  a Japanese-Russian conflict was certain. I had  even
received from the Russian side the impression that a  Moscow-
Tokyo agreement would be welcomed there.

Page 71

     4)  Since the Anti-Comintern discussions (which had been
mentioned  by Oshima) had been undertaken, the front  of  our
enemies had been dislocated both by Japan and by Germany.  It
was  clear as day that for Japan England had become Enemy No.
1,  just  as Germany also was threatened much less by Russian
than by English policy. The agreement which was being reached
with Moscow was serving the interests of both of us.
     5) If Oshima referred to certain earlier German-Japanese
conversations, we would not argue the point with him that  we
had  sought  tirelessly to improve German-Japanese relations.
We  had  waited for half a year to hear some echo from Japan.
The  Japanese  Government, therefore, had  the  priority  and
Oshima   had  certainly  had  the  merit  of  having   always
recognized  this, and of having urged that these negotiations
be speeded up.
     6) Our economic, and also certain political, discussions
with Moscow had lasted for some time. The negotiations for  a
non-aggression pact were, however, of very recent origin.  It
was  only  in the last two or three days that the possibility
of  this  had appeared. Polish arrogance might force us  into
war even in the course of this week. With only such a limited
amount of time available, we had been absolutely compelled to
act.
     
     The  Ambassador  took  note  of  these  remarks  and  in
conclusion he assured me of his unaltered intention  to  work
further for German-Japanese friendship. Besides. he hoped  to
be  able to have a brief conference yet today with the  Reich
Foreign  Minister,  if the latter passed through  Berlin,  in
order  to give his report to Tokyo still more weight.  If  it
were necessary, Oshima would come to the airfield.

WEIZSŽCKER

                            *****

Frame 254847, serial 644

   The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Foreign Office

                        Telegram [32]

VERY URGENT
Moscow, August 2X, 1939-8:05 p. m.

No. 204 of August 23

     Please  advise the Fhrer at once that the first  three-
hour  conference with Stalin and Molotov has just  ended.  At
the  discussion- which, moreover, proceeded affirmatively  in
our sense-it transpired that the decisive point for the final
result  is  the demand of the Russians that we recognize  the
ports  of  Libau  and  Windau  as  within  their  sphere   of
influence.  I  would  be grateful for confirmation  before  8
o'clock  German  time that the Fhrer is  in  agreement,  The
signing

[32]  Other  copies of this message and of the  reply  to  it
indicate  that  the  messages were transmitted  by  telephone
(frame 24017, serial 34 and frame 260299, serial 695).

Page 72

of  a  secret protocol on delimitation of mutual  spheres  of
influence  in  the  whole eastern area is  contemplated,  for
which I declared myself ready in principle.

RIBBENTROP

                            *****

Frame 24018, serial 34

   The German Foreign Office to the Reich Foreign Minister

                        Telegram [33]

No. 205
BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

Reference your telegram No. 204.

     Answer is Yes. Agreed.

KORDT

                            *****
                              
Frames 0019-0030, serial F 11

Memorandum of a Conversation Held on the Night of August  23d
     to  24th, Between the Reich Foreign Minister, on the One
     Hand, and Herr Stalin and the Chairman of the Council of
     People's Commissars Molotov, on the Other Hand

VERY SECRET!
STATE SECRET

The following problems were discussed:

1) Japan:
     The  REICH  FOREIGN  MINISTER stated  that  the  German-
Japanese  friendship  was  in no wise  directed  against  the
Soviet  Union. We were, rather, in a position, owing  to  our
good  relations with Japan, to make an effective contribution
to  an adjustment of the differences between the Soviet Union
and  Japan.  Should  Herr Stalin and  the  Soviet  Government
desire it, the Reich Foreign Minister was prepared to work in
this  direction. He would use his influence with the Japanese
Government  accordingly and keep in  touch  with  the  Soviet
representative in Berlin in this matter.
     HERR STALIN replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired
an  improvement in its relations with Japan, but  that  there
were   limits  to  its  patience  with  regard  to   Japanese
provocations.  If Japan desired war, it could  have  it.  The
Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If
Japan   desired  peace-so  much  the  better!   Herr   Stalin
considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an

[33]  Another copy of this message (frame 260299, serial 695)
indicates  that it was transmitted by telephone and  received
at Moscow at 11 p. m. on August 23.

Page 73

improvement  in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful,  but  he
did  not  want  the Japanese to get the impression  that  the
initiative  in  this direction had been taken by  the  Soviet
Union.
     The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER assented to this and stressed
the   fact  that  his  cooperation  would  mean  merely   the
continuation  of  talks that he had for months  been  holding
with  the  Japanese Ambassador in Berlin in the sense  of  an
improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. Accordingly,  there
would be no new initiative on the German side in this matter.

2) Italy:
     HERR STALIN inquired of the Reich Foreign Minister as to
Italian  aims.  Did  not  Italy have aspirations  beyond  the
annexation  of  Albania-perhaps for Greek  territory?  Small,
mountainous,  and  thinly  populated  Albania  was,  in   his
estimation, of no particular use to Italy.
     The  REICH  FOREIGN MINISTER replied  that  Albania  was
important to Italy for strategic reasons. Moreover, Mussolini
was a strong man who could not be intimidated.
     This he had demonstrated in the Abyssinian conflict,  in
which Italy had asserted its aims by its own strength against
a  hostile coalition. Even Germany was not yet in a  position
at that time to give Italy appreciable support.
     Mussolini  welcomed warmly the restoration  of  friendly
relations  between  Germany and  the  Soviet  Union.  He  had
expressed himself as gratified with the conclusion of the Non-
aggression Pact.

3) Turkey:
     HERR  STALIN  asked  the  Reich  Foreign  Minister  what
Germany thought about Turkey.
     The  REICH FOREIGN MINISTER expressed himself as follows
in  this  matter: he had months ago declared to  the  Turkish
Government  that  Germany  desired  friendly  relations  with
Turkey.   The   Reich  Foreign  Minister  had  himself   done
everything  to  achieve this goal. The answer had  been  that
Turkey  became  one  of  the  first  countries  to  join  the
encirclement pact against Germany and had not even considered
it necessary to notify the Reich Government of the fact.
     HERREN  STALIN  and MOLOTOV hereupon observed  that  the
Soviet  Union  had  also had a similar  experience  with  the
vacillating policy of the Turks.
     The   REICH  FOREIGN  MINISTER  mentioned  further  that
England  had spent five minion pounds in Turkey in  order  to
disseminate propaganda against Germany.

Page 74

     HERR  STALIN said that according to his information  the
amount  which England had spent in buying Turkish politicians
was considerably more than five million pounds.

4) England:
     HERREN  STALIN  and MOLOTOV commented adversely  on  the
British Military Mission in Moscow, which had never told  the
Soviet Government what it really wanted.
     The  REICH  FOREIGN MINISTER stated in  this  connection
that  England had always been trying and was still trying  to
disrupt the development of good relations between Germany and
the  Soviet Union. England was weak and wanted to let  others
fight for its presumptuous claim to world domination.
     HERR  STALIN eagerly concurred and observed as  follows:
the  British  Army  was  weak; the  British  Navy  no  longer
deserved its previous reputation. England's air arm was being
increased,  to  be sure, but there was a lack of  pilots.  If
England dominates the world in spite of this, this was due to
the   stupidity  of  the  other  countries  that  always  let
themselves be bluffed. It was ridiculous, for example, that a
few hundred British should dominate India.
     The  REICH FOREIGN MINISTER concurred and informed  Herr
Stalin confidentially that England had recently put out a new
feeler which was connected with certain allusions to 1914. It
was  a  matter  of a typically English, stupid maneuver.  The
Reich  Foreign Minister had proposed to the Fhrer to  inform
the  British  that every hostile British act, in  case  of  a
German-Polish conflict, would be answered by a bombing attack
on London.
     HERR  STALIN  remarked  that the  feeler  was  evidently
Chamberlain's   letter  to  the  Fhrer,   which   Ambassador
Henderson delivered on August 23 at the Obersalzberg.  Stalin
further  expressed  the  opinion that  England,  despite  its
weakness, would wage war craftily and stubbornly.

5) France:
     HERR   STALIN   expressed  the  opinion   that   France,
nevertheless, had an army worthy of consideration.
     The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, on his part, pointed out  to
Herren  Stalin  and  Molotov  the  numerical  inferiority  of
France.  While Germany had available an annual class of  more
than  300,000  soldiers,  France could  muster  only  150,000
recruits annually. The West Wall was five times as strong  as
the  Maginot  Line.  If France attempted  to  wage  war  with
Germany, she would certainly be conquered.

Page 75

6) Anti-Comintern Pact:
     The  REICH  FOREIGN  MINISTER observed  that  the  Anti-
Comintern Pact was basically directed not against the  Soviet
Union  but against the Western democracies. He knew, and  was
able  to  infer from the tone of the Russian press, that  the
Soviet Government fully recognized this fact.
     HERR STALIN interposed that the Anti-Comintern Pact  had
in  fact  frightened principally the City of London  and  the
small British merchants.
     The   REICH  FOREIGN  MINISTER  concurred  and  remarked
jokingly that Herr Stalin was surely less frightened  by  the
Anti-Comintern  Pact than the City of London  and  the  small
British  merchants. What the German people  thought  of  this
matter  is evident from a joke which had originated with  the
Berliners, well known for their wit and humor, and which  had
been  going  the  rounds for several months, namely,  "Stalin
will yet join the Anti-Comintern Pact."

7) Attitude of the German people to the German-Russian Non-
aggression Pact:
     The  REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated that he had been able
to  determine  that  all  strata of the  German  people,  and
especially  the  simple  people,  most  warmly  welcomed  the
understanding  with  the  Soviet  Union.  The   people   felt
instinctively  that between Germany and the Soviet  Union  no
natural   conflicts  of  interests  existed,  and  that   the
development  of  good relations had hitherto  been  disturbed
only  by  foreign  intrigue, in particular  on  the  part  of
England.
     HERR  STALIN replied that he readily believed this.  The
Germans   desired  peace  and  therefore  welcomed   friendly
relations between the Reich and the Soviet Union.
     The  REICH FOREIGN MINISTER interrupted here to say that
it  was  certainly true that the German people desired peace,
but,  on  the other hand, indignation against Poland  was  so
great  that  every single man was ready to fight. The  German
people would no longer put up with Polish provocation.

8) Toasts:
     In   the   course  of  the  conversation,  HERR   STALIN
spontaneously proposed a toast to the Fhrer, as follows:

     "I  know how much the German nation loves its Fhrer;  I
should therefore like to drink to his health."

Page 76

     HERR  MOLOTOV  drank to the health of the Reich  Foreign
Minister and of the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg.
     HERR  MOLOTOV raised his glass to Stalin, remarking that
it  had  been Stalin who-through his speech of March of  this
year,  which had been well understood in Germany-had  brought
about the reversal in political relations.
     HERREN  MOLOTOV and STALIN drank repeatedly to the  Non-
aggression Pact, the new era of German-Russian relations, and
to the German nation.
     The  REICH FOREIGN MINISTER in turn proposed a toast  to
Herr  Stalin,  toasts  to the Soviet  Government,  and  to  a
favorable  development of relations between Germany  and  the
Soviet Union.

9) When they took their leave, HERR STALIN addressed to the
Reich Foreign Minister words to this effect:

     The Soviet Government takes the new Pact very seriously.
He could guarantee on his word of honor that the Soviet Union
would not betray its partner.

HENCKE

Moscow, August 24, 1939.

                            *****

Frames 0048-0050, serial F 11

  Treaty of Non-aggression Between Germany and the Union of
                 Soviet Socialist Republics

August 23, 1939.

     The Government of the German Reich and
     the   Government  of  the  Union  of  Soviet   Socialist
Republics
     desirous  of  strengthening the cause of  peace  between
Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental
provisions  of  the Neutrality Agreement concluded  in  April
1926  between  Germany  and the U.S.S.R.,  have  reached  the
following agreement:

                          ARTICLE I

     Both  High  Contracting Parties obligate  themselves  to
desist  from any act of violence, any aggressive action,  and
any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with
other powers.

Page 77

                         ARTICLE II

     Should  one  of the High Contracting Parties become  the
object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High
Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this
third power.

                         ARTICLE III

     The  Governments  of  the two High  Contracting  Parties
shall  in  the  future maintain continual  contact  with  one
another  for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange
information on problems affecting their common interests.

                         ARTICLE IV

     Neither  of  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties  shall
participate  in  any  grouping of powers whatsoever  that  is
directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

                          ARTICLE V

     Should  disputes  or conflicts arise  between  the  High
Contracting  Parties over problems of one  kind  or  another,
both   parties  shall  settle  these  disputes  or  conflicts
exclusively  through  friendly exchange  of  opinion  or,  if
necessary,   through   the   establishment   of   arbitration
commissions.

                         ARTICLE VI

     The  present  treaty is concluded for a  period  of  ten
years,  with the proviso that, in so far as one of  the  High
Contracting  Parties does not denounce it one year  prior  to
the  expiration of this period, the validity of  this  treaty
shall automatically be extended for another five years.

                         ARTICLE VII

     The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest
possible  time.  The  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  in
Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is
signed.

     Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:
V. RIBBENTROP

With full power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
V. MOLOTOV

Page 78

Frames 182-183, serial F 19

                 Secret Additional Protocol

     On  the  occasion of the signature of the Non-aggression
Pact  between  the  German Reich and the Union  of  Socialist
Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of
the   two   parties   discussed  in   strictly   confidential
conversations   the  question  of  the  boundary   of   their
respective  spheres  of  influence in Eastern  Europe.  These
conversations led to the following conclusions:
     1.   In   the  event  of  a  territorial  and  political
rearrangement  in  the areas belonging to the  Baltic  States
(Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern  boundary
of  Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres  of
influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection  the
interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each
party.
     2.   In   the  event  of  a  territorial  and  political
rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state  the
spheres  of  influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R.  shall  be
bounded  approximately  by  the line  of  the  rivers  Narew,
Vistula, and San.
     The  question  of whether the interests of both  parties
make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state
and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely
determined in the course of further political developments.
     In any event both Governments will resolve this question
by means of a friendly agreement.
     3.  With  regard  to  Southeastern Europe  attention  is
called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia.  The
German side declares its complete political disinterestedness
in these areas. [34]
     4.  This  protocol shall be treated by both  parties  as
strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:
V. RIBBENTROP

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
V. MOLOTOV

[34]  The German text of this article of the Protocol  is  as
follows:   "Hinsichtlich  des  Sdostens  Europas  wird   von
sowjetischer Seite das Interesse an Bessarabien  betont.  Von
deutscher  Seite wird das v”llige politische Desinteressement
an diesen Gebieten erkl„rt."
     For a statement by the Reich Foreign Minister concerning
the   discussion  of  these  subjects  at  the  time  of  the
conclusion  of  the  Non-aggression  Pact,  see  Ribbentrop's
memorandum for Hitler of June 24, 1940, post, p. 157.


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