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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression - Volume Two, Chapter 15
6. THE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (GESTAPO) AND
SICHERHEITSDIENST
[Page 248]
This section on the Geheime Staatspolizei (GESTAPO) includes
evidence on the criminality of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of
the Schutzstaffeln (SS). In the Indictment the SD is
included by special references as a part of the SS, since it
originated as a part of the SS and always retained its
character as a party organization, as distinguished from the
GESTAPO, which was a State
[Page 249]
organization. As will be shown in this section, however, the
GESTAPO and the SD were brought into close working
relationship, the SD serving primarily as the information-
gathering agency and the GESTAPO as the executive agency of
the police system established by the Nazis for the purpose
of combatting the political and ideological enemies of the
Nazi regime. This close working relationship between the
GESTAPO and the SD was accomplished by the appointment of
Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, to the position of
Chief of the German Police. What is proved in this section
with respect to the criminality of the SD applies directly
to the case against the SS. The relationship between the SS
and the GESTAPO is considered in section 5 on the SS.
A. Development of the Gestapo and the SD.
(1) Development of the GESTAPO. The Geheime Staatspolizei,
or GESTAPO, was first established in Prussia on 26 April
1933 by Goering, with the mission of carrying out the duties
of political police with or in place of the ordinary police
authorities. The GESTAPO chief was given the rank of a
higher police authority and was subordinated only to the
Minister of the Interior, to whom was delegated the
responsibility of determining its functional and territorial
jurisdiction (2104-PS). Pursuant to this law, and on the
same date, the Minister of the Interior issued a decree on
the reorganization of the police which established a State
Police Bureau in each government district of Prussia
subordinate to the Secret State Police Bureau in Berlin.
(2371-PS)
On 30 November 1933 Goering issued a decree for the Prussian
State Ministry and for the Reichs Chancellor which
acknowledged the valuable services which the GESTAPO was
able to render to the State and which placed the GESTAPO
under his direct supervision as Chief. The GESTAPO was
thereby established as an independent branch of the
Administration of the Interior, responsible directly to
Goering as Prussian Prime Minister. This decree gave the
GESTAPO jurisdiction over the political police matters of
the general and interior administration and provided that
the district, county, and local police authorities were
subject to the directives of the GESTAPO (2105-PS). By a
decree of 8 March 1934 the regional State Police offices
were separated from their organizational connection with the
district government and established as independent
authorities of the GESTAPO. (2113-PS)
Parallel to the development of the GESTAPO in Prussia, the
Reichsfuehrer SS, Heinrich Himmler, created in Bavaria the
[Page 250]
Bavarian Political Police and also directed the formation of
political police forces in the other federal states outside
of Prussia. The unification of the political police of the
various states took place in the spring of 1934 when Hermann
Goering appointed Himmler the Deputy Chief of the Prussian
GESTAPO in place of the former Deputy Chief, Diels. Himmler
thereby obtained unified control over the political police
forces throughout the Reich. (1680-PS)
On 10 February 1936 the basic law for the GESTAPO was
promulgated by Goering as Prussian Prime Minister. This law
provided that the Secret State Police had the duty to
investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the
State all tendencies inimical to the State, and declared
that orders in matters of the Secret State Police were not
subject to the review of the administrative courts (2107-
PS). On the same date, 10 February 1936 , a decree for the
execution of said law was issued by Goering as Prussian
Prime Minister and by Frick as Minister of the Interior.
This decree provided that the GESTAPO had authority to enact
measures valid in the entire area' of the State and measures
affecting that area, that it was the centralized agency for
collecting political intelligence in the field of political
police, and that it administered the concentration camps.
The GESTAPO was given authority to make police
investigations in cases of criminal attacks upon Party as
well as upon State. (2108-PS)
On 28 August 1936 a circular of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of
the German Police provided that as of 1 October 1936 the
political police forces of the German provinces were to be
called the "Geheime Staatspolizei" (Secret State Police).
The regional offices were still to be described as State
Police (2372-PS). On 20 September 1936 a circular of the Minister of
the Interior commissioned the GESTAPO Bureau in Berlin with
the supervision of the duties of the political police
commanders in all the States of Germany. (L-297)
The law relating to financial measures in connection with
the police of 19 March 1937 provided that officials of the
GESTAPO were to be considered direct officials of the Reich
and their salaries, in addition to the operational expenses
of the whole State Police, were to be borne from 1 April
1937 on by the Reich. (2243-PS)
Through the above laws and decrees the GESTAPO was
established as a uniform political police system operating
throughout the Reich and serving Party, State, and the Nazi
leadership.
(2) Development of the SD. In 1932 the Reichsfuehrer of the
SS, Heinrich Himmler, created the Sicherheitsdienst, or SD,
as an
[Page 251]
intelligence service of the SS under the then SS-
Standartenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich. (1680-PS)
On 9 June 1934, the NSDAP issued an ordinance which merged
all information facilities then existing within the Party
organization into the SD, and the SD was established as the
sole Party information service.
In the course of its development, the SD came into
increasingly closer cooperation with the GESTAPO and also
with the Reich Kriminalpolizei, the Criminal Police, or
KRIPO. The GESTAPO and the KRIPO considered together were
called the Sicherheitspolizei, the Security Police, or SIPO.
The SD was also called upon to furnish information to
various State authorities. On 11 November 1938 a decree of
the Reich Minister of the Interior declared that the SD was
to be the intelligence organization for the State as well as
for the Party, that it had the particular duty of supporting
the Secret State Police, and that it thereby became active
on a national mission. These duties necessitated a close
cooperation between the SD and the authorities for the
General and Interior Administration. (1680-PS; 1638-PS)
Through the above laws and decrees the SD was established as
a uniform political information service operating throughout
the Reich and serving Party, State, and the Nazi leadership.
(3) Consolidation of the GESTAPO and the SD. The first step
in the consolidation of the political police system of the
State (the GESTAPO) and the information service of the Nazi
Party (the SD) took place in the spring of 1934 when Goering
appointed Himmler Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO. Heydrich was
the head of the SD under Himmler, and when Himmler took over
the actual direction of the GESTAPO, these two agencies were
in effect united. under one command. (1956-PS)
On 17 June 1936, "for the uniformity of police duties in the
Reich," the position of Chief of the German Police was
established in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to which
was assigned the direction and protection of all police
affairs within the jurisdiction of the Reich. By this law
Himmler was appointed Chief of the German Police under
Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, and was given the
right to participate in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet as
Chief of the German Police. (2073-PS)
On 26 June 1936 Himmler issued a decree providing for the
appointment of a chief of the uniformed police and of a
chief of the Security Police. This decree divided the German
police system into two principal branches:
(a) Ordnungspolizei (ORPO or Regular Police).
[Page 252]
(b) Sicherheitspolizei (SIPO or Security Police).
The Ordnungspolizei was composed of the Schutzpolizei
(Safety Police), the Gendarmerie (Rural Police), and the
Gemeindepolizei (Local Police). The Sicherheitspolizei was
composed of the Reich Kriminalpolizei (KRIPO) and the
Geheime Staatspolizei (GESTAPO). Daluege was named head of
the Ordnungspolizei and Heydrich was named head of the
Sicherheitspolizei. Since Heydrich was also head of the SD,
he took the new title of Chief of the Security Police and
SD. (1551-PS)
On 27 September 1939 by order of Himmler, in his capacity as
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, the central
offices of the GESTAPO and the SD, together with the
Criminal Police, were centralized in the office of the Chief
of the Security Police and SD under the name of the
Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reich Security Main Office, or
RSHA. Under this order the personnel and administrative
sections of each agency were coordinated in Amt I and Amt II
of the RSHA; the operational sections of the SD became Amt
III (except for foreign intelligence which was placed in Amt
VI); the operational sections of the GESTAPO became Amt IV
and the operational sections of the KRIPO became Amt V.
Ohlendorf was named the Chief of Amt III, the SD within
Germany; Mueller was named the Chief of Amt IV, the GESTAPO;
and Nebe was named the Chief of Amt V, the KRIPO. (L-361)
On 27 September 1939 Heydrich, as Chief of the Security
Police and SD, issued a directive pursuant to the foregoing
order of Himmler, in which he ordered the designation and
heading "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" to be used exclusively
in internal relations of the Reich Ministry of the Interior,
and the heading "The Chief of the Security Police and SD" in
transactions with outside persons and offices. The directive
provided that the GESTAPO would continue to use the
designation and heading "Geheime Staatspolizeiamt" according
to particular instructions.
In 1944 most of the sections of the Abwehr (military
intelligence) were incorporated into the various sections of
the RSHA and into a new section connected with Amt VI,
called the Militaersches Amt.
Heydrich was Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA)
until his death on 6/4/1942, after which Himmler directed
the organization until the appointment of the defendant
Ernst Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD.
Kaltenbrunner took office on 30 January 1943 and remained
Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) until the end of
the war. (2644-PS)
[Page 253]
B. Organization of the Gestapo and the SD.
(1) Organization of the Gestapo (Amt lV of the RSHA). The
headquarters organization of the GESTAPO (Amt IV of the
RSHA) was set up on a functional basis. In 1943 it contained
five sub-sections.
Section A dealt with opponents, sabotage, and protective
service and was subdivided as follows:
A 1 Communism, Marxism and associated organizations,
war crimes, illegal and enemy propaganda.
A 2 Defense against sabotage, combatting of sabotage,
political falsification.
A 3 Reaction, opposition, legitimism, liberalism,
matters of malicious opposition.
A 4 Protective service, reports of attempted
assassinations, guarding, special jobs, pursuit troops.
Section B dealt with political churches, sects and Jews, and
was subdivided as follows:
B 1 Political Catholicism.
B 2 Political Protestantism Sects.
B 3 Other churches, Freemasonry.
B 4 Jewish affairs, matters of evacuation, means of
suppressing enemies of the people and State,
dispossession of rights of German citizenship.
(Eichmann was head of this office).
Section C dealt with card files, protective custody, and
matters of press and Party, and was subdivided as follows:
C 1 Evaluation, main card index, administration of
individual files, information office, supervision of
foreigners.
C 2 Matters of protective custody.
C 3 Matters of the press and literature.
C 4 Matters of the Party and its formations, special
cases.
Section D dealt with regions under greater German influence,
and was subdivided as follows:
D (aus. arb.) Foreign Workers.
D 1 Matters of the Protectorate, Czechs in the Reich,
Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, and the remaining regions of
the former Jugoslavia, Greece.
D 2 Matters of the General Government, Poles in the
Reich.
D 3 Confidential office, foreigners hostile to the
State, emigrants.
[Page 254]
D 4 Occupied territories, France, Belgium, Holland,
Norway, Denmark.
D 5 Occupied Eastern territories.
Section E dealt with security and was subdivided as follows:
E 1 General security matters, supply of legal opinions
in matters of high and State treason, and other
security matters.
E 2 General economic matters, defense against economic
espionage, protection of works and those engaged in
guarding.
E 3 Security West.
E 4 Security North.
E 5 Security East.
E 6 Security South.
Section F dealt with passport matters and alien police and
was subdivided as follows:
F 1 Frontier police.
F 2 Passport matters.
F 3 Identification and identity cards.
F 4 Alien police and basic questions concerning
frontiers.
F 5 Central visa office. (L-219)
Subordinate offices of the GESTAPO were established
throughout the Reich and designated as Staats
Polizeileitstellen or Staats Polizeistellen, depending upon
the size of the office. These offices reported directly to
the RSHA in Berlin but were subject to the supervision of
Inspekteurs of the Security Police in the various provinces.
The inspectors were expected to foster cooperation between
the Security Police and the central offices of the general
and interior administration. (2245-PS)
In the occupied territories the regional offices of the
GESTAPO were coordinated with the Criminal Police and the SD
under Kommandeurs of the Security Police and SD, who were
subject to Befehlshabers of the Security Police and SD who
reported to the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA)
in Berlin. (1285-PS)
(2) Organization of the SD (Amt III of the RSHA). The
headquarters organization of the SD (including only Amt III
of the RSHA and not Amt VI, the Foreign Intelligence Branch)
was set up on a functional basis. In 1943 it contained four
sections.
Section A dealt with questions of legal order and structure
of the Reich and was subdivided as follows:
A 1 General questions of work on spheres of German
life.
A 2 Law.
[Page 255]
A 3 Constitution and administration.
A 4 National life in general.
A 5 General questions of police law, and technical
questions of legislation.
Section B dealt with nationality, and was subdivided as
follows:
B 1 Nationality questions.
B 2 Minorities.
B 3 Race and health of the people.
B 4 Citizenship and naturalization.
B 5 Occupied territories.
Section C dealt with culture, and was subdivided as follows:
C 2 Educational religious life.
C 3 Folk culture and art.
C 4 Press, literature, radio, office for evaluation of
material.
Section D dealt with economics, and was subdivided as
follows:
D a Reading office, economics, press, magazines,
literature.
D b Colonial economics.
D S Special questions and review of material.
D West Western occupied regions.
D 0st Eastern occupied regions.
D 1 Food economy.
D 2 Commerce, handcraft, and transport.
D 3 Finance, currency, banks and exchanges, insurance.
D 4 Industry and Power.
D 5 Labor and Social Questions. (L-219)
Within Germany the original regional offices of the SD were
called SD-Oberabschnitte and SD-Unterabschnitte. In 1939
these designations were changed to SD-Abschnitte and SD-
Leitabschntte. Offices of the SD-Abschnitte were located in
the same place as the Staatspolizeistellen. SD-Abschnitte
located where there were Staats Polizeileitstellen were
called "SD Leitabschnitte. Direct orders came from the Chief
of the Security Police and SD in Berlin (RSHA) to these
regional offices, but they were also subject to the
supervision of the Inspekteurs of the SIPO and SD. In the
occupied territories the regional offices of the SD were
coordinated with the GESTAPO and Criminal Police under
Kommandeurs of the SIPO and SD who were subject to
Befehlshabers of the Security Police and SD who reported to
the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) in Berlin.
(1680-PS, L-361)
[Page 256]
(3) Combined Organization of the GESTAPO and SD. The central
offices of the GESTAPO and SD were coordinated in 1936 with
the appointment of Heydrich, the head of the SD, as chief of
the Security Police. The office of Heydrich was called
"Chief of the Security Police and SD." (1551-PS)
When the central offices of the GESTAPO and SD, together
with the Criminal Police, were centralized in one main
office (RSHA) in 1939, the functions were somewhat
redistributed.
Amt I of the RSHA handled personnel for the three agencies.
Subsection A 2 handled personnel matters of the GESTAPO, A 3
handled personnel matters of the KRIPO, and A 4 handled
personnel matters of the SD.
Amt II handled organization, administration, and law for the
three agencies. Subsection C handled domestic arrangements
and pay accounts, and was divided into two sections, one to
take care of pay accounts of the Security Police and the
other to take care of pay accounts of the SD, since
personnel of the former were paid by the State and personnel
of the latter were paid by the Party. Subsection D, under SS-
Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff handled technical matters,
including the motor vehicles of the SIPO and SD.
Amt III was the SD and was charged with investigation into
spheres of German life. Its subdivisions have heretofore
been considered.
Amt IV was the GESTAPO and was charged with combatting
political opposition. Its subdivisions have heretofore been
considered.
Amt V was the KRIPO and was charged with combatting
criminals. Subsection V D was the criminological institute
for the SIPO handling matters of identification, chemical
and biological investigations, and technical research.
Amt VI was concerned with foreign political intelligence and
contained subsections dealing with western Europe, Russia
and Japan, Anglo-American sphere, and central Europe. It
contained a special section dealing with sabotage.
Amt VII handled ideological research against enemies, such
as Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and
liberalism. (L-185, L-219)
The centralization of the main offices of the GESTAPO and SD
was not fully carried out in the regional organization.
Within Germany the regional offices of the GESTAPO and SD
maintained their separate identity and reported directly to
the section of the RSHA which had the jurisdiction of the
subject matter. They were, however, coordinated by the
Inspekteurs of the Secur-
[Page 257]
ity Police and SD. The Inspekteurs were also under the
supervision of the Higher SS and Police leaders appointed
for each Wehrkreis.
The Higher SS and Police leaders reported to the
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in each
Wehrkreis and supervised not only the Inspekteurs of the
Security Police and SD but also the Inspekteurs of the Order
Police and various subdivisions of the SS.
In the occupied territories the organization developed as
the German armies advanced. Combined operational units of
the Security Police and SD, known as Einsatz Groups,
operated with and in the rear of the Army. These groups were
officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the KRIPO, and the
SD, and the enlisted men were composed of Order Police and
Waffen SS. They functioned with various army groups. The
Einsatz Groups were subdivided in to Einsatzkommandos,
Sonderkommandos, and Teilkommandos, all of which performed
the functions of the Security Police and SD with or closely
behind the army. After the occupied territories had been
consolidated, the Einsatz Groups and their subordinate parts
were formed into permanent combined offices of the Security
Police and SD within prescribed geographical locations.
These combined forces were placed under the Kommandeurs of
the Security Police and SD, and the offices were organized
in sections similar to the RSHA headquarters. The
Kommandeurs of the Security Police and SD reported directly
to Befehlshabers of the Security Police and SD, who in turn
reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and
SD. In the occupied territories, the Higher SS and Police
leaders exercised more direct control over the Befehlshabers
and the Kommandeurs of the Security Police and SD than
within the Reich. They had authority to issue direct orders
so long as they did not conflict with the Chief of the
Security Police and SD who exercised controlling authority.
(1285-PS, Chart Number 19.)
C. Place of the GESTAPO and SD in the Conspiracy.
(1) Tasks and Methods of the GESTAPO. In the basic law of 10
February 1936, the GESTAPO was declared to have "the duty to
investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the
State, all tendencies dangerous to the State." The decree
issued for the execution of said law gave the GESTAPO the
authority to make police investigations in treason,
espionage, and sabotage cases, and in other cases of
criminal attacks on Party and State." (2107-PS, 2108-PS)
[Page 258]
In referring to the above law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner
Best, commented as follows:
"Not the State in its outward organic appearance but
the tasks of the leadership in the sense of the
National-Socialist idea is the object of protection."
(2232-PS)
The duties of the GESTAPO were described in 1938 as follows,
in an order published by the Party Chancery:
"To the GESTAPO has been entrusted the mission by the
Fuehrer to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of
the Party and the National Socialist State as well as
all disintegrating forces of all kinds directed against
both." (1723-PS)
In Das Archiv, January 1936, the duties of the GESTAPO were
described in part as follows:
"Since the National Socialist revolution, all open
struggle and all open opposition to the State and to
the leadership of the State is forbidden, and a Secret
State Police as a preventive instrument in the struggle
against all dangers threatening the State is
indissolubly bound up with the National Socialist
Fuehrer-State." (1956-PS)
The successful accomplishment of this mission to strike down
the political and ideological opponents of the Nazi
conspiracy was stated in the official magazine of the SIPO
and SD on 1 February 1943 in the following words:
"The Secret State Police by carrying out these tasks,
contributed decisively to the fact that the National
Socialist constructive work could be executed in the
past ten years without any serious attempts of
interference by the political enemies of the nation."
(1680-PS)
The methods used by the GESTAPO were limited only by the
results to be obtained.
"The duties of the political police and the necessary
means for their performance are not chosen freely but
are prescribed by the foe. Just like the operations of
an army against the outward enemy and the means to
fight this enemy cannot be prescribed, so the political
police also must have a free hand in the choice of the
means necessary at times to fight the attempts
dangerous to the State." (2232-PS)
The GESTAPO was not restricted to the limitations of written
law. The Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:
"As long as the 'police' carries out the will of the
leadership, it is acting legally." (1852-PS)
The GESTAPO was given the express power to take action
outside the law in the occupied territories. The laws
pertaining to the
[Page 259]
administration of Austria and the Sudetenland provided that
the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police will
take measures for the maintenance of security and order
"even beyond the legal limitation otherwise laid down for
this purpose." (1437-PS, 1438-PS)
The actions and orders of the GESTAPO were not subject to
judicial review. The decision of the Prussian High Court of
Administration on 2 May 1935 held that the status of the
GESTAPO as a special police authority removed its orders
from the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunals. The
court said that under the law of 30 November 1933 the only
redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority
within the GESTAPO itself. (2347-PS)
The basic law of 10 February 1936 on the powers of the
GESTAPO provided specifically in Section VII:
"Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not
subject to the review of the administrative
courts.".(2107-PS)
Concerning the power of the GESTAPO to act outside the law,
the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:
"It is no longer a question of law but a question of
fate whether the will of the leadership lays down the
'right' rules, i.e., rules feasible and necessary for
police action -- the 'police' law suitable for and
beneficial to the people. Actual misuse of the
legislative power by a people's leadership -- be it a
harmful severity or weakness -- will, because of the
violations of the 'laws of life,' be punished in
history more surely by fate itself through misfortune,
overthrow and ruin, than by a State Court of Justice."
(1852-PS)
The great power of the GESTAPO was "Schutzhaft" -- the power
to imprison people without judicial proceedings on the
theory of "protective custody." This power was based upon
the law of 28 February 1933 which suspended the clauses of
the Weimar Constitution guaranteeing civil liberties to the
German people, including Article 114 thereof, which provided
that an abridgement of personal liberty was permissible only
by authority of law. (2499-PS)
In April 1934 the Reich Minister of the Interior issued a
decree (which was not made public) stating that in view of
the stabilizing of the national situation it had become
feasible to place restrictions upon the exercise of
protective custody and providing for limitations upon its
exercise. (L-301, 779-PS)
The Gestapo did not observe such limitations, and the
practice of taking people into protective custody increased
greatly in
[Page 260]
1934. The GESTAPO did not permit lawyers to represent
persons taken into protective custody and, in one instance,
counsel were themselves placed in protective custody for
trying to represent clients. Civil employees were
investigated and taken into protective custody by the
GESTAPO without knowledge of their superiors. (775-PS)
As of 1 February 1938, the Reich Minister of the Interior
rescinded previous decrees relating to protective custody,
including the decree of 12 April 1934, and issued new
regulations. These regulations provided that protective
custody could be ordered:
"*** as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police
against persons who endangered the security of the
people and the State through their attitude, in order
to counter all aspirations of enemies of the people and
State";
that the GESTAPO had the exclusive right to order protective
custody; that protective custody was to be executed in the
State concentration camps; and that the GESTAPO, which
authorized release from protective custody, would review
individual cases once every three months. The Chief of the
Secret Police was given authority to issue the necessary
regulations. (1723-PS)
The importance of this power of protective custody was set
forth in Das Archiv, 1936, in the following language:
"The most effective preventive measure is without doubt
the withdrawal of freedom, which is covered in the form
of protective custody, if it is to be feared that the
free activity of the persons in question might endanger
the security of the State in any way. While protective
arrest of short duration is carried out in police and
court prisons, the concentration camps under the Secret
State Police admit those taken into protective custody
who have to be withdrawn from public life for a longer
time." (1956-PS)
The authority of the GESTAPO to administer the concentration
camps was set forth in the decree to the basic law of 10
February 1936 . (2108-PS)
Other methods used by the GESTAPO consisted of the
dissolution of associations, prohibition and dissolution of
assemblies and congregations, prohibition of publications of
various kinds and so forth. (1956-PS)
(2) Tasks and Methods of the SD. The task of the SD, after
it became the intelligence service for State and Party, was
to obtain secret information concerning the actual and
potential enemies of the Nazi leadership so that appropriate
action could be taken to destroy or neutralize opposition.
(1956-PS)
[Page 261]
The duties of the SD were stated by the Nazi jurist, Dr.
Werner Best, as follows:
"As the intelligence service of the German National
Socialist Labor Party, the Security Service has first
of all the task of investigating and keeping a watch
over all forces, events and facts which are of
importance for the domination of the National Socialist
idea and movement in German territory. With this task
follows that duty laid down by the Reich Minister of
the Interior -- the duty of supporting the Security
Police -- which is fulfilled, so far as it goes, under
State orders. In support of the tasks of the Security
Police in securing the ranks of the German people
against interference and destruction of any kind, the
Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life
of the German people with regard to the activities of
inimical forces and the result of state and political
measures, and to inform continually the competent State
authorities and offices about the facts which have come
to light Finally, it has to investigate politically and
explore fundamentally the activities and connections of
the great, ideological, arch-enemy of National
Socialism and the German people, in order thereby to
render possible a purposeful and effective fight
against it." (1852-PS)
To accomplish this task, the SD created an organization of
agents and informants operating out of various SD regional
offices established throughout the Reich, and later in
conjunction with the GESTAPO and Criminal Police throughout
the occupied territories. The organization consisted of
several hundred full-time agents whose work was supplemented
by several thousand part-time informants. Informants were
located in schools, shops, churches, and all other spheres
of German life, operating under cover, and reporting any
utterances or actions against the Nazi Party, State or
leadership. (2614-PS)
The SD had direct and powerful influence in the selection of
Nazi leaders. It investigated the loyalty and reliability of
State officials, evaluating them by their complete devotion
to Nazi ideology and the Hitler leadership. It secretly
marked ballots and thereby discovered the identity of
persons who cast "No" votes and "invalid" votes in the
referenda. (2614-PS, R-142)
The SD worked closely with the GESTAPO. An article in the
"Voelkischer Beobachter" published in Das Archiv, January
1936, stated:
"As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in
addition to its primary executive tasks, this
observation of the enemies
[Page 262]
of the state, to the extent necessary, there steps
alongside to supplement it the Security Service of the
Reichsleader of the SS, set up by the Deputy Fuehrer as
the political intelligence service of the movement,
which puts a large part of the forces of the movement
mobilized by it into the service of the security of the
state." (1956-PS)
(3) The Place of the GESTAPO and the SD in the Conspiracy.
The GESTAPO was founded in April 1933 by Goering to serve as
a political police force in Prussia. Goering instructed
Diels, the first Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO, that his main
task would be the elimination of political opponents of
National Socialism and the fight against Communism. (2460-PS)
In "Aufbau Einer Nation," published in 1934, Goering said:
"For weeks I had been working personally on the
reorganization and at last I alone and upon my own
decision and my own reflection created the office of
the Secret State Police. This instrument which is so
feared by the enemies of the State, has contributed
most to the fact that today there can no longer be talk
of a Communist and Marxist danger in Germany and
Prussia." (2344-PS)
So effective had the GESTAPO proven itself in combatting the
political opposition to National Socialism by the fall of
1933 that Goering took over direct control of the GESTAPO
(2105-PS). Goering's position as Chief of the GESTAPO in
Prussia was recognized by Himmler even after he became Chief
of the German Police in 193 (272-PS). Even as late as
December 1938 Goering continued to exercise his direct
control over the Prussian GESTAPO. (D-183)
Himmler was named Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia in
1934. He used the GESTAPO, infused with new personnel
recruited in large part from the SS, to carry out the Roehm
purge of 30 June 1934. (2460-PS)
The GESTAPO, through its great power of arrest and
confinement to concentration camps without recourse to law,
was the principal means for eliminating enemies of the Nazi
regime. Diels, the former Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO under
Goering, declared:
"*** From (1934) on the GESTAPO is responsible for all
deprivations of freedom and breaches of law and
killings in the political field which took place
without court verdict. Of primary importance among
these was the shooting of numerous persons who had been
committed to jails by the courts and then shot
supposedly because of resistance. Many such
[Page 263]
cases were at that time published in the papers. For
people guilty of immorality such illegal shootings
became the rule. As for deprivation of freedom, there
was no legal reason any more for protective custody
orders after 1934, which had still been the case before
that date, since from 1934 on the power of the
totalitarian state was so stabilized that the arrest of
a person for his own protection was only an excuse for
arbitrary arrest -- without court verdict and without
legal measures for him. 'The terroristic measures,
which led to the development of the pure force system
and punished to an increasing degree each critical
remark and each impulse of freedom with the
concentration camp, took on more and more arbitrary and
cruel forms. The GESTAPO became the symbol of the
regime of force."
D. Criminal Responsibility of the Gestapo and SD.
In the remainder of this section the criminal responsibility
of the GESTAPO and the SD will be considered with respect to
certain crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity which were in principal part committed by
the centralized political police system the development and
organization of which has previously been considered. In
some instances the crimes were committed in cooperation or
conjunction with other groups and organizations.
Frequent reference will be made to the phrase, "SIPO and
SD." The SIPO and SD was composed of the following
organizations, the GESTAPO, the KRIPO and the SD.
The GESTAPO was the largest of these, having a membership of
about 40,000 or 50,000 in 1943-45. It was the political
police force of the Reich. Much of its personnel consisted
of transferees from former political police forces of the
States. Membership in the GESTAPO was voluntary.
The KRIPO was second largest. having a membership of about
15,000 in 1943-45. It was the criminal police force of the
Reich.
The SD was the smallest, having a membership of about 3,000
in 1943-45. It was the intelligence service of the SS.
Membership in the SD was voluntary. (3033-PS)
In common usage, and even in orders and decrees, the term
"SD" was used as an abbreviation in the term "SIPO and SD."
Since the GESTAPO was the primary executive agency of the
SIPO and SD, and by far the largest, in most such cases the
actual executive action was carried out by personnel of the
GESTAPO rather than
[Page 264]
of the SD or of the KRIPO. In occupied territories members
of the GESTAPO frequently wore SS uniforms. (3033-PS)
The term "Chief of the Security Police and SD" describes the
person who is the head of the GESTAPO, KRIPO and the SD, and
of their headquarters office called the RSHA. The "Chief of
the Security Police and SD" and the "head of the RSHA" are
always one and the same person. The RSHA was a department in
the Reich Ministry of the Interior and in the SS. Sometimes
organizational responsibility can be established by the fact
that the orders in question were issued by or submitted to
Amt III of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the
SD), to Amt IV of the RSHA (in which case the action
concerned the GESTAPO), or to Amt V of the RSHA (in which
case the action concerned the KRIPO ) .
Although the GESTAPO was the chief executive agency in the
political police system, all three organizations contributed
to the accomplishment of most of the criminal activities
discussed hereinafter.
E. Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD against the Peace.
Prior to the invasion of Poland by Germany, "border
incidents" were fabricated by the GESTAPO and SD for the
purpose of furnishing Hitler with an excuse to wage war.
(2751-PS)
Early in August, 1939, the plan was conceived by the Chief
of the Security Police and SD, Heydrich, to stage simulated
border raids by personnel of the GESTAPO and SD dressed as
Poles. To add authenticity, it was planned to take certain
prisoners from concentration camps, kill them by use of
hypodermic injections, and leave their bodies, clad in
Polish uniforms, at the various places where the incidents
were planned to occur. The Chief of the GESTAPO, Mueller,
took a directing hand in these actions, which were staged on
31 August 1939 in Beuthen, Hindenburg, Gleiwitz, and
elsewhere.
The leader of the SD agents who made the pretended attack on
the Gleiwitz radio station on 31 August, said:
"*** In my presence, Mueller discussed with a man named
Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it
should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were
attacking German troops. Germans in the approximate
strength of a company were to be used. Mueller stated
that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be
dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground
of the scene of the incident, to show that they had
been killed while attacking. For
[Page 265]
this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by
a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to
be given gunshot wounds. After the incident members of
the press and other persons were to be taken to the
spot of the incident. A police report was subsequently
to be prepared.
"4. Mueller told me that he had an order from Heydrich
to make one of those criminals available to me for the
action at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred
to these criminals was 'Canned Goods.'
"The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was
carried out on the evening preceding the German attack
on Poland. As I recall, war broke out on 1 September
1939. At noon of the 31st August I received by
telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack
which was to take place at 8 o'clock that evening.
Heydrich said, 'In order to carry out this attack
report to Mueller for Canned Goods.' I did this and
gave Mueller instructions to deliver the man near the
radio station. I received this man and had him laid
down at the entrance to the station. He was alive but
he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his
eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was
alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot
wounds but a lot of blood was smeared across his face.
He was in civilian clothes.
"6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a
speech of three to four minutes over an emergency
transmitter, fired some pistol shots and left." (2751-
PS; 2479-PS)
These were the "frontier incidents" to which Hitler referred
in his speech to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939. (Adolf
Hitler, "My New Order," Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p.
687.)
F. War Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD.
(1) The GESTAPO and SD carried out mass murders of hundreds
of thousands of civilians of occupied countries as a part of
the Nazi program to exterminate political and racial
undesirables ("Einsatz Groups"). About four weeks before the
attack on Russia, special task forces of the SIPO and SD,
called Einsatzgruppen or Special Task Groups, were formed on
order of Himmler for the purpose of following the German
armies into Russia, combatting Partisans and members of
resistance groups and exterminating the Jews and Communist
leaders. In the beginning four Einsatz Groups were formed.
Einsatz Group A, operating in the Baltic states was placed
under the command of Stahlecker, former Inspector of the
SIPO and SD. Einsatz Group B, operating toward
[Page 266]
Moscow, was placed under the command of Nebe, the Chief of
Amt V (KRIPO) of the RSHA. Einsatz Group C, operating toward
Kiev, was placed under the command of Rasch and later of
Thomas, former Chief of the SIPO and SD in Paris. Einsatz
Group D, operating in the south of Russia, was placed under
the command of Ohlendorf, the Chief of At III (SD) of the
RSHA.
The Einsatz Groups were officered by personnel of the
GESTAPO, the SD and the KRIPO. The men were drawn from the
Order Police and the Waffen SS. The groups had complements
of 400 to 500 men, and had their own vehicles and equipment.
By agreement with the OKW and OKH, the Einsatzkommandos were
attached to certain Army corps or divisions. The Army
assigned the area in which the Einsatzkommandos were to
operate, but all operational directives and orders for the
carrying out of executions were given through the RSHA in
Berlin. Regular courier service and radio communications
existed between the Einsatz Groups and the RSHA.
The affidavit of Ohlendorf, Chief of the SD, who led Einsatz
Group D, reads in part as follows:
"When the German Army invaded Russia, I was leader of
Einsatzgruppe D in the southern sector, and in the
course of the year during which I was leader of the
Einsatzgruppe D, it liquidated approximately 90,000
men, women and children. The majority of those
liquidated were Jews, but there were also among them
some Communist functionaries.
"In the execution of this extermination program the
Einsatzgruppen were subdivided into Einsatzkommandos,
and the Einsatzkommandos into still smaller units, the
so-called Sonderkommando and Teilkommandos. Usually the
smaller units were led by a member of the SD, the
GESTAPO or the KRIPO. The unit selected for this task
would enter a village or city and order the prominent
Jewish citizens to call together all Jews for the
purpose of resettlement. They were asked to hand over
their personal belongings to the leaders of the unit,
and shortly before the execution, to surrender their
outer clothing. The men, women and children were led to
a place of execution which usually was located beside a
deepened antitank ditch. Then they were shot, kneeling
or standing, and the corpses were thrown into the
ditch. I never permitted the shooting by individuals in
Group D, but ordered that several of the men should
shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct
personal responsibility. The leaders of the unit, or
especially designated persons, however, had to fire the
last shot against those victims who were not dead
immediately.
[Page 267]
I learned from conversations with other group leaders
that some of them asked the victims to lie down flat on
the ground to be shot through the neck. I did not
approve of these methods." (2620-PS)
The contention that these murders were carried out by
subterfuge and without force and terror is belied by the
eyewitness account of two such mass murders witnessed by
Hermann Graebe, who was manager and engineer in charge of
the branch office of the Solingen firm of Josef Jung in
Sdolbunow, Ukraine, from September 1941 until January 1944.
Graebe's interest in the mass executions derived from the
fact that in addition to Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians, he
employed Jews on the various construction projects under his
supervision. He was personally acquainted with the leader of
the SIPO and SD who carried out the actions hereinafter
described with the aid of SS-men (most of whom wore the SD
arm-band) and Ukrainian militia. Graebe negotiated with SS-
Major Putz, the leader of the SIPO and SD, for the release
of about 100 Jewish workers from the action which took place
in Rowno on 13 July 1942. The original letter which exempted
these Jewish workers from the action is attached to Graebe's
affidavit, which states in part as follows:
"In the evening of this day I drove to Rowno and posted
myself with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the
Bahnhofstrasse in which the Jewish workers of my firm
slept. Shortly after 22.00 the ghetto was encircled by
a large SS detachment and again about three times as
many members of the Ukrainian militia. Then the
electric floodlights which had been erected all around
the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details of
4 to 6 members entered or at least tried to enter the
houses. Where the doors and windows were closed and the
inhabitants did not open upon the knocking, the SS men
and militia broke the windows, forced the doors and
beams with crowbars and entered the dwellings. The
owners were driven onto the street just as they were,
regardless of whether they were dressed or whether they
had been in bed. Since the Jews in most cases refused
to leave their dwellings and resisted, the SS and
militia both applied force. With the help of whippings,
kicks and hits with the rifle butts they finally
succeeded in having the dwellings evacuated. The people
were chased out of their houses in such haste that the
small children who had been in bed had been left behind
in several instances. In the street women cried out for
their children and children for their parents. That did
not prevent the SS from chasing the people along the
road, at double time, and hitting them
[Page 268]
until they reached a waiting freight train. Car after
car was filled, over it hung the screaming of women and
children, the cracking of whips and rifle shots. Since
several families and groups had barricaded themselves
in especially strong buildings, and the doors could not
be forced with crowbars or beams, these houses were now
blown open with hand grenades. Since the ghetto was
near the railroad tracks in Rowno, the younger people
tried to get across the tracks and to a small river to
be outside of the ghetto. This sector being outside of
the floodlights was lighted by signal ammunition. All
through the night these beaten, chased and wounded
people dragged themselves across the lighted streets.
Women carried their dead children in their arms,
children hugged and dragged by their arms and feet
their dead parents down the road toward the train.
Again and again the calls 'Open the door,' 'Open the
door' echoed through the ghetto." (2992-PS)
The leader of Einsatz Group D, Ohlendorf, stated in his
affidavit that other Einsatz Group leaders required the
victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through
the neck. Graebe describes a mass execution of this kind
which he observed carried out under the direction of a man
in SD uniform on 5 October 1943 at Dubno, Ukraine, as
follows:
"Thereupon in the company of Moennikes I drove to the
construction area and saw in its vicinity a heap of
earth, about 30 meters long and 2 meters high. Several
trucks stood in front of the heap. Armed Ukrainian
militia chased the people off the trucks under the
supervision of an SS man. The militia men were guards
on the trucks and drove them to and from the
excavation. All these people had the prescribed yellow
badges on the front and back of their clothes, and thus
were recognized as Jews.
"Moennikes and I went directly to the excavation.
Nobody bothered us. Now we heard shots in quick
succession from behind one of the earth mounds. The
people who had gotten off the trucks -- men, women, and
children of all ages -- had to undress upon the orders
of an SS man who carried a riding or dog whip. They had
to put down their clothes in fixed places, sorted
according to shoes, over and underclothing. I saw a
pile of shoes of about 800 to 1,000 pairs, great piles
of laundry and clothing. Without screaming or crying
these people undressed, stood around by families,
kissed each other, said farewells and waited for the
nod of another SS man, who stood near the excavation,
also with a whip in his hand. During the 15 minutes
that I stood near the excavation I have
[Page 269]
heard no complaint and no request for mercy. I watched
a family of about 8 persons, a man and a woman, both
about 50 with their children of about 1, 8 and 10, and
two grownup daughters of about 20 to 24. An old woman
with snow-white hair held the one-year-old child in her
arms and sang for it, and tickled it. The child was
squeaking from joy. The couple looked on with tears in
their eyes. The father held the hand of a boy about 10
years old and spoke to him softly; the boy was fighting
his tears. The father pointed toward the sky, fondled
his hand, and seemed to explain something to him: At
that moment the SS-man at the excavation called
something to his comrades. The latter counted off about
20 persons and instructed them to walk behind the earth
mound. Among them was the family which I had mentioned.
I remember very well a girl, blackhaired and slender,
passing near me; she pointed at herself and said, '23
years.' I walked around the mound, and stood in front
of a tremendous grave. Closely pressed together the
people were lying on top of each other so that only
their heads were visible. Several of the people shot
still moved. Some lifted their arms and turned their
heads to show that they were still alive. The
excavation was already two-thirds full. I estimated
that it contained about 1,000 people. I looked for the
man who did the shooting. I saw an SS-man who sat at
the rim of the narrow end of the excavation, his feet
dangling into the excavation. On his knees he had a
machine pistol and he was smoking a cigarette. The
completely naked people descended a stairway which was
dug into the clay of the excavation and slipped over
the heads of the people Iying there already to the
place to which the SS-man directed them. They laid
themselves in front of the dead or injured people, some
touched tenderly those who were still alive and spoke
to them in a low voice. Then I heard a number of shots.
I looked into the excavation and saw how the bodies
jerked or the heads rested already motionless on top of
the bodies that lay before them. Blood was running from
their necks. I was surprised that I was not chased
away, but I saw there were two or three postal officers
in uniform nearby. Now already the next group
approached, descended into the excavation, lined
themselves up against the previous victims and was
shot. When I walked back, around the mound, I noticed
again a transport which had just arrived. This time it
included sick and frail persons. An old, very thin
woman with terribly thin legs was undressed by others
who were already naked, while two persons
[Page 270]
held her up. Apparently the woman was paralyzed. The
naked people carried the woman around the mound. I left
with Moennikes and drove with my car back to Dubno."
(2992-PS)
There are two reports by Stahlecker, the Chief of Einsatz
Group B, available. The first report, found in Himmler's
personal files, states that during the first four months of
the Russian campaign Einsatz Group A murdered 135,000
Communists and Jews, and carried out widespread destruction
of homes and villages and other vast crimes. Enclosure 8 to
this Stahlecker report is a careful survey of the number of
persons murdered, classified as to country, and whether Jew
or Communist, with totals given in each instance. This
report discloses that the Einsatz Groups frequently enlisted
the aid of the local populations in the extermination
program. It states:
"In view of the extension of the area of operations and
the great number of duties which had to be performed by
the Security Police, it was intended from the very
beginning to obtain the cooperation of the reliable
population for the fight against vermin -- that is,
mainly the Jews and Communists." (L-180)
With respect to extermination of Jews the report stated:
"From the beginning it was to be expected that the
Jewish problem could not be solved by pogroms alone. In
accordance with the basic orders received, however, the
cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim
at a complete annihilation of the Jews. Special
detachments reinforced by selected units -- in
Lithuania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the
Latvian auxiliary police therefore performed extensive
executions both in towns and in rural areas. The
actions of the execution detachments were performed
smoothly. ***"
Enclosure 8, "Survey of the number of executed persons" is
quoted directly from the report:
[Page 271]
"Enclosure 8, Survey of the number of executed persons
Area Jews Communists Total
"Lithuania:
Kwono town and surroundings
(land) 31,914 80 31,994
Schaulen 41,382 763 42,145
Wilna 7,015 17 7,032
-------------------------------------
80,311 860 81,171
-------------------------------------
-------------------------------------
"Latvia:
Riga town and surroundings
(land) 6,378
Mitau 3,576
Libau 11,860
Wolmar 209
Dueanaburg 9,256 589 9,845
-------------------------------------
30,025* 1,843* 31,868
-------------------------------------
"Esthonia 474 684 1,158
"White Ruthenia 7,620 7,620
-------------------------------------
-------------------------------------
"Total:
Lithuania 80,311 860 81,171
Latvia 30,025 1,843 31,868
Esthonia 474 684 1,158
White Ruthenia 7,620 7,620
-------------------------------------
118,430 3,387 121,817
[*Transcription note: Above figures are from the printed page -
no reason is apparent for the totals. knm]
"to be added to these figures:
In Lithuania and Latvia Jews annihilated by pogroms 5,500
Communists and partisans executed in old-Russian area 2,000
Lunatics executed 748
-------------------------------------
122,455
Communists and Jews liquidated by State Police and Security
Service Tilsit during search actions 5,502
-------------------------------------
135,567"
(L-180.)
The second report from Einsatz Group A (L-180) reports the
extermination of nearly 230,000 persons. With respect to
Esthonia, it states in part:
"Only by the SIPO and SD were the Jews gradually
executed as they became no longer required for work.
Today there are no longer any Jews in Esthonia."
With respect to Latvia, the report states in part:
"Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been
executed by these Sonderkommandos. The remaining Jews
who were still indispensable from the economic point of
view were collected in Ghettos, which were established
in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau."
With respect to Lithuania, the report states in part:
"Therefore by means of selected units -- mostly in the
proportion of 1:8 -- first of all the prisons, and then
systematically, district by district, the Lithuanian
sector was cleansed of Jews of both sexes. Altogether
136,421 people were liquidated
[Page 272]
in a great number of single actions. As the complete
liquidation of the Jews was not feasible, as they were
needed for labor, Ghettos were formed which at the
moment are occupied as follows: Kauem approximately
15,000 Jews; Wilna approximately 15,000 Jews; Schaulen
approximately 4,500 Jews. These Jews are used primarily
for work of military importance. For example, up to
5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome
near Kauen on earthworks and work of that sort."
With respect to White Russia, the report states in part:
"In view of the enormous distances, the bad condition
of the roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol, and
the small forces of Security Police and SD, it needs
the utmost effort to be able to carry out shootings in
the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews have been shot up
to now."
With respect to Jews from the Reich, the report states in
part
"Since December 1940 transports containing Jews have
arrived at short intervals from the Reich. Of these,
20,000 Jews were directed to Riga and 7,000 Jews to
Minsk. Only a small section of the Jews from the Reich
is capable of working. About 70-80 percent are women
and children or old people unfit for work. The death
rate is rising continually also as a result of the
extraordinarily bad winter. In isolated instances sick
Jews with contagious disease were selected under the
pretext of putting them into a home for the aged or a
hospital, and executed."
Attached as an enclosure to this report is a map entitled
"Jewish Executions Carried out by Einsatzgruppe A," on
which, by the use of coffins as symbols, the number of Jews
murdered in each area covered by Einsatz Group A is shown
(Chart Number 4). The map shows thousands of Jews in
ghettos, and an estimated 128,000 Jews "still on hand" in
the Minsk area. Number of murdered, according to figures
beside the coffins, during the period covered by this
report, was 228,050.
On 30 October 1941 the Commissioner of the territory of
Sluzk wrote a report to the Commissioner General, Minsk, in
which he severely criticized the actions of the
Einsatzcommandos operating in his area for the murder of all
the Jews of Sluzk:
"On 27 October in the morning at about 8 o'clock a
first lieutenant of the police battalion No. 11 from
Kauen (Lithuania) appeared and introduced himself as
the adjutant of the battalion commander of the security
police. The first lieutenant explained that the police
battalion had received the assignment to effect the
liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk,
[Page 273]
within two days. The battalion commander with his
battalion in strength of four companies, two of which
were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march
here and the action would have to begin instantly. I
replied to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss
the action in any case first with the commander. About
half an hour later the police battalion arrived in
Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival the conference
with the battalion commander took place according to my
request. I first explained to the commander that it
would not very well be possible to effect the action
without previous preparation, because everybody had
been sent to work and that it would lead to terrible
confusion. At least it would have been his duty to
inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to
postpone the action one day. However, he rejected this
with the remark that he had to carry out this action
everywhere and in all towns and that only two days were
allotted for Sluzk. Within these two days, the town of
Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means. For the
rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must
point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered
already on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of
horror during the action. With indescribable brutality
on the part of both the German police officers and
particularly the Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish
people, but also among them White Ruthenians, were
taken out of their dwellings and herded together.
Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in
different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated.
The White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free
themselves from the encirclement. Regardless of the
fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also
tradesmen, were mistreated in a terribly barbarous way
in the face of the White Ruthenian people, the White
Ruthenians themselves were also worked over with rubber
clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an
action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like
a revolution. In conclusion I find myself obliged to
point out that the police battalion has looted in an
unheard of manner during the action, and that not only
in Jewish houses but just the same in those of the
White Ruthenians. Anything of use such as boots,
leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, has been
taken away. On the basis of statements of members of
the armed forces, watches were torn off the arms of
Jews in public, on the streets, and rings were pulled
off the fingers in the most brutal manner. A major of
the finance department reported that a Jewish girl was
asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles
[Page 274]
to have her father released. This girl is said to have
actually gone everywhere in order to obtain the money."
(1104-PS)
This report was submitted by the Commissioner General of
White Ruthenia to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern
Territories on 1 November 1941 with the following comment:
"I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one
copy may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and
order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with
methods of that sort. To bury seriously wounded people
alive who worked their way out of their graves again is
such a base and filthy act that the incidents as such
should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reichs Marshal."
(1104-PS)
On the same date by separate letter the Commissioner General
of White Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the
Eastern Territories that he had received money, valuables,
and other objects taken by the police in the action at Sluzk
and other regions, all of which had been deposited with the
Reich Credit institute for the disposal of the Reich
Commissioner. (1104-PS)
On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent
to the personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the
Minister of the Reich with a copy to Heydrich, the Chief of
the Security Police and SD.
On 6 November 1942 a secret report submitted to the Reich
Commissar for the East concerning the struggle against
partisans in the East discloses that destruction of villages
continued, and reports the execution of 1,274 partisan
suspects and 8,350 Jews, and the deportation of 1,217
people. This report was forwarded on 10 December 1942 to the
Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories. (1113-
PS)
The report from the prison administrator at Minsk as of 31
May 1943 to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia
states:
"The German, former dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and
his wife Elisa Sara Tichauer, born Rosenthal, were
delivered to the Court-Prison by the SD
(Hauptscharfuehrer Rube) on 13 April 1943. Since that
date, the golden bridgework, crowns and fillings of the
received German and Russian Jews were pulled out,
respectively broken out by force. This always happened
1-2 hours before the actions in question.
"Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews were
liquidated. After careful investigation it was
ascertained that gold objects were only taken away
during 2 actions, namely on 14 April 1943 from 172 and
on 27 April 1943 from 164 Jews. About 50 percent of the
Jews had gold teeth, bridges or fill-
[Page 275]
ings. Hauptscharfuehrer Rube of the SD was always
present in person, and also took the gold objects with
him.
"This has not been done before 13 April 1943."
This report was forwarded to the Reich Minister for the
occupied Eastern territories on 1 June 1943. (L-135)
"Death vans were used by the Einsatz Groups to murder
victims by gas. These vans were built by the Saurer
Works in Berlin and other firms. The vans were built
for the technical section of Amt II of the RSHA, which
sent them to the Einsatz Groups in the field. They were
first used in the spring of 1942 and continued to be
used throughout the war (2348-PS). The method of using
the vans is described by Ohlendorf in the following
words:
"We received orders to use the car for the killing of
women and children. Whenever a unit had collected a
sufficient number of victims, a car was sent for their
liquidation. We also stationed these cars in the
neighborhood of the transit camps to which the victims
had been brought. They were told that they would be
resettled and had to climb into the cars for that
purpose. Then the doors were closed and as soon as the
cars started moving the gas would enter. The victims
died within ten to fifteen minutes. The cars were
driven to the burial place where the corpses were taken
out and buried." (2620-PS)
A letter from Becker, the operator of several death vans,
written to Rauff, the head of the technical section of Amt
II of the RSHA, on 16 May 1942, states:
"The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished.
While the vans of the first series can also be put into
action if the weather is not too bad the vans of the
second series (Saurer) stop completely in rainy
weather. If it has rained for instance for only one-
half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply
skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry
weather. It is only a question now whether the van can
only be used standing at the place of execution. First
the van has to be brought to that place, which is
possible only in good weather. The place of execution
is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is
difficult of access because of its location; in damp or
wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons
to be executed are driven or led to that place, then
they realize immediately what is going on and get
restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible.
There is only one way left; to load them at the
collecting point and to drive them to the spot.
"I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as
house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on
each side
[Page 276]
of the small van and two on each side of the larger
vans, such as one often sees on farm-houses in the
country. The vans became so well-known, that not only
the authorities but also the civilian population called
the van "death van", as soon as one of these vehicles
appeared. It is my opinion that the van cannot be kept
secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.
"*** I should like to take this opportunity to bring
the following to your attention: several commands have
had the unloading after the application of gas done by
their own men. I brought to the attention of the
commanders of those SK concerned the immense
psychological injuries and damages to their health
which that work can have for those men, even if not
immediately, at least later on. The men complained to
me about headaches which appeared after each unloading.
"*** The application of gas usually is not undertaken
correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as
possible, the driver presses the accelerator to the
fullest extent. By doing that the persons to be
executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by
dozing off as was planned. My directions now have
proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death
comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully.
Distorted faces and excretions, such as could be seen
before, are no longer noticed." (501-PS)
The death vans were not always satisfactory. A telegram from
the commandant of the SIPO and SD "Ostland" to the RSHA, Amt
II D, on 15 June 1942, states:
"A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a
special way, arrives weekly at the office of the
commandant of the Security Police and the Security
Service of White Ruthenia. "The three S-vans, which are
there, are not sufficient for that purpose. I request
assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the same time
I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three S-
vans on hand (2 Diamond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on
hand are leaky already." (501-PS)
The reports of the various Einsatz Groups were summarized at
RSHA, and the summaries were then distributed to the various
sections interested, particularly Amt III (the SD), Amt IV
(the GESTAPO), and Amt V (the KRIPO) (2752-PS). One such
report covering the period 1 October 1941-31 October 1941 is
entitled "Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the Einsatz
Groups of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR" (R-
102). This report describes in summary form the activities
of the various Einsatz Groups dur-
[Page 277]
ing the month of October 1941. The report first discusses
the stations and in that regard states:
"During the period covered by this report the stations of
the Task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have
changed .only in the Northern Sector.
The present stations are:
"Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.
"Task Force B- continues in Smolensk
"Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.
"Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.
"The Action and Special Commandos (Einsatz und Sonder
Commandos) which are attached to the Task Force
continue on the march with the advancing troops into
the sectors which have been assigned to them." (R-102)
The report next discusses the activities of each Einsatz
Group. There is included first a discussion of the Baltic
area, next of White Ruthenia, and last of the Ukraine. Under
each section the work of the Einsatz Groups in connection
with the action taken against partisans, Jews, and communist
officials is considered. With respect to the treatment of
Jews in the Baltic area the report states in part:
"*** However, the Estonian Protective Corps
(Selbtschutz), formed at the time of the entry of the
Wehrmacht, immediately started a comprehensive arrest
action of all Jews. This action was under the direction
of the task force of the Security Police and the SD.
"The measures taken were:
1. Arrest of all male Jews over 16.
2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who rived
in Reval and environs and were fit for work; these were
employed in peat
3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all
Jewesses living in Dorport and its environs.
4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in
Pernau and its environs
5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and
capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in
a camp that is being prepared.
"The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception
of .- doctors and the elders. At the present time this
action is still in progress. After completion of this
action there will remain only 500 Jewesses and children
in the Eastern territory. ***" (R-102)
[Page 278]
With respect to partisan activity in White Ruthenia, the
report states in part:
"*** In the village Michalowo, after careful
reconnaissance through civilian agents, 8 partisans
were surprised in a house by the same Commando of the
Security Police and the SD, they were arrested and
hanged the next day in this particularly partisan
infested village.
"The president of the District Region Soviets in
Tarenitsch and his secretary were shot because of their
connections with partisans.
"During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of
Mogilow, 25 Armenians, Kirghize and Mongols were
apprehended with false identification papers with which
they tried to conceal the fact that they belong to a
partisan group. They were liquidated. ***"
With respect to arrests and executions of communists in
White Ruthenia, the report states in part:
"A further large part of the activity of the Security
Police was devoted to the combating of Communists and
criminals. A special Commando in the period covered by
this report executed 63 officials, NKVD agents and
agitators. * *" (R-102)
With respect to the action taken against the Jews in White
Ruthenia the report states in part:
"*** All the more vigorous are the actions of the task
forces of the Security Police and the SD against the
Jews who make it necessary that steps be taken against
them in different spheres.
"In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschenrigow
19 Jewish Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish
communists were shot at Beresna.
"It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women
showed an especially obstinate behaviour. For this
reason 28 Jewesses had to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at
Mogilew.
"In Borissow 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish
looters were executed.
"In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the
last in incitement and horror propaganda [Hetz-und
Greuelpropaganda] against the German army of
occupation.
"In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own
accord and returned to their old home quarters,
attempting to expel the Russians who had been quartered
there in the meantime. All male Jews as well as 3
Jewesses were shot.
"In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against
the
[Page 279]
establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses
had to be shot. Among them was a political Commissar.
"In Mogilew too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their
removal to the Ghetto; 113 Jews were liquidated.
"Moreover four Jews were shot on account of refusal to
work and 2 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged
orders issued by the German occupation authorities.
"In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda
and in Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had
sabotaged orders issued by the German occupation
authorities.
"At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot because they had
participated in acts of sabotage.
"On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a
beginning was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto
at Witebsk. This involved approximately 3000 Jews. ***"
(R-102)
With respect to partisan activity in the Ukraine the report
states in part:
"Although partisan activity in the south sector is very
strong too, there is nevertheless the impression that
spreading and effective partisan activity are strongly
affected by the flight of higher partisan leaders and
by the lack of initiative of the subordinate leaders
who have remained behind. Only in one case a commando
of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight
with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the
Communist Party for the administration district of
Nikolajew-Cherson, who was at the time Commissar of a
partisan group for the district Nikolajew-Cherson-Krim.
***"
With respect to treatment of Jews in the Ukraine the report
states in part:
"The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against
the Jews is extremely great because they are thought
responsible for the explosions in Kiew. They are also
regarded as informers and agents of the NKVD who
started the terror against the Ukrainian people. As a
measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all Jews
were arrested and altogether 33,771 Jews were executed
on the 29th and 30th September. Money, valuables and
clothing were secured and put at the disposal of the
National-Socialist League for Public Welfare (NSV) for
the equipment of the National Germans [Volks-
[Page 280]
deutschen] and partly put at the disposal of the
provisional city administration for distribution to the
needy population.
"In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from
experience they have to be regarded as bearers of
Bolshevik propaganda and saboteurs.
"In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of
retaliation for acts of sabotage. Especially in the
area east of the Dnjepr the solution of the Jewish
question has been taken up energetically by the task
forces of the Security Police and the SD. The areas
newly occupied by the Commandos w ere purged of Jews.
In the course of this action 4,891 Jews were
liquidated. At other places the Jews were marked and
registered. This rendered it possible to put at the
disposal of the Wehrmacht for urgent labor, Jewish
worker groups up to 1,000 persons." (R-l 02)
These reports, circulated among the various offices of the
RSHA, brought general knowledge to the entire organization
of the program of mass murder conducted by these special
task forces of the SIPO and SD. (R-102)
The activities of the Einsatz Groups continued throughout
1943 and 1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the SIPO and
SD. New groups were formed and sent into action in the West
(2890-PS). Under adverse war conditions, however, the
program of extermination was to a large extent changed to
one of rounding up slave labor for Germany. A letter written
on 19 March 194 from the headquarters of a Sonderkommando
(section of Einsatz Group C) states as follows:
"It is the task of the Security Police and of the
Security Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the
Reich and fight against them in the interest of
security, and in the zone of operations especially to
guarantee the security of the army. Besides the
annihilation of active opponents all other element who,
by virtue of their opinions or their past, may appear
active as enemies under favorable conditions, are to be
eliminated [sind *** auszumerzen] through preventive
measures. The Security Police carries out this task
according to the general directives of the Fuehrer with
all the required toughness. Energetic measures are
especially necessary in territories endangered by the
activity of hostile gangs. The competence of the
Security Police within the zone of operations is based
on the Barbarossa decrees. I deem the measures of the
Security
[Page 281]
Police, carried out on a considerable scale during
recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:
"1. The situation at the front in my sector had become
so serious that the population, partly influenced by
Hungarians and Italians, who streamed back in chaotic
condition, took openly position against us.
"2. The strong expeditions of hostile gangs, who came
especially from the forest of Bryansk, were another
reason. Besides that, other revolutionary groups,
formed by the population, appeared suddenly in all
districts. The providing of arms evidently provided no
difficulties at all. It would have been irresponsible,
if we had observed this whole activity without acting
against it. It is obvious that all such measures bring
about some harshness. I want to take up the significant
points of harsh measures:
"1. The shooting of Hungarian Jews.
"2. The shooting of directors of collective farms.
"3. The shooting of children.
"4. The total burning down of villages.
"5. The "shooting, while trying to escape" of
Security Service (SD) prisoners.
"Chief of Einsatz Group C confirmed once more the
correctness of the measures taken, and expressed his
recognition for the energetic actions.
"With regard to the current political situation,
especially in the armament industry in the fatherland,
the measures of the Security Police have to be
subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting
of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible time,
the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament
industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent
from our territory daily.
"The work of the field groups has therefore to be
changed as of now. The following orders are given:
"1. Special treatment is to be limited to a minimum.
"2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists
and so on, is to take place by roster only for the time
being, without arresting anybody. It is, for instance,
no longer feasible to arrest all the close relatives of
a member of the communist party. Although, members of
the Komsomolz are to be arrested only if they were
active in a leading position.
"3. The activity of the labor offices, respective of
recruiting commissions is to be supported to the
greatest extent possible. It will not be possible
always to refrain from using force. During a conference
with the Chief of the Labor Commit-
[Page 282]
ment Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that
wherever prisoners can be released, they should be put
at the disposal of the Commissioner of the Labor
Office. When searching [Uberholung] villages, resp.,
when it has become necessary to burn down a village,
the whole population will be put at the disposal of the
Commissioner by force.
"4. As a-rule, no more children will be shot.
"5. The reporting of hostile gangs as well as drives
against them is not affected hereby. All drives against
these hostile gangs can only take place after my
approval has been obtained.
"6. The prisons have to be kept empty, as a rule. We
have to be aware of the fact that the Slavs will
interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness
and that they will act accordingly right away. If we
limit our harsh measures of security police through
above orders for the time being, that is only done for
the following reason. The most important thing is the
recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent
into the Reich will be made. No written certificates of
political reliability check or similar things will be
issued.
"(signed) Christiansen."
(3012-PS)
The head of the Jewish section in the GESTAPO, and the man
directly responsible for carrying out the mass extermination
program against the Jews by the GESTAPO,
Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann, estimated in his report to
Himmler on the matter, that 2,000,000 Jews had been killed
by shootings, mainly by the Einsatz Groups of the SIPO and
SD during the campaign in the East. This did not include the
estimated 4,000,000 sent by the GESTAPO for extermination in
annihilation camps.
(2) The GESTAPO and SD stationed special units in prisoner
of war amps for the purpose of screening out racial and
political undesirables and executing them. The program of
mass murder of political and racial undesirables carried on
against civilians was also applied to prisoners of war
captured on the Eastern front. Warlimont, Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab, states:
"*** Shortly before the beginning of this campaign
[with U.S.S.R.] I was present in a group composed of
the Commanders in Chief (with their Chiefs of Staff) of
the three Armed Forces, of the Army groups, of Armies,
and of the corresponding groups in the Air Forces and
Navy. Hitler made an announcement to this group that
special measures
[Page 283]
would have to be taken against political functionaries
and commissars of the Soviet army. He said that this
would not be an ordinary campaign but would be the
clash of conflicting ideologies. He further said that
the political functionaries and commissars were not to
be considered as prisoners of war but were to be
segregated from other prisoners immediately after their
capture and were to be turned over to special
detachments of the SD which were to accompany the
German troops to Russia. He further said that when it
was not possible to turn over the political
functionaries and commissars to the SD, they were to be
eliminated by the German troops." (2884-PS)
The Chief of the SD, Otto Ohlendorf, describes this action
in the following words:
"In 1941, shortly after the start of the campaign
against Russia, an agreement was entered into between
the Chief of the Security Police and SD and the OKW and
OKH to the effect that the prisoner of war camps on the
Eastern front should be opened to Einsatzkommandos of
the SIPO and SD so that the prisoners could be
screened. All Jews and Communist functionaries were to
be taken from the prisoner of war camps by the
Einsatzkommandos and executed outside the camps. To my
knowledge, this action was carried on throughout the
entire Russian campaign. In the other occupied
territories and within the Reich -- to my knowledge --
the GESTAPO had been made responsible for this program
in the Russian prisoner of war camps. It was, to my
knowledge, carried on throughout the greater part of
the war." (2622-PS)
Lahousen, chief of a division in the office of foreign
intelligence in the Wehrmacht, states:
"*** From the start of the campaign against the USSR.
the higher German political and military leadership
followed the policy of eliminating Russian commissars
and various other types of Russian prisoners of war
captured y the Wehrmacht. In June and July 1941 I
participated in a conference which concerned itself
with the treatment of Russian commissars. ***
Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller was present as
representative of the RSHA, and he participated in this
matter because, as Chief of Section IV, he was
responsible for the carrying out of these measures.
Jointly with the SD and the GESTAPO he had the task of
instituting the necessary measures for the execution of
commissars. *** In the discussion that followed,
Mueller promised in a peculiarly cynical manner that
these executions would
[Page 284]
take place in the future outside the camp, so that the
troops would not be obliged to watch them. He promised
further a certain limitation in the concept of
'Bolshevistically infected.' This concept and its
interpretation had been hitherto left to the discretion
of the SD Sonderkommandos. *** An agreement was
concluded between the OKW, the GESTAPO and the SD.
Pursuant to this agreement Russian prisoners of war
under the control of the OKW were delivered to the
GESTAPO and SD for execution. The term
'Sonderbehandlung' in the official documents and way of
speaking of the SD was equivalent to 'condemned to
death'." (2846-PS)
On 17 July 1941 instructions were issued by the GESTAPO to
Commandos of the SIPO and SD stationed in Stalags, providing
in part as follows:
"The activation of commandos will take place in
accordance with the agreement of the Chief of the
Security Police and Security Service and the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces as of 16 July 1941 (see
enclosure 1). The commandos will work independently
according to special authorization and in consequence
of the general regulations given to them, in the limit
of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos
will keep close contact with the camp-commander and the
defense-officers assigned to him.
"The mission of the commandos is the political
investigating of all camp-inmates, the elimination and
further 'treatment'
"a. of all political, criminal or in some other way
unbearable elements among them.
"b. of those persons who could be used for the
reconstruction of the occupied territories.
"The commandos must use for their work as far as
possible, at present and even later, the experiences of
the camp-commanders which the latter have collected
meanwhile from observation of the prisoners and
examinations of camp inmates.
"Further, the commandos must make efforts from the
beginning to seek out among the prisoners elements
which appear reliable, regardless if there are
communists concerned or not, in order to use them for
intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if
advisable, later in the occupied territories also.
"By use of such informers and by use of all other
existing possibilities, the discovery of all elements
to be eliminated among the prisoners, must proceed step
by step at once. ***
[Page 285]
"Above all, the following must be discovered: All
important functionaries of state and party, especially
Professional revolutionaries
Functionaries of the Komintern
All policy forming party functionaries of the
KPdSU and its fellow organizations in the central
committees, in the regional and district committees.
All peoples-commissars and their deputies All
former political commissars in the Red-Army
Leading personalities of the state-authorities of
central and middle regions.
The leading personalities of the business world.
Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence
All Jews
All persons who are found to be agitators or
fanatical communists. ***
"Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the
immediate vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the
general-government are in the immediate vicinity of the
border, then the prisoners are to be taken for special
treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet-Russian
territory. ***
"In regard to executions to be carried out and to the
possible removal of reliable civilians and the removal
of informers for the Einsatz-group in the occupied
territories, the leader of the Einsatz-Kommando [?]
must make an agreement with the nearest State-Police-
Office, as well as with the commandant of the Security
Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these with
the Chief of the Einsatz-group concerned in the
occupied territories. ***"
On 23 October 1941 the Camp Commander of the concentration
camp Gross Rosen reported to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO,
a list of Russian PWs who had been executed the preceding
day. (1165PS)
On 9 November 1941 Mueller issued a directive to all GESTAPO
offices in which he ordered that diseased PWs should be
excluded from the transport into the concentration camps for
execution. The letter began: "The commandant of the
concentration camps are complaining that 5 to 10 percent of
the Soviet Russians destined for execution are arriving in
the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the impression has
arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such prisoners in
this way. ***" (1165-PS)
The affidavit of Kurt Lindow, former GESTAPO official,
states:
"*** 2. From 1941 until the middle of 1943 there was
[Page 286]
attached to subsection IVA1 a special department that
was headed by the Regierungsoberinspektor, later
Regierungsamtmann, and SS-Hauptsturmbannfuehrer Franz
Koenigshaus. In this department were handled matters
concerning prisoners of war. I learned from this
department that instructions and orders by
Reichsfuehrer Himmler, dating from 1941 and 1942,
existed according to which captured Soviet Russian
political Commissars and Jewish soldiers were to be
executed. As far as I know proposals for execution of
such PWs were received from the various PW camps.
Koenigshaus had to prepare the orders for execution and
submitted them to the chief of section IV, Mueller, for
signature. 'these orders were made out so that one
order was to be sent to the agency making the request
and a second one to the concentration camp designated
to carry out the execution. The PWs in question were at
first formally released from PW status, then
transferred to a concentration camp for execution. ***
"*** 4. There existed in the PW camps on the Eastern
front small screening teams (Einsatzkommandos) headed
by lower ranking members of the Secret Police
(GESTAPO). These teams were assigned to the camp
commanders and had the job to segregate the PWs who
were candidates for execution, according to the orders
that had been given, and to report them to the Office
of the Secret Police (Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt). ***"
(2542-PS)
(3) The GESTAPO and SD sent recaptured prisoners of war to
concentration camps where they were executed ("Bullet
Decree"). In March 1944 the Chief of the Security Police and
SD forwarded an OKW order to regional SIPO and SD offices in
which the OKW ordered that, on recapture, every escaped
officer and nonworking NCO prisoner of war, with the
exception of British and American prisoners of war, were to
be handed over to the SIPO and SD, with the words "Stufe
III". Whether escaped British and American officers and
nonworking NCOs, upon recapture, should be handed over to
the SIPO and SD was to be decided by the High Command of the
Army. In connection with this order, the Chief of the
Security Police and SD (RSHA) issued instructions that the
GESTAPO Leitstellen should take over the escaped officers
from the camp commandants and transport them in accordance
with a procedure theretofore in force to the Mauthausen
concentration camp. The camp commandant was to be informed
that the prisoners were being handed over under the
operation "Kugel". On the journey the prisoners of war were
to be placed in irons. The
[Page 287]
GESTAPO Leitstellen were to make half-yearly reports, giving
numbers only, of the handing over of prisoners of war.
Escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoners of war, with
the exception of British and Americans, recaptured by police
stations were not to be handed back to the Stalag command.
The Stalag was to be informed of the recapture and asked to
surrender them with the words "Stufe III", (1650-PS)
On 27 July 1944 an order from the 6th Corps Area Command was
issued on the treatment of prisoners of war, which provided
that prisoners of war were to be discharged from prisoner-of-
war at us and transferred to the GESTAPO if they were guilty
of crimes, had escaped and been recaptured, or refused to
work or encouraged other prisoners not to work, or were
screened out by Einsatzkommandos of the SIPO and SD, or were
guilty of sabotage. No reports on transfers were required
(1514-PS). This decree was known as the "Kugel Erlass"
("Bullet Decree"). Prisoners of war sent to Mauthausen
concentration camp under it were regarded as dead to the
outside world and were executed. (2478-PS; 2285-PS.)
(4) The GESTAPO and SD were responsible for establishing and
classifying concentration camps, and for committing racial
and political undesirables to concentration and annihilation
camps for slave labor and mass murder. The first
concentration camps were established in 1933 at Dachau in
Bavaria and at Oranienburg in Prussia. The GESTAPO was given
by law the responsibility of administering the concentration
camps. (2108-PS)
The GESTAPO had the sole authority to take persons into
protective custody, and orders for protective custody were
carried out in the State concentration camps. (1723-PS)
The GESTAPO issued the orders establishing concentration
camps, transforming prisoner of war camps into concentration
camps, designating concentration camps as internment camps,
changing labor camps into concentration camps, setting up
special sections for female prisoners, and so forth. (D-50;
D-46.) .The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the
classification of concentration camps according to the
seriousness of the accusation and the chances for reforming
the prisoners from the Nazi viewpoint. The concentration
camps were classified as Classes I, II, or III. Class I was
for the least serious prisoners, and Class for the most
serious prisoners. (1063-A-PS)
Regional offices of the GESTAPO had the authority to commit
persons to concentration camps for short periods, at first
21 days later 56 days, but all other orders for protective
custody had
[Page 288]
to be approved by the GESTAPO headquarters in Berlin. Orders
for protective custody issued by GESTAPO headquarters had to
be signed by or on behalf of the Chief of the Security
Police and SD, at first Heydrich, later Kaltenbrunner. (2477-
PS)
The Chief of the Security Police and SD had authority to fix
the length of the period of custody. During the war it was
the policy not to permit the prisoners to know the period of
custody and merely to announce the term as "until further
notice". (1531-PS)
The local GESTAPO offices which made the arrests maintained
a register called the "Haftbuch." In this register the names
of all persons arrested were listed, together with personal
data, grounds for the arrest, and disposition. When orders
were received from the GESTAPO headquarters in Berlin to
commit persons who had been arrested to concentration camps,
an entry was made in the Haftbuch to that effect. The reason
assigned for the arrest and commitment of persons to
concentration camps usually was that, according to the
GESTAPO, the person endangered by his attitude the existence
and security of the people and the State. Further
specifications of grounds included such offenses as that of
"working against the Greater German Reich with an illegal
resistance organization," "being a Jew," "suspected of
working for the detriment of the Reich," "being strongly
suspected of aiding desertion," "because as a relative of a
deserter he is expected to take advantage of every occasion
to harm the German Reich," "refusal to work," "sexual
intercourse with a Pole," "religious propaganda," "working
against the Reich," "loafing on the job," or "defeatist
statements." Sometimes specification of the grounds simply
referred to an "action," under which a large number of
persons would be arrested and sent to concentration camps.
(L-358; L-215.)
On 16 December 1942, Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, reported
that, in connection with an increase in slave labor required
by concentration camps by 30 January 1943 the GESTAPO could
round up 45,000 Jews, including invalids, aged, and
children. The telegram stated:
"In accordance with the increased recruitment of
manpower into the concentration camps, which was
ordered by 30 January 1943, the following may be
applied in the Jewish sector:
"1. Total amount: 45,000 Jews.
"2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943.
"3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943." (1472-PS)
On 17 December 1942, Mueller issued an order to the
Kommandeurs and Inspekteurs of the SIPO and SD and to the
directors
[Page 289]
of the GESTAPO regional offices, in which he stated that
Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police,
had given orders on 14 December 1942 that at least 35,000
persons who were fit for work had to be put into
concentration camps not later than at the end of January.
The order further provided that Eastern or foreign workers
who had escaped or broken the labor contracts were to be
sent to the nearest concentration camps as quickly as
possible, and that inmates of detention rooms and
educational work camps who were fit for work should be
delivered to the nearest concentration camps. (1063-D-PS)
On 23 March 1943, Mueller issued another directive referring
to said directive of 17 December 1942, in which he stated
that measures are to be carried out until 30 April 43. More
explicit instructions were given as to which concentration
camps the slave laborers were to be sent. He said:
"Care has to be taken that only prisoners who are fit
for work are sent to concentration camps, and
adolescents only in accordance with the provisions
issued; otherwise, contrary to the purpose, the
concentration camps become overburdened." (L-41)
On 25 June 1943, Mueller issued an order stating that the
decrees of 117 February 1942 and of 23 March 1943 had
achieved the intended goal.
On 21 April 1943, the Minister of Justice declared in a
letter that the RSHA had ordered on 11 March 1943 that all
Jews who were released from prison were to be handed over to
the GESTAPO for lifelong detainment in the concentration
camps at Auschwitz and Lublin. Poles released after an
imprisonment of over six -months were to be transferred to
the GESTAPO for internment -in a concentration camp for the
duration of the war. (701-PS)
The arrest of Jews and their shipment to annihilation camps
was carried out under the direction of Eichmann, head of the
section handling Jews in the Gestapo. Eichmann's staff was
composed of members of the SIPO, especially the GESTAPO. The
Jews were shipped on order of the SIPO and SD to
annihilation camps in the East. Eichmann estimated, and so
reported to Himmler, that 4,000,000 Jews were killed in the
annihilation camps in the East, in addition to the 2,000,000
Jews shot by the Einsatz Groups. The termination of Jews in
the annihilation camps was accomplished mainly after the
beginning of 1943, during the time Kaltenbrunner vas the
Chief of the Security Police and SD. (2615-PS)
(5) The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the deportation
of citizens of occupied countries for forced labor and
handled the
[Page 290]
disciplining of forced labor. On 26 November 1942, Fritz
Sauckel transmitted a letter to the president of provincial
employment offices in which he stated that he had been
advised by the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA)
under date of 26 October 1942 that during the month of
November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district
would begin in order to make room for the settlement of
persons of the German race. The Poles who were evacuated as
a result of this measure- were to be put into concentration
camps for labor so far as they were criminal or asocial. The
remaining Poles who were suitable for labor were to be
transported without their families into the Reich, there to
be put at the disposal of the Labor Allocation Offices to
serve as replacements for Jews eliminated from the armament
factories. (L-61)
During 1943 the program of mass murder carried out by the
Einsatz Groups in the East was modified, and orders were
issued to round up hundreds of thousands of persons for the
armament industry.
"In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to put
at the disposal of the armament industry one million
workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory
daily. *** The activity of the labor offices *** is to
be supported to the greatest extent possible. *** When
searching villages, esp. when it has become necessary
to burn down a village, the whole population will be
put at the disposal of the Commissions by force. ***
The most important thing is the recruiting of workers."
(3012-PS)
On 18 June 1941 secret orders were issued from the Chief of
the Security Police and SD, signed by Mueller, to prevent
the return of Eastern emigrants and civilian workers from
the Reich to the East, and to keep them in German war
production. Any attempts at refusal to work were to be
countered by the GESTAPO with the severest measures, arrest
and confinement in concentration camps (1573-PS). The Chief
of the Security Police and SD had exclusive jurisdiction
over labor reformatory camps established under control of
the GESTAPO for disciplining foreign workers. (1063-B-PS)
(6) The GESTAPO and SD executed captured commandos and
paratroopers, and protected civilians who lynched Allied
fliers. On 4 August 1942 Keitel issued an order which
provided that the GESTAPO and SD were responsible for taking
counter-measures against single parachutists or small groups
of them with special missions. Even if such paratroopers
were captured by the Wehr-
[Page 291]
macht, they were to be handed over to the GESTAPO and the
SD. (553-PS)
On 18 October 1942, Hitler ordered that all members of
Commando units, even when in uniform, or members of sabotage
groups armed or not, were to be exterminated to the last man
by fighting or by pursuing them. Even if they wished to
surrender they were not to be spared. Members of such
Commandos, acting a agents, saboteurs, etc., handed over to
the Wehrmacht through other channels, were to be turned over
immediately to the SD. (498-PS)
On 17 June 1944, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, in
a Top Secret letter to the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces, stated that he had instructed the Commander of the
SIPO and SD in Paris to treat parachutists in English
uniform as members of Commando operations in accordance with
Hitler's order of 18 October 1942. (1276-PS)
On 26 June 1944, WFST issued an order in which it was stated
that enemy paratroopers landing in Brittany were to be
treated as commandos, and that it was immaterial whether the
paratroopers were in uniform or civilian clothes. The order
provided that in cases of doubt enemy soldiers who were
captured alive were to be handed over to the SD for
examination as to whether the Fuehrer Order of 18 October
1942 was to be applied or not. (532-PS)
Commandos turned over to the SIPO and SD under these orders
were executed. (526-PS; 2374-PS.)
The affidavit of Adolf Zutter, former adjutant of Mauthausen
concentration camp, states in part:
"*** Concerning the American Military Mission which
landed behind the German front in the Slovakian or
Hungarian area in January, 1945, I remember, when these
officers were brought to Camp Mauthausen; I suppose the
number of the arrivals were about 12 to 15 men. They
wore a uniform which was American or Canadian; brown-
green color shirt, and cloth cap. Eight or ten days
after their arrival the execution order came in by
telegraph or teletype. Standartenfuehrer Ziereis came
to me into my office and told me now Kaltenbrunner has
given the permission for the execution. This letter was
secret and had the signature: signed Kaltenbrunner.
Then, these people were shot according to martial law
and their belongings were given to me by 1st Sgt.
[Oberscharfuehrer] Niedermeyer. ***" (L-51)
On 10 August 1943, Himmler issued an order to the Security
Police stating that it was not the task of the Police to
interfere
[Page 292]
in clashes between Germans and English and American terror
flyers who had bailed out. (R-110)
In 1944 at a conference of Amt Chiefs Kaltenbrunner said:
"All offices of the SD and the security police are to
be informed that pogroms of the populace against
English and American terror-flyers are not to be
interfered with; on the contrary, this hostile mood is
to be fostered." (2990-PS)
On 12 June 1944 the Chief of the SD-Abschnitte Koblenz
stated that the Army had issued a similar order, namely,
that German soldiers were not to protect enemy flyers from
the populace and that the Army no longer attached value to
enemy flyers taken prisoner. (745-PS)
(7) The GESTAPO and SD took civilians of occupied countries
to Germany for secret trial and punishment ("Nacht und Nebel
Erlass". On 7 December 1941 Hitler issued the directive,
since called the "Nacht und Nebel Erlass" (Night and Fog
Decree), under which persons who committed offenses against
the Reich or occupation forces in occupied territories,
except where death sentence was certain, were to be taken
secretly to Germany and surrendered to the Security Police
and SD for trial or punishment in Germany. An executive
ordinance was issued by Keitel the same date, and on 4
February 1942 the directive and ordinance were published to
the police and the SS. (L-90)
In compliance with the above directive, the military
intelligence turned over cases, other than those in which
the death sentence was probable, to the GESTAPO and the
Secret Field Police for secret deporting to Germany. (833-
PS)
After the civilians arrived in Germany, no word of the
disposition of their cases was permitted to reach the
country from which they came, or their relatives. Even when
they died awaiting trial, the SIPO and SD refused to notify
the families, so that anxiety would be created in the minds
of the family of the arrested person. (668-PS)
(8) The GESTAPO and SD arrested, tried, and punished
citizens of occupied territories under special criminal
procedure and by summary methods. The GESTAPO arrested,
placed in protective custody, and executed civilians of
occupied territories under certain circumstances. Even where
there were courts capable of handling emergency cases, the
GESTAPO conducted its own executions without regard to
normal judicial processes. (674-PS)
On 18 September 1942, Thierack, the Reich Minister of
Justice, and Himmler came to an understanding by which
antisocial
[Page 293]
elements were to be turned over to Himmler to be worked to
death, and a special criminal procedure was to be applied by
the police to the Jews, Poles, gypsies, Russians, and
Ukrainians who were not to be tried in ordinary criminal
courts. (654-PS)
On 5 September 1942 an order was issued by the RSHA to the
offices of the GESTAPO and SD covering this understanding.
This order provided that ordinary criminal procedure would
not be applied against Poles, Jews, gypsies, and other
Eastern people, but that instead they would be turned over
to the police. Such persons of foreign extraction were to be
treated on a basis entirely different from that applied to
Germans.
"*** Such considerations which may be right for
adjudicating a punishable offense committed by a German
are, however, wrong for adjudicating a punishable
offense committed by a person of alien race. In the
case of punishable offenses committed by a person of
alien race the personal motives actuating the offender
must be completely eliminated. The only standard may be
that German civil order is endangered by his action,
and that consequently preventive measures must be taken
to prevent the recurrence of such risks. In other
words, the action of a person of alien race is not to
be viewed from the angle of judicial expiation, but
from the angle of the police guard against danger.
"As a result of this, the administration of penal law
for persons of alien race must be transferred from the
hands of the administrators of justice into the hands
of the police.***" (L-316)
(9) The GESTAPO and SD executed or confined persons in
concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by their
relatives. On 19 July 1944, the Commander of the SIPO and SD
for the District Radom published an order transmitted
through the Higher SS and Police Leaders to the effect that
in all cases of assassination or attempted assassination of
Germans, or where saboteurs had destroyed vital
installations, not only the guilty person but also all his
(or her) male relatives should be shot and the female
relatives over 16 years of age put into a concentration
camp. (L-37)
In the summer of 1944, the Einsatzkommando of the SIPO and
SD at Luxembourg caused persons to be confined at
Sachsenhausen concentration camp because they were relatives
of deserters and were, therefore, "expected to endanger the
interest of the German Reich if allowed to go free." (L-215)
[Page 294]
(10) The GESTAPO and SD were instructed to murder prisoners
in the SIPO and SD prisons to prevent their release by the
Allied armies. On 21 July 1944, the Kommandeur of the SIPO
and SD for the District Radom forwarded an order of the
Befehlshaber of the SIPO and SD to the effect that it was
essential that the number of inmates of the SIPO and SD
prisons be kept as low as possible. Inmates were to be
subjected only to short formal interrogations and then to be
sent by the quickest route to concentration camps.
Preparations were to be made for total clearance of the
prisons should the situation at the front necessitate such
action. In the case of sudden emergency precluding the
evacuation of the prisoners, they were to be shot and their
bodies buried or otherwise disposed of, the buildings to be
dynamited, and so forth. In similar circumstances, the Jews
who were still employed in the armament industries or in
other work were to be dealt with in the same way. The
liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy was to be
avoided at all costs. (L-53)
(11) The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the seizure and
spoliation of public and private property. In connection
with the program for the mass extermination of Jews and
Communist functionaries, the GESTAPO and the SD seized all
personal effects of the persons executed or murdered. On the
eastern front the victims were required not only to give up
all their personal possessions, but even to remove their
outer garments prior to being murdered. (2620-PS)
In connection with the program of confiscation of
scientific, religious, and art archives and objects, an
agreement was entered into between Rosenberg and Heydrich,
under which the SD and Rosenberg were to cooperate closely
in the confiscation of public and private collections. (071-
PS)
(12) The GESTAPO and SD conducted third degree
interrogations. On 26 October 1939 an order to all GESTAPO
offices from the RSHA signed Mueller, "by order," in
referring to execution of protective custody during the war,
stated in part:
"In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of
the German Police will order flogging in addition to
detention in a concentration camp. Orders of this kind
will, in the future, also be transmitted to the State
Police District Office concerned. In this case, too,
there is no objection to spreading the rumour of this
increased punishment. ***" (1531-PS)
On 12 June 1942 the Chief of the Security Police and SD,
[Page 295]
through Mueller, published an order authorizing the use of
third degree methods in interrogating where preliminary
investigation indicates that the prisoner could give
information on important facts such as subversive
activities, but not to extort confessions of the prisoner's
own crimes. The order stated in part:
"*** 2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only
be employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah's
Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance
movements, parachute agents, anti-social elements,
Polish or Soviet-Russian loafers or tramps. In all
other cases, my permission must first be obtained.
"*** 4. Third degree can, according to the
circumstances, consist amongst other methods, of:
very simple diet (bread and water)
hard bunk
dark cell
deprivation of sleep
exhaustive drilling
also in flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor
must be consulted)." (1531-PS)
On 24 February 1944 the Kommandeur of the SIPO and SD for
the district Radom, "in view of the variety of methods used
to date in third-degree interrogations and in order to avoid
excesses," published an order issued by the BdS Cracow based
on regulations in force for the Reich which followed closely
the limitations laid down in the above decree of 12 June
1942. (L-89)
G. Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD Against Humanity.
The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the
persecution of the Jews. The persecution of the Jews under
the Nazi regime is a story of increasingly severe treatment,
beginning with restrictions, then seizure and spoliation of
property, commitment to concentration camps, deportation,
slave labor, and finally mass murder. The responsibility of
the GESTAPO and the SD for the mass extermination program
carried out by the Einsatz Groups of the SIPO and SD and in
the annihilation camps to which Jews were sent by the SIPO
and SD has already been considered. In this subdivision, the
place of the GESTAPO and SD in the development of this
persecution will be treated.
Section B of the SD dealt with problems of nationality,
including minorities race and national health, immigration,
and resettlement. Section B4 of the GESTAPO, headed by
Eichmann, dealt with Jewish affairs, including matters of
evacuation, means
[Page 296]
of suppressing enemies of the people and State, and
dispossession of rights of German citizenship. One of the
functions of the SD was to furnish information concerning
the Jews to the GESTAPO. One of the functions of the GESTAPO
was to carry out the Nazi program of persecution of the
Jews. (L-185; L-219)
The GESTAPO was charged with the enforcement of
discriminatory laws, such as those preventing Jews from
engaging in business, restricting their right to travel, and
prohibiting them from associating with gentiles. Violations
of such restrictions resulted in protective custody and
confinement in concentration camps by the GESTAPO. (L-217; L-
152; L-167.)
The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the GESTAPO
and the SD to supervise the anti-Jewish pogrom staged in
November 1938 following the von Rath incident in Paris. As
many Jews were to be arrested in all districts as the
available jail space would hold. Well-to-do Jews were to be
singled out for arrest, and primarily only healthy male
adults of not too advanced age. Immediately after completion
of the arrests, the competent concentration camp was to be
notified in order to provide for speediest transfer of Jews
to the camps. (3051-PS)
On 11 November 1938 Heydrich reported to Goering by secret
express letter on the results of the action as reported by
the GESTAPO. The report stated in part:
"*** The extent of the destruction of Jewish shops and
houses cannot yet be verified by figures. The figures
given in the reports: 815 shops destroyed, 171 dwelling
houses set on fire or destroyed, only indicate a
fraction of the actual damage caused, as far as arson
is concerned. Due to the urgency of the reporting, the
reports received to date are entirely limited to
general statements such as 'numerous' or 'most shops
destroyed.' Therefore the figures given must have been
exceeded considerably.
"191 synagogues were set on fire, and another 76
completely destroyed. In addition 11 parish halls,
[Gemeindehauser] cemetery chapels and similar buildings
were set on fire and 3 more completely destroyed.
"20,000 Jews were arrested, also 7 Aryans and
foreigners. The latter were arrested for their own
safety.
"36 deaths were reported and those seriously injured
were also numbered at 36. Those killed and injured are
Jews. One Jew is still missing. The Jews killed include
one Polish national, and-those injured include 2
Poles." (3058-PS)
On 31 July 1941 Goering sent the following order to the
Chief of the Security Police and SD, Heydrich:
[Page 297]
"Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24
January 1939, which dealt with arriving at a solution
of the Jewish problem through furtherance of emigration
and evacuation as advantageous as possible, I hereby
charge you with making all necessary preparations in
regard to organizational and financial matters for
bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish
question in the German sphere of influence in Europe."
(710-PS)
In February or March 1943, according to Gottfried Boley,
Ministerialrat in the Reich Chancery, a conference on the
solution of the Jewish problem, attended by representatives
of the ministries, was called by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of
the Security Police and SD. Boley states:
"The meeting was presided over by Eichmann who had
charge of Jewish problems in the GESTAPO. In his
opening remarks Eichmann referred to former conferences
that had taken place in the office of the Chief of the
Security Police and SD, and that on this occasion he
wished to discuss the matter in a more basic manner. He
stated that the Jewish question had to be solved in a
quick and proper way. Representatives of the Chief of
the Security Police and SD who attended the conference
made it clear to those present that the remaining Jews
had to be sent forcibly to concentration camps or be
sterilized. Those present at the conference must have
carried away the impression that the objectives were
the extermination of the Jewish people." (2645-PS)
The deportation of Jews into concentration camps was part of
the program for slave labor. Jews not fit for work were
screened out at extermination centers, such as Auschwitz,
and the remainder were taken into concentration and work
camps. The orders were issued by Himmler and passed through
the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner
(formerly Heydrich) to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, and
then to Eichmann for execution. (2376-PS; 147-PS.)
In Galicia, the deportation of Jews was carried out during
the period from April 1942 to June 1943. At the end of that
time Galicia had been entirely cleared of Jews. In all,
434,392 Jews were deported from Galicia alone. In connection
with the deportations Jewish property was confiscated,
including furniture, clothing, money, dental fillings, gold
teeth, wedding rings, and other personal property of all
kinds. The Security Police participated in this action along
with other police and SS detachments. (L-18)
In Warsaw the Security Police played a responsible role in
the
[Page 298]
segregation of the Jews and placing them in the Ghetto, in
the subsequent removal of the Jews to concentration camps,
and in the final clearance of the Ghetto. The Ghetto was
established in November of 1940. Over 300,000 Jews were
deported from it between July and October 1942, and 6,500
more were deported in January 1943. In April and May 1943
the final clearance of the Ghetto was accomplished under the
direction of the SS and Police Leader of the Warsaw area,
and with units of the SIPO, Waffen SS, Order Police, and
some military and Polish police units. Thousands of Jews
were killed in the action. About 7,000 were transported to
"T. II" where they were exterminated. The remaining 40,000
to 45,000 were placed in concentration camps.
In Denmark the Kommandeur of the SIPO and SD was ordered in
September of 1943 to arrest all Danish citizens of Jewish
belief and send them to Stettin by ship and from there to
the concentration camp at Theresienstadt. In spite of the
protests of the Kommander of the SIPO and SD, Kaltenbrunner
as Chief of the Security Police and SD gave direct orders to
carry out the anti-Jewish action. Eichmann, head of the
Jewish section in the GESTAPO, had direct charge of the
clearance program. (2375-PS)
In Hungary the deportation of Jews was again carried out by
Eichmann. This action took place under direction of the
GESTAPO after the German occupation of Hungary in March
1944. About 450,000 Jews were deported from Hungary due to
the pressure and direction of the GESTAPO. (2605-PS)
(2) The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the
persecution of the churches. The fight against the churches
was never brought out into the open by the GESTAPO and the
SD as in the case of the persecution of the Jews. The
struggle was designed to weaken the churches and to lay a
foundation for the ultimate destruction of the confessional
churches after the end of the war. (1815-PS)
Section C2 of the SD dealt with education and religious
life. Section B1 of the GESTAPO dealt with political
Catholicism. Section B2 with political Protestantism sects,
and Section B3 with other churches and Freemasonry. (L-185)
As early as 1934 the GESTAPO enforced restrictions against
the churches. An order by the State Police of Dusseldorf
prohibited the churches from engaging in public activities,
especially public appearances in groups, sports, hikes, and
the establishment of holiday or outdoor camps. (R-145)
In 1934 the Bavarian Political Police placed three ministers
in
[Page 299]
protective custody for refusing to carry out the order of
the Government to ring church bells on the occasion of the
death of Hindenburg. (1521-PS)
The GESTAPO dissolved those church organizations which it I
considered to have political objectives. In 1938 the GESTAPO
at Munich dissolved by order the Guild of the Virgin Mary of
the Bavarian dioceses. (1481-PS)
An insight into the hidden objectives and secret methods of
the GESTAPO and the SD in the fight against the churches is
disclosed in the file of the GESTAPO regional office at
Aachen (1816-PS). On 12 May 1941 the Chief of the GESTAPO
issued a directive in which he reported that the Chief of
the Security Police and SD had issued an order under which
the treatment of church politics which had theretofore been
divided between the SD and the GESTAPO was to be taken over
entirely by the GESTAPO. The SD "church specialists" were to
be temporarily transferred to the same posts in the GESTAPO
and operate an intelligence service in the church political
sphere there. SD files concerning such political opposition
were to be handed over to the GESTAPO, but the SD was to
retain material concerning the confessional influence on the
lives of the people.
On 22 and 23 September 1941 a conference of church
specialists attached to GESTAPO regional offices was held in
the lecture hall of the RSHA in Berlin. The notes on the
speeches delivered at this conference indicate that the
GESTAPO considered the church as an enemy to be attacked
with determination and "true fanaticism." The immediate
objective of the GESTAPO was stated to be to insure that the
Church did not win back any lost ground. The ultimate
objective was stated to be the destruction of the
confessional churches. This was to be brought about by the
collection of material through the GESTAPO church
intelligence system to be produced at a proper time as
evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the
German fight for existence.
The executive measures to be applied by the GESTAPO were
discussed. It was stated to be impractical to deal with
political offenses under normal legal procedure owing to
lack of political perception which prevailed among the legal
authorities. The so-called "agitator-Priests," therefore,
had to be handled by GESTAPO measures, and when necessary
removed to a concentration camp. The following punishments
were to be applied to priests according to individual
circumstances: warning, fine, forbidden to preach, forbidden
to remain in parish, forbidden all activity as priest, short-
term arrest, protective custody. Retreats, youth and
recreational camps, evening services, processions and pil-
[Page 300]
grimages were all to be forbidden on grounds of interfering
with the war effort, blackouts, overburdened transportation,
etc.
In executing this program close cooperation was required
between the GESTAPO and the SD. The study and treatment of
the Church in its opposition to the Nazi state was the
responsibility of the GESTAPO. The result of this treatment
of the Church in the sphere of "religious life" remained the
province of the SD. By these means the GESTAPO and the SD
carried on the struggle of the Nazi conspirators against the
Church.
H. Conclusion.
The evidence shows that the GESTAPO was created by Goering
in Prussia in April 1933 for the specific purpose of serving
as a police agency to strike down the actual and ideological
enemies of the Nazi regime, and that henceforward the
GESTAPO in Prussia and in the other States of the Reich
carried out a program of terror against all who were thought
to be dangerous to the domination of the conspirators over
the people of Germany. Its methods were utterly ruthless. It
operated outside the law and sent its victims to the
concentration camps. The term "GESTAPO" became the symbol of
the Nazi regime of force and terror.
Behind the scenes, operating secretly, the SD, through its
vast network of informants, spied upon the German people in
their daily lives, on the streets, in the shops, and even
within the sanctity of the churches.
The most casual remark of a German citizen might bring him
before the GESTAPO, where his fate and freedom were decided
without recourse to law. In this government, in which the
rule of law was replaced by a tyrannical rule of men, the
GESTAPO was the primary instrumentality of oppression.
The GESTAPO and the SD played an important part in almost
every criminal act of the conspiracy. The categories of
these crimes, apart from the thousands of specific instances
of torture and cruelty in policing Germany for the benefit
of the conspirators, indicate the extent of GESTAPO and SD
complicity.
The GESTAPO and SD fabricated the border incidents which
Hitler used as an excuse for attacking Poland.
Through the Einsatz Groups they murdered approximately
2,000,000 defenseless men, women, and children.
They removed Jews, political leaders, and scientists from
prisoner of war camps and murdered them.
[Page 301]
They took recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps
and murdered some of them.
The GESTAPO established and classified concentration camps
and sent millions of people into them for extermination and
slave labor.
The GESTAPO cleared Europe of the Jews and was responsible
for sending 4,000,000 Jews to their deaths in annihilation
camps.
The GESTAPO and SD rounded up hundreds of thousands of
citizens of occupied countries and shipped them to Germany
for forced labor, and sent slave laborers to labor
reformatory camps and concentration camps for disciplining.
They executed captured commandos and paratroopers and
protected civilians who lynched Allied flyers.
They took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for
secret trial and punishment.
They arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied
territories under special criminal procedures which did not
accord them fair trials, and by summary methods.
They murdered or sent to concentration camps the relatives
of persons who had allegedly committed crimes.
They ordered the murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons
to prevent their release by the Allied armies.
They participated in the seizure and spoliation of public
and private property.
They were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews
and of the churches.
In carrying out these crimes the GESTAPO operated as an
organization, closely centralized and controlled from Berlin
headquarters. Reports were submitted to Berlin, and all
important decisions emanated from Berlin. The regional
offices had only limited power to commit persons to
concentration camps. All cases, other than those of short
duration, had to be submitted to Berlin for approval. From
1943 to the end of the war the defendant Kaltenbrunner was
the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin. The
GESTAPO was organized on a functional basis. Its principal
divisions dealt with the groups and institutions against
which it committed the worst crimes -- Jews, churches,
communists, and political liberals. Thus, in perpetrating
these crimes, the GESTAPO acted as an entity, each section
performing its part in the general criminal enterprises
ordered by Berlin. It must be held responsible as an entity.
The SD was at all times a department of the SS. Its
criminality directly concerns and contributes to the
criminality of the SS.
As to the GESTAPO, it is submitted that:
1. The GESTAPO is an organization, in the sense in which
that term is used in Article 9 of the Charter.
[Page 302]
2. The defendants Goering and Kaltenbrunner committed the
crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter in their capacity
as members and leaders of the GESTAPO.
3. The GESTAPO, as an organization, participated in and
aided the conspiracy which contemplated and involved the
commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the
Charter.
In 1941, on German Police Day, Heydrich, the former Chief of
the Security Police and the SD, said:
"Secret State Police, Criminal Police, and SD are still
adorned with the furtive and whispered secrecy of a
political detective story. In a mixture of fear and
shuddering -- and yet at home with a certain feeling of
security because of their presence -- brutality,
inhumanity bordering on the sadistic, and ruthlessness
are attributed abroad to the men of this profession."
(Extract from a brochure on Reinhard Heydrich,
published in December 1943.)
The evidence as it is submitted, shows that brutality,
inhumanity, sadism, and ruthlessness were characteristic of
the GESTAPO and that it was and should be declared, a
criminal organization, in accordance with article 9 of the
Charter.
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